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DIE GLOCKE 38th Issue December 16, 1916 Year 2. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source information is permitted. Determined to fight and ready for peace! It was a great moment when the German Chancellor, on Tuesday, December 12, extended the hand of peace to the enemy in the name of the allied Central Powers. Central Europe was able to unite in this decision not because it knew it was defeated, but on the contrary, because it felt strong and victorious. The peace proposals that the Central Powers are prepared to make to their opponents are not based on unbridled plans of conquest, but solely on the preservation of the existence, honor, and freedom of development of their countries. If the enemy rejects this offer to enter into peace negotiations, then the responsibility for the further horrific slaughter falls on it. It will reject it. It would be foolish and disastrous to deceive ourselves: Lloyd George, who will have developed his political program shortly after the German Chancellor, cannot take on Balaam's role and preach peace when it is meant to lead to war. And the irresponsible-responsible men in Paris and Rome will not wave the olive branch tomorrow or the day after. Although the Chancellor's speech will not have any immediate practical effect, it is nevertheless one of the most humanly welcome and politically wisest steps he has ever taken. The more certain it is that immediate success is denied it, the more certain it will be of success in the near future. One can already see the days approaching when the war-38/1 p. 402 (422) 402 Determined to fight and ready for peace! Politicians on the Seine and Thames will collapse under the terrible burden of their responsibility. If they fail to bring their peoples the promised triumph by crushing Germany in a very short time, they will have reached the end of their rope, and this end would merely be their own moral collapse. The step taken by the united Central Powers, the meaning of which the Chancellor summed up in the happy words: determined to fight and ready for peace, will strengthen the masses of the people in the Entente countries, who are also suffering terribly from the fury of war, in their efforts for peace and will make the work of the warmongers more difficult. It is precisely these elements who will find the offer of peace extremely fatal and inconvenient. For how could they now rekindle the collapsing morale of their peoples? On what grounds should they demand these new terrible sacrifices from them? A wedge has now been driven deeper and deeper into these peoples still at war with us, a wedge that will penetrate deeper and deeper, ultimately shattering the warlike unity of the nations and removing the rule of the warmongers from their necks. The attitude of the Reichstag after this speech was peculiarly characteristic. Once again, the extreme right and the extreme left united, perhaps not directly protesting the Central Powers' peace offer, but

nevertheless raising various objections. And so the Cloverleaf, Westarp, Bassermann, and Ledebour, united in opposing the majority's motion to adjourn the Reichstag. It does no harm; it may even be useful if foreign countries learn that influential circles of the German people, such as the conservatives and the liberal imperialists, are by no means unconditionally in agreement with the Central Powers' move, because they expect more and hope to be able to achieve more. But the fact that the Ledebour group also had to side with them was bitter and had a slightly comical effect. They believed they had to uphold the "dignity of parliament." By what means? By speeches! At the very moment when the Reich Chancellor has to make social democratic p. 403 (423) Twilight of the Gods. 403 policy and delivers a speech that a spokesman for social democracy would not have delivered essentially differently, these gentlemen feel the need to speak in order to give the impression through speeches that they are making history! What does Marx say about parliamentary cretinism? First of all, the step taken by the central powers is nothing other than a demonstration, albeit one of tremendous force. As such, however, it had to be brief. The call has been made. Let us await the echo. It will not fail to come. Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: DE Twilight of the Gods of War. The war has entered its final, great phase. In England and Russia, the change of ministers is complete; in France, it is imminent. In all three countries and in Italy, we have once again heard the wildest war talk. People are preparing for the decisive, gigantic effort that is supposed to squeeze the last breath out of every man and finally overthrow the Central Powers. There is no talk of any willingness to make peace. But this determined will to war does not arise from the certain conviction that victory is as good as in our hands. On the contrary! The recent, tremendous successes of our troops in Romania have, for the first time, awakened doubts about this victory, even in England. Even in England, where the conviction of a victorious outcome to this war was so self-evident that for a long time it was not taken seriously at all and was actually fought with only half-strength. Quite different from France, where the terrible danger of a united Germany under arms was more correctly assessed from the outset, and where only the hysterical shrieks of a worthless press overshadowed the people's deep longing for peace; quite different also from Russia, where one has never been able to shake off a secret horror of the sinister German, who can do anything and for whom nothing is impossible, and where only confidence in the strength of the English friend and the supposed weakness of the Austro-Hungarian enemy made the risk of this war possible. Therefore, the change of minister in England is the event that overshadows all other events in enemy territory. It is possible, indeed probable, that Briand, too, will have to

go. There's a flaw in his vote of confidence, which the Chamber issued after days of secret deliberations. When the Chamber delivered its verdict on the cabinet on June 22nd, following a secret session, the priority of the agenda approved by the government was adopted by 454 votes to 89; this time the vote was 295 to 117. In this decisive vote, around 150 deputies abstained, thereby declaring that they had no particular interest in the survival of the Briand cabinet. The resolution of confidence itself then received 344 votes to 160, with approximately 50 abstentions. Since June, the loss of confidence in Briand has been considerable. When the then Viviani Ministry put forward the vote of confidence in October of last year, it won, similar to Briand's now, by 303 votes to 190. Two weeks later, it was a corpse. Highly characteristic in this crisis is the attitude of the French government socialists, who are already preparing to abandon the sinking ship. As is well known, they have so far delighted in the lyrical gesture of protesting against "wars of conquest," although they described the planned conquest of Alsace-Lorraine as a "reconquest" that was entirely in keeping with the international fraternity of socialism. The proof presented by the German Chancellor on October 9 in the main committee of the Reichstag that this war was planned and waged by the Entente as a pure war of conquest, since England and France had already granted Russia territorial control over Constantinople, the Bosporus, and the p. 405 (425) Twilight of War. 405 the western bank of the Dardanelles with its hinterland and the division of Asia Minor among the Entente powers – this evidence received little attention in the socialist press. But Trepov's massive speech, in which he plainly announced the Entente's program of conquest, as established by an agreement between the Entente governments in 1915, from the rostrum of the Russian Duma – at least insofar as it related to certain Russian war aims – put an end to all further hiding. Naturally, the French Social Democrats were fully informed of these plans of conquest; for they had had several members in the ministry since 1914. But that did not prevent them from asserting in the most virtuous voices that they were against all desires for conquest. This inherently false position of the French party leaders is also the true reason for their attitude toward the German party, which heaped excessive insults upon them, thereby successfully achieving their secret intention of thwarting any rapprochement. They could count on the fact that in the "scientific central organ" of German Social Democracy, the so-called "Neue Zeit," a few lackeys were always ready to keep their wardrobes clean and, at the same time, accept the systematic denigration of the German party with the "silence of the penitent Brahmin" as a just act of God. Nevertheless, the excellent Renaudel felt compelled to unleash a few embarrassing phrases against Trepov's intention to "destroy

Germany" in his "Humanité," even though this Russian war aim had always been completely in line with that of the French government and its socialist accomplices. Viviani's call: Fight without end! Revenge! was expressly adopted by the French Socialists. We state this without any intention of making a moral accusation against them, which is not our concern at all. The war has taught us sufficiently what we have to expect from the French Social Democrats. p. 406 (426) 406 Twilight of the Gods of War. But let us do it in order to be able to draw a conclusion about the mental state of France and the fragility of the Briand Ministry from the clearly noticeable disintegration of the Socialist elements. -- But Briand may fall sooner or later: the hallmark of the world political situation is the collapse of the Asquith Ministry. A Lloyd George Ministry is taking its place. With this, England has documented in the most abrupt way imaginable its decision to continue the war until Germany's destruction. The brutal manner in which this ministerial change took place is evidence of the terribly irritable, not to say nervous, mood that had taken hold in London. It was recognized that victory for England could never be achieved with the previous method of waging war, but rather that England itself would ultimately be unthinkable; that would be like doubting the existence of God! Nevertheless, nothing had been achieved. The Somme was a failure; Romania, which was supposed to seal the decision, had been greeted by the Central Powers as a deliverance from deep distress. In any case, a big line had been drawn in the blockade's calculations. Above all, the activity of the German U-boats increased England's embarrassment and almost threatened to make the mistress of the seas feel all the trials of the blockade herself. The food problem became difficult; with poor harvests almost all over the world, one had to prepare for the worst in the spring. Moreover, the fleet did not live up to expectations. Germany was rearming and had just given proof of its spirit and strength with the passage of the National Auxiliary Service Bill. Lloyd George felt his moment had come, and within a few days he had sent his liberal colleagues into retirement like a couple of invalid hospital cripples and taken over the reins of England's destiny himself. It was a moment of historic magnitude, and it was no coincidence that the daily press awakened the memory of Cromwell, the great Puritan and Lord Protector. England is now gathering all its strength in the great Welshman; for it now finally knows that this war is about England's fate. The great despot and world tyrant is determined to stake everything on maintaining his world domination, and he is clear that things are different for him than for his opponent. For England, there can be no draw in this war, precisely because it is a world war. If it does not win, it is defeated. The opposite is true for Germany. If it is not defeated, it has won. This is

ultimately the reason for the opposing attitudes of the two countries towards the question of peace. Germany is always ready to negotiate; England can only dictate peace. England thus finds itself in a much greater predicament than Germany. And it is only obeying this coercion when it leads hundreds of thousands of its sons to the slaughter at the Somme, when it turns England's entire social system upside down and borrows from socialism and the German model. State power, which for centuries had been weak to maintain, the core and star of English culture and the English worldview, has become all-powerful overnight and has undermined personal freedom, that palladium of the English. Lloyd George is determined to follow this path to its conclusion. In him, English state power has achieved a force and concentration like never before. He is the new Lord Protector. His dictatorship means the collapse of English liberalism. With it, a cultural era will perish that shone for centuries and that gave humanity values that are among the best it possesses: personal freedom and a free personality. They will not disappear with it, but will blossom more fully and freshly in the new cultural soil of a socialized society toward which we are moving. Thus, it is no coincidence that Lloyd George composes his cabinet mainly of Conservatives and workers and that he begins his work by announcing his intention to place shipping companies and mines under state supervision and to equip a food dictator with the most far-reaching powers. The Liberals are holding back. They p. 408 (428) 408 Twilight of the War Gods. They have declared that they will pose no obstacles to his conduct of the war. But here lies the weak point of the new cabinet. A goal such as England must now pursue can only be achieved if the entire nation stands united and with utter devotion behind its leader. It is not enough if 40 percent of the population, which is how many Liberal and other opponents of Lloyd George will amount to, "make no obstacles." In the House of Lords, the new Prime Minister will encounter the same cold disdain that he aroused there years ago when he finalized his "socialist budget" with his massive attacks on the English aristocracy. And whether Lloyd George will be able to secure the long-term support of the workers, which he received only by a very narrow majority, is more than questionable. The hard times that lie ahead for the English proletariat, especially this winter and spring, will be a severe test of patience for these politically backward masses. And if the Minister makes energetic interventions in English economic life to secure better living conditions for them and their sympathy for himself, there is a danger that he will thereby antagonize other social classes. The end result will be social unrest, with which England will feel firsthand the shaking of its world position. The probability of social upheaval and revolution is no less great in England than

in Russia. But first and foremost, Lloyd George has promised his Englishmen victory. He will fight for them with the energy and organizational talent of which he has often demonstrated. And he will fight in vain; For the victory that England needs and can only need, the crushing victory that brings it to its knees, such as it achieved in 1815 with the help of the Prussians, it will never be able to achieve. And only when the England of Lloyd George, the England of the utmost and wildest determination to win, must refrain from fighting, only then will England be ripe for peace. The times are quickly fulfilling, and we may hope that it will soon wear out. p. 409 (429) The Rally of Organized Workers. 409 will be the new Protector of England, who also reminds us of the great Puritan in that the former brought about the beginning of English world domination, the latter its collapse. WILHELM JANSSON: The Rally of Organized Workers. For the first time, the entirety of Germany's union-organized workers and employees has raised its voice at a joint conference. What no one could have even dreamed of before the war became a living reality on December 12, 1916, born out of the common wartime hardship of the entire people. All groups of the trade union organizations of workers and employees, who wanted independent representation of their interests, independent of employers, sent around 700 of their representatives to Berlin to discuss the implementation of the Compulsory Service Law and to express their determination to support their sons and brothers at the front through energetic work at home. The Reich government did not stay away from this parliament of labor. Dr. Helfferich and his councilors were present in person, and the head of the new War Office, Lieutenant General Gröner, did not miss the opportunity to establish direct contact with those here whose cooperation is indispensable for solving the tasks posed by the new law. Helfferich also expressed this clearly and unequivocally in his welcoming speech . The cooperation of the workers' organizations had been the government's wish from the beginning; it was necessary if the goal was to be achieved. The government appealed not only to the goodwill and patriotism, but also to the expertise and practical experience of the unions represented at the conference. And Mr. Gröner spoke of the necessity of meeting each other with the greatest trust, so that when the law is repealed one month after the end of the war, we can say that we have done a good, sensible job. There are people who, as a matter of principle, pay no attention to statements from the government table, and in the present case, too, one cannot make them see reason. But they cannot erase the fact that the unionized workforce today represents a power factor in Germany, whose importance in the Reich's struggle for survival the Reich government openly acknowledges before the world. And that is the second

gain this conference has brought us. Social Democratic, Christian, Hirsch-Duncker unions, and the working groups of the various commercial and technical employee associations have jointly declared their willingness to implement the Auxiliary Service Law in support of the German armies, which, far from their homeland, are fighting for the existence of the Reich, which is also the existence of the workers. The will of the conference is expressed in the following unanimously adopted resolution: "The representatives of approximately four million organized workers and employees, gathered on December 12 in the "Germania Halls" in Berlin, declare their willingness to cooperate to the best of their ability in the implementation of the law on patriotic auxiliary service. The popular classes represented by the organizations of workers and employees are prepared to unite and put all their strength at the service of our country so that the annihilation plans of Germany's enemies remain unsuccessful. Those gathered expect the Reich government and the War Office to extensively support the legitimate efforts of workers and employees to achieve better wages and working conditions, as well as to safeguard the right to form coalitions. They demand a stricter crackdown on profiteering for foodstuffs and a better distribution of the available foodstuffs, so that the working population can meet the demands placed on it. This unanimous declaration by the Conference of Trade Unions of all stripes is at the same time an expressive commentary on the peace offer made by the German government and its allies on the same day by the Chancellor in the Reichstag. Foreign countries must conclude from this that, however strongly the German working class supports peace, it is equally determined to participate in the continuation of the war to its happy conclusion, i.e., until the opponents are ready for peace. Speculation on the disunity of the German people is speculation in worthless paper, whose final devaluation was accomplished before the whole world by the workers' demonstration of December 12. HEINRICH CUNOW: New Writings of Marx and Engels.[1] A 1. Revisionism and Vulgar Marxism. LS Towards the end of the last century, revisionism raised its head within German Social Democracy, and Eduard Bernstein entered the arena with his "Prerequisites of Socialism" to As a bold espionage leader, who launched a fatal blow against the false "prognoses" of Marx's theory of evolution, liberal critics wanted to see in this "a crisis of Marxism" that must logically end with its collapse. A strange, albeit understandable overestimation of the revisionist movement at that time, given certain traditional illusions of liberalism. Bernstein's revisionist critique could not be considered a crisis of Marxism, if only because this revision was not at all [1] Collected Writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1852 to 1862. Edited with introductions and commentaries by N. Ryazanoff.

2 volumes. Published by JHW Dietz Nachf. G. mb H., Stuttgart 1917. Price per volume 8 marks paperback, 9.25 marks hardback. p. 412 (432) 412 New Writings of Marx and Engels. It was not a theoretical dispute within Marxism itself, but merely a reaction by certain party elements stuck in petty-bourgeois democracy or individualistic-liberal intellectualism, and a reaction directed less against the (if one may so call it) original Marxism of Marx himself than against Kautsky's Marx scholasticism. Bernstein's revisionism was insufficient from the outset to constitute a scientific critique of Marxism, since Bernstein lacked any ability to grasp Marx's theories in their temporal context and their historical position in the development of social philosophy. He therefore contented himself with doubting the correctness of certain so-called Marxist views on the rapidity of capital and industrial concentrations, class antagonisms, the effects of crises, etc., on the basis of superficial observations and statistical groupings, and with grafting onto the remaining residue of his Marxism, as a substitute for what had been eliminated, all sorts of views from radical-liberal English social theory, which he had acquired on English soil with extraordinary capacity for acclimatization. Marxism, however, could not be overcome in this way, even in its Kautskyian vulgarization. Theoretically, Bernsteinian revisionism achieved absolutely nothing, especially since several of its finest deductions were very quickly refuted by economic developments. For example, his beautiful hypothesis that, due to the spatial expansion of the world market, the shortening of the time required for communications and transport, the enormous increase in wealth, etc., "general business crises of the earlier type are to be regarded as improbable, at least for a longer period of time." The fact that Bernstein's revisionism soon proved theoretically inadequate did not, however, eliminate the mistrust of the party-official vulgar Marxism that had gradually developed under Kautsky's influence and was applied to the current issues arising in the political struggle; for many of the formulas, justifications, and predictions borrowed from this vulgar Marxism were in fact consistent with the facts of social development. in all too striking disproportion. Thus, the inability of revisionism to overcome the alleged Marxist errors and to replace them with another theory only led to the result that those who did not recognize the true character of the theoretical quid pro quo reluctantly turned away from the so-called "theoretical spin" and, following a popular recipe, summarily declared all theory to be gray. In other words: revisionism fled from the realm of theory into everyday political practice. Strangely enough, revisionism, insofar as it has as an amalgamation of Marxist thought with English-liberal social views, has many points of contact with German eclectic vulgar Marxism, for this, too, by interpreting Marxist theories in the

sense of a democratic-individualistic social philosophy, achieved a mixture of Marxist and radical-liberal views, except that the relevant variety of revisionism exhibits a certain English-liberal character, while vulgar Marxism, on the other hand, shimmers with Rousseauist-Blanquist. Despite certain differences, Kautsky and Bernstein are indeed affinities in their fundamental outlook, just as they once, as intellectual dioscuri of official party theory, spun the same theoretical threads for a long time without noticing their differences. It is therefore quite natural that after the outbreak of the current World War they soon found common ground again in their ideology—to which, of course, their mutual admiration for England's political way of life may also have contributed a great deal. Fundamentally, this rediscovery is something logical, as it is also quite understandable that those intellectuals who only recently joined the Social Democratic Party in recent years, and who until recently had fiercely opposed socialism in the National Socialist or liberal-democratic camp, have without further ado joined the Kautsky-Bernstein movement, for they find there, disguised as Marxist, part of that complex of social-theoretical ideas which once drew them to liberal radicalism. The theoretical discord that has become increasingly acute within the Social Democratic Party since the beginning of the war is fundamentally different from Bernstein's revision of Marx. It signifies a genuine crisis of Marxism, for today we are actually dealing with a profound division within the Marxist ranks themselves, an internal countermovement directed against Kautsky's interpretation of Marxism, which does not seek a way out in a return to an outdated liberal-individualist ideology, but rather, starting from Marx's fundamental views, seeks to transcend Kautsky's vulgar Marxism and achieve a real-political understanding of contemporary problems by applying Marxist methods. For the time being, however, the war is still hindering this theoretical regeneration by, on the one hand, pushing to the forefront all sorts of current issues, interests, and momentary moods that demand solution, and, on the other, by creating pressure conditions that hinder the necessary freedom of discussion. But if the Social Democratic Party is not to fall into a state of complete intellectual stagnation, the acquisition of a new theoretical foundation is absolutely necessary. One cannot combat the theories of hostile parties without countering them with a solid theory of one's own. - 11. The New Marx-Engels Edition. This overcoming of vulgar Marxism, however, is only possible if one returns to the true foundations of Marx's teachings and demonstrates the erroneous interpretations and conclusions of the popular interpretation of Marx. p. 415 (435) New Writings of Marx and Engels. 415 It must therefore be recognized as a commendable achievement of the JHW Dietz publishing house that, despite the unfavorable

current conditions burdening the German book trade, it has agreed to publish two strong new volumes of collected writings by Marx and Engels, which have the potential to contribute significantly to destroying the Marx legends that have arisen in recent decades and to replacing the legendary Marx with the real Marx. These two volumes do not contain any genuine theoretical articles or treatises, although individual statements by Marx point to his distinction between society and state, between social and constitutional law. What the new collection offers are mostly political and economic articles on England and English politics, the Oriental Question and the Russo-Turkish War of 1853/55, the Spanish Revolution, Pan-Slavism, the English military system, etc. Some of these articles and essays were previously completely unknown, such as: For example, the first 23 articles from the "New York Tribune" (1852/53), which Ryazanoff compiled in the first volume under the title "Letters on England." Other articles have been published earlier, such as the essays on the Eastern Question, Palmerston, and the Crimean War. But until now, they had only been found in English collected editions, primarily in "The Eastern Question : A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856, Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War by Karl Marx," published in London in 1897 by Eleanor Marx-Aveling and Edward Aveling, and in "Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston," published in 1899. But even these essays and reports, which had previously appeared in English, were not simply translated into German and included in his new edition. Rather, he has carefully compared the articles in the "Eastern Question" on the Oriental Question and the Crimean War with the originals in the "New York Tribune" and has come to the conclusion that a whole series of the reports contained in the "Eastern Question," at least 19, do not originate from Marx and Engels at all (many articles, especially the leading articles written by Marx, appeared anonymously) or have been so considerably reworked by the New York editorial staff that they can no longer be considered the intellectual products of Marx or Engels, while on the other hand, important articles are missing from the collection edited by Eleanor Marx-Aveling or have been included in a very mutilated form. In addition to such articles and correspondence from the "New York Tribune" and the Chartist "People's Paper," the second volume of the new collection contained a series of correspondence articles for the democratic "Neue Oder-Zeitung," which in 1854 had come into the possession of Max Friedländer, a cousin of Lassalle, Julius Stein, and Moritz Elsner. Like the articles in the "Tribune," these essays mostly relate to the situation and history of England; the course of the Crimean War also receives extensive consideration. In some respects, these articles are even more interesting than those written for the "New York Tribune"; for Marx imposes

less constraint on himself in his Oder-Zeitung articles than in his reports to the "Tribune," which were intended for a larger American readership. His judgment is fresher and more ruthless. He follows the moods and thoughts that his observation of English political life triggers in him. In addition to these articles on English warfare, the fall of the Aberdeen Ministry, the Palmerston Ministry, the English parliamentary proceedings, and conditions in the British Army, the second volume contains nine articles on the Spanish Revolution, which Marx wrote for the "New York Tribune" from August 19 to December 2, 1854: the fruit of a thorough study of Spanish history since the days of the great French Revolution. p. 417 (437) New Writings by Marx and Engels. 417 III. Marx and Engels on English Politics. Marx was nothing less than an Anglomaniac. Several statements in his correspondence with Engels (Correspondence between Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx 1844 to 1883. 4 volumes. JHW Dietz Nachf., Stuttgart 1913) provide drastic evidence of this. Likewise, Engels's who, as an industrialist, had become acquainted with the English industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and, as his 1845 work on the condition of the working classes in England amply demonstrates, had studied the English industrial working class in detail. Both Marx and Engels, while seeing England in the 1850s as the most economically and, in a certain sense, politically advanced country in the world, by no means misjudged the strongly conservative trend, the habitual adherence to old, outdated state institutions, that left its mark on English social life. And in England's then global economic position, its capital monopoly, they saw a factor hindering the social development of continental Europe: a view that had already led Marx to remark in 1848 in the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" (article: "French and English Class Struggles") that the more England's capital monopoly increased, the more the western parts of Europe "'to the level of proletarians in comparison with the all-absorbing English bourgeoisie'." Marx himself was completely free of that peculiar uncritical infatuation with English ways of life, which we find in so many of Marx's epigones. The tendency to view English conditions exclusively through English glasses never captivated him. Already in the letters on England included in the first volume (the majority of which, incidentally, were written by Engels in agreement with Marx), not only the political conditions, but also the economic situation, financial policy, and working-class conditions in England are sharply criticized. In fact, the new liberalism of the so-called middle class (the free traders and Manchesterites, financial reformers, etc.) comes off the worst in Marx's critique. Their arguments and programs are dismissed with derision. Engels, for example, characterizes their business liberalism (Volume 1, p. 6) as follows: "The party that officially represents modern English society, the England that dominates

the world market, is the free traders (the Manchester men, the parliamentary and financial reformers). They represent the party of the self-confident bourgeoisie, of industrial capital, which seeks to exploit its social power as political power and to eradicate the last haughty remnants of feudal society. The leaders of this party are recruited from the most active and energetic section of the English bourgeoisie, the manufacturers. What they demand is unrestricted, undisguised supremacy of the bourgeoisie, open, official subjection of the whole of society to the laws of modern bourgeois production and to the rule of those men who direct this production." They understand free trade as the unrestricted movement of capital, freed from all political, national, and religious constraints. Land should be a salable commodity and can be exploited according to general commercial laws. There should be food manufacturers, just as there are yarn and cotton manufacturers, and the landlords should disappear." This sharp assessment of the new liberalism of the time, which went beyond the conservative liberalism of the Whigs and Peelites, is, of course, significantly influenced by the view of Marx and Engels that, now that the corn tariff had been abolished and the free trade system had achieved its breakthrough, the Tories would soon be ruined. The very near future could bring the followers of Cobden, Bright, etc. to power. Both, with keen foresight, recognized the path of development that England actually embarked on later in the second half of the nineteenth century, but in their revolutionary impatience to move forward, they overestimated the speed of England's capitalist development, just as they had overestimated the economic maturity of Germany and France in 1849/50, so too here. Therefore, Marx viewed the Tories as a party that was already essentially historically defunct, while, as is well known, after the first Derby ministry, they immediately as a conservative reform party again a p. 419 (439) New writings by Marx and Engels. 419 However, they only achieved an outstanding position by reforming themselves under Disraeli's influence and adapting to the changed circumstances. Marx and Engels were particularly unimpressed by the peace gospel of the phrase-mongering "Manchester Gang." As a sociologist, Marx never had much use for ordinary English pacifism. The peace gospel of English liberal radicalism appeared to him merely as a reflection of the particular expansion needs of English commercial capital, as stated in an article in the "Tribune" of February 18, 1853 (Volume I, p. 84): "It would be a great error to assume that the peace gospel of the Manchester School has any deep philosophical significance. It simply states that the feudal method of warfare should be replaced by the mercantile method—cannons by capital." Marx has nothing in common with the English-liberal nothing-but-pacifism that is now

cherished in the circles of certain Marx interpreters. He is by no means a war fanatic, but nevertheless too well-versed in the history of human development not to know what role war has temporarily played in this history as a revolutionary factor. When, after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, the Cobdenites in England developed a vigorous peace agitation and sought to prevent England from declaring war on Russia, they and their leader Cobden, about whose business connections with Russia Marx has all sorts of pleasant things to say, were met with poisonous ridicule: "The great 'Reform Meeting' in Manchester," says a correspondence dated January 27, 1854, in the "New York Tribune" was launched and was a real humbug, as the Englishman rightly remarks. The few commonplaces that form the regular inventory of the Manchester School in foreign policy: the glorification of Aberdeen's policy, the denigration of Turkey, and the rejection of all interference with foreign states, were once again widely trodden on by Messrs. Cobden, Bright, and the other "plain and simple" gentlemen who want a "man of peace" in the War Office and a "brakeman" in the House of Lords who will sell out the English and undercut the other nations." 38/2* p. 420 (440) 420 New Writings by Marx and Engels. And not only English politics, which is sharply attacked primarily in the letters on Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, challenges Marx's satire, but also the so-called liberal institutions of England, such as parliamentary and party rule, the government system, the Electoral movements, etc., are disrespectfully criticized, sometimes with interesting flashbacks to England's earlier history. For example, English electoral corruption is sharply castigated in a "Tribune" article of August 20, 1852. In Engels' view, it is not only the election at that time that presents such an extremely disgusting picture—it has always been so in Old England: "Election days in England have always been bacchanalia of drunken debauchery, the usual stock exchange dates, where political convictions are discounted, the richest harvest time for tavern keepers." And the lack of judgment of the lower classes of the English people, associated with corruption, is described as follows: "The sanctuary of the Delphic priestesses had to be fogged with vapors so that they could find their oracles. The British people must fog themselves with brandy and porter in order to be able to Oracles, the legislators, to be found." After the outbreak of the Crimean War, especially after England's participation in the fighting, criticisms of English warfare and the English military system took up a large space in the correspondence. Most of these articles appeared in the "Neue Oderzeitung" and were written by Engels or at least inspired by him. He had been studying military science for years, while Marx never seems to have given it much thought. Some of the criticisms of that time are now worth

renewed attention, as German troops confront massed English armies on French soil, even though much has naturally changed since the Crimean War. Engels considers the individual English soldier to be quite capable and brave, but strategic leadership to be deficient, and the internal organization of the English military to be downright absurd. In particular, the departmental division and the provisioning of the British armies (in the letters of January 5 and 6, 1855, to the "Neue Oderzeitung") are treated quite derisively. More important than the critique of English political life, however, today, when a complete transformation of the political situation in the Orient is imminent, appears the position of Marx and Engels on the Balkan problem. This will be dealt with in a second article. JOSEF KLICHE: Something more about the soldiers' newspapers. Following on from the article "The German Field Press" (No. 37 of the "Glocke"), a few more remarks will be made here about the most important German field newspapers. Currently, about a dozen field newspapers are published on behalf of divisions and army corps. Worth mentioning here are the newspaper of the 8th Landwehr Division, the "Messenger in the Sundgau," which features a good caricature supplement; the "War Newspaper of the 14th Infantry Division," the "Baranovichi War Newspaper," published by a division of the Woyrsch Army Detachment; the "Schützengraben" of the 54th Division; the aforementioned "Zwischen Maas und Mosel" (Between Meuse and Moselle); the "Grabenbote" of the 11th Army Corps; the "Schützengraben" of the 14th Reserve Corps; the "War Newspaper for the 15th Army Corps," the "Champagne War Newspaper" of the 8th Reserve Corps, which has now established a legal information center for its readers, both oral and written; and the "War Newspaper of the Marshal's Corps" of the Imperial German Southern Army, which combines German and Austrian troops. This newspaper published some very interesting pictures some time ago. from the Carpathians, which the well-known Worpswede resident Heinrich Vogeler, who had participated in the Carpathian battles, put at his disposal. And finally, among other publications, the youngest addition to the green line of corps papers , the Marine Corps' war newspaper "On Flanders Coast." A very interesting paper in terms of text and graphics. All of these papers place little emphasis on reporting. They are intended solely for entertainment and instruction, often geological and geographical in their area of publication. "You will learn about major events in the world from the newspapers that are sent to you. "Here in our paper, we shall mainly include events taken from our current, more intimate life," wrote Divisional Commander Baron von Watter in the foreword to the first issue of the organ of the 54th Infantry Division. The above-mentioned naval newspaper expressed this view more drastically, writing in the lead poem of

its first issue that it did not want to report on "how much chicory costs in Saxony now and whether the virgins are already rusting at home." The army newspapers represent the highest level of soldier's papers. They are mostly produced in large factories in the rear echelons and usually have quite high circulation figures. However, we would like to point out that the circulation figure is by no means identical to the quality of the paper. A small battalion paper can be as valuable as it is—because it is only distributed for a fee and lacks widespread advertising—it will remain unknown and have a low circulation, which is, after all, only the intention. Army newspapers are almost always delivered free of charge to members of the respective army, twice or three times a week, while the former appear only weekly, some only fortnightly. Whether the paper is popular with readers cannot be determined from the circulation figures, especially since the newspaper is distributed through official channels. We would like to mention, however, that today hardly any newspaper is in a position to regularly deliver a copy to every member of the respective army. That would be technically difficult. The resulting reduction in the circulation of the "War Newspaper of the 7th Army" demonstrates how the paper shortage is also making itself felt here. While this was initially 40,000, it is now only 33,000. The first army newspaper to become known was the "Liller Kriegszeitung," founded on December 8, 1914. Since the two well-known writers Höcker and Ompteda, both captains in rank, along with the Simplicissimus cartoonist Arnold, represented the editorial staff, the name of the paper soon became widely known. Ompteda later left the editorial team, which was replaced by Weiglin and Friedel Merzenich, the first and, for the time being, only woman in a field editorial team. The Liller Blatt appears three times a week with a circulation of 80,000 copies. p. 423 (443) Something else about the soldiers' newspapers. 423 Also worth mentioning are the special publications "Lille in German Hands" produced in his company. (October 1915), Arnold's "War Leaflets" album (December 1915), then the three "excerpts" from the newspaper published at six-month intervals, and finally the "Lustige Büchel" published in the summer of 1916 and the "Feldsoldatensang in Flandern" (Field Soldiers' Song in Flanders) followed in the fall. It should be emphasized that the "Liller," considered the newspaper of the 6th Army, contains a great deal of original work. Like the "Liller," the newspaper of the 4th Army is now also produced in a well-run factory using high-speed presses. Its first 132 issues were not granted such a favorable fate, but nevertheless, for nine months it has been published twice a week with a circulation of 25,000 copies. Today, this figure has increased considerably. The weekly "Loose Pages" included with it offer excellent coverage, particularly of Belgian architectural monuments . Three

times a week, like the "Liller," the newspaper of the 2nd Army appears in St. Quentin, and its 100th and 200th issues are published in festive print. Its circulation is 20,000. The only news bulletin is the "Field Newspaper of the 5th Army," while the more entertaining "Watch in the East," the organ of the 12th Army, is more entertaining. Very noteworthy are the "Newspaper of the 10th Army" and the "Army Newspaper Scholtz," both produced in Vilna and essentially featuring the same text. They appear three times a week in eight- to ten-page sections, have an illustrated supplement, the "Spotlight," and are the only two soldiers' newspapers that, in addition to the smaller feature section, promote the major novel. The printing of short novellas, running through one, two, or three issues, can be found in various newspapers. For example, the newspaper of the 4th Army recently published works by Viebig, Zahn, Greinz, Georg Herrmann, and others—thus only a very first taste. In addition, humorous elements are abundantly cultivated almost everywhere, both in text and illustration. As for color illustrations, they currently exist most perfectly in the second-youngest field newspaper, the "Vogesenwacht," launched last summer. Following in its footsteps is the most recent field newspaper, the "Horchposten," created in the fall of 1916 by a Württemberg mountain battalion. Since only Antiqua characters were encountered in French typesetting, the vast majority of field newspapers are published in this typeface. Recently, the "Champagne-Kamerad" and the "Kriegszeitung der 4. Armee" have switched to Fraktur type, an advantage which, for obvious reasons, is usually only granted to army newspapers, but which, on the other hand, robs the field newspaper of some of its originality. p. 424 (444) 424 Something else from the soldiers' papers. While the small papers are always printed by soldiers, often in their free time, we often find a larger staff of Belgian or French workers in the technical operations of the larger papers. For example, in St. Quentin, where 26 French printers work alongside 16 German ones, or in Lille, where, in addition to the German ones, 15 French printers and 15 folders are employed. If we also mention the soldiers' newspapers published by the rear commands, such as the "Feldzeitung in Polen," the former "Kriegszeitung für Tauroggen," the "Deutsche Soldatenpost" published by the General Government in Brussels, as well as the "Kriegszeitung der Festung Borkum," we have not listed every single one of the approximately 50 currently existing field newspapers, but we have nevertheless described each category of soldiers' papers in their most striking form. Since obtaining many field newspapers is often impossible for outsiders today, especially since some are only printed in small editions, antiquarians have already seized the material, and collector prices are now being demanded for an entire year of a newspaper. Unfortunately, as the 4th

Army newspaper was able to determine following an article I published there almost a year ago, the field newspapers have not been completely collected anywhere. Neither in the German Library in Leipzig nor in the Royal Library in Berlin, despite great efforts later made in these places. The field newspapers serve entirely different purposes than the field newspapers. While the former are intended to bring humor and entertainment to soldiers in the monotony of trench warfare, the latter are aimed almost exclusively at the civilian population of the occupied territory. The need for such a press can be twofold. First, there is the natural desire of the population for a regular newspaper, which is doubly great due to the hunger for news in war; second, the occupying power may also have the need to present its views to the citizens of the enemy state. The former factor can also be observed everywhere in this war. In the areas of Belgium, France, and Russia occupied by our troops, a large portion of the population has fled, and the newspaper publishers often with them. Or those who remained in the country had to refrain from further publication of their papers, as the change in all things had seriously devastated their regular subscriber base, and a good portion had left the country. The existence of many papers was over. Apart from the reports the population received from the German soldiers, or, if they knew German, from German newspapers that happened to come into their hands, they were very uncertain about the course of the war. To meet the desire for news and the truth, the German military authorities, at least in the larger occupied towns, used the form of posters from the beginning. The daily army report, sometimes with explanatory additions, was regularly published on street corners in German and in the language of the occupied country. Of course, this type of information could only be viewed by the population as a last resort. Later, when the first field newspapers appeared, it was thought that they could also be used by the civilian population in some places. For example, the first eight issues of the "Zeitung der 4th Armee" (4th Army Newspaper) were published partly in German, partly in Flemish. Or, as with the "Zeitung der 7th Armee" (7th Army Newspaper), special editions were produced for the civilian population in their own language. In this case, the "Journal de Guerre" in Laon, which appeared in November and December 1914. In its dying hour, the "Journal" recommended its readers to subscribe to the "Gazette des Ardennes," which was then still published in Rethel, but since mid-March 1915 in Charleville. This large-format paper can be described as the ideal of a good staging newspaper. Extraordinarily skillfully and tactfully edited, it presents war news, maintains editorials and features; but also, and this is very important, it continuously publishes prisoner lists. The French soldiers currently imprisoned in German prison camps are listed

here by name and with the details of their unit. This method proved appropriate, if only because the French government was notoriously denialist in this regard. Culturally equally important is the parallel list of fallen French soldiers buried by our troops. Also valuable in its content and presentation is the monthly illustrated special edition of the "Gazette." It regularly presents views of German cities with good illustrations. The "Gazette des Ardennes" appears once a week with a circulation of 125,000 copies and finds readers across most of the West Front, including Belgium. On May 31, 1916, its 200th issue appeared, richly equipped with technology. Just one year after its existence, in November of the previous year, it published a publication containing a selection of its leading articles published during the year. A second, similar publication followed in July 1916. While only a French-language newspaper was possible for the occupied West, one could try founding German newspapers in the large cities of the East. Large numbers of German-speaking residents live in the industrial centers there. Two newspapers in particular stand out as being founded by the German administration: the "Deutsche Lodzer Zeitung" and the "Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung." Both are large daily newspapers published by the German State Printing Offices in Poland, with a circulation of 40,000 and 30,000 copies respectively. The one in Lodz was founded in the first days of February 1915, the one in Warsaw on August 10, just five days after the German troops entered the city. The founding and early days of the "Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung" (German Warsaw Newspaper) were dealt with quite interestingly in a concise essay by the technical director of the State Printing Office, Corporal A. Leipnitz. L., who previously worked at the "Lodzer Zeitung," recounts how, on the very day Warsaw fell, an order from the then head of the Press Administration for Poland, First Lieutenant Cleinow (the publisher of the "Grenzboten"), summoned him to Warsaw, where he was to take over the organization of the new newspaper. After many fruitless wanderings through the Warsaw printing works, the operation of the former Russian state newspaper was deemed suitable for the new purposes. This intensity alone demonstrates the importance attached to the press in the occupied territories. Both the Lodzer and the Warsaw newspapers are based on their layout, with editorials, features, local and especially business sections being cultivated. Incidentally, both newspapers, which also have readers in Germany, also pursue the goal of awakening interest in the East, and especially in Poland, at home. The newspapers in Kovno and Bialystok are also published by the German administration. The former, a daily newspaper, produced on typesetting and rotary presses, also carries a weekly illustrated supplement printed on better paper, the "Sketch Portfolio."

It alternates between good drawings of Russian architecture and folk types. The circulation currently stands at over 10,000, 1 p. 427 (447) Something else about the soldiers' papers. 427, a large number of which are sold on the street. In addition to the commercial printing and bookbinding shop, the paper also has a bookstore and a lottery collection. It is worth mentioning that the paper had only a few predecessors. After the fortress was captured by German troops on August 18, a press department was established on September 1, which, starting on the 6th, published a single-sided paper containing the latest news. This later developed into the already significantly improved "Neueste Nachrichten " and further into the "Anzeiger für Kowno," until the latter became the "Kownoer Zeitung" on January 1, 1916. Also worth mentioning are the German newspapers run by the German administration in Vilna, Mitau, and Libau. The "Wilnaer Zeitung," the "Mitausche Zeitung," and the "Libausche Zeitung" together have 28,000 subscribers. While the aforementioned towns were content with publishing German newspapers, Bialystok and Grodno were forced to take a further step. Both the "Bialystok Newspaper" and the "Grodno Newspaper" are published in three languages: German, Polish, and Hebrew. This is done in such a way that either, as with the Bialystok Newspaper, three different editions are published simultaneously, or, as with the Grodno Newspaper, the first two pages are in German, while the third is intended for Polish readers and the fourth for Hebrew readers. The same applies to the "Suwalki News." This, too, has been published in the three languages mentioned since April of this year. Thus, there is a certain affinity with the bilingual army newspapers. This three-part division corresponds to the composition of the relevant population in those districts. Meanwhile, there are also some, albeit modest, counterparts to the "Gazette des Ardennes" in Russia. First, there is the newspaper "Dabartis" ("The Present"). Here we are dealing with a newspaper published twice weekly by the German military administration with a circulation of 18,000 copies, intended to provide the Latvian-speaking inhabitants of Lithuania with their own newspaper. Also in Vilnius are the Polish newspaper "Dziennik Wilnaski," the Jewish newspaper "Letzte Nais" (Last Nais), and the Belarusian newspaper "Homand" ("The People's Voice"). These three daily newspapers, managed by the German press departments there, currently have a combined 11,000 subscribers. One can see that the German staging press is considerably more diverse in the occupied territories of the East than in those of the West. p. 428 (448) 428 Something else from the soldiers' papers. While in the French occupied territory we are dealing with a unified linguistic community that even extends its feelers strongly into Flemish, on the other hand, in the vast regions of the occupied East there are probably

half a dozen more or less distinct linguistic units. Taking this circumstance into account required a great deal of energy and organizational talent. However, both in the occupied West and in the East, a number of newspapers have managed to withstand the storms so far or, like the Social Democratic "Vooruit" in Ghent and other publications, have reopened after temporary closure. In the East, some new publications have even been founded by the Germans living there. In Belgium, the Young Flemish founded the "Vlamsche Post," but it has since folded. It was replaced, albeit with a different program, on October 1, 1916, by the "Nieuve Gazette van Gent." All of these newspapers are, of course, also subject to German censorship. In addition to the daily newspapers intended for the general public, a whole series of special papers are published by the authorities. These are regulatory and administrative organs intended for the subordinate bodies and agents of the German administration, or for civilians entrusted with official rank under them. Finally, for the public itself. These periodicals, which appear regularly or irregularly, can be viewed as either central or special organs. For example, the political department of the General Government of Belgium in Brussels publishes the "Law and Ordinance Gazette for the Occupied Territories of Belgium." But the individual provinces also have their special administrative gazettes. Also worth mentioning are the "Ordinance Gazette for the Rear Area of the 4th Army" and the "Collection of Announcements and Ordinances of the German Authorities in Antwerp." Most of the ordinance gazettes appear in the three languages German, French, and Flemish. In the East, among others, the "Ordinance Gazette for the General Government of Warsaw", the "Ordinance Gazette for the Imperial Government and the German Administration of Vilna", the "Ordinance Gazette of the German Civil Administration for Poland left of the Vistula", the "Ordinance Gazette of the German Civil Administration for Courland" should be mentioned. For the reasons already stated above, we are also dealing with a comprehensive variety in this area in the East. Of organs other than those of the mere state administration, we should also mention the "Official Gazette of the German Railway Administration Council" p. 429 (449) Something else about the soldiers' papers. 429 in Brussels and the "School Regulation Gazette for Poland" produced in the Warsaw State Printing Office. While most of these regulatory bodies are limited to a small circle, mostly German officials and honorary representatives and other interested parties from the population of the occupied country, we must not forget a publication published on the Western Front that benefits broad sections of the rural population. This is the "Landmann" (Landman), published by the Belgian General Government. This agricultural weekly aims to provide the

established rural population with valuable advice on farming. It contains informative agricultural articles and relevant notes and announcements. Since this magazine is also published in German, French, and Flemish, it is welcomed by the population. The previous statements have shown that, in addition to the field newspapers intended for the front, the other press activities conducted by the German administration in enemy territory are also extensive and of great importance. It goes without saying that the daily newspapers intended for the public are more important here than the recently described ordinance sheets. Other interesting special publications to date, in addition to the already mentioned works from the Liller publishing house, the brochures from the "Gazette des Ardennes," and the Warsaw printing house, include Professor Dreiling's work "The Basilica of St. Quentin, Its History and Character," produced at the St. Quentin rear printing works, as well as the album of a Canadian officer published by the 26th Reserve Corps. This work is a sketchbook taken from a captured Canadian officer during the previous year's fighting near Ypres. The Canadian's pen recorded various events from field life, including a situation in which an Englishman, somewhat imperiously and self-confidently, maneuvers his French comrades aside. The twenty sketches were reproduced by the corps that came into possession of the book and combined into an album, which was then sold for one mark. The "Champagne War Newspaper" has published an album with over one hundred pictures from Champagne in several editions, and another has been announced. Incidentally, other noteworthy publications are also in preparation in Poland and Flanders, namely those of a scientific nature in Poland. It should only be mentioned that some larger military units also published extensive war literature through their own publishing houses, but had their technical production handled at home. J. MEERFELD: They killed their child. . . . At 9:44 a.m. the jurors enter the courtroom. The prosecutor has already taken his seat at the court end of the table, with the clerk opposite him on his right. The usual, legally prescribed formalities of calling and drawing the summoned jurors are performed; those selected are sworn in, and then the trial begins. A very young creature, barely more than eighteen years old, crouches fearfully in the compartment known as the dock. She killed her child! The prosecution claims that she violently extinguished the life that had germinated in her womb and was striving for humanization. And for this, she stands before her judges today. Our time is humane. Schiller's infanticide was handed over to the executioner's axe; there is also the smell of blood in the Gretchen tragedy; modern law, on the other hand, recognizes no death penalty for the murder of a child committed immediately after birth, only imprisonment. But the fact remains: a mother

murdered her own flesh and blood. And even prison has more than enough horrors for a young human child. The penal code for the German Reich cannot be compared to a edition of Schiller's or Goethe's poems, and a court hearing for infanticide differs significantly from a recitation of "The Child Murderer" or the classic depiction of Gretchen's gruesome fate. It is all considerably more sober, without a trace of romanticism. And yet, anyone who witnesses such a businesslike court hearing with open eyes and a compassionate heart is shaken by it to a much greater degree than by the most tragic work of art. There, a poet created from his imagination, but here, life itself shows us a social tragedy. The young defendant is parentless and was placed in the care of relatives at an early age. She received virtually no education. Immediately after leaving school, she had to earn her living, working either in a factory or part-time in someone else's household. She lives with a relative. Her lodgings are nothing more than her lodgings! For when this woman was questioned as a witness during the trial, she revealed herself to be both mentally limited and completely worn down by the hardships of proletarian life, unable to offer the young girl anything other than makeshift shelter. And it all happened so naturally. The girl was pretty and slim and met young men, and one day she gave herself to one of them, whom she loved most. "He was the first and the only one," she sobbed before the judges. Then, after a few months, the familiar fears emerged, which soon escalated into desperate certainty. Meanwhile, war had broken out, and her lover had gone to war. Letters never reached him or were deliberately left unanswered. The expectant mother is all alone in the world. She covers up and conceals everything, fearing shame. At no cost must her aunt find out. And when she has to give up her job because the pregnancy is already too advanced, she lies to her aunt that she has taken a part-time job, leaves the house early every morning, hangs around the city parks, and doesn't return until late afternoon. Her diet consists of a few bites of bread and begged fruit. But her aunt still notices nothing. In fact, she doesn't even claim to have suspected anything when one morning around five her niece dragged herself out of the house and told her she felt ill. Calmly, she lets her go, in whose womb the young life stirs. The girl wanders aimlessly around in painful labor, finally escaping to the outhouse of an abandoned gravel pit, where she gives birth. Late in the morning, a man who happened to be passing by found her swimming in blood and took her to a hospital. But the child is dead: it is lying suffocated in the feces of the toilet! p. 432 (452) 432 They have killed their child. Four months later, the preliminary final act of this tragedy takes place in court. The forensic doctor gives his report and describes the findings. He is a cool-headed practitioner, grown skeptical

through years of experience; he has long since forgotten all sentimentality. He tries to win the jurors over to his view with medical-scientific explanations that it can be assumed with almost absolute certainty that the birth was normal and that deliberate killing had occurred. He denies the possibility of a so-called precipitate birth, which would allow the assumption that the newborn fell into the lavatory without the mother's intervention and died through no fault of her own. The prosecutor wants the defendant to be granted extensive mitigating circumstances, but the law must be respected; the crime demands atonement. The jurors are better off than the prosecutor, who must prosecute, and even better than the civil servant judge, who must bow to the rigid paragraphs of the penal code, and the jurors, who must pronounce the young mother guilty or not guilty, unite a majority of their votes for not guilty. "The defendant is to be acquitted," announces the presiding judge. By finding not guilty, the jurors believe they have acted both within the bounds of the law and morally right. A precipitate birth and the complete lack of willpower on the part of the woman giving birth during the act of childbirth would have been possible, they conclude. And besides: is this wretched creature in the dock the truly guilty party? Isn't she rather a victim, and isn't human society the true culprit? It was a liberal bourgeois, not a socialist, who asked these accusatory questions in the deliberation room. He is agreed with. Everyone seems to feel that they share responsibility; everyone dreads the idea of finding guilty when they themselves feel a share of the blame rests on themselves. The votes required for a guilty verdict are not gathered. The girl receives the acquittal with complete apathy: the mental suffering she endured during pregnancy and in prison has dulled, her young life is destroyed, her future uncertain and dark. "Where do I get my witness fee?" the aunt hastily asks the bailiff. At p. 433 (453) They killed their child. 433 She doesn't care about the girl. Not a ray of human understanding or female compassion has penetrated her rotten soul. - The next day, a very similar case. Again a creature in the dock who is said to have killed her own flesh and blood; again conditions are revealed that rise up in accusation not against individuals, but against society. She was a maid, now 22 years old. In the manner of a maid, she visited dances on Sundays and made this and that fleeting acquaintance. She evidently had a bit of a soft side - who would throw a stone at her? And one day she feels like a mother, without having a father for the child that is due to be born in a few months. He has left, perhaps out of caution, perhaps somewhere in the war. She doesn't know his address. She works until a few weeks before her delivery, when the virtuous middle-class woman who employed her sends her away. She finds no support in a married sister; she turns to prostitution,

gives herself to men for money shortly before she is due to give birth, and, as her difficult hour approaches, escapes to a wretched dive, where she kills her child by strangling. A random inspection of the house by the morals police the next morning brings the crime to light and lands the perpetrator in prison. Since she confesses, the jury can only accept the mitigating circumstances also recommended by the public prosecutor; They must answer the question of infanticide in the affirmative , and the court imposes a two-year prison sentence. No punishment of any kind can restore the destroyed life to the human child she killed, and no one can erase society's guilt. This child murderer, too, was a victim of social injustice, a victim of her inadequate upbringing caused by social damage, a victim of the unkindness of her surroundings, and finally, a victim of the completely inadequate public welfare for pregnant women and women in labor. She could have become a worthy wife, a good mother, but social injustice drove her to infanticide and plunged her into a bleak future. Even if the path to orderly circumstances were later paved for her, the sting of her crime would remain in her heart and eclipse all joy in life. 38/3 p. 434 (454) 434 They killed their child. And a third child murder. Another maid. She worked until almost her last day and then went to her married sister's home in the countryside with the faint hope of finding shelter there for her postpartum period. But she encountered hardened hearts. An illegitimate birth? At no price! What would the villagers say? How furious would the priest be! Out of the village with her shame! In labor, the girl dragged herself to the train station. As the train rolled toward the city, she felt the birth approaching. She sneaked into the toilet of the railway carriage and there gave birth to a child whose body was later discovered on the track. The pious village was saved from the impending shame of an illegitimate birth—the price was a human life! The jury did not get to convict the sinner because the court agreed to a medical expert's request that the defendant be observed for a period of time to determine her mental state. Therefore, no further details of her fate can be reported here. But what she experienced and suffered is typical of illegitimate mothers in general , and fits seamlessly into the pictures already drawn. This girl's guilt, too, is infinitesimal compared to the sins of a society that, in addition to its social ills, carries with it pathological and corrupting prejudices. At the same jury session, a major abortion trial was scheduled for trial: here, too, the victims were inexperienced young girls who paid for the pleasure of a fleeting moment with degrading prison sentences because they wanted to escape the social stigma of an illegitimate birth. We know: anyone who deals with questions of sexual morality touches on the deepest connections of society. And yet, the Heraclitusian saying that Lassalle placed at the

beginning of his masterpiece of philosophy applies here too: "Everything flows!" Every comparative study of moral history teaches us that Republican Rome had a completely different code of public morality than the Rome of the imperial era! The Greece that waged the Persian Wars, in turn, had a different code than it did during the time when Alexander's Empire was crumbling. Around Charlemagne, sexual morality was completely different from that of the time of the Minnesingers; in the Renaissance, it was different again from that during the heyday of humanism, which was leading completely into the capitalist era. The social underpinnings of all public morality, and especially of sexual mores, are clearly perceptible throughout the entire history of mankind. - "Everything flows," even today. A quarter of a century ago, a reactionary newspaper was horrified that a representative in the Prussian Parliament had spoken publicly about venereal diseases. Today, the public discussion of these diseases, their broadest discussion, is considered one of the most urgent tasks of preventive healthcare; in the upper classes of secondary schools, doctors insistently instruct students about the dangers of uncontrolled sexual intercourse. Just a decade ago, there were local health insurance funds that refused sickness benefits to male members suffering from sexual ailments. We now deal with the delicate problem of declining birth rates openly and publicly. We too today are in the flow of development, and everything flows ten or even a hundred times faster than it did a hundred or five hundred years ago. The undoubtedly very lasting influence of the World War on sexual morality will probably only be determined more precisely in the future. Perhaps also that the current war has somewhat worsened the situation of the illegitimate mother. less painful. It is already being reported from Baden that the engaged brides of fallen soldiers there are allowed to call themselves women and give their child their father's name. The war will deprive the German Reich of around a million fertile men, while at the same time the inevitable impoverishment of large sections of the population and the high prices that will long outlast the war will undoubtedly threaten us with a further decline in births, and this at a time of the most painful loss of national strength and precisely when we must exert every fiber to rebuild destroyed cultural values. All this, however, strengthens the hope that in the future the illegitimate mother will no longer be merely an outcast and an outcast, no longer a being against whose depravity honorable ladies measure their own virtue - 38/3 p. 436 (456) 436 Glosses. Absolutely, a bearer of young and precious life. Every mother is venerable, even if her fingers lack the ripeness of marriage, for in her fertile womb the miracle of the incarnation takes place. Even if the woman giving birth has been dragged down to the lowlands by the adversities of fate, she

still deserves our care for the sake of the young life that springs from her womb. Today, more than ever, the child is a social matter of the utmost importance, against which the discordant prophecies of doom do not rise, which want to see even the illegitimate children of fallen soldiers treated as pariahs. We are fighting for the future, we are fighting for a higher morality, and we are acting truly nationally when we ensure, through revolutionary reforms, that even the illegitimate woman enjoys the loving protection of society and that the bitter tragedies of mothers who have killed their children disappear from the courtrooms. Glosses. Political Characters. HERMANN PACHNICKE. LIMITLESS diligence. Always in the hall, early in the parliamentary group, evening in the committees. Gray-haired and white-bearded, his delicate body always crushed by responsibility. Far too serious to make a Western-style spokesman for the longed-for parliamentary Germany; but well-suited to the post of head of the Reich Chancellery, to a ministerial director, to someone who prepares in some way and, in not-too-critical matters, also makes decisions. A speaker for whom a call to order is unthinkable. Oh, one can speak quite decisively once in a while, but always keep oneself in check, remain polite, don't offend—for God's sake! Carefully consider the rarely appropriate joke beforehand, lest it be perceived as a personal barb, and generally consider everything, everything carefully. Temperament is eliminated. —— Not so old after all, but a speaker for the council of the elderly. What a sacrifice to make oneself older than one is—to always too modest, towards people who can't be flattered or outwitted! Progressive without a doubt. But a People's Party?? p. 437 (457) Glosses. 437 OTTO WIEMER. Regarding the similarity to Eugen Richter, there is still a lot missing: the ugliness, the rough bristles, the wit, the bitterness. A quiff and a beard alone are not enough. But Dr. Wiemer feels himself. Doesn't walk, but strides. Doesn't speak, but proclaims. Always in a chesty tone. Elevated. Magnificent. Sublime. And almost always the step towards the ridiculous is taken; but with the utmost dignity the mess is stepped on. In the listeners, however, the schoolboy awakens, who recognizes the ordinary person in the majestic teacher and is excited by the contrast to the caricature. Mild cheerfulness spreads, the Trumpet. Ah, their roar brings down no walls . . . All speeches are beautiful in print. And so the oratory of this liberal belongs more to his private profession: Paper Trade Association. Psychological considerations of war policy. From the letter of an occasional contributor, which was in our hands and typed even before the announcement of the Chancellor's speech, we extract the following observations, which are still of interest today and do not contradict our assessment of the Chancellor's speech given at the top of this issue:

Tactically, it is often demanded by the socialist side, even by supporters of the majority, that Germany should only act very modestly, and above all, repeatedly emphasize loudly and clearly that we only want to defend ourselves and from the outset reject any thought of expanding the Reich's power. Anyone who recommends this is a bad psychologist. The rage of our enemies is so great and their desire for destruction so honest and sincere that the convulsive effort to to initiate is seen as weakness and a sign of impending collapse and must ignite new efforts. I am a determined opponent of the Pan-Germans, but I consider their daring, overly bold talk far less dangerous for prolonging the war than the other side's anxious pleas for peace. And what does the most insane annexation rage of our Pan-German fanatics mean compared to what official English and French figures are doing! It is no longer a question of annexation, but of destruction and division. Even the "mild" Asquith wanted to "strangle" the German Reich, much as his former colleague Churchill spoke of the gag that should be placed on Germany and that would have a fatal effect on its heart. (Strange, p. 438 (458) 438 Glosses. Incidentally, the types of death that the imagination of English ministers conjures up for their enemies tend to occur in the neck region!) The former German Reichstag deputy Wetterlé writes editorial after editorial concluding that Germany must disappear from the map, etc., etc.! And with such people, one believes one can make an impression with indulgent modesty; one believes one can thereby strengthen the peace parties in the enemy countries! The enemy peoples certainly desire peace; but stronger among them is the will to victory than the will for peace. The majority of the socialist press in Germany displays an admirable naiveté when it comes to the moods and opinions from the enemy countries. One would like only too much to be "objective" and always fails because that is not possible in the great struggle of forces and passions. I recently read in a socialist newspaper belonging to the majority, in response to the terrible ranting and raving of the English and French newspapers and statesmen, the incredibly harmless remark that this was not right, how could anyone come up with such accusations? The Germans were certainly no better, but also no worse than members of other nations. One arrives at such childishness when, in Schopenhauer's terms, one wants to counter utterances born of will with facts of knowledge, or, to put it another way, combat purely subjective manifestations of hatred with objective criticism. That is impossible and ridiculous. In the assessment of the entire situation by neutral observers, morality plays almost no role at all. We may prove ten times how brutally the enemy violates human and international law, how the Cossacks behave, and how the Romanians, how little England cares about treaties when they

conflict with its interests, how treacherously Italy and Romania have acted; That won't lure a dog away from the stove. People argue back and forth, take this or that view, and continue to watch with a shrug. But when our army delivers its mighty blows, or the enemy's storm waves uselessly rebound off it, then people begin to warm up, to admire and sympathize. Where has the fiery indignation of the entire non-English world gone, which swept through Europe when England strangled the Boer states? Strong England is feared and admired, and so will strong Germany. Let us hear what Johannes Scherr says about morality in world history (Blücher, His Time and His Life, Volume 2, p. 15): "And in the face of a fact like this (referring to Napoleon's reception in France after his return from Elba) 1 " p. 439 (459) Glosses. 439 you poor "ideologists" still refuse to understand that in this, our best of worlds, catechism morality only exists to be learned by heart, and that law is a phrase, but success and power are realities!" And about England (ibid., p. 44): "England's foreign policy, an unparalleled mixture of brutality and hypocrisy, had at this time (the time of Napoleon) already happily worked its way up to the height of that insular selfishness for which the mainland of Europe and the entire earth was and is simply an object of exploitation. It required the bronze-faced shamelessness of English Tartuffarianism to accuse France of encroachment and lust for conquest before all men and gods, while oneself, with an insatiable robber's fist, snatched up everything within reach, while enslaving millions upon millions of Hindus and allowing the English leopard to strike its greedy paws wherever there was room on all continents. Out of tender concern for the independence of the peoples of the continent, would England have fought its restless battle against Napoleonism? Lies and deception! How childish this fairy tale must be, even to the most idiotic person, when they consider that while the World War against Napoleon was still ongoing and after its end, the English aristocracy faithfully assisted continental absolutism in depriving the peoples of the fruits of the tremendous struggle. cheat. But one must acknowledge that English egoism waged the great war with that tenacious perseverance, with that relentless logic and absolute ruthlessness, through which world-historical successes are achieved. Certainly, it would be ridiculous to decry this egoism; however, it is history's duty to testify to its existence. Doesn't that sound downright prophetic? If one substitutes "Germany" for "France," which was accused of all kinds of encroachments and lust for conquest by England, and instead of " tender concern for the independence of the continent," tender concern for the independence of Belgium, one has precisely the situation today. How naive it seems, in comparison, to read so often in socialist newspapers today: " If only Germany had clearly

emphasized that it was not considering annexations, then England would have told itself that the war no longer served any purpose." What a misunderstanding of things! "Capturing the German trade" (the headline of so many advertisements at the beginning of the war), that is England's war aim, and when it realizes that this cannot be achieved, then it will relax. Not sooner! - p. 440 (460) 440 Glosses. Rip van Winkle. HOW strange it sometimes is! I'm reading, as is fitting, Sunday morning No. 34 of the "Glocke," and with particular interest the article on "State Socialism and the Politics of Desperation." And afterwards, feeling the need for lighter reading, I go to the bookcase and, from the reserved, sacred corner where I've housed some of the world's humor, pull out a volume at random. I open it: "Rip van Winkle, by Washington Irving." Thank goodness, nothing about the war, nothing about the partisan squabbles, for Washington Irving has been dead and buried since 1895, forgotten by the present generation. His writings, with their serene tranquility, only delight the increasingly rare old-fashioned like myself. So: "Rip van Winkle." I've known the story since my younger years, but occasionally enjoy reading it again, the story of the man who slept through twenty years. Immediately, I'm in the middle of it: Rip escaped his nagging wife and went squirrel hunting in the Kaatskill Mountains, lay down, and soon fell asleep. Finally, he awakens, goes "home" with his now horribly rusty rifle, and gradually realizes that he has slept for twenty years. Washington Irving recounts: "It was some time before he could get into the flow of the conversation or comprehend the strange events that had occurred during his stupor. How there had been a revolutionary war—that the country had thrown off the yoke of Old England, and that instead of a subject of His Majesty George III, he was now a free citizen of the United States. . . ." - - Hell, too! Isn't that exactly what I just read in the "Glockenspiel," except that Rip van Winkle involuntarily dozed away twenty years in the Kaatskill Mountains, while the . . . well, the others, the thoroughgoing revolutionaries, retreated to their studies of their own free will during the most revolutionary period since the Great Migration? But to return to Rip van Winkle: "Rip was really no politician; the changes in states and empires made little impression on him. . . . " Isn't that true? But Rip van Winkle, namely Washington Irving's, contented himself with recounting his adventure to the new generation that had grown up; he made do with the bench in front of the tavern. Our Rips van Winkleschen claim to be the leaders and teachers of those who did not sleep in the Kaatskill study and who know from their own observation what has been going on in the world. Wahrmund. p. 441 (461) THE GLOCK 39th issue, December 23, 1916, Year 2. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source references is permitted. MAX COHEN (Reuß), M. d. R.: THE Relearning

and Reorientation. I. The necessity of a strong and healthy political perseverance, which, unaffected by new facts, has the task of preserving and defending what already exists, was emphasized often enough by conservative politicians before the war. One cannot exactly claim that this view was met with much friendship from the socialist side. Only the World War opened the eyes of a large number of socialists to the glory of being conservative and led them to work for the preservation and continued adherence to all the political doctrines held up to that point, in a way that the previous advocates of this archaic conservative method could almost envy. However this terrible war may end, the German people will find themselves confronted with tasks that political history has probably never presented to any other people before. Anyone who wants to approach the solution of these diverse and difficult tasks without abandoning the slightest bit of pre-war political practice will be condemned from the outset to political ineffectiveness and will have to run alongside or behind the state machine while others take the lead. New things will emerge after this tremendous war. Helping to shape it correctly is the most important task of Germany's political parties. 39/1 p. 442 (462) 442 Relearning and reorientation. It seems as if no one has grasped this task as little as the extreme right and the extreme left. This is not surprising in the case of the former: rejecting anything new is in their blood. But it is hardly comprehensible that large sections of the Social Democrats are increasingly threatening to squander this unique opportunity to enormously increase the number of their supporters, both as organized members and as voters, and to extraordinarily strengthen their political influence , through unprecedented strife within their own ranks . However, the majority of the party, represented by the majority of the Reichstag faction and the party executive, has a strong feeling—as was demonstrated at the Reich Conference—that German Social Democracy must not emerge from the seething cauldron of this war as the only unchanging, unchanging political element in Germany. The opposition, unfortunately not weak, certainly seems to assume that the upheavals of the global conflagration must, under all circumstances, stop short of the eternally unchanging views of previous socialist party politics. A truly grotesque idea. Don't these stalwarts realize that with such behavior they are throwing overboard the most important component of scientific socialism? Have they completely forgotten that socialism's strongest argument against the "existing and lasting" so dearly beloved by conservatives lay in the assertion that all things in this world are in eternal flux and becoming? Do they no longer want to accept that with the emergence of new facts, intellectual concepts, which surely also include political views, must change? - Indeed. Anyone who

refuses to learn anything from this world struggle violates the fundamental tenet of socialist knowledge. The recognition of the conditionality of all events and the constant growth and decay of all human relationships is the sharpest weapon in the armory of scientific socialism. With it, one could and can demonstrate to the advocates of eternal truths and unchanging orders the never-ending further development of society. p. 443 (463) Relearning and Reorientation. 443 economic and political-economic conditions. The stark facts of real life are and remain the fundamental factors from which changed political situations grow and force every seeing person to frequently change political practice, to incessant forgetting, relearning, and learning anew. But is it possible that there are politicians, socialist politicians, who can believe that this World War, which has thrown supposed facts, political hopes, and fears into disarray like a house of cards, provides no reason to re-examine economic and political views and to adapt tactics and fighting methods to new, different circumstances? Is it really conceivable that socialists, who have always drawn the best reasons in favor of their socialist views from progressive and changing conditions, can now suddenly draw the best reasons in favor of their socialist views from the momentous changes that the World War has brought about and will continue to bring about? will not want to draw the smallest conclusions? Does the development and change arising from the further development and transformation of things apply only to the bourgeois parties, and must they, in contrast, remain stationary when Social Democracy is in question? No one will dare to assert this without exposing themselves to the laughter of the entire world. However, one should therefore also leave the task of not allowing the traditional to be shaken under any circumstances to the conservative elements; revolutionary Social Democracy is truly not suited for this. - II. The universal willingness to subject outdated political agitation methods and views to scrutiny is the first prerequisite for a true reorientation. Anyone who declares fundamentally and from the outset that they will not abandon the "tried and tested" is placing serious obstacles in its path. From all sides, people are gradually beginning to realize that a reorientation worthy of the name cannot be achieved by the 39/1* p. 444 (464) 444 Relearning and Reorientation. It cannot be presented to the people as a finished and complete work, ready for use, by the present Chancellor or by any of his successors, but that the people themselves must will it with all their strength and with definite goals. The people themselves must build the new state in the restored peace just as they protected and preserved it during the war. In order to be able to do this, they must, above all, become political on a much larger scale than before; that is, they must feel and learn to understand that

the community of the entire people itself represents the state. That the authoritarian government with its countless host of civil servants is not the state, for which the people form an indispensable, but nevertheless only a background. This national consciousness, which is synonymous with national community, with national community, was certainly extraordinarily fostered by the war years. The field-grey masses of the people out there in the trenches, who in the truest sense of the word saved the German state, thereby performed a practical work for it and on it that can no longer be surpassed. Their impact must far exceed that of the preceding years of peace, and one may well assume that in this respect the years of fighting will have a more profound effect than just as many decades of peace. This time of war must have filled the men facing the enemy with a new, strong national consciousness that makes them say: This state is our state. We want to continue working on it so that it remains ours even in peace and, quite unlike before, becomes a reflection of our entire national life and its profound and far-reaching impact. But even we who stayed at home have a different attitude toward the state than before the war. Admittedly, our achievements can hardly be mentioned in the same breath as those of the men in the field. But nevertheless: they are our fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers. They are one with us. Together we realize, both inside and outside, that we are fighting for ourselves by defending the state. This experience means becoming political p. 445 (465) Relearning and reorientation. 445 in the highest sense. It will give tremendous impetus to the insight that national community and state community are one concept and must become one, and will bring forth the forces that will give new, firm foundations to the freedom of state and people. It goes without saying that with such a transformation, symbols of the pre-war era such as the Prussian three-class voting system must fall. One may hope that the new German people will not dwell on this for long. It would be good if returning soldiers no longer found this model of a state as it should not be. Here, an insightful and far-sighted authoritarian government could limit superfluous domestic political disputes to the bare minimum; for even the governing authorities will be aware that the abolition of class voting rights can only be a beginning of the emerging German people's state. The future of the German Reich, even with a good outcome of the war, will not be so rosy that one could easily conjure up the most serious domestic political struggles. But they are inevitable if one were to attempt to deprive the masses of the political rights to which they are fully entitled, even after the war. This realization, in my firm conviction, is not only held by the current Reich Chancellor, but will very soon, if not immediately, become the common property of all those called upon to guide the policy of

the Reich. Only recently has the Auxiliary Service Law passed in the Reichstag shown everyone how much the possibility of holding out in this war has become a workers' issue. One cannot later allow those sections of the population to be second- and third-class political citizens, without whose self-sacrificing activity this war could not have been brought to a successful conclusion. That is simply impossible. The masses of the people would no longer tolerate it. Germany's peaceful development and its position of power in the world are henceforth dependent on the political equality of all members of the people. III. But even the abolition of the Prussian three-class voting system and other political inequalities would not necessarily be of fundamental importance if the development process that began on August 4, 1914, did not steadily increase. We can see from the Reichstag that equal voting rights alone are not enough. The things already mentioned above must be added. More than 18 months ago, Hugo Preuss excellently addressed the questions of the authoritarian and the people's state in a book published by Diederichs in Jena. In the urgency of our times, this excellent work has not yet received the attention it deserves. One might hope, however, that the resurgent political struggles of the future peacetime will automatically bring the expositions of Preuss's book to the forefront. For it is desperately necessary that ever wider circles be permeated by the feeling that a real expansion of popular power in the state cannot be achieved without the active participation of all. Even though I view future developments with much more hope than Preuss does, one must nevertheless hope that his somewhat pessimistic book will be widely read. And all those who rely primarily on the promises of statesmen should especially remember these sentences from the book: "Morality and honor, including political honor, may demand of the individual statesman that he withdraw if he cannot keep his word [namely, the promise of political reforms]; however, an authority as such cannot be required to do what seems detrimental to it because of a promise." And a people can not express its apolitical sense more clearly than when it relies for its political future on relearning and reorientation instead of on inner strength and necessity. 1 "The German People and Politics", Jena 1915. p. 447 (467) Relearning and reorientation. 447 relies on a promise, no matter how and from where it is made." - For the supporters of Social Democracy, these warnings are hardly necessary, for the entire political activity of the party—today as well as that of yesterday and tomorrow—is permeated by the conviction that political progress can only be conquered, not handed over to the people as a voluntary dowry by the state leaders. Only to a strong, general popular movement, whose will is clear and unified in its immediate goals, whose will

is unbreakable, will statesmen grant the political changes without which Germany can no longer live, without which it can no longer overcome the great difficulties of the future. A people like the German people, which is capable of asserting its national and economic existence against a world of enemies, must also be capable of achieving the necessary progress in domestic political life. And just as little can one doubt that the Social Democrats, in particular, will devote all their strength to this will, one can only hope that it will do so in the right way. To do this, it is necessary, above all, that it abandon its previous, voluntarily chosen, brilliant isolation and, together with other parties, form a solid parliamentary majority to achieve its immediate political goals. Social Democracy, regardless of its socialist aspirations for the future, must take the realities of the present into account. If it does not do so, in the expectation that a final revolutionary struggle will bring it all power and the final goal at once, then—I fear that would take a while longer—it will have to forgo any serious attempt to gain power until then. That could amount to a perpetuation of the authoritarian state, which cannot be transformed without the original strength inherent in the mass movement of the German working class. As certain as it is that the great upheavals of this war will present us with entirely new questions that can only be answered from the experiences of wartime, it is just as certain that in peacetime—- p. 448 (468) 448 The Economic Plan for 1917. the old problems will confront us, which can no longer be solved in the usual pre-war manner. In the transformation of things and facts brought about by the war, everyone will have to learn new things if we are not to fail—the German Social Democracy as much as the others. --- Before this gigantic international struggle, the Social Democracy rejected any real responsibility for the state. But when the great danger came on August 4, 1914, it resolutely affirmed it. The majority of the party has adhered to this policy of affirming the state. And its parliamentary representatives, with few exceptions, gave it strong expression for the second time by approving the Auxiliary Service Law on December 2. The Social Democracy must adhere to the principles of this policy; from now on, all political, economic and social progress in Germany depend on it. Social democracy has it in its power to hinder or promote free development in Germany; today it is in a position to replace the authoritarian state and the masses of people separated from it with the higher unity of the general people's state. That this people's state will still have class conflicts and class struggles—perhaps of a very serious nature—is beyond question. But we must affirm it itself. Now or never. The favorable hour will not return so easily. ROBERT SCHMIDT, M. d.R.: THE -- The Economic Plan for 1917. The war, which elevates violence to domination, has also placed heavy shackles

on economic life. No matter how hard efforts were made to maintain the "free play of forces," there was no other way than to bring the freedom of the market and production into the coercive organization of the war economy; our national economy, too, was p. 449 (469) The Economic Plan for 1917. 449 put on a uniform to organize the defense of food supplies. A defense that was directed against everyone interfering with stocks at their own discretion, harping on their wallets, in order to brush aside concerns about what was left for others with the excuse: now I'm my own best friend. This principle drove them to the greatest ruthlessness. The producer, like the dealer, takes the price they can get; they won't take less, nor will they fend off a higher offer by pointing out that the benefit to them is too great. It was no use; the state had to draw a line if it didn't want to deprive a large section of the population of important foodstuffs that lack the income to buy their daily bread under such circumstances. Resistance to this coercion has increasingly dried up; hardship has reinforced the realization that freedom of competition and the freedom of the market are a very bad thing in wartime. However, the long duration of the war continues to present us with new difficulties in food policy and raises problems whose solutions are taking us ever further away from the old liberal economic order. Our agriculture has laboriously kept us fed, but we haven't been very happy doing so. We must keep an eye on things to ensure that they don't get even worse, because there are many obstacles to agricultural production. We lack fertilizers, teams, and labor for intensive soil cultivation, concentrated feed for livestock, and much else. We urgently need an increase in production. But how can this be achieved if, as we regret to note, winter planting has lagged behind this year? The favorable weather has allowed much to be made up for, but there is always a gap that cannot be filled by spring planting. Unfortunately, there are also increasing reports of fields lying fallow. We cannot afford that now; no field may remain unused; where this happens, the compulsory cultivation, as stated in the Federal Council decree of March 31, 1915, must be strictly enforced. The decree gives the administrative authorities the right to withdraw control over the land from the user who is unable to cultivate the field or deliberately fails to do so. There must be no hesitation in applying compulsory production; Whether it will be necessary to require the cultivation of certain crop varieties depends entirely on whether pricing unilaterally favors the cultivation of certain crops and neglects others. Currently, there are strong threats that, for example, sugar beet cultivation will decline because the price situation is unsatisfactory. If the price issue is decisive for sugar beet cultivation, it does not necessarily have to be regulated upwards; the prices of competing crops could just as easily be

reduced. Naturally, this solution is not popular among interested parties; their desire is always upward. Much more significant for promoting beet cultivation would be preferential treatment for the distribution of nitrogenous, artificial fertilizers and increased returns of beet pulp and molasses for the beet farmers' livestock. A decline in sugar production would be very worrying, because sugar is a valuable foodstuff. In an emergency, cultivation must be enforced. At this point, a word against Comrade Kaliski, who repeatedly raises objections in the "Socialist Monthly" to the faction's standpoint on food policy. He rejects compulsory production and demands production promotion, in which less attention should be paid to pricing. The Social Democratic faction does not demand compulsory production in the form of dictating to each farmer what to grow, but rather the compulsion to grow certain crops in certain quantities. The faction demanded the full utilization of arable land and all fallow land. p. 451 (471) The Economic Plan for 1917. 451 Kaliski wants to promote production by other means; the necessary incentive for farming should be provided. The faction has never rejected production promotion through easier management, but has practically supported, but the faction will probably almost unanimously reject the position that price must provide an incentive to increase production. The price should cover production costs and operating profits; the faction has only just established this as a principle in its motions; however, it rejects increasing production with war profits. Moreover, one can hardly say that prices do not provide an incentive to production; on the contrary, they pose the danger of a reduction in production, because today, even with lower yields, the farm is profitable. The aversion in agriculture to paying higher wages is so widespread that people would rather accept poor management than increase yields at the expense of wages. In many cases, rural communities go to great lengths to prevent a poor soldier's wife from receiving support if she has earned a few pennies a day; they fear that the people might be too well off and their demands might grow. As in peace, so in wartime, the Rural workers. The Social Democratic faction advocated the promotion of agricultural production right from its first proposals on August 13, 1914. It demanded: Measures for the procurement of means of production. 1. Delivery of fertilizers and seeds by public institutions and regulation of their use. 2. Delivery of machinery by municipal associations to owners for intensive use. 3. Release of forests and moors for reclaiming. What the Party Executive and the General Commission of the Trade Unions demanded here has been implemented to a considerable extent over time. If the seed trade were entirely handed over to public corporations, the much-lamented deficiencies in free trade would have been eliminated long ago.

The distribution of artificial fertilizers is regulated. The machine factories have also produced the last steam and motor plow. purchased to assist agriculture in cultivation. The release of forests for fodder and bedding has been completely achieved. However, the government has been so hesitant with all its measures and has pursued their implementation with such lack of zeal that the value of the resources has been severely impaired. But how are we supposed to achieve increased cultivation of pulses, vegetables, and oilseeds, which we so urgently need, next year, if not through coercion? It would have been necessary this year to curb tobacco cultivation and completely prohibit the cultivation of luxury plants in gardening and agriculture. We need food today; everything else must take a back seat. We must make even more extensive use of uncultivated land, even that near large cities, for the cultivation of food. It will not be necessary to provide for a specific cultivation for all types of crops, but inappropriate use of productive soil must be prevented, and for some types of crops, taking into account the special conditions of the an obligation to cultivate can be constructed for each individual farm. Sensible farmers will not evade this request; if the individual decides, the general interest suffers. We lack an economic plan that influences and directs cultivation so that we can increase our food production to the greatest possible extent. This is the demand that now imperatively approaches the War Food Office. If all forces are now mobilized for national defense, even those at home who are required to provide services, then the question of food supply must not be the last priority. Good admonitions do not help us; they have never brought us forward in the war economy. Today, p. 453 (473) Russia and Serbia. 453 where the struggle for existence takes on such harsh forms, self-interest ruthlessly comes to the fore in the economic sphere; we can only save the general interest through the compulsion to Duty. HERMANN WENDEL, M. d. R.: ON Russia and Serbia. Based on incontrovertible documents, this important work is the first to present a document of the highest order, proving the ruthless, selfish policy Russia has always pursued toward other states, and the infamous role Russia has always played against its protectorates. Furthermore, the work shows that the Serbs originally desired Austrian rule and submitted such requests nine times. A series of unknown political events of the most significant nature are revealed in the book." With such resounding fanfare, the accompanying pamphlet welcomes a book recently published by the well-known prolific writer Spiridion Goptschevich. But not to mention this hype-filled promise, the book falls far short of even its title. Anyone hoping to find a real account of Serbia's relations with Russia throughout the nineteenth century (1804-1915!) will be bitterly disappointed,

as Goptschevich only deals extensively with the period of the first major Serbian uprising against the Turks. For this period, he overwhelms the reader with a wealth of diplomatic documents, secret reports, and other documents that may not yet have been published in German, but have certainly been published in Russian and Serbian, and in any case, their contents have long been known. [1] Count Sp. Gopcevic, Russia and Serbia 1804-1915, based on documents from the secret archives of Petersburg and Paris and the Vienna archive. Stapled 2.80 Mk. Hardcover 3.80 Mk. Munich, Hugo Schmidt Verlag. p. 454 (474) 454 Russia and Serbia. Goptschevich may act so importantly, Vladan Georgewitsch and Stojan Novakovich, among others, have presented Russia's deceitful behavior during the Serbian uprising far more clearly, convincingly, and coherently. For Goptschevich has no intention of regarding Serbia's relations with Russia and Austria as a historical problem, but with the same mystical fervor with which the midwife of the Holy Alliance, Frau von Krüdener, saw in Alexander I the white angel of the north and in Napoleon I the black angel of the south, he regards Russia as an embodiment of the dark principle and Austria as an incarnation of the light principle. Unfortunately, Serbia allowed itself to be ensnared by its dark demon and is now going to hell, hurray, hurray, hurray, hurray! While, in the opposite case, eleven million Serbs would be living happily under the Habsburg scepter today, and we would also have been spared the minor inconvenience of the World War. Ah yes! In reality, the problem only begins where Goptschevich puts his pen down. Since the Turks, in Treitschke's words, had settled in the fourteenth century like "a mass migration frozen in sleep over the Christian peoples of the southeast," and since the Serbian Empire was buried with the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the Serbs, along with the other inhabitants of the Balkans, found themselves cast into the darkness of "nations without history," that is to say, of nations that, instead of a class structure, exhibit only a ruled class. For in the conquered lands, the Turks, separated from the subjugated by ethnicity and faith, formed the ruling class; Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, and Albanians were crammed into the collective term of the Raja, the rightless herd that had to toil for the Ottoman landowner, the Spahi, and deliver the prime of its male youth to the Grand Lord's army. For many generations, Turkish feudalism on the Balkan Peninsula thus buried all sources of power. of development and hindered the rise to higher forms of production and richer culture. p. 455 (475) Russia and Serbia. 455 tions forms and richer culture. Dully resigned to his fate, the Christian farmer strode behind his wooden plow as if he had never known anything else, decade after decade, century after century. But while the Bulgarians were completely uprooted nationally during these centuries of disgrace, the Serbs

perpetuated the national tradition by cultivating heroic song. When the song of Tsar Dushan sounded to the simple stringed instrument, the guzla, it conjured up for all listeners, if not a better Serbian future, then at least a better Serbian past. The consciousness of being Serb did not die out even in the last shepherd. Nevertheless, the Serbian uprising at the beginning of the The nineteenth century was by no means a conscious national rallying cry or a premeditated political revolution, but merely a sudden, haphazard resistance against unbearable economic pressure. While the Greeks, having become the first merchant nation of the Levant, took up arms twenty years later to free their trade from the draining arbitrary rule of the pashas, the Serbs were peasants of the simplest kind. They lived in peasant ideas and never went beyond peasant goals. They plowed, sowed, and reaped, and without complaint paid the poll tax to the state and the obligatory tithe to the landlord, as long as the Turkish authorities otherwise allowed them their little self-government in the communities. But if the usual Turkish order already smacked of disorder, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the return of the exiled Janissaries turned Pashalik Belgrade into a playground for the most unbridled Anarchy. The Janissary behaved towards the Spahi as a robber baron does towards a pensioner, and here in Christian lands he showed himself a special kindness. Wild lads settled down and feasted on foreign land, whistling at the self-government of the Serbian communities, ripped the wool over the eyes of Christians and Muslims, both figuratively and figuratively, and destroyed the grain on the stalk like a child in the womb. Gritting their teeth, the Serbian peasants watched the activities of the monsters; more and more fled from their burned-down huts into the mountains as pagans, until finally everything that could fire a gun rose up and purged the Pashalik of its suckers. Karatschorsch, Black George, was the name of the leader of the Serbian People's militia, a cattle dealer from the Shumadija region and a former Austrian sergeant major. But the loyal uprising, not against the Sultan, but against the Sultan's opponents, could not last in the long run. Their rapid and powerful success, which had allowed the insurgents to thoroughly wipe out ten of the Pashalik's thirteen districts in a short space of time, had to broaden their goals. Moreover, the tremendous upheaval on European soil caused by the French Revolution had not gone entirely without reverberations in the gorges of the Balkans. In particular, the news that in 1798 the allied Russians and English had granted the Ionian Islands a form of national self-government under Russian guarantee after expelling the French, had an incredibly profound effect on all Christian Balkan peoples and also awakened a desire for similar rights among the Serbs. It was less the illiterate peasants who aspired to this, fighting only

for the most immediate needs, who were striving for this. than the isolated educated people, mainly the priests, whose national consciousness grew through their study of literature. From this thin layer, the longing for a rebirth of the Serbian Empire gradually permeated the masses, and quite automatically, the unplanned upsurge of those tortured to the point of bloodshed, who only wanted to shake off cruel tyranny, transformed into a planned uprising aimed at a free and independent Serbian state, much to the unpleasant astonishment of the Turkish rulers, who, after driving out the Janissaries, wanted to settle into the cushions of power in their usual way. But whether, given Karashorsch's considerable military skill and the tenacious bravery of the fighters, the fortunes of arms were on the side of the insurgents, the healthy... Von p. 457 (477) Russia and Serbia. 457 Peasant common sense told them that, in view of the immense superiority on the Turkish side, their freedom could not endure without the guarantee of a major European power. The entire foreign policy of the emerging Serbia, based on its forest origins, had to be exhausted in the search for a protector of its independence. Two powers came into consideration: Austria and Russia. Serbia was connected to the former by the Danube trade route, and to the latter by the Greek faith. Moreover, both states had repeatedly used the Serbs as cannon fodder in their Turkish wars. But whenever, in the days of Prince Eugene and later, the Serbs offered valiant and valuable military support to the imperial banner, thanks from the House of Habsburg were always lacking; the peace agreement regularly left the helpers to their fate and their oppressors. Even for the help that 60,000 Serbs brought to Austria during the Seven Years' War, they received only a few crumbs in the form of the right of self-government for schools and churches. swept from the table. The Serbs, who had settled in Hungary under the Patriarch of Ipek around 1670, following an invitation from Vienna, spun so little silk under the pressure of the Magyars that eighty years later they decided on mass emigration and settled two entire provinces in southern Russia. But the gratitude for loyal military aid from the House of Romanov was no more abundant. Each time, in 1711, 1739, and 1768, the Serbs of Montenegro in particular obediently stood up and sacrificed their property and blood for the Tsar, only to be shamefully abandoned at every peace agreement. When, in 1782, Joseph II and Catherine II, brought together by the predatory dismemberment of Poland, agreed on the partition of European Turkey, the Tsarina, with a placid gesture, pushed the largest part Serbian land to the partner in the deal. Nevertheless, Serbs and Montenegrins fought with such self-sacrifice in the war of the allied Austrians and Russians against the Turks (1787 to 1791) that they, by their own strength, freed the entire later

Kingdom of Serbia 39/2 p. 458 (478) 458 Russia and Serbia. from the enemy. The Serbs, as usual, could paint their thanks in thin air; the Peace of Svishtovo gave them neither flesh nor bones. No wonder that those so often betrayed harbored no tender feelings for either power. Hard necessity alone forced them to choose one of the two as their protector, and they unhesitatingly accepted help wherever they could get it. "Like the Turks," writes Stoyan Novakovich, the historian of the Just as the Serbian freedom struggle, "their former teachers and opponents," Karaschorsh and the other Serbian leaders also followed the principle that one must always have two irons in the fire. They fought incessantly and negotiated simultaneously; they sought help both in Constantinople and in St. Petersburg or Vienna, establishing connections both in negotiations and in armed conflict, animated by the sole desire to consolidate and secure the freedoms so hard-won as much as possible." When, however, the Serbian leaders knocked on the doors of St. Petersburg and Vienna during the first year and a half of the uprising, both powers, heavily occupied in Western Europe, limited themselves to comforting but unfounded promises, and nothing more than a very platonic "exchange of ideas" between the Austrian, Russian, and Turkish governments emerged. Even a Serbian delegation that found its way to Petersburg in September 1805 to request money and ammunition, experienced leaders, and military aid was initially fobbed off with empty promises, but the Tsarist clan decided to keep the matter in mind as beneficial. Even though throughout 1806 the Serbs hoped in vain for energetic Russian-Austrian intervention and achieved what they achieved through their own efforts, the ruble from then on rolled through the country as an eager recruiter. When, under the influence of Western European events, the alliance between Austria and Russia crumbled and a new Russo-Turkish war was imminent, the Serbs p. 459 (479) Russia and Serbia. 459 and Montenegrins from Petersburg were drawn into the fight, although the Sublime Porte had assured them fairly extensive self-government to achieve a quick peace. But the Muscovite rulers regarded the Serbs merely as vassals, for whom the Tsar's will had to be the supreme and final law. State Councilor Rodofinikin, one of those cunning and unobjectionable agents employed by Tsarist diplomacy throughout the world, appeared in Belgrade with powers and tasks that no official entrusted with the administration of a conquered country could otherwise have brought with him. Karaschorsh's peasant cunning was no match for his cleverness, for he allowed himself to be coerced into signing a Russian-Serbian agreement that quite bluntly placed Serbia under the sovereignty of the Tsar. The result was that in the preliminary peace agreement between Russia and Turkey in August 1807,

Serbia was not even considered: let the "South Slavic brother" see how it got itself out of the jam! In general, bitterness against treacherous Russia was brewing in Serbia, and Karaschorsch was reaching out to Austria. Nevertheless, the Russian agent's intrigues were once again able to thwart an understanding between Turks and Serbs in 1808. "The Serbs remained more firmly bound to Russia and its negotiations with Turkey than before. By rejecting all proposals from the Porte for immediate reconciliation, the Serbs finally relied solely on what Russia would achieve for them. In this way, Serbian affairs became completely dependent on the fortunes of Russia in European politics at the time." (Novakovitch.) For the final peace, the Russian negotiators did, of course, try to secure expanded rights for a geographically expanded Serbia, naturally in the Russian and not in the Serbian interest, but since the renewed outbreak of war put an end to the discussions, the incompetence and inactivity of the Russian commanders, if not malicious premeditation, placed the brunt of the burden on Serbia's shoulders. While, at the Russian request, the core of the Serbian armed forces approached the Adriatic coast in order to awaken desires for rebellion in the Greeks, their troops in Serbia itself faced superior Turkish numbers and found themselves receiving only inadequate support from the Russians. Thus, 1809 became a year of defeats for Serbia. The Turks advanced as far as the mouth of the Morava River. Terror drove many Serbs, with their families, across the Austrian border. Fists clenched in gnashing anger against Russia, whose agent had fled in time. No wonder that hope for Austrian aid was now revived and that Karatschorsch, under the impression of the defeats, offered the Emperor of Austria supremacy over all of Serbia. Although the Hofburg refused to provide direct support to the Serbs, it nevertheless kept in touch with the situation and, above all, allowed the florin to circulate within the country. At the same time, Karatschorsch had unsuccessfully asked Napoleon to take Serbia under his protection and, as a sign of his commitment, to place French garrisons in the Serbian fortresses. The Russians now stirred to reassert their influence and, in 1810, albeit only at the earnest urging of Karaschorsh, provided the Serbs with not ineffective military assistance in clearing the Krajina. But in February 1811, almost at the stroke of midnight, at the same time as a Russian regiment established itself in the fortress of Belgrade, Emperor Alexander, in tentative attempts to renew the Austro-Russian alliance for the partition of Turkey, offered his friendly cousin in Vienna not only Moldavia and Wallachia as far as the Sereth, but also, without regret or shame, Serbia, like breakfast! Forced by consideration for France, Austria refused. In the same year, after the Battle of Rustchuk, the armistice between Russians and Turks also put an end to hostilities in Serbia.

But the peace that followed this armistice in May 1812 struck the Serbs with a heavy blow to the forehead, for Russia conceded to the Turks the occupation of all Serbian fortresses; self-government of the country was only mentioned in passing and in a non-binding manner; moreover, the infamous Article 8 of the Bucharest Peace Treaty commended Serbia to the compassion of the Sublime Porte! Even the Tsar's political confidant, Count Capodistria, openly complained that the peace had delivered the unfortunate Serbs to the arbitrary power of the Turks, and the Russian commander on the lower Danube, Chichagov, had to admit that the Serbs were the first victims of this shameful agreement and, he might have added, the only ones, for Russia managed to gain Bessarabia as a considerable booty for itself in the peace treaty. News of the brazen betrayal committed by the "Patron of all Christian Slavs" caused the Serbian people's representative body, the Skupchina, to explode in uncontrollable fury, and the Serbian plenipotentiaries sent to Constantinople categorically refused to consent to the Peace of Bucharest. Unfortunately for their cause, Napoleon's withdrawal from Russia led to a reconciliation between Petersburg and Vienna, at Serbia's expense, as neither government now had any reason to take up the Serbs in defiance of the other. Indeed, Metternich informed the Porte that Tsar Alexander had no intention of intervening in the impending conflicts between Turks and Serbs. For the rulers in Constantinople, this was a clear warning, and superior Turkish forces descended upon the Serbs in 1813 and crushed them with bloody cruelty. Karaschorsch, paralyzed and headless by the oppressive feeling of being sold and betrayed by his ally, fled to the Austrian bank of the Danube, only to be immediately taken into custody. The dream of Serbia's rebirth had dissolved in blood and fire. But even if Serbia's half-won freedom was shamefully destroyed by Russian treachery, it is still a futile undertaking to simply harp, as Goptschevich does, on Russia's "ruthless, selfish policy" and leave Austria out of the picture altogether. Austrian and Russian diplomacy in their relationship with Serbia were worth each other at that time; Both were guided by the most selfish motives and saw poor, little Serbia merely as an object of their unscrupulous great power politics. One of the most popular means of Russian Oriental policy, even in the eighteenth century, was to incite the Christian Rajah peoples of Turkey in order to disrupt the Ottoman Empire and clear the way to the immovable goal of Constantinople. The Serbs were as suitable as any other cannon fodder for Tsarism as a means to an end, with the only difference being that they could be used not only against the east but also against the west, not only against Turkey but also against Austria. In a secret report from October 1808, the aforementioned agent Rodofinikin discussed how valuable it was

for Russia, especially with regard to Austria, to have a position in Serbia bordering Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, which offered the possibility of causing unrest in Turkey at any time, wherever this might be desired. In order to make Serbia truly only Russia's sentinel in the Balkans, Tsarism sought to loosen the ties between Serbia and Turkey, but by no means to abolish them. An independent Serbia could easily elude Russian influence—Karl Marx makes some thoughtful remarks on this point in his "Eastern Question"—but a wholly or semi-submissive Serbia would have to repeatedly call on Russian help. Therefore, with every peace treaty, Russia was prepared to once again place Serbia in the Turkish chain, and for the same reason, it strove to keep Austrian influence away from Belgrade at all costs. Austria, too, was not at all averse to expanding its power even further southeast, and as long as the alliance with Russia held, Vienna watched the progress of the Serbian uprising with a secret smile, for wherever Russia appropriated a piece of crumbling Turkey, - p. 463 (483) Russia and Serbia. 463, according to the treaty, Austria could not be left out either. It certainly shied away from openly supporting the rebels, for in this age of upheaval, the core of Metternich's worldview was a superstitious fear of legitimacy. In the magical glow of legitimate rule, the Prince of Schleiz-Ebersdorf-Lobenstein stood as untouchable as the Grand Lord in Constantinople, and to assist subjects in the fight against their ancestral lord meant laying the axe to the root of the entire system. Added to this was perhaps a faint fear of the awakening of South Slav nationalism and concern for the peace of mind of the Serbs under Austrian rule. After the break with Russia, however, the Hofburg's concern was to prevent Serbia from becoming a Russian vassal state that threatened the thrice-sacred European balance of power. It was therefore essential to gain a firm foothold in Belgrade, albeit, if possible, without endangering the legitimate principle. As early as 1807, the Emperor's brother, Archduke Charles, proposed in a memorandum occupying Belgrade by force, and a year later, the Austrians sought to achieve the same goal through a bargaining deal: they promised to provide Karaschorsch with ample grain and flour if he would voluntarily surrender Belgrade and the other Serbian fortresses to Austria. Two years later, Metternich emphasized the guiding principles of Austrian Balkan policy as keeping Russian influence away from the right bank of the Danube, and therefore also from Serbia, and mediating peace between Serbia and the Porte, with the aim of establishing a foothold in Belgrade. Napoleon encouraged Metternich in this policy and offered Austria his services to prevent Russian protectorate over Serbia by all means. The fact that in the meantime the dice were being cast over the fate of Europe in the West, on the battlefields of Germany and France,

temporarily diverted the interests of Russia and Austria from Serbia, which had only awakened in each of the two great powers the selfless love of the wolf for the lamb. p. 464 (484) 464 The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx and Engels's Conception. All of this seems like a dim past today, amid the thunder of the World War, and it's hard to fathom why Goptschevich unties dusty bundles of files to act as Austria's advocate against Russia for events a hundred years ago. What is essential to the prehistory of the World War, Serbia's relationship with Russia up to the present day, he treats only in a few inconsequential pages and makes even less effort to delve into its depth. He blithely babbles on the surface: Serbia's "madness to allow itself to be stirred into unjustified hatred against Austria and to turn its gaze to false, duplicitous Moscow," and Pashitsch and his party are merely a gang of corrupt scoundrels who, for the sake of their own personal interests, cold-bloodedly plunged their fatherland into the abyss. This, Gospodine Goptsevich, is historiography in the style of Gustav Kühn's colorful picture books in Neu-Ruppin. Unbiased historical research, which, however, can only unfold after the war, will have to search for the true causes of Serbia's hatred of Austria in a different field than Goptsevich's. HEINRICH CUNOW: The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx and Engels's Conception. While the articles in the previous issue of the "Glocke" in the essay "New Writings by Marx and Engels" from the new Marx-Engels edition on England, just published by Dietz in Stuttgart, mentioned that Marx was by no means an Anglomaniac, but on the whole had a rather low opinion of England's much-praised democratic institutions, the articles in the "New York Tribune" and the "Neue Oder-Zeitung" prove, on the other hand, that his position on the Balkan problems and, more broadly, on the entire Oriental question has been thoroughly misunderstood almost throughout the Social Democratic Party. Until recently, Marx was considered by most of our party press to be a "Turkophile," a politician who who, in order to keep Russianness away from the Balkans and to limit as much as possible the reactionary political influence of the Tsarist Empire on Central and Western Europe, demanded the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans and denied the Balkan Slavs any ability to establish a South Slavic empire open to Western culture. This assessment of Marx and Engels's position on the so-called Balkan question is primarily due to Wilhelm Liebknecht, who, in his memoirs of Marx, tells us that Marx was cured of his romantic predilection for the "people of Homer" and the other Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula by the Turkophile Scottish publicist David Urquhart, that he adopted Urquhart's Turkophile views, and that he ridiculed the "silly sentimentality" of seeing "an oppressed nationality in every sheep rustler who comes into conflict with

Turkey." As often happens, Liebknecht misunderstood his Marx here too, by unconsciously substituting his own opinion for Marx's critical remarks on Balkan events, himself completely caught up in Urquhart's romantic ideas. An interesting example of how students of a master interpret his views from their own perspective. angle and completely reverse it. This is a truly astonishing reversal, for in fact, the statements of Marx and Engels say roughly the opposite of what Liebknecht heard. After all, when a portion of Marx-Engels's "Tribune" articles appeared in the aforementioned collection of the "Eastern Question" in 1897, one in our party should have immediately recognized Liebknecht's statements as completely erroneous, for in this work, not only Marx and Engels repeatedly, in long, hardly misunderstood statements, oppose the maintenance of the status quo on the Balkan Peninsula, p. 466 (486) 466 The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx-Engels's View. Marx also pours on the Turkophilia of the "monomaniac" Urquhart, who is afflicted with fixed ideas and suffers from severe self-aggrandizement. the full extent of his mockery. In the very first article of the "Eastern Question" of March 22, 1853, entitled "Turkey" (in the new Marx-Engels edition, the title is "The Nationalities in Turkey"), it is claimed that only someone "without historical knowledge or insight into the facts" could believe that the existing state of affairs (i.e., the status quo of 1853) could be maintained on the Balkan Peninsula. It literally states: Yet Turkey remains no more in the same position than the rest of the world; and just when the reactionary party has succeeded in restoring what it calls the status quo ante in civilized Europe, one discovers that in the meantime the status quo in Turkey has changed greatly; that new questions, new relationships, new interests have arisen, and that the poor diplomats must begin again where they were interrupted eight or ten years ago by a general earthquake. Maintain the status quo in Turkey! Yes, one might as well try to always keep the carcass of a dead horse at exactly the same degree of decay in which it is, before complete decomposition occurs. Turkey is rotting and will continue to rot more and more as long as the present system of "European balance of power" and the maintenance of the status quo continue; and despite all congresses, protocols, and ultimatums, it will contribute its annual share to diplomatic difficulties and international confusion." Such statements neither resemble enthusiasm for maintaining the status quo, nor do they testify to any Turkophilia. In fact, Marx never suffered from it, even though he neither accepted the naive, indignant accusations of the Christian newspapers of the time about the heinous Turkish atrocities (recently, the "atrocities in Armenia" have taken their place), but viewed the events purely from a developmental-historical perspective. --- Despite these articles in the

"Eastern Question," our party press remained stuck with Liebknecht's statements. Even an essay by N. Ryazanoff in the "Neue Zeit" (Year 1909/10, Vol. 2, p. 4), based on some articles by Engels in the "New York Tribune" and challenging Liebknecht's statements, changed very little, just as little as the lessons of the Balkan Wars of 1912/13. Even when the correspondence between Engels and Marx appeared in 1913 and confirmed the Marx-Engels assessment of the Balkan problem contained in the "Eastern Question," the majority of the Social Democratic Party press, as can be seen from its statements before and at the beginning of the current war of nations, in their previous views. It had become a kind of tradition that Marx had recommended maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, and that such maintenance of the existing situation was the best means of preventing new fighting in the Balkans. The differences between the individual Balkan states, it was said, could easily be bridged by establishing an alliance of states, a Balkan confederation. Admittedly, after the Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Montenegrins had initially fought the Turks together in 1912, these differences had soon led to a dispute over spoils between these powers, in which the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Greeks turned against Bulgaria, while the Romanians used the favorable opportunity to secretly annex the southern part of Dobruja. However harsh the facts might be against all confederation projects, peace in the Balkans was essential, and so all national, economic, and religious differences between the small Balkan states were simply negated or declared easily surmountable. The beautiful illusion of a peaceful reconciliation of all interests through the establishment of a Balkan Federation continued to be pursued. As the above quotation shows, which could easily be expanded by further excerpts from their articles written for the "New York Tribune," Marx and Engels, neither at the time of the Crimean War nor later, indulged the delusion that the existing conditions in the Balkans could be preserved. They recognized as early as 1853 that the liberation of the small Christian nations p. 468 (488) 468 The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx-Engels's Conception. from Turkish rule was a historical necessity that would and must be accomplished sooner or later, and history has proven them right in this. But just as they foresaw this later development, they also recognized as early as 1853 that peaceful coexistence of these small Balkan states, in view of the racial, religious, and economic differences, the different cultural levels and cultural skills, would be impossible. If the Balkans were to be opened up to Western culture, this could, in their view, only happen if the most culturally capable and internally strongest of the Balkan peoples gained supremacy over the others and swept them along with them. In such a mixed population as the Balkans, according

to an article in the Tribune of April 7, 1853 (Vol. 1, p. 147), only one of the various nationalities can ever assume power, and since the Turks could not be this under the given circumstances, only the South Slavs would be capable of doing so. "First," Engels stated in an editorial in the New York Tribune of April 21, 1853, "it is an undeniable fact that the peninsula, which is simply called European Turkey, is the natural inheritance of the South Slav race. Of the twelve million inhabitants, seven belong to it. For twelve hundred years it has possessed the soil. Apart from a sparse population which, although of Slavic origin, has nevertheless adopted the Greek language, its rivals are Turkish and Arnautian barbarians, who have long since established themselves as have proven themselves to be entrenched opponents of any progress. On the other hand, the South Slavs are the exclusive bearers of civilization in the interior of the country. They may not have formed a nation yet, but in Serbia they are already the most powerful and relatively educated core of a nation." This view, that only the Balkan Slavs, even if they are not yet a truly civilized people, alone possess the ability to establish a rule of their race in the Balkans, recurs several times in the letters of Marx and Engels. In their opinion, Turkey's monopoly on rule is no longer tenable, but to claim that this rule can only be overthrown "if one replaces them with Russians p. 469 (489) The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx-Engels's View. 469 or Austrians, is at the same time to assert that the present political condition of Europe must endure forever and ever." It is therefore precisely the opposite of what Liebknecht claimed: Marx does not want to maintain the status quo in the Balkans; rather, he considers such maintenance impossible. He does not deny the Balkan Slavs the ability to establish a southern Slavic empire; on the contrary, he considers the rule of the South Slavs in the Balkans to be the only possible solution to the so-called Eastern Question. While Engels still assumed in 1853/54 that the Serbs would play the actual leadership role in this Slavic Balkan empire of the future, the more Serbia surrenders to Russian influence and favors Russia's ambitions for power on the peninsula, the more Serbs decline in Engels's opinion. As some letters from Engels to Marx from 1876 show, Engels's former overestimation of the Serbs is replaced by a near-contempt for the role that Serbs, as early as the 1870s, began to play as Russian agents on the Balkan Peninsula. However, such a Slavic empire, if it expands and consolidates in the Balkans, would, according to Marx and Engels, inevitably come into conflict for political and economic reasons with the Russian Empire, which was striving for possession of the Dardanelles. Engels recognized as early as 1853 that the Russians would initially be welcomed by the Balkan Slavs as blood-related liberators; but stronger than the ties of

blood and religion are economic interests, and so Engels prophesied (Vol. 1, p. 169): "No matter how many ties blood kinship and common religion may forge between Russians and South Slavs, their interests will nevertheless diverge from the day the latter liberate themselves. The commercial needs arising from the geographical position of the two countries make this understandable." Russia, the compact landlocked country, today produces predominantly agricultural products, and perhaps later also industrial products. p. 470 (490) 470 The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx-Engels' Conception. The Greco-Slav peninsula is, admittedly, of relatively small size; but its extensive coastlines are washed by three seas, one of which it dominates; it is mainly a trading country with transit traffic, although it also possesses sufficient capabilities for its own independent production. Russia's economy is geared toward monopoly, that of the South Slavs toward expansion." Due on the one hand to this antagonism against Russia, and on the other hand to the interest in directing trade from Western and Central Europe to Asia Minor, if possible, via the Balkans, the South Slavs will later repeatedly seek ties with the West. It is truly astonishing with what insight Marx and Engels recognized, as early as 1853/54, the direction that developments in the Balkans have actually taken to this day; and, given their entire understanding, there is no doubt that, had they lived through today's war, they would have advocated for the establishment of a large, hegemonic Bulgarian empire aligned with the Central Powers. But doesn't the advocacy of South Slavic supremacy in the Balkans contradict the right of the other Balkan peoples to national independence? Certainly, but for Marx and Engels, such a right does not exist at all, but only for popular vulgar Marxism. and universal democracy. Marx presents the course of history as a great process of merging humanity, once fragmented into countless small tribes, peoples, and small nations, into great, gigantic nations, and in this process, only that which proves to be a historical necessity, inherent in the course of development, has any legitimacy. To say at a certain stage of development: "Up to now, the history of development has taught us that small nations have repeatedly been absorbed by the large nations, but now things are to be different, and we therefore make the legal demand that henceforth each of the small nations be recognized as a sacred, natural right to national and political independence" would have seemed to Marx nonsense, a foolish mockery of the entire historical development. For him, there is no such thing as p. 471 (491) The Balkan Question in the Light of Marx-Engels's Conception. 471 not a law derived from any ethical assumptions, wishes, or expediencies, standing outside the facts of development, but only a historical law rooted in such facts. The new Marx-Engels edition also offers interesting

evidence for this, e.g. For example, in the articles in the Neue Oder-Zeitung of April 21 and 24, 1855, on "Pan-Slavism," in which Marx contrasts the Pan-Slavist aspirations of the Austrian Slavs with the law of history: "Pan-Slavism," Marx explains in the article of April 21, 1855, "is a movement not only for national independence, it is a movement that strives to undo what a thousand years of history has created, a movement that cannot be realized without wiping Turkey, Hungary, and half of Germany off the map of Europe, a movement that, should it achieve this result, cannot ensure its permanence except through the subjugation of Europe." And in an article published a few days later, it states: "In order to reassert imaginary nationalities, the Pan-Slavists declare themselves ready to sacrifice eight hundred years of de facto participation in the civilization of Russo-Mongolian barbarism. Wasn't that the natural result of a movement that began with a decisive reaction against the course of European civilization and sought to rein in world history?" * - It is at least in part a very different Marx who speaks to us through these newspaper articles than the Marx of the common, vulgar Marxist legend. And the value of these articles lies in the fact that they show us how Marx (and in a certain sense Engels too) viewed and assessed world events of the time on the basis of their historical and social theoretical outlook, not in the temporal trappings. The question of whether Marx always correctly assessed the motives of a minister, e.g., Palmerston, in the day-to-day political struggle, whether he was mistaken about individual dates or, for example, underestimated the influences of certain English parliamentary greats or courtiers, is not even relevant in comparison. Hopefully, the two further p. 472 (492) 472 God and the English. Further planned volumes of the new "Collected Writings," which are to contain a series of unknown Marx articles from the years 1856 to 1862 on England, the Credit Mobilier, the Russo-Anglo Alliance, the Indian Revolt, as well as essays from the American Encyclopedia, as well as on the Italian War and the struggle between the northern and southern states of the Union, will also be published soon. And what about the fragments of theoretical works that have been found in Marx's estate? As far as I know, a large manuscript written by Marx himself was found in the estate of Mrs. Lafargue, Marx's daughter, in which he comments on Lewis H. Morgan's prehistoric research. It might be of interest to some circles if Ryazanoff were to comment on when this work is expected to be published. TAMEN: WHO God and the English. HE the newspapers of the nations at war with Germany objectively reads will always follow with particular pleasure the articles intended to lure the neutrals out of their neutrality. Neither Holland nor Denmark evidently know as well what is truly useful to them as the Parisian and London newspapers, which daily

remind them anew in a fatherly and truly selfless manner. But the most distinguished neutral, whom the Entente is courting in this bitter struggle, is God. Day after day, the Pope rides along the Russian front and blesses the just cause in the name of God, while behind the front the cannons are already being mounted, forcing the poor illiterates into the deadly enemy fire. And while England, by all sorts of means, the morality of which is certainly debatable, is trying to starve the German people, according to the English newspapers- p. 473 (493) God and the English. 473 prayer services were held in London's churches every week so that German women and children would not suffer too badly from this hunger. Perhaps this most powerful of all neutrals, the good Lord, even feels a certain regret in England that he cannot be forced, as he did with Greece, to stand up for the truly good cause. One cannot possibly compare these things with the situation during the Thirty Years' War. Certainly, material interests ultimately underlay the fighting back then, too, but they were deeply hidden, and in the people's consciousness, religious passions clashed quite seriously, and each of the opponents praying for victory was honestly convinced that he was the only true champion of the divine cause. Today, however, an aging trading state wants to strangle a competitor that has become unpleasant with cunning and force. In a sense, it is expected of God to ensure that English cotton is bought more than German cotton. The world is They have simply become materialistic, and one no longer fights for passions, but for very real things. England will never succeed in making the aura it would like to create around this war even remotely credible in the eyes of its own citizens. At times, it even quite honestly admits its true nature. Only when the English newspapers report on church services and religious events do they consistently adopt a pose as if they wanted to prevent God from seeing into their hearts. The most wonderful thing is that the islanders, who are more God-fearing than God-fearing, seem to seriously believe in the success of such efforts. God, who is all-powerful and all-knowing, is placed on a par with those neutrals who have allowed themselves to be deceived by England. The English church newspapers repeatedly speak of the God of Old England, just as if God were English 39/3 p. 474 (494) 474 Glosses. Blood in his veins and a burning interest in the prosperity of the factories in Birmingham and Manchester. If God were to one day abandon his neutrality and declare himself against England, he would certainly have nothing to laugh about. England would then realize that God was ungrateful to him and would know how to punish him for his Germanization. It would most likely create a counter-god, for which purpose it would have the greatest choice among the gods of its colored comrades. And since the uncle of the King of England was

already giving a speech in favor of the British Empire before his beloved Indians in full chieftain's finery, nothing would stand in the way of declaring Manitou, the Great Spirit, the English god. That would be all the more correct since he is a god of human sacrifices. Glosses. Political Characters. DR. FRIEDBERG, THE leader of the National Liberal parliamentary group and ambivalent like them. In cultural matters, absolutely Liberal, even quite resolute, not sworn to the sacred authority of the district administrators, but in tax matters, big capitalist and in state policy, property-conservative. Radical to the East, reactionary to the West. Not decisive enough to break away from plutocratic ideas of electoral law, strongly under the spell of pan-German world power ideas, in constant contact with the greats of the coal, iron, and steel world, and yet far too clever to, like certain of his party friends, ruin things with the rest of bourgeois humanity. His polemical wit, sometimes sharp against the right, even more ironic, also indignant against the extreme left, points to the Talmudic-honed intellect of his forefathers. Herein lies a braking factor against all too exaggerated nationalism. After all, still staunchly Hakatist. A fine mind, yet devoid of success; the self-imposed shackles hinder any decisive movement. And if it When it comes down to it, the heart's pull to the right has always been the voice of fate. Bassermann could tell us something about that, from the time when he was just driven to the left. What a pity about this bourgeois professor, who is incapable of rising to bourgeois politics. p. 475 (495) Glosses. 475 The abolition of gravity. Thirty or more years ago, the magazine "Daheim" carried a very strange story that has stuck in my mind, at least in its main features. One night, a couple of late-night strollers, crossing a bridge, noticed a man clinging convulsively to the railing with both hands, his legs staring vertically into the air, or rather, flailing in the air. He calls for help, and the revelers hold on to him just long enough until he explains his strange situation and thus reveals his secret. In their astonishment, their grip loosens, and the man floats off into unknown distances. But they have his secret: The man is, or was, a great scholar who had turned to physics and succeeded in fathoming the ultimate origin of the law of gravity. Once he had discovered this, it was naturally no longer impossible for him to find ways and means to counteract gravity. One had only to do this and that, and the earth lost its attraction for the immunized object; it floated freely in space. Finally, the scholar had made himself the subject of an experiment and truly lost gravity; At the last moment, he was just able to grab the bridge railing to temporarily secure himself before he floated out of the Earth's orbit. But when his muscles weakened and his helpers failed, it was all over; the man with the suspended force of gravity was simply gone! Among "Daheim" readers, the gruesome

story of the man who, in his scientific pride, had tempted God by snooping around in his holy and eternal laws, aroused great interest, which was expressed in numerous letters – until the editors put an end to the matter by declaring it an April Fool's joke. But a good joke always contains some truth, even if the author isn't aware of it. I have now, after thirty or more years, discovered that the author of that "at home" story about the abolition of gravity was a prophet; it's just a pity I've forgotten his name. Prophet—or perhaps a future-looking satirist. If we substitute "national affiliation" for "gravity," we have the whole of inventor's misfortune before our eyes. A whole school of thought came together, devoting all its thought and speculation to how to render the natural law of gravity—no, of national affiliation—ineffective. The wise men and women pondered and pondered until their heads were spinning, and finally they came to the conclusion: international-antinational-anational. After the theory had been painstakingly developed, it was time for experimentation, and in the study, everything went smoothly. 39/3* p. 476 (496) 476 Glosses. Like clockwork. The great secret had been revealed: to free humanity, from Papuans and Pasherahs to Englishmen (of course, for the true scholar in the study, the English are the highest type!) from the gravity of nationality, to enable them to swarm smoothly through the ether. Smooth, because organized, swarming, mind you; even the English were expected to neither use elbows nor deliver kicks. And then, in 1914, the day came when the invention would be put into practice. The school was prepared and wanted to set an example for the world. Were they all now flying into the air and further into the vacuum, the denationalized, like the "home" man who had eliminated gravity for himself? Everything went well until the bridge railing! There they did "handstands" like good gymnasts and kicked their legs (the female adepts with their petticoats down) in the air. But it wasn't enough to float away. When their muscle strength gave out and no one helped them, the theoretical space-floaters plummeted into a moldy swamp. For there was a swamp beneath the bridge. But from the swamp, foul-smelling bubbles rise at regular intervals. About principles. True mouth. The Cassandra cry of violations of principles is as cheap as it is commonplace in the Social Democratic Party. Its originators are usually people who confuse principles with stereotypes. They forget that our principle is not opposition, but the fight for democratic socialism or socialist democracy. Opposition is not a principle. Fundamental opposition is a stereotype created by mental inertia. Principles are propositions that form the basis of our actions. Therefore, the decisive principle can only be the establishment of a state of affairs. Socialist democracy is the state of affairs that we have recognized as the best means of securing the general welfare.

Therefore, our principles are directed toward the positive, constructive, not destructive. Principles can also apply to the means of achieving a goal. The principles of tactics, of immediate action. They can only be directed toward the expediency of action, regulated by general moral laws. Unfortunately, the cosmic principle of gravity makes itself all too noticeable in the spiritual sphere as well, in the form of clinging to the tried and tested. "Upholding resolutions" is, for so many "revolutionarily minded" people, the essence of revolutionary politics. Like a hen tends to its chicks, many a person tends to the few resolutions that are the tangible result of a seemingly fruitful intellectual activity, cackling piteously at the betrayal of all principles when the resolutions lose their power of conjuring. Acting on principle, however, does not mean preserving the sacred traditions of the fathers. Applying the resolution template and refusing to play along when life no longer fits the template is no art, but it doesn't get us anywhere either. Daily rethinking and re-examining what brings us closer to our goal is difficult and can even lead to mistakes, but it is the only method to achieve success. The constant worry about violating principles demonstrates not only a lack of confidence in the power of principles, but also a lack of discernment of their essence. Anyone who believes the principles are exhausted in a few resolutions lacks insight into the social universality of socialist democracy. They are a slave to drilled formulas. Socialist democracy encompasses all of social life. It will therefore remain a desirable goal for a long time to come, even if we will have made considerable progress on the path to it than we have today. For the same reason, differences of opinion will persist for the foreseeable future about what is still necessary to perfect socialist democracy. Therefore, it can always be a controversial question of the day whether one should oppose or support a government. It can, however, be oppositional or friendly. It should be neither a matter of principle to oppose nor to support the government. We even hope that we will have a parliamentary system of government long before the demands of social democracy are met. Then, with orderly party relations, it will simply be the case that the parliamentary majority leads the government. In a parliamentary system, the question cannot even arise for a large, parliamentary-leading party whether it is compelled by principle to form opposition or not. If a government belonging to another party does not act according to its will on essential issues, it will try to take control of the government itself. From this perspective, however, we should already look at the questions of day-to-day politics today, where we will have to fight for the parliamentary system for a long time to come. Then many doubts will be resolved about what position we should take towards the government and what violates or conforms to our fundamental principles. THE "An English

Specialty..." The World War is not only being fought with all the refinement of modern technology, but our enemies are also firing every mine of the modern commercial and advertising spirit. The coolly calculating English business sense, in particular, is not hidden. It is evident in the methods of recruiting soldiers, in the p. 478 (498) 478 Glosses. treatment of neutrals and allies alike, in dozens of small and large aspects of the warfare. Therefore, on the enemy island, no one will appreciate the cold comedy of a proposal made by the English newspaper "Spectator": it calls for large-scale defector propaganda among the German soldiers, agitation using all means of unscrupulous business advertising. Aircraft are supposed to rain clouds of postcards down on the German lines, peppered with quotations from "satisfied letters" from German prisoners, with references to the poor treatment in the German army, with questions like: "Is it worth the effort to endure all this?" "In view of the treatment we are receiving, are we justified in not enduring it any longer?" "Not only must we shout to them: Good treatment of prisoners is an English specialty!, but we must also add: In the British lines, every opportunity is offered to surrender quickly and easily. Do it now!" Who doesn't think of the methods of the bargain bazaars, of the tricks of all the clever swindlers and swindlers: How can I get ahead quickly and easily?! How can I get rich quickly and easily?! But this "English specialty" still contains some clues for those in charge. One can laugh at these and similar postcard tricks, but it is even healthier to blunt their edge. In domestic politics, give to the people what is the people's, and in the army, give to the national defender what the national defender deserves. In the face of a people's army, any enemy's art of seduction becomes ridiculous. A debate on England in 1848. In the Constituent National Assembly in Frankfurt am Main, the session of June 14, 1848, on the occasion of the unfriendly neutrality observed by England towards the German Confederation in the German-Danish conflict, brought about a debate on England, which deserves to be rescued from oblivion both by the outstanding personalities of the speakers and by the content of the speeches. First, Ruge spoke in favor of European disarmament; then he continued: "It is not only the The French, who hold out the possibility of European disarmament, are also the English; for the Cobden party proposed this as early as 1847. The English view of war is generally quite different from that of glory, of pistol and cannon shooting; the English view of war is that one has soldiers to use them for mercantile and civil purposes; they regard war only as a means of trade, as armed trade with the barbarians; that is the English view of war; that is how they have dealt with China, and that is how they would deal with Germany if it did not cease to be China, which we are currently in the process of accomplishing;

we are finally working to ensure that this Chinese economy is established in Germany. finally reached its end. . . . " (Bravo and applause.) Karl Vogt, the professor of zoology in Giessen and colonel of the Giessen Citizens' Guard, also took the floor. He spoke powerfully, first, for the establishment of an unarmed peace in Europe "as the ultimate goal and greatest task." But then he continued: "We have been told that England is our natural ally. It seems to me that this is one of those aspects of outdated politics which finds an ally in those governments which pay subsidies to princes in order to induce them to give up the land to the threshing floor on which other nations fight their wars. (Bravo from several sides.) That is the role the English have played as allies up to now. Where they were still our allies, we Germans were the ones who fought things out with their blood, and England paid money for it to a few privileged individuals. (Lively bravo.) That is the role the English have played as allies up to now. Such an alliance policy, gentlemen, and such an ally, I will no longer wish for in the future, and even more so an ally who, after having paid the little money in subsidies, then drains it like a leech from the marrow of the people by Trade agreements, through customs interests, and similar manipulations. (Stormy bravos from the assembly and the gallery.) So fierce and instinctive was the hatred that filled the champions of the revolutionary democracy of 1848 against British world domination, to which so many peoples and states had sacrificed their happiness and freedom! THEY The house of injustice. YOU sit on the wall under the linden tree and watch how the sun's redness gloriously showers the Alps, and the other two also come over, listening, as he begins: What do you think someone in the cellar of our castle would see of this evening? The hatches in the vault, too high for the eyes, will only give him an ugly glow of red! It will be better in the rooms on the lower floor; although there are no windows to the outside either, one sees the reflection in the courtyard and senses the splendor! Only upstairs, where the windows from the halls allow a clear view in all directions, can the resident Sit comfortably in a niche and enjoy the view! Now imagine, friends, there were no stairs in this house, so that the gentlemen in the halls were the only ones who could enjoy it. p. 480 (500) 480 Glosses. The citizens in the rooms below could not climb up, although the reflection in the courtyard made their blood race; but the poor people would sit imprisoned in the vaults in windowless darkness and would only have the dull red glow of God's sun on the hatch! Thus, friends, is the house of injustice built around the classes of society. Therefore I have strove all my life and have become a fool before their eyes to build the stairs of human education into this house of injustice." Thus the aged Pestalozzi spoke to his colleagues in Burgdorf, the last station on his long and painful journey as an

educator. 1 Pestalozzi's life and teachings still occupy pedagogical and philosophical circles. He resembles a fountain of youth that never ages, always provides cool water, and cannot be exhausted. He is not a fictional character at all. And yet there is something in his nature that demands to be clearly and distinctly brought to light: his intuitive powers of observation, his indestructible optimism, his strong belief in the power of human education, his hope for a better future for humanity. Pestalozzi also contained a part of the poet and fabulist. Moreover, he was also a politician without wanting to be: his new educational ideas were political battle cries. That is why, with his "education of mankind," he is still known today to all conservative and reactionary circles as the "revolutionary and the confuser of immature village schoolteachers." A century had to pass before a poet placed Pestalozzi's life, which actually only took place on a small scale, on the full stage of life, bathed it in the sun of poetry, and gave his followers an artistically transfigured development of this unique man. One cannot read this book without inner involvement, and no one will put it down without that feeling of devotion and emotion that every true work of art evokes in us. Of course, the sensationalism is not appreciated in this context. But the reader is richly rewarded by the psychological subtleties, the poetic imagery, and the noble language. Pestalozzi's life's work was the upliftment of humanity through education. His longing and his work were always for the poor and oppressed, and even before his death, the establishment of an orphanage was the ultimate goal of his wishes. When he faced the inner choice: to join the rich or the poor, he didn't need to ponder it for long; he bravely sided with the disinherited. Their inner and outer upliftment was the content of his life. Dr. Palatinus. 1 Day in the Life of a Humanitarian. Novel by Wilhelm Schäfer. Munich 1916, published by Gg. Müller. p. 481 (501) DIE GLOCKE 40th Issue 30 December 1916 2nd Year Reprint of all articles permitted with detailed source references Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: DIE Friedensecho. The responses of Pokrowski, Briand, Sonnino and Lloyd George to the German peace offer turned out as one had to expect and as had been predicted here. All rejected the proposal, and the difference in their speeches concerned only the justification for their rejection. It would not be a good sign for German diplomacy if one could say that it had expected a different outcome from its peace efforts. It was, of course, perfectly clear that at a time when the old ministry in England had to make way for a new one because it was accused of lacking energy in conducting the war, when in Russia English puppets were becoming ministers because the previous Russian ministers were not reliable enough for the English war party, when in France Briand was wavering because people were dissatisfied with his military successes, that

at such a moment, voices of peace would find no echo in the cabinets. When the Central Powers nevertheless issued their call for peace, they knew very well what they were doing. The more seriously their note served peace, the more surely it would have an effect like an apple of Eris in the enemy camp, and the excellent Briand did not fail to describe it directly as an "act of war." The Central Powers did not shy away from the possibility that this call for peace would be interpreted in enemy territory as proof of their weakness, 40/1 p. 482 (502) 482 The Peace Echo. As it happened, too. On the Eastern Front, loud Russian cheers greeted the news of the German peace offer. It was believed that the Germans were declaring themselves defeated. And in the Western states, the press had widely spread the conviction that the Central Powers, despite Bucharest, were on the verge of collapse, both militarily and economically, so that here, too, it was easy for the state leaders to characterize the German call for peace as merely a bitter cry of despair born of deep distress. Despite all this, the Central Powers' peace move remains the wisest achievement their diplomacy has achieved during the war. By adopting a position on the peace offer, the Entente was forced to abandon, at a stroke, all the mendacious phrases it had been feeding its public for months and to state quite soberly what was. By rejecting the German offer, it recognized Germany as the victor. Weeks earlier, Lloyd George had said in his Boxer Speech: initiating peace at this moment would be nothing other than an acknowledgment of the German victory. In England, there is a perfectly clear understanding that if the Central Powers are not defeated, they will have won, and that accordingly, if England does not want to relinquish its previous world position, it must continue this war until the destruction and dismemberment of Central Europe. This predicament does not exist for the other Entente powers. They could, purely from the standpoint of their material national needs, very well agree to a peace of mutual understanding. If they did not, it would only be because they are under the dictatorship of England. And precisely for this reason, the speeches of the Russian, French, and Italian leaders were hollow tirades, whose blaring fanfare was only intended to conceal the fact that foreign, not their own, state interests were being represented. This is closely linked to the second important consequence. By rejecting the German peace offer, the Entente powers openly declared their intentions of conquest and annihilation and formally assumed sole responsibility for the further bloodshed. p. 483 (503) The Peace Echo. 483 Now, one should not believe that the admission by the enemy governments that they are waging a naked war of plunder would have a particularly cooling effect on their peoples, who had previously been told that it was about preserving "culture" and "civilization." Neither the

Russians, nor the French, nor the English, for whom wars of conquest have been the national ideal for centuries, are as timid as the "timid" Germans. Nevertheless, after 22 years of World War, even these peoples are now so exhausted that they can no longer be issued with long-term bills of exchange. Any enemy statesman who willfully lets the opportunity to conclude a tolerable peace pass can only do so if he simultaneously guarantees a swift and brilliant victory. If he cannot keep his promise, he will sail into the abyss. But the prospects for such a victory for the Entente are bleak enough. Its leaders will surely redouble their efforts and burden their peoples with new, unprecedented sacrifices. But the greater the sacrifices become and the longer victory—namely, the swift and brilliant, all-shattering victory—is elusive, the more critical the situation becomes. the mood in the Entente camp; for then the realization grows that further bloodshed could have been avoided, that the war had been continued for the sake of fantastic goals of conquest at a time when the enemy was inclined towards peace, and that the continuation of the war was solely in England's interest. If, in such a critical situation, the Entente powers were struck by a powerful military blow, it could be their end. And the German Empire is working towards such a blow with concentrated energy. Compared to the gigantic efforts that the German people have undertaken today in the terrible struggle for their lives, what does the levée en masse of France at the height of its revolutionary energy in 1792 and 1793 mean? What does 40/1* p. 484 (504) 484 The Peace Echo. the great French Revolution in general Next to today's world revolution? Even the boldest imagination of our most determined revolutionaries could not imagine a situation like the one we are currently facing. For Friedrich Engels, a war in which only Russians and French marched against Germany was already a life-and-death struggle for Germany, in which it could only secure its national existence by applying the most revolutionary measures. In such a situation, he wrote warningly to the French socialists in 1891, the Germans would prove that 1893 could hold its own next to 1793! Today, Russians and French play only the role of "administrative accessories." If we were only dealing with them, the war would have been over years ago. The situation in which Germany finds itself today exceeded even the boldest imagination of an Engels, if only because he would never have believed it possible that he and Marx could be imprisoned as enemy aliens in an English concentration camp, as they both certainly would have been today! In its current situation, compared to which the desperate situation of 1893 described by Engels seems like a friendly idyll, Germany can only save itself by applying the most revolutionary measures. In this respect, the law on national auxiliary service represents an

important stage. It represents the most revolutionary intervention in national economic life that the war has so far produced. And just as the government could only be forced to take this step by the dictatorship of circumstances, it will be driven to even further consequences by this same dictatorship. But all are working in the same direction: to raise the nation's fighting power to the peak. We know, and the Reich administration knows too, that munitions alone will not do the trick. Moral factors are just as necessary. But nothing has a more powerful effect, nothing closes ranks so closely, than the conviction that this is a defensive war and a fight to the death. With their offer of peace, the Central Powers have confirmed this conviction in their p. 485 (505) The Peace Echo. 485 their own peoples, thereby gaining a tremendous moral advantage over the Entente powers. But their own advantage appears to the other side as a disadvantage, and in fact, nothing is more likely to have a corrosive effect on the moral cohesion of the masses and their governments in the enemy countries than the conviction that the sons of the country are not falling in a war dictated by the absolute vital interests of the nation, but rather for the sake of naked aims of conquest. This process of moral disintegration should and must, however, have become so deeply ingrained by the German offer of peace by next spring that the Entente no longer possesses the necessary moral resilience to withstand significant military blows. To strengthen itself for such blows—that is the task that the German people must accomplish during the winter months. The enemy is also arming, we know it. He is arming to destroy us, to turn the German people back into the beggars they have been for centuries. Having forced the Entente powers to admit these predatory aims is, after all, not the smallest success of the German peace offer. Lloyd George already declared in his Boxer Speech that England would crush Germany. In his speech of December 19, he demanded: complete restoration, full satisfaction, effective guarantees. This, of course, does not mean that England is prepared to fully restore the German colonies, for example, in exchange for the surrender of Belgium. Rather, these are all conditions that England wants to dictate. And that the World Distribution Syndicate is busy again here, as it was already at work before the war and also appeared so cheerfully during the war in the treaty of 1915 concerning the fate of Constantinople and the partition of Turkey, needs no explanation and is already clearly evident from the phrases about "full satisfaction" and "effective guarantees". Even the "Vorwärts", which, of course, with its view of England in the German Social Democracy is becoming more and more " p. 486 (506) 486 The Peace Echo. isolated, now writes soberingly: "The satisfaction can only consist in the payment of war reparations or in the cession of territory by Germany. Lloyd George does not

say which of the two he means; it is to be assumed that it is both. And that the "effective guarantees" are to consist of far more than a promise by Germany is sufficiently demonstrated by the single sentence of the speech. Here one can only think of things like the surrender of the German fleet, the limitation of the German armed forces at the discretion of the Entente, and so on." This is certainly a welcome realization that suddenly emerges here, but we would have wished that "Vorwärts," instead of using the English statesman's speech as an opportunity to once again encourage the Working Group and the Spartacus elements, had finally followed Scheidemann's advice and said bluntly what Scheidemann so brilliantly summed up in his Bielefeld speech on December 16th : "If the English brusquely reject the German offer, then for us too there can only be one fight to the last man. This must, of course, be made clear to the foreign countries; For there is nothing more stupid than whining for peace, that is, crying out for peace in powerless gestures, mere pleading and begging, which can only create the impression that Germany is at its end and cannot endure much longer." This fresh manner in which Scheidemann expressed himself on the matter is extremely gratifying and testifies to how effective the educational process is gradually becoming that the attitude of our enemies is exerting on the spirit and self-esteem of German Social Democracy. Such voices have not yet been allowed to be heard in "Vorwärts" itself, however. Here, until now, that "stupid whining for peace" prevailed, which Scheidemann so aptly characterized, and which we may now perhaps hope, given the new tone struck, will gradually disappear. Nothing is more likely to expel the comical illusions of certain "Austro-Marxists" about England than the brutal manner in which England is now tearing the German peace offer to pieces and throwing it into the corner. The reaction on these somewhat soft-sweet souls is very beneficial; for it forces them to look at the world soberly and without the illusions about England that stem from the childhood years of the German bourgeoisie. And given the influence these "Austro-Marxists" still have in the German working-class press, this process of disillusionment is not the worst service the German peace offer can provide to the German working class and its spokesmen. But beyond that, it also has a significance for Social Democracy in the enemy countries, especially in France, that cannot yet be foreseen. Suppose the German Social Democracy were in the position of the French party: the enemy makes a peace offer and makes it clear enough that it renounces secession from the body of the German Reich. If, in such a situation, the German Reich leadership were to behave as Briand is behaving, the German Social Democracy would refuse, down to the last man, the means to continue the war. There would be not the slightest doubt about

that. This is how they acted in 1870 after September 2, when Germany rejected the French peace offer. And what is the French Social Democrats doing? Their two most important literary spokesmen are Hervé, who still sits on the party executive, and Renaudel, the leader of "Humanité" and a well-known member of parliament. Neither of them is thinking of changing their tactics. Renaudel even supported Briand's dictatorial ambitions and managed to justify the dictatorship bill in the House of Representatives on December 15 by arguing that the House had too many good republicans to have any reason to fear dictatorship. In his "Humanité," he had responded to Scheidemann's slogan: "What is French should remain French" by saying that the evacuation of French soil must begin in Alsace-Lorraine. The response of the French Social Democrats to the German peace offer is, for the time being, a hoarse cry for conquests! Indeed, it gives the very impression that the French majority is allowing itself to be abused by Briand and his cronies to suppress the pro-peace mood in France. The fact that part of French territory is occupied by the enemy is no excuse for this. But it does explain the other fact that the minority in the party believes it has already done a great deal by speaking out against the outright rejection of the German call for peace. Nevertheless, there are already signs that the French Social Democrats will not be able to escape the moral influences of the German peace offer for long. They, too, who, as a well-known German party newspaper recently noted, have so far represented in France the standpoint represented in Germany by Westarp, Bassermann, and Reventlow, will learn to incorporate the word "peace" into their vocabulary. Any word about the attitude of the English workers' representatives toward the German peace offer is superfluous. They are Lloyd George's most excellent warmongers and eagerly participate in his boxing policy. This attitude of the foreign workers' representatives must exert an influence on the mental state of German Social Democracy that must sooner or later become apparent. It is as if international socialism had conspired to inculcate critical restraint and a stronger sense of self-respect into its German section with fistfights for the times of the future Third International. The lesson must not be lost. The essay was written before the peace notes from America and Switzerland were available. It cannot be denied that both manifestos have served the cause of peace, and we therefore sincerely welcome them. It is clear, however, that the American note, as it caused greater surprise, can also claim greater importance. The English press is gruffly dismissing Wilson, and it is indeed difficult to believe that English anger at America's move is hypocritical. The case of the English warmongers has certainly not been improved by Wilson. Throughout the war, the American President had always

proven himself a loyal advocate of English interests, and there is no reason to assume that he has now changed his position. Indeed, we too believe that a peace agreement would be the best option in the current situation, especially from the English point of view. It would certainly mean English defeat, but England no longer has any serious prospect of averting this. The probability is much greater that a continuation of the war would only make English defeat more severe. Whether English conceit is yet ripe for this harsh realization is another question. But that does not change the fact that Wilson's step is, in the objective sense of the word, the best English policy. Indeed, he is perhaps precisely capable of recognizing true English interests, perhaps better than the fiery Lloyd George, because he stands somewhat more removed from the situation. But even American interests, which until now saw their strongest advance in supporting the horrific slaughter, are beginning to desire a peace policy. The warning issued by the highest American banking authority against the further assumption of foreign loans came as a thunderclap in England and will considerably increase the Entente's grave financial embarrassment. In any case, the Federal Reserve Board's call for peace is a strong push toward peace and not the worst proof that America's and England's interests are largely identical here again. Now, there are, of course, people in Germany who want nothing to do with peace precisely because it is in England's interest. But peace is also in Germany's interest; it is even more in Germany's than England's, because if it were concluded now, it would mean a triumph for the Central Powers and a defeat for the Entente, as well as an irreversible shock to England's world domination. Central Europe can already have the war aims it needs in the interest of its existence, honor, and freedom of development today. If, as we fear, its enemies still refuse them at this moment, it has every prospect of securing them even if the war continues. But to desire this continuation simply because one hopes to deepen the enemy's defeat and increase one's own war aims is a policy we reject. Dr. LUDWIG QUESSEL, M. d. R.: National Character and Foreign Policy. One often hears supporters of the Socialist Working Group express the view that those party members who stand on the ground of national defense have completely abandoned the ideal of international solidarity. But nothing is more false than that. Certainly, among those party members who feel national defense against external enemies is a socialist duty, a profound change has taken place in their attitude toward the Proletarian International. This shift in thinking that the war brought about in them does not consist in the fact that the high ideal of international solidarity has lost its luster in their eyes, but rather in the reluctant realization that we had enormously overestimated the power and strength of

international solidarity among the workers of the Entente countries. The German workers and their leaders have had to experience with painful sorrow that the fraternal relations they had cultivated with so much love, care, and sacrifice with the working classes of other countries were destroyed almost without a trace by the nationalism of the Entente nations, which had been heated to fever pitch in just a few days. And more than that! We also had to see how proven leaders of the Socialist International, whom we once highly esteemed (Guesde, p. 491 (511) National Character and Foreign Policy. 491 Vandervelde, Plekhanov), abused socialist ideals to disguise a narrow and limited nationalism which, with the lying slogan: "Down with German Militarism!", is heading for the destruction of Germany's economic and political greatness. Various reasons can be given for our overestimation of the strength of international solidarity among the proletariat of the Entente nations. First, in order not to diminish the Socialist International in the eyes of its opponents, we have not emphasized to the extent that the roughly million organized German party members in France corresponded to only a pitiful handful of 80,000, and in England to 38,000 organized socialists, to the extent that would have been necessary. Fundamentally, the Socialist International as a mass movement in the Entente countries was never a social phenomenon that already existed, but rather one that was yet to develop. In the Entente countries, the Socialist International was more a hope for the future than a present value. Its seeds existed, nothing more. The war has now shown us that it was incapable of development, because immediately at the outbreak of war, when they were supposed to prove their viability, the small groups of internationally minded socialists in France and England fled almost entirely to the nationalist camp. However, if we had realistically assessed the immense strength of national feeling in the Entente countries, we really shouldn't have expected anything else. For the French, the word "La France" (France), and for the English, the word "Great Britain" (Great Britain), express something as sublime and eternal as the sun or the universe itself. The powerfully heightened national feeling of the French in the "Marseillaise" sounds to us like the roar of an organ. With the power of a song of hate, which the German is only capable of in moments of extreme excitement, this song preaches the merciless destruction of the enemy, whose filthy blood (sang impur) the French furrows are to soak up. It is for the in p. 492 (512) 492 National Character and Foreign Policy. It is highly characteristic of the French national feeling, heightened to the point of wild hatred of the enemy peoples at a critical time, that they elevated this song of hate to the dignity of a national anthem long after its historical preconditions had vanished. Do not believe that I am

alone in this opinion of the character of the Marseillaise. Anyone who truly knows the text in French will have to agree with me. Comrade Eduard Bernstein occasionally said to me that he detested the Marseillaise for its wild chauvinism. Compared to the storm of this song of hate, our chauvinistic songs have always seemed to me like a gentle spring breeze. It must be noted, incidentally, that the amiable image of the French people portrayed in the circles of the Socialist Working Group does not at all match the descriptions of sharp-sighted Frenchmen who were open to the political weaknesses of their nation. Voltaire, one of the best connoisseurs of French intellectuals, comes to the following conclusion about the national character of the French: "It is always difficult for me to understand how a nation can be so amiable and so bloodthirsty at the same time, how it can move so easily from opera to St. Bartholomew's Day, how it can consist of dancing monkeys and roaring bears at one moment, so inventive and yet so stupid, so brave and so cowardly." In my opinion, Voltaire aptly expressed the contradictory and irritable nature of the French character when they appear as a nation and have an impact on history in this brief description of the French mentality. The description that the French historian and statesman Alexis de Tocqueville draws of the French as a nation is milder in expression, but essentially in the same spirit: When I consider this nation in itself, I find it more unusual than any event in its history. Never has one appeared on earth so full of contrasts and so extreme in its actions, guided more by feelings and less by principles, thereby always causing more or less mischief than was expected of it, sometimes below the ordinary level of humanity, sometimes standing very far above it; a people so unchanging in its chief instincts that one can still recognize it in the portraits made of it two or three thousand years ago, and at the same time so mobile in its daily opinions and in its tastes that it comes to become an unexpected spectacle in itself, and often stands as surprised as strangers at the sight of what it has just done. The most down-to-earth and commonplace of all peoples when left to themselves, but once torn from their quarters and their habits, ready to risk anything and push them to the ends of the earth; unruly by temperament, yet preferring to adapt to the arbitrary and even violent rule of a prince rather than the regulated and free government of their first citizens; today the declared enemy of all obedience, tomorrow exhibiting a kind of passion for servitude that nations better equipped for bondage could not muster; so tightly led by the lead rope that no one resists, ungovernable whenever an example of resistance is given anywhere, thus always deceiving their masters, who fear them either too much or too little; never so free that one would despair of subjugating them, never so subjugated that one could not

still break their yoke; capable of everything, but outstanding only in war. More admirers of fortune, strength, success, splendor, and attention than of true fame; more capable of heroism than virtue, of genius than intelligence, more fitted to conceive immense plans than to execute great undertakings; the most brilliant and dangerous of all the nations of Europe, and the best equipped to become successively an object of admiration, hatred, pity, terror, but never of indifference." p. 494 (514) 494 National character and foreign policy. Anyone who has thoroughly considered Voltaire's and Tocqueville's descriptions of the French national character and knows their almost pathologically heightened national feeling will also better understand Hervé, who before the war wanted to plant the tricolor on the dung heap and today preaches the most aggressive nationalism. The contradictory and irritable nature of the French national character is also dramatically revealed to us in Guesde, who, after having branded the supporters of ministerialism as traitors for a generation, at that very moment greedily sought the mi- Ministerial portfolio, where more than ever a clean separation from the rulers of the bourgeois republic, burdened with heavy blood guilt, would have been more appropriate. However, one must be very careful not to draw too far-reaching conclusions for one's own country's foreign policy from such descriptions of a people's national character. National character resembles a broad current that appears unchanging to the superficial eye, and in a certain sense is, but which nevertheless remains very dependent on the times. A critical eye can always distinguish subcurrents and eddies alongside the main current, which forms the dominant force. Anyone who knows the river will easily be able to say which current will gain the upper hand in critical times. All diplomatic art and all political wisdom consists in ensuring that the side currents and eddies that are dangerous to one's own country do not gain the upper hand. In times of peace, the main current in all countries is directed towards maintaining peace, while the eddies and undercurrents, if sufficient water flows into them, can force the river out of its bed so that its waters pour devastatingly over the terrible plains of peace. A sound knowledge of the national character of various peoples is therefore always of the utmost importance for the correct assessment of foreign affairs. Alongside this, however, familiarity with the various political currents in foreign countries plays a no less important role. 5 p. 495 (515) National Character and Foreign Policy. 495 It is therefore always of great interest to learn how the leaders of foreign policy think and judge about these matters. What Bismarck thought of the French is well known. "As a nation," he explained, "they resemble certain people in our lower classes. They are narrow-minded, brutal, loud-mouthed, and gain the admiration of their peers

through their bold, violent behavior. . . . France is the disturber of the peace in Europe and will remain so as long as it can remain so." This fundamental view dominated Bismarck's political conduct of the war in 1866. When the German Confederation, which united the military might of Austria and Prussia and had thus secured peace in Central Europe for half a century, was torn apart and seemingly rendered defenseless by the "revolution from above," Bismarck immediately said to himself that this event would give ample impetus to the nationalist undercurrent and whirlwind in France, whose goal was the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, because the French could now easily be persuaded to believe that the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine would be easy to achieve militarily against half of Germany (the North German Confederation). Already in the final stages of the war of 1866, after masterfully thwarting France's intention to quickly annex the Bavarian Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, Bismarck secured, on the one hand, Austria's neutrality and, on the other, the military aid of the southern German states for what he considered the inevitable war against France, in which he opposed the annexation of Austrian and southern German territory with all his might. It therefore makes sense when French historians write that Bismarck won the war against France as early as 1866 at the peace negotiations in Prague. We do not know what Bethmann-Hollweg, in whose hands lies the political leadership of the second war that the new Germany must wage against France, thinks of the national character of the French. In contrast, his predecessor in the Imperial Chancellery, Prince Bülow, recently published a book p. 496 (516) 496 National Character and Foreign Policy. ,[1] in which he speaks in detail about the national character of the peoples with whom we are at war. In general, one cannot deny Bülow the ability to pass judgment on the national character of our present enemies. That he really knows the peoples about whose character he speaks is clear from his previous activities. From 1874 to 1900, Bülow spent most of his time abroad; first in Athens, Bucharest, and Vienna, then as ambassador to Rome, Paris, and Petersburg. Bülow therefore had ample opportunity to get to know the peoples of the European continent; only the Anglo-Saxons seem to be less familiar to him from his own observations. What is striking about Bülow's descriptions is that he views the current of national life as something entirely uniform and consistent, paying little attention to the undercurrents, side currents, and eddies. Thus, he tells us about France that resentment against Germany has been the soul of French politics for forty-four years. Based on his life experience, Bülow believes he must fully endorse the view of the French historian Henri Welschinger that "there is literally an abyss between France and Germany that nothing can fill." "We must not, however," he says,

"conceal that French hostility will be considerably intensified by the war." Bülow expects no mitigation of the sharp contrast from the French socialists: "As soon as war broke out, they returned to the chauvinistic traditions of the Jacobins, even Mr. Gustav Hervé, who had been imprisoned before the war for declaring that the French tricolor belonged on the dung heap." Prince Bülow considers a rapprochement with France after the war only possible if Germany voluntarily returns Alsace-Lorraine to the French. Since no German is considering this, it is weak to abandon hope. 1 Bülow, German Politics. Publishers of Reimar Hobbing, Berlin. p. 497 (517) National Character and Foreign Policy. 497 to be able to truly and sincerely reconcile France." We should rather expect and prepare ourselves for increased hatred among the French after the war. For the French mood during the war of 1870/71 is to the present mood as a smoking factory chimney is to an eruption of Mount Vesuvius. Bülow also considers any attempt to reconcile the French through territorial concessions in other parts of the world to be completely hopeless. "France will not see a fully valid compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, even in the most enormous colonial possessions." He bases this opinion on the French historian Ernest Lavisse, who, six months before the outbreak of war, dismissed all such thoughts with the agitated words: "The Germans will never, never understand that we are bound to Alsace-Lorraine by a duty of honor." It should come as no surprise that, based on these views, Prince Bülow concludes that there is no other protection for the German people against French attacks and provocations than the expansion of our power position in the West. Bülow himself feels that his view of the ineradicably aggressive character of the French can be countered by the fact that France has not launched an attack against us for more than four decades. To this, he replies: they did not dare! They were always ready and willing to do so. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a sufficient deterrent for them; they learned from it that they could no longer as in earlier times, were allowed to invade with impunity and understood that this annexation had significantly strengthened our position of power vis-à-vis them. According to Bülow, those statesmen who saw in the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 a sure guarantee for a lasting peace spanning several decades were proven right by history. Prince Bülow deals with the Russian national character less thoroughly than with the French. He contents himself here with the rather meager remark that Prussia "continued to do good business" with Russia, "despite the long-standing antipathy of Russian circles towards Germany" under the reigns of the three Russian emperors Alexander I, Nicholas I, and Alexander II. Accordingly, it seems that Bülow "did good business" in the Russian national character does not see any absolute obstacle to reaching a

compromise and modus vivendi with Russia. Regarding the relationship between the German and Russian states, he attributes the fact that in one hundred years Russia has not crossed arms with either the old German Confederation, in which the military might of Austria and Prussia were united, or with the new German Empire, to the peace-preserving power of the annexation policy. When Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided the Kingdom of Poland among themselves, a close solidarity of interests developed among the three empires. Thus, the partition of Poland, which was a misfortune for the Polish people, became a great blessing for Central and Eastern Europe, as it enabled peace in the East to be maintained for over one hundred years. As far as Prussia and Russia are concerned, "for both empires, the territorial possessions resulting from the Polish partitions served as a warning not to divide themselves, but rather to jointly defend themselves against Greater Polish invasions." Aspirations as a bridge on which Prussia and Russia could always meet." As a politician, Prince Bismarck thus appears to lean toward the view of the German historian Ranke, who in his writings expresses the reluctantly acquired insight that "nothing binds states more tightly together than injustice committed jointly." In Bülow's view, as long as the Poles perceived the partition of their country as a grave and bitter injustice, Russia, Austria, and Prussia remained firmly chained together. Only when these annexations were no longer perceived by the Poles as so sharply injustice did their inherent peace-preserving power disappear. Prince Bülow does not believe that the former cordial understanding between Germany and Russia will ever be restored. "Now that the tablecloth between us and Russia has been cut, we need considerable expansion to the East p. 499 (519) National character and foreign policy. 499 reinforced and increased security, which, given the current situation, can now only consist of a correction of our unfavorable eastern borders, a correction that protects us from new invasions. Naturally, we cannot wish for the Russian Empire to regain strength either." It must be noted that Prince Bülow doubts whether the separation from Congress Poland would mean a weakening of Russia. As can be seen, Bülow's statements about our future relationship with Russia are based on the idea that, as things have developed, a lasting peace with the Russian Empire cannot be achieved without the annexation of the Russian border regions important for our defense. Here, too, we encounter his belief in the peace-preserving power of annexations. What Prince Bülow says about England is very remarkable. Despite all the hate speeches from both sides, he does not seem to truly believe in an irreconcilable enmity between the English and the Germans. He explicitly approves of the Kaiser's policy, which he says has "worked since his accession to establish good relations between

the two great Germanic nations." The conflict between England and Germany appears to him less a conflict between peoples than between states. And even the latter does not seem significant to him. "The future will show," he says, "whether English interest policy has not been misguided precisely because the past has not produced a German-English conflict of interest of the kind that justifies a struggle for survival." In summary, one can say that Bülow stands in the camp of Pan-German politicians who believe a lasting peace is only possible if so much is annexed in the East and West that the Central Powers, as bastions of peace, achieve supremacy on the continent. In this view, he appears to be an opponent of Bethmann's policy; however, with regard to England, he is extraordinarily close to Bethmann-Hollweg. For him, not the Anglo-Saxons, but the French and Russians are Germany's main enemies for all time. 40/2 p. 500 (520) 500 Eastern Jewish. In his attitude toward England, a deep gulf opens up between him and the right-wing parties, who, as is well known, see England as Germany's main enemy, a country that has masterfully understood how to rekindle the old and partly forgotten French and Russian desires for revenge and conquest. Although Bülow undoubtedly belongs to the annexationists of a pan-German persuasion, his attitude toward England makes it doubtful whether he can be considered a confidant of the right-wing parties in this war in the true sense of the word. For, based on his understanding of the conflict between England and Germany, he would have to arrive at a political leadership of the war that differs from Bethmann-Hollweg's only in that it emphasizes more sharply and decisively the necessity of extensive annexations in the West and East. No word need be wasted on the fact that Bülow vastly overestimates the value of annexations for securing peace and completely fails to see the dangers they entail for the future. The most striking thing is that the fourth chancellor completely lacks ideas for a constructive policy. As far as Germany's future is concerned, his book certainly does not whitewash the situation, but Bülow has virtually nothing to say about what must be done, based on the national character of the enemy peoples and their political aspirations, to eliminate or at least mitigate the dangers threatening us. G. NOSKE, M. d. R.: Eastern Jewish. War shakes peoples to their core; it gives entire nations a new shape. But the fate of the ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe is being influenced most significantly. New problems have emerged there, and old ones have been brought into rapid flux. In the East, everything is still in such flux, still in the process of becoming, and even the future shape of the borders is so uncertain that neither the direction nor the degree of development can be accurately estimated. For us Germans, the war has violently posed major problems: what will become of the German minorities

in Russia who settled in Volhynia, Podolia, and on the Volga; furthermore, the question of whether Germanness can be preserved in the Russian Baltic provinces, especially in Courland; and finally, the Eastern Jewish question, which is infinitely complicated and extraordinarily difficult to solve. Like the Germans, the Jews also came to the East centuries ago as bearers of a higher culture. But just as in their German homeland, from which they were mostly driven out by the most brutal intolerance, the Jews in Poland were rarely or never considered equal citizens. They were treated with inferior rights, strangers, and therefore could not become part of the people among whom they lived. They were always only tolerated, rarely appreciated, never loved, but frequently harassed. Pogroms, anti-Jewish propaganda in the style of the Middle Ages, have deeply shocked us even in modern times. This does not mean that interest in Eastern Jews has lasted long. Anyone who briefly thought of Eastern Jews conjured up the image of a man in a greasy caftan with corkscrew curls in his ears. The Polish Proclamation suddenly made the Eastern Jew Question topical. It concerns the future fate of a people. Before the war, approximately 2 million Jews lived in Congress Poland, or 15 percent of the country's total population. In Warsaw, Jews number over 300,000, or 40 percent of the population; in Lodz, 39 percent. In some cities, their share of the population rises to 90 percent. On average, Jews constitute 37.7 percent of the entire urban population. The Russians inflicted unspeakable suffering on the Jews during the war. Many thousands were driven into boundless misery by being expelled from their homes to the East. How many of the displaced people became corrupted and died will never be counted. It is quite uncertain how many of the poor will ever return home. I had already encountered mass Jewish misery in Lodz at the beginning of 1915. But I had only seen the surface: many dirty people, some in rags, dark courtyards, broken windows in tenements, shouting and hustle and bustle in the market, dirty shops with dreary odds and ends and scraps of food. p. 502 (522) 502 Eastern Jewish. goods. All of this presented a gruesome overall picture. This summer I was able to devote several days to learning more about the Eastern Jews on site. -— In Vilna I began a guided walk through the Jewish quarter. When you stand on the Castle Hill and look out over the beautiful, imposing cityscape in the valley of the broad Viliya River, even the most vivid imagination cannot imagine the immense amount of hardship and misery that lies hidden behind the beautiful facade. Even the best narrator cannot paint an accurate picture of what you see in the narrow alleys of the Jewish quarter, in the courtyards, and in the cellars. The Western European cannot shake off the horror of such a walk, accompanied by an ever-growing crowd of men, women, and children screaming, whimpering, and begging—a

horrific accumulation of misery and vice. Not only do you see masses of impoverished, ragged people living in dark cellars that never see a ray of sunlight, but I have also been in cellars that were once beneath the cellars, where people still vegetate. Thousands of Jews in Vilna make their living from the most meager of small trades. In courtyards that lead from one street to the next, for example, there is shop after shop, that is, one small shack next to the other, 20 or more in one courtyard, where nothing but rags and tatters can be sold. The profit you can make in a day is only pennies, and anyone who tries to live on that has to go hungry. Crafts and manufacturing, which provided a meager existence for many Jews in Vilna, have almost completely collapsed as a result of the war. Tens of thousands are left with nothing, living on the merest of support. What you see in Vilna is repeated in Bialystok and other cities; Misery, filth, hunger, and disease cause the poor Jew to lead a constant life of martyrdom. In Bialystok, on the Jewish burial ground with its mostly flimsy gravestones, rises a tall, gleaming black obelisk, which, as long as it stands, is a monument to the worst Russian shame and Eastern lack of culture. Engraved on it are the names of the many Jews murdered in the horrific pogrom of Bialystok. In Warsaw, too, a very significant proportion of Jews live in miserable, inhumane housing in a small area. For days, under expert guidance, I tried to gain insight into the living conditions of the proletarian Jewish masses. Things are terribly complicated. But I can say this much: p. 503 (523) Eastern Jewish. 503 say that there is probably nowhere else in the world such an accumulation of need, misery, and perhaps even crime. Of the Warsaw Jews, at least 200,000 are proletarians, more than half of them paupers, a totally impoverished lumpenproletariat. Most of them are small traders. Individuals, and initially the German administration, are helpless and unable to help in the face of this accumulation of misery. Rapid, comprehensive aid is completely impossible. A new order can only bring gradual improvement. Such mass misery as that experienced by the Eastern Jews is only possible in conjunction with cultural backwardness and lack of education. The Russians have done nothing for the education of the Jews, but have even sought to hinder it. Yet the people's desire for education is undoubtedly great. Unfortunately, its satisfaction is largely misguided. There are, of course, a number of modern, well-run Jewish schools. But in July only 3,000 children attended Jewish elementary schools and 6,000 middle schools, while 13,500 boys were taught in the Orthodox religious cheder schools. Many of these small private schools are run by the teacher in his apartment, usually in some back building, three or four flights of stairs up. These "schools" are small, dingy, semi-dark shacks, where 20 to 25 small bundles of rags sit on low benches, all blaring in Hebrew from tattered books

in a sing-song tone, making a hell of a racket. The Russian government has not attempted to address the boundless misery of the masses of the Jewish proletariat with any trace of social welfare. After the Russian withdrawal, private welfare work by warm-hearted men and idealistic women and girls has been deployed to alleviate the heartbreaking misery. Given the limited resources available, what is being achieved can only be modest piecemeal in its initial stages and therefore requires a degree of sacrifice and enthusiasm bordering on heroism. Will the liberation of Poland from the Russian yoke also immediately bring about a significant improvement in the lives of the Jews living in Poland? Will this bring them a better future and full equality as citizens of the community to which they have belonged for centuries? Unfortunately, there is no clear yes. The Russian yoke has been lifted; strong Polish pressure will remain for the time being. The reason for this is fierce economic competition between Poles and Jews. Therefore, life will continue to be made very difficult for the Jews. At the same time, there will be strong pressure to force the Jews to assimilate, to merge into Polishness. Neither emigration nor fusion will happen quickly. Incidentally, even the Jews of Poland themselves are not in agreement about what they want, or even what they should strive for for the time being, except, of course, the demand for political equality, which is raised by all. The economic circumstances of the Eastern Jews are currently undergoing a far-reaching transformation. In the past, trade in its various forms was almost exclusively the occupation of Jews. When trade could no longer support them despite heavy emigration, many had to turn to all kinds of trades. Agriculture remained closed to them due to residence restrictions. Many Jews have become small-scale craftsmen, home workers, and even wage laborers. The emergence of a modern industrial proletariat has begun. Competition from newly emerging and still emerging non-Jewish trade and commerce is continually depriving Jews of customers. Farmers' credit, consumer, and purchasing cooperatives are also making many Jewish intermediaries dispensable. The great economic transformation process, which also began in the Eastern countries with the penetration of modern capitalism, is deepening the mass misery of Eastern Jews, a sight that fills Western Europeans with horror. The growing number of Jewish wage and industrial workers initially finds employment mainly with Jewish entrepreneurs. Numerous Polish entrepreneurs refuse to to employ Jewish workers. But Polish workers also frequently refuse to cooperate with Jews. Jewish socialists allege that Polish workers' organizations demand, as a prerequisite for cooperation, that Jews celebrate Sunday, abandon the Yiddish language, and join Polish organizations. Most Jewish workers reject this and cling to their trade union and special socialist organizations. Socially,

Jewish workers must therefore lag behind Polish workers, since their organizations remain smaller in number, weak in financial resources, and they are limited in their choice of jobs as long as they remain almost exclusively dependent on Jewish entrepreneurs. p. 505 (525) Eastern Jewish. 505 Since the situation for Eastern Jews will continue to be difficult, the strong emigration that has taken place so far to England and the United States is likely to continue. A mass emigration There can be no question of migration to Palestine, regardless of one's stance on Zionism. There is a lack of money for it. Palestine's economic conditions are not conducive to it either. And Turkey would not be pleased with such immigration. That the Poles are trying to vigorously exploit their numerical superiority against the Jews was demonstrated in Warsaw. When municipal self-government was introduced, the German General Government prevented a Jewish majority in the city council by incorporating suburbs with 200,000 Poles. However, the Jews were also persuaded to refrain from an election campaign except for one of the six curiae and contented themselves with about half the seats to which they could claim based on their numbers. The Poles are now rewarding them by adopting a series of measures against the Jews, not employing any Jewish officials, severely discriminating against Jews in the school system, etc. The Jewish complaints in the city council are accompanied by a A brusque declaration of war from the Polish side has been met. One must be clear that it is unthinkable that Germany could permanently stand beside Poland as a great policeman and ensure that no injustice befalls the Jews. However, the German administration will now have to counter blatant injustice. If it is to be demanded that Germany interfere as little as possible in Poland's internal political affairs after the war, then it must be absolutely ensured that the rights of the Jews, as well as those of the other minorities in Poland, especially the Germans, are permanently secured. Political equality and opportunities for physical and intellectual education must be guaranteed to the Eastern Jews. But then it means for them not to cower and cower, but to fight for a better future. The Eastern Jews will essentially have to shape their own destiny. For a people that has managed to assert itself despite centuries of suffering and persecution, one can be sure that the greater freedom that the war brings, despite everything, will be used by them in such a way that that from now on, out of need, misery, and lack of freedom, his path will lead upward to economic advancement and modern culture. p. 506 (526) 506 Legal Regulation of War Disabled Persons' Welfare! FRIEDRICH KLEEIS: Legal Regulation of War Disabled Persons' Welfare! Welfare for war disabled persons has often been the subject of detailed discussions. One need only recall the large Congress for War Disabled

Persons' Welfare, which took place in Cologne from August 23 to 25, 1916, and was attended by approximately 1,500 participants, including about 250 trade union representatives of all stripes and many representatives of military and civil authorities. The deliberations were preceded by several special meetings, the most important of which was that of all trade union groups. This unanimously adopted a resolution, According to which the welfare of war invalids, which will be of the greatest economic importance, especially after the end of the war, requires, for its successful effectiveness, first and foremost the trust of those affected by the welfare. This trust can only be acquired if the welfare benefits are guaranteed to them by an organization regulated by Reich law. Since the welfare of war invalids has so far lacked this basis, the representatives of the workers' and employees' organizations in Germany demanded its regulation by Reich law. The circumstances are indeed such that this demand must be supported with the utmost emphasis. At present, of all the welfare of war invalids, apart from medical treatment, only the granting of (military) pensions is regulated by Reich law. And even these pensions are still very inadequate, since they are graded according to the rank of the invalids and not according to their civil status. The requests made on this issue have been met by several ordinances, which provisionally address the most basic Eliminate hardships. All other welfare for war invalids has been left to private activity. As early as February 18, 1915, the General Commission of Trade Unions, in a petition to the Reich Chancellor's deputy, requested the establishment of uniform principles for social welfare for war invalids. However, the government rejected such intervention because "the efforts in question do not concern legally regulated responsibilities and activities, but rather free organizations." The government took the position that this welfare, namely vocational counseling, vocational training, and job placement, should be regulated by private welfare. It provided 5 million marks from Reich funds, to be distributed by the federal states. The central state authorities then issued decrees that primarily regulated the organization of welfare, cost coverage, the goals of welfare activities, etc. These instructions were usually formulated in very general terms. Provincial committees were provided for in Prussia, and subcommittees for individual urban and rural districts, which remained in constant contact with the provincial authorities. The involvement of employers, employees, and workers was of particular importance. In Bavaria, the appointment of local committees was provided for in larger cities, which were to recruit suitable volunteers. In Saxony, a "Foundation of Homeland Thanks" was established, with a district association for each administrative district and each larger city. In Württemberg, local

committees were established to offer welfare as a "service of love and gratitude, but never to impose it." At the conference in Cologne, Comrade Wels reported that a survey by the General Commission of Trade Unions in 296 towns had shown that welfare committees existed in 147 towns. The organization was best in Saxony. Aside from the vocational counselors, 445 union representatives served as assessors. But the participation of the unions was not appreciated everywhere. In Krefeld, for example, the involvement of union representatives was expressly rejected on the grounds that religious and political considerations could not be taken into account. Further suggestions were countered by saying that they did not want to unnecessarily expand the circle of participants. In many towns, the participation of workers' representatives exists only on paper. In many towns, again, there are no welfare offices for the war-disabled at all, although all the prerequisites for it exist. This proves that ministerial decrees are insufficient to create a uniform and satisfactory organization. The resistance of the lower authorities can only be overcome by categorical provisions of Reich law. Care for war invalids will still be necessary for many years after the end of the war. After all, it is not only necessary to restore their health and make them fit for work, to advise them on pursuing employment, to prepare them for a new profession appropriate to their abilities, and to find them positions in this profession, but it is also necessary to look after them in the future with regard to wages, differences with employers or co-workers, in the event of renewed unemployment, etc. War victims require permanent support, to which they can turn in all perils, but which also enjoys their trust in its composition and overall effectiveness. This already provides the guidelines for the content of the law to be created. First, the obligation to establish welfare offices must be declared under certain conditions. The law must then contain provisions regarding the composition of welfare committees. In this regard, emphasis must be placed on the professional organizations involved in the election of workers' and employees' representatives. If a joint venture (a contract between employers and workers' or employees' associations) exists in a trade, the representatives appointed by these organizations must be appointed. In general, the composition of welfare committees must be based on parity. For large towns, a main committee should be established, which can appoint subcommittees for individual areas of work (career counseling, organizing vocational retraining, job placement, mediating disputes between war-disabled persons and employers, etc.). Finally, it is necessary to define the procedures for the welfare committees in certain outlines. The rights of the committee members must also be formulated. For example, they must be granted the right to confer with war-disabled persons

in the hospitals and to inspect their personnel files. In addition, the rights of the war-disabled themselves must be expanded. To the extent their health permits, they must have the right, even before their discharge from military service, to visit the welfare office and career counselors, to attend training courses, etc. Enough has been said about all these things. What is needed is action—helpful, swift, legislative action! - If one were to take away all of a person's faults, even their vices and passions, one would have a perfect person, but whether that would still be a person is a question that all improvers should seriously consider. p. 509 (529) Bernard Shaw. 509 EDGAR STEIGER: NUN Bernard Shaw.' UN, I owe to Mozart the discovery that the march of the human spirit need not be funeral music, that one can cast away all the ponderous features, the silly adornments, and the solemn, joyless grimaces of our official, academic, and priestly idols and yet climb all heights and fathom all depths of the soul through the most impetuous cheerfulness of spirit and the most exquisite tenderness of feeling." This confession of the bright-eyed Irishman, whose name was mentioned with undisguised bitterness in all English newspapers at the beginning of the World War, is doubly valuable for us Germans. Shaw, like almost everyone across the Channel, did not struggle with the German language for long. Like most Englishmen, he speaks very poor German; he knows German poets and thinkers, such as Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, more by hearsay or, at best, from Translations. The only German books he read in the original language are certainly as characteristic of the poet as they are of the socialist Shaw Grimm's "Fairy Tales" and Marx's "Capital." There he learned at its source the Romanticism that he fought against throughout his life. Here, of course, one shouldn't take the mockery of the socialist arch-heretic and "Fabian" too seriously—he wonders why in this Bible of socialism, "there isn't a word about socialism." But if he has thus breathed in German ideas, as it were, simply with the air, because they were in the air, then German music, whose international musical language ingratiates itself into every human ear without translation, grammar, or dictionary, has become his true educator. From Bach to Richard Strauss, he knows all the great masters in whom the German national soul, long before it could speak, sounded out as pure feeling. He owes it to them, he himself confesses without hesitation———— 1 An excellent selection of Shaw's dramatic works has been published in a masterful translation by Siegfried Trebitsch by S. Fischer's Verlag in Berlin. p. 510 (530) 510 Bernard Shaw. -- the best that he processed and assimilated from the cultural life of the past, in order then to hold up a mirror to his century as his own and unique one. And it was as an apostle of Richard Wagner in England that the young

Irishman first made a name for himself. Wagner and Ibsen: every German who has lived through the last generation, be it as a creator or even just as a sympathetic spectator, knows what these two names mean to us. But if Shaw is now lured from the novel to the drama by Ibsen's "Nora" and "Ghosts," then we have the intellectual threads that are spun from Germany to England in our hands, as it were. He first entered the public eye as a theater critic. But now that Mr. Grein's independent theater in London was performing "Ghosts," he ventured onto the stage himself and had a resounding success with his first project, "Widows' Houses," or, as Siegfried Trebitsch translated it, "Mr. Sartorius's Houses." This powerful satire on the highly virtuous, who derive their physical well-being and virtue from the misery and vice of their less fortunate fellow human beings, was something entirely new and unheard of even in the English theater, where social decency is still considered the highest law. But only in the English theater? No, such a matter-of-factness, to express the most outrageous and offensive things with a cold smile and the most amiable expression, had never been seen anywhere else. Here was no moral ranter railing against sin, but also no romanticist condemning sin. did her hair and makeup so that she would look all the better next to the pale virtue. No, this Irish socialist, who saw into the very core of people and things, did not take society's register of sins as lightly as the late Augier and Dumas had done it. But he did not stop at Ibsen's social criticism, which pillories the social lies of its time with all the pathos of an offended conscience. Here, too, the main culprit is not the landlord Sartorius, who exploits, extorts, and seizes the poor tenants, but rather those distant, distinguished and virtuous people whose hands do not get soiled by this usury, but who instead receive the fat interest every quarter, p. 511 (531) Bernard Shaw. 511 who emerge from this exploitation of misery, into their pockets. Just as in the equally funny and serious contemporary picture "Mrs. Warren's Business," the procuress and brothel owner Mrs. Warren, who has raised her daughter to be a respectable lady with the money she earned from her sins in order to spare her the fate of her mother, is, for all her meanness, a true angel compared to the respectable gentlemen of society who call themselves her friends. But that is by no means the last word. Shaw digs deeper than all the poets who tackled the social problem before him. The worthy personalities that the poet pits against each other in these two plays are merely the puppets of life—that is what the smiling tone of this profound satire is meant to tell us—or, if you prefer, the natural and self-evident products of precisely that civilized society, of which we ourselves are full members and tacit eulogists, who, through our mere existence, say yes and amen to that very society.

Therefore, everyone sitting in the theater—this is Shaw's ultimate intention and his most grim joy at the sight of these "unedifying plays"—should say to himself: "de te fabula narratur" ("The story is about you"). It is not for nothing that Shaw emphasizes in the book edition that his attacks are not directed against the stage characters, but against the readers. "They cannot learn to understand thoroughly enough," he continues, "that the guilt of the defective social organization lies not only solely with the people who actually carry on the business dealings that are unavoidable because of these damages, and who often, like Sartorius and Mrs. Warren, display valuable practical skills and even high moral virtues in their actions, but with the entire body of citizens, whose public opinion, public action, and public taxation can alone replace Sartorius's back alleys with decent homes and Mrs. Warren's trades with decent industries, regulated by a humane trade code and Minimum wages are protected." - This is, of course, cold sobriety and at the same time bitter seriousness. No wonder that it pained the poet, who wanted to express such profound truths, to the core of his heart that the theater audience, seduced by the dry irony of his dialogue and the astonishing self-evidence of all his misguided people, did not want to take him seriously. p. 512 (532) 512 Bernard Shaw. And yet, his fight against Romanticism, which falsifies all our feelings and ideas about the world, was for him a kind of self-preservation and world liberation at the same time. For all Romanticism, whether it dresses itself in the garb of everyday life and calls itself decency or morality, or whether it passes itself off as history and revels in the cult of heroes, is to him nothing but a ridiculous lie that must be exposed as quickly as possible. That is why, parodying the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885, he writes his "Heroes" or, as the actual title, based on the opening words of the Aeneid, is boastfully, "Arma virumque" ("The weapons and the hero," understand: "I sing of them"). In this color, the Swiss Captain Bluntschli, who performed the greatest heroic deeds in the war, must tremble like a coward before his pursuers in the bedroom of the pretty Raina and, literally in his shirtsleeves, laughingly throw all notions of heroism into the scrap heap, to the astonishment of the girl and the listeners. Likewise, the great Napoleon, the "man of destiny" or "battle leader," as a budding general, must make himself ridiculous with all his heroic poses in front of a pretty spy who knows how to seize his jealousy of the beautiful Josephine Beauharnais, only to end up appearing as a petty braggart. Yes, even the great Caesar finally takes a headfirst dive into the sea in front of the pretty cat Cleopatra, who has played with him like a mouse. This somersault mortale, in which all previous historical interpretations are turned upside down, truly characterizes the profound meaning of this laughing suicide of all

great men. When these plays were first staged in Germany, sympathetic people, for whom the learned pathos of the schoolmaster had become second nature, spoke of a Thersites of the modern stage. But Shaw is not a slanderer who views world history from a researcher's perspective, but rather one who compares the present and the past with the natural standards of a future. which, especially today, in the midst of the thunder of World War, is perhaps closer to us than most of us suspect. His Caesar, for example, is so great precisely because of the many all-too-human qualities that cling to him that, contrary to all the popular notions of the school, he can tolerate a good dose of humor and self-irony. He does not, as our moral code demands, kill his nature by fulfilling his duty, but rather he does his duty because he simply does what he naturally wants. Yet here, where the poet Shaw is concerned, I cannot explain his forward-looking worldview in detail. He himself has fleetingly hinted at it in his ironic way on various occasions when he speaks of his work. For example, when he speaks of the misery of our theater speaks, for which love is still an indispensable requisite, that love which, strictly speaking, is merely a decent or indecent romanticism, depending on whether the poet addresses himself more to women or to men. "If we had a mirror that doubled our noses, it would make the future believe that we had all been buffoons." Isn't our theater such a deceitful mirror, reflecting nothing but the grimace of the acted reality? And now an honest fellow comes along and puts people on stage as they are, the audience and critics, who have become accustomed to the grimace, claim that these real people are just grimace! What else is left for the poet to do but burst out laughing again? "Hush! I am searching for love, and I find immeasurable treasures of it stored up in the hearts of others; but I dare not ask for it; a terrible shyness constricts my throat, and I sit here, mute, worse than mute, and talk senseless nonsense and stammer foolish lies." The poet Marchbank, who speaks these words, is none other than Bernard Shaw. The Irish mocker needed someone else to reveal his secret to us. He himself would never have brought it out. And yet he had to say it once, for he was a poet. And being a poet is the greatest misfortune on earth for one who does not want to be a bad person. For a poet must have no shame, least of all when writing for the theater. And bad people, that is, people who are without love; "therefore they are also without shame," such as B. a poet who strips naked in front of everyone and then drums people into the theater to watch this pathetic spectacle. The great question of life is thus this: how is the contradiction between poet and human being resolved? How can someone - 40/3 p. 514 (534) 514 Bernard Shaw. - become a poet and yet remain human? The answer is: only if the poet does not take human beings seriously and human

beings do not take the poet seriously, or, what is the same thing, so terribly seriously that when he feels like crying at the sight of himself, he suddenly begins to laugh, not at himself or humanity (that is the same thing!), but at the great misunderstanding of all towards all and the false standards by which wise men and fools measure one another. The generally human nature of this worldview is obvious. But how did this Irishman, Bernard Shaw, come to her, or she to him? One must not forget that Ireland lies right next to England. So, in a sense, he had humanity's mask shop right under his nose. The little English word "cant," which we Germans only really learned to understand during this World War, says it all. But no one, long before Mr. Grey peddled the defense of Belgian neutrality in Europe, pilloried England's hypocrisy like the Irish socialist with his redeeming laugh. Each of his comedies is, so to speak, a sofa cushion studded with pins, which he smilingly foists on the unctuous Pharisees on the Thames with the friendly request that they please sit on it with the acquired dignity of their most demanding parts of flesh. What a pity, then, that this great ironist, as a foreigner, cannot currently perform on the German stage, according to a decision by the Theaterverein! But should Bernard Shaw even be considered an Irishman or an Englishman? Listen to him yourself! "As an Irishman, I could muster no patriotism for the country I had left, nor for the country that had ruined it. As a human being, I abhorred violence and murder, whether in war, sport, or the slaughterhouse. I was a socialist, detested our anarchistic pursuit of money, and believed in equality as the only possible lasting basis of social organization and discipline." I think this self-confession is enough to reveal the Irish poet, whose seemingly contradictory traits have mocked so many of his followers and opponents, as the man he always was in the innermost depths of his soul: the good European, as Friedrich Nietzsche would say, but not in the sense of the aristocratic human breeder who, as an admirer of the Greek Dionysus, cannot imagine a world without slaves, but rather in the sense of modern socialism, which today, in the midst of the gruesome massacre of nations, believes in humanity. THIS Glosses. Political Characters. EUGEN SCHIFFER. THIS pinched Jewish face bears the traces of restless intellectual work. And this council at the Higher Administrative Court has come to very definite judgments in the countless disputes: there is too much government and too much Too top-down. And the constitutional state still lacks important legal guarantees. Thus, this national liberal, who doesn't forget the liberal in the face of nationalism, has truly drawn the lessons of his profession and translated them into legislative force: Every notification must indicate whether and how a higher authority is to be appealed to; police regulations should not be perpetuated like law and justice, like an eternal

disease. More light and more law should be brought into the administration, and Schiffer's contribution to the protective custody law and the auxiliary service law is not the smallest. It is said of a Central German ruler that, upon introducing a national liberal representative, he remarked meaningfully: "You're national liberal? Well, you look quite liberal to me!" Schiffer-Magdeburg not only looks like one, he is one, and within his party he is the leader of the Bethmann group. Orientation to the left, connection to the future, no map-swallowing. And a united Central Europe! Alongside Wermuth, on the board of the Brotherhood in Arms Association, which wants to unite us in Vienna and Budapest forever, and in a way other than just secret diplomacy. Not a cookie-cutter politician—and not the man of the Pan-Germans and heavy industry. We need theory! THEORY must determine our practice; but theory can only be derived from practice, because we can only think what we have experienced. Theory is the abstraction of experience, the spiritual unity from the diversity of daily life's processes. For this reason, however, theory is rooted in the past, while its meaning and purpose are directed towards the future. This presents a difficulty for the theory of social life. Theory should teach us to give the diversity of sober, everyday life the 40/3* p. 516 (536) 516 Glosses. to find a fixed point at which general welfare culminates and the standard for evaluating individual actions in achieving this goal. However, the new events to which we wish to apply the theory do not completely resemble the old ones from which it is derived. Therefore, debate and counter-debate are useful in order to use the theory correctly as a teacher. The dispute of opinions creates and strengthens the theory and ensures its correct application. But the dispute of opinions must know how to maintain the right middle ground in both quantity and quality. It is easy to overdo it. Where a people or a section of a people does not find sufficient opportunity for practical work in the affairs of public life, it easily converts its strengths into sonorous words, and tiresome persistence soon turns necessity into a virtue, a means to an end in itself. Woe betide those who are inclined to act in favor of necessity! Then self-righteousness replaces the pursuit of knowledge, forgetting the living source of theory, which flows only in life. Formulaic nonsense and verbal superstition replace creative thought. And where we expected only intellectual bread, nourishing knowledge to master life, spiritual starvation stares us in the face, laboriously concealed by a fruitless and endless dispute under the motto: I disagree! This state is not only the grave of all practical political action, it is the death of theory, just as hyper-radicalism is the most fertile root of shallow opportunism. The complete collapse of official theory stands as an obtrusive warning sign on the path of the German Social Democratic Party. It

must rouse itself to political action in order to save its theory and its reputation, which it is only barely maintaining, as the intellectual leader of the international proletariat! You practical thinkers, create for us a theory, create for us above all a method of theoretical thinking that will give our political practice the unerring calm and clarity we need to guide the proletariat to fulfill its historic task! hw The master craftsmen as re-learners. The changed attitude of the master craftsmen towards the cooperative system is good evidence of how much the war did away with fragile prejudices and outdated principles. Once the bearers of economic progress and the creators of the medieval guild system, the craftsmen were increasingly pushed into the background with the rise of big capital. Over time, the revolutionary, professionally proud citizens of the Middle Ages had often become cowardly reactionaries who felt the ground shaking beneath their feet with every new advance and therefore longingly returned- p. 517 (537) Glosses. 517 looked back to the time when the handicrafts still had their "golden ground." Pressed on the one hand by big capitalism, on the other by the increasingly powerful trade unions, the master craftsmen felt as if they were caught between two millstones, and one must admit that many of them found themselves in an unenviable position. The handicrafts seemed doomed. Capitalist development ruthlessly wiped out the handicraftsmen. One could expect a world war to sweep away a large number of middle-class handicraft existences and push them down into the proletariat. Did that happen? Undoubtedly, it happened on a large scale! But at the same time, something else happened, something that shows the craftsmen in a completely new light, something that has given new strength to a part of the trade, and which justifies us in calling them re-skillers. The trades are organized along cooperative lines. More than 400 craftsmen's cooperatives of various kinds have been founded in the German Reich in the last two years, most of them in the construction industry and related trades. Anyone who knows the aversion, indeed the sometimes fanatical hatred, of master craftsmen toward the cooperative system before the outbreak of the war can appreciate what this means. Nowhere was the idea of the independence of a purely individual economy, the idea of being the master of the house, more strongly developed than among master craftsmen. And now, all of a sudden, craftsmen's cooperatives are springing up everywhere! And the war, the revaluer of all values, the war from which many expected the complete demise of the crafts, has brought about this innovation! The reasons that prompted the master craftsmen to initiate this innovation are easy to understand. The war exposed the craftsmen's economic weakness with elemental force. It threatened many of them with economic ruin. By forming

cooperatives, the craftsmen hope to strengthen themselves economically. They want to take advantage of the benefits of large-scale operations to save their livelihoods by increasing their competitiveness. The war, as the chairman of the Berlin Chamber of Crafts, Master Craftsman Rahardt, recently said in the "Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung," had opened the eyes of craftsmen so thoroughly regarding the cooperative system that a comparison with the views of earlier years was no longer possible. One had to have experienced how, just a few days after mobilization, merchant conventions canceled their customers' credit, how they demanded fulfillment of all current obligations as well as a 15 percent price surcharge and cash payment from new buyers, how no bank would have even 100 marks available, to understand p. 518 (538) 518 Glosses. why the former indifference toward cooperatives of all kinds within the commercial middle class had turned into its opposite. Our entire economic life was moving at a galloping pace toward trustification, and the trade The craft industry would be even more undermined than before if it did not use the same means as trade, agriculture, industry, and the working class. It is the duty of the skilled trades to unite all still viable members of the commercial middle class in such a way that they would wage the relentless struggle for existence under more favorable conditions than if each individual operated on its own and thus remained a plaything in the hands of the stronger. This is a truly classic justification for the change of heart of the master craftsmen. It shows that even these reactionary elements are learning from the war, that, shaken by powerful facts, they are seeking to adapt to new conditions, and that they understand the signs of the times. May the working class not allow itself to be shamed by them in this regard by clinging to the old ways in a radically conservative way! The craft cooperatives are children of the war period; but one must not believe that they will disappear again after the war. To increase the efficiency of war deliveries and especially in the reconstruction of East Prussia, they will prove their usefulness to master craftsmen during the war and thus make themselves indispensable for the future. They will be all the more indispensable for craftsmen after the war, as this period will undoubtedly bring severe economic struggles, struggles in which individual master craftsmen will likely find themselves crushed between the millstones more than ever before. This is already clear in craft circles today. No initiated leader, says the aforementioned Mr. Rahardt, is deluded anymore about these struggles, the severity of which only those in the know can properly comprehend. And woe betide anyone who looks forward to these struggles with complete trust in the support of the state. Since the craft cooperatives are also supported by the government, the movement will probably expand

rapidly. Those workers and those unions who, in their struggles for better wages and working conditions, have so far mainly dealt with individual small master craftsmen to deal with, more capital-strong, more tightly organized, and therefore more serious opponents are emerging in the craft cooperatives. They have every reason to realize this in good time and to ensure the strengthening of their own power. A. Ellinger. p. 519 (539) Glosses. 519 THE Complaints Against Our State! The particular conception of our relationship to the state is expressed not only in general theoretical principles, but also in the smallest practical behavior of the citizen. At a meeting of the consumer cooperatives of the Central German Association, it was determined that the possible and necessary use of the right to complain against unjust treatment of consumer cooperatives is far from being adequately utilized. This was rightly strongly criticized by the association's leadership. Every well-founded complaint must be pursued unconditionally until successful or even to the highest court, meticulously objectively and in a binding form. During the debate, an interjection was made: "Reorientation!" This, of course, meant: "Yes, that's how they are up there, they'll stay as they were." But it would be much more useful if the "reorientation" took hold primarily within ourselves, in the sense that we perceive this state as our state, from which we demand our rights, and to which we therefore also address our complaints in order to make it function according to our wishes. We must demand our spirit in its administration! In a meeting in the Prussian Ministry, Dr. Müller, the representative of the War Food Office, was told that the Ministry had not received a single complaint from consumer cooperatives, while the opponents of consumer cooperatives had presented a whole host of complaints. The others simply know how to treat this state to make it their state. Social Democrats often don't yet know this. It is up to the citizens themselves, by using their right of complaint, to ensure the proper functioning of the official bodies. This, of course, requires renouncing the "fundamental" distrust of the state. Despite all its shortcomings, the existing state is to be viewed as our state and, through all our actions, made more and more so. H. Peus-Dessau. The career of a worker is described in a book recently published by JHW Dietz Nachf. in Stuttgart (price 1.10 marks), entitled "How I Became a Fledgeling" and authored by Albert Rudolph. Until now, such youthful confessions have only appeared on a very small scale. Given the great value they certainly possess for the growing youth of the working class, they are to be warmly welcomed. The self-education expressed in them will inspire emulation, and many an illusion, which young people often and gladly have about life, will be prevented from becoming excessively rampant. Both apply to Rudolph's book. p. 520 (540)

520 glosses. Nothing remarkable is told in them. A proletarian everyday life is unfolded: Schmalhans is the head chef in the large family, the father, attached to the soldier's life, is harsh and strict, the overworked mother ultimately seeks in piety a substitute for what life could not give her. The sunless school years are followed by thorny apprenticeships. Even if the boy cowered under his father's harsh hand, the adolescent seeks justice from his master and master. Unfortunately, he does not find it. The apprentice's training only improves when a socialist newspaper makes a noise about the conditions in the factory. This opens the young man's eyes early on; he learns the value of political and trade union organization and is diligently active in both. The apprenticeship is followed by a period of wandering. The hoped-for romance fades the leaner his wallet becomes. Rudolph has to see where a vice opens up for him. He does find work, but he can't stay anywhere for long. The police monitor the man, who is so zealously active in politics and unions. Finally, he has to give up his job completely and put his energies exclusively into the service of the labor movement. How these youthful experiences unfold is recounted in an exceedingly simple and straightforward, yet all the more compelling form. Fact follows fact, all accessories are dispensed with. Life speaks for itself. Many an adult worker who reads Rudolph's book will surely imagine they are looking in a mirror; the narrative seems so typical. The concise sentence structure and the condensed nature of the events significantly underline the impact of what is described and make reading the barely 100-page book an experience. LL MA The exception. Arie von Bunsen wrote an essay in the Berliner Tageblatt about a pamphlet entitled "Behind the Plow in Wartime." "It is literally true," the author writes, "that when the war broke out, this young daughter of a public prosecutor in Trier had a keen desire to bring in the precious, endangered harvest; therefore, she helped a farmer with many children." The essay describes how the public prosecutor's daughter worked. worthy of all honor, girl! But did a book really have to be written about it? If all workers wrote books about their work, the world would consist of nothing but printing paper. But of course, the girl was the daughter of a public prosecutor. H. Sonntag. p. 521 (541) DIE GLOCKE 41st Issue 6th January 1917 2nd Year Reprint of all articles with detailed source references permitted Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: E The Entente's Response. The Entente had to accomplish a difficult piece of work in the last two weeks of the past year. They had to and wanted to reject the German invitation to peace negotiations and did not know how. The document that Mr. Briand finally handed to the American ambassador in Paris on New Year's Eve bears all too clearly the hallmarks of embarrassment. While the Central Powers' note states in brief and dignified

sentences that it is time to end the horrors of war, the Entente's response contains a rude invective and speaks directly of "new crimes" that the Central Powers' offer is supposed to justify in advance. This alone reveals the boundless rage that the German call for peace has provoked among the leaders of the Entente. They know that this call for peace has also found a strong echo among the peoples of the Entente states, and precisely for this reason, Lloyd George, Briand, and whatever they may be called, are striving to drown it out with their excited shouting. The voice of reason must not be heard, and therefore the entire note is filled with nervous declamations about alleged atrocities of the Central Powers. Here, one can only repeat what Philippe Egalité shouted to the judges after his conviction: "Since you wanted to condemn me, you should at least have sought better reasons for it." 41/1 p. 522 (542) 522 The Entente's reply. Since the Entente note is designed to make a good impression on the neutrals, this time they dispensed with all the phrases of destruction and annihilation with which enemy ministers usually adorn their speeches. While the note of the Central Powers speaks of the existence, honor, and freedom of development of their peoples, the Entente lists as its war aim: satisfaction, restoration, and guarantees. However, while the German Chancellor was able to expressly emphasize that the rights and justified claims of the Central Powers do not conflict with the rights of other nations, the enemy's reply contains not a word of such an assurance. Such an assertion would have been a blatant contradiction to the treaty of 1915, which was recently announced in the Duma and in which the World Distribution Syndicate had already divided up the entire Orient, including Constantinople and the Dardanelles, among itself. But nevertheless, we are not yet entirely certain whether, from the fact that there is no mention of the destruction of the Central Powers, certain quarters are once again drawing the most remarkable conclusions about the enemy's "already more modest war aims." We will gladly leave it to others to examine the Entente's response in detail. It is not impossible that the Central Powers will respond to some of the most clumsy distortions. The battle of notes is a battle for the souls of the neutrals, and it is certainly advantageous if the international discussion about peace and its possibility does not die down so quickly. But this should not cloud the harsh realization that the war is now entering a new stage, hopefully its last, but certainly its most terrible. The responsibility for this rests entirely on the Entente and its instigators. But it rests most heavily on the necks of those French Social Democrats who have made themselves and their unfortunate people the henchmen of the English. and Russian despotism and have now repulsed the hand of peace that could have saved France from ruin. p. 523 (543) The Entente's Response. 523 The

Entente will not recover from this blow. The war continues, but its outcome can be no different than it could have been by now. In two and a half years of world war, Europe has proven that its national and political conditions have become so irresistibly strong in the 20th century that the time is just as over for a policy of subjugation, at least towards the great nations, as it is for a strategy of subjugation. What was possible just 100 years ago, and even then merely as an episode—the subjugation of Europe to one will—has now become impossible. The English bourgeoisie will not succeed in shattering the Central European bloc and thus removing the last obstacle to its world domination. This impossibility, however, will make its world domination itself impossible. fail. Only the consolidation of the conditions in Central Europe—that is, essentially, the global political, if not yet constitutional, unification of the entire German people of approximately 80 million—was the great national fact that first created the prerequisite for the destruction of English world domination. The historical task that Germany must fulfill in this war is therefore to maintain its consolidation and not allow itself to be split again into its old atoms. This explains the otherwise inexplicable fact that Germany can achieve its war aims without appropriating foreign territory, but that the Entente dreams and speaks of nothing but annexations and destruction. If one may perhaps say that the laws of historical development are written in the blood of war, the connection between war and law is also given by the fact that both, ultimately, cannot so much create new law as they must recognize newly established law. The consolidation of Central Europe, which is essentially German, is also a A new fact that the peoples out there have not yet even become aware of, indeed, the possibility of which terrifies them as if they were staring at the head of a Medusa. 41/1* p. 524 (544) 524 The Entente's response. In Central Europe, they have so far seen only the Prussians and Bavarians, the Swabians and Saxons, the Bohemians and Austrians, without really realizing that all of these are Germans, and that their union, on the one hand, is the indisputable right of these tribes, but on the other hand, would establish a political center of the highest order precisely where, for centuries, there had been a powerless hodgepodge of medium-sized, small, and tiny states. The other peoples, especially England and France, believed in the preservation of this powerless hodgepodge in the heart of Europe. to have a "right," because their own historically established position of power in the world was based on Germany's powerlessness. And what they call the great "crime" of the Central Powers is, historically speaking, German consolidation, the replacement of the powerless hodgepodge with a mighty center of power in the heart of Europe. They protest against this; here, significantly, they demand the restoration of the

previous state: satisfaction, restoration, guarantees! Reactionary childish minds who, in impotent fury, want to turn back the wheel of history. In France, there is discussion about whether to restore the borders of 1815 or 1814, and England, too, hopes to be able to push the chicken back into the egg—restoration!—and, in its war aims, to create a fleet- and colony-less Central Europe, as at the time of the Congress of Vienna or the German Federal Act. Precisely because German consolidation was a slow historical process, beginning quietly around the middle of the 18th century and moving at a completely different pace in the northwest of Central Europe than in the southeast, its immense world-historical significance was not fully recognized. The Germans themselves barely noticed it, and foreign countries certainly didn't. Imperial France played a predominant role alongside the German Confederation in the second half of the 19th century. When war broke out in 1870, the German consolidation process was far from complete, but sufficient forces were already present to crush Imperial France, which sought to interfere with the process of national unification. What we have experienced since 1914 is merely a repetition of 1870, albeit on a vastly expanded scale. Then Imperial France, with its enormous superiority in its European position over the German Confederation, now England, with the greater half of the world at its side, beside which little Germany disappears in power and prestige. Even now, the German consolidation process is not entirely complete, but like the war of 1870, the World War also represents an extraordinary acceleration of this process. And once again, Germany demonstrates far greater strength than it itself previously suspected. It proves itself invincible in defense and is capable of completing the great consolidation process of the German nation, despite the world. A good century and a half of German rise comes to a close in this World War. At the end of this war, more than 80 million Germans, under whatever constitutional form, will be on the verge of economic and political unification. A fact that revolutionizes everything! And then there are the many smaller nations that belong to the sphere of attraction of this enormous center of power. This slow, tenacious process of development in Central Europe is thus the most loyal, most peaceful thing in the world, at least from the German point of view. But here it becomes clear again that peaceful evolution and violent revolution are not opposites, but rather condition and presuppose each other. It is sometimes touching to witness the zeal with which the German side repeatedly affirms German peacefulness and points to the fact that the German Reich has not waged war for 44 years. All right! But the Reich developed and surpassed all its neighbors in its pace. However, there is nothing in the world as subversive as a vigorous "peaceful" p. 526 (546)

526 The Entente's response. Development. What was merely a normal and entirely legitimate growth phenomenon from the German point of view was, from the French, and especially from the English, point of view, the collapse of all previous conditions, against which one had to defend oneself with all means at one's disposal. Here, just as Marx argues for the relationship between capitalist and worker in the struggle over the limits of the working day, an antinomy arose: right against right. Between equal rights, force decides. Thus, the peaceful evolution of the last 44 years precipitated into the violent revolution of the World War. We need not fear the outcome of this revolution. The peace agreement that ends the World War will contain as its content the recognition of the German consolidation process. Germany and Central Europe need nothing more, for with it, the old powers, especially England, must acknowledge that the basis of their previous power has collapsed. It is the unique privilege of the central powers to be able to make peace proposals at any time and to be content with very moderate demands. They are the force rising from below that only needs a free field of activity: freedom of development, says Bethmann-Hollweg. They are the proletarians among the world powers of Europe. Like the working class, they fight for their advancement, but they are always ready to negotiate. The Entente, under the leadership of England, is still playing the role of warmongers and is declaring harshly: we will not negotiate with you, we demand unconditional submission! Well then, we will fight. Once upon a time... Cato's words will become true. The profound corruption, the lust for enslavement and naval tyranny of the English government must unite all the peoples of Europe in the decision to save human freedom in the fight against England and to wipe the new Carthage from the earth. (Bertrand Barère in the French National Convention.) p. 527 (547) Longing for peace and the possibility of peace. 527 ENGELBERT PERNERSTORFER, Vice President of the Austrian A.-H.: In longing for peace and the possibility of peace. Rivers of blood have been flowing in Europe's west, south, and east for almost two and a half years. And it is the noblest blood that is being shed. The blood of ancient, civilized peoples who have done the most valuable work for humanity. Millions of human lives have been destroyed. Millions of people have been severely damaged for life. Material goods have been destroyed in incalculable quantities. And what is almost even more terrible: on both sides of the river of blood, a vast hatred between nations is growing, filling civilized people with horror. It is fortunate for us Germans that we are innocent of all these atrocities before history. Our enemies bear the entire, undivided responsibility. I deliberately do not say: the peoples of the Quadruple Alliance, because even in the Western states, which so gladly boast of their

democracy, the peoples have had just as little say in foreign policy as anywhere else. Least of all in despotic Russia. Everywhere, the ruling classes have determined foreign policy. Never and nowhere in the history of mankind have peoples themselves guided their own destinies. Thus, the war in which we live was brought about by the power interests of arrogant oligarchic cliques. It is foolish to search for the individuals who caused the war, and it is least of all for us socialists to hold individuals responsible, since they are merely the bearers of a system. From the perspective of our conception of history, world events do not depend on the activity of individuals (just as we are not inclined to underestimate this activity or disregard it entirely). For us, they are merely exponents of certain developmental tendencies. An intelligent party comrade, on the other hand, suggested that the materialistic p. 528 (548) 528 Longing for Peace and the Possibility of Peace. The class view is not an indulgence. But it is also not a moral catechism. Power-hungry politicians are just as much products of the current state order as money-hungry entrepreneurs are products of the current social order. Where both sides exceed the necessities established by these "orders," we may at least feel moral outrage. And there we can even come to personal condemnations. From this perspective, there is one man who can be called the father of today's war—Edward VII of England, who prepared it with full awareness of the consequences of what he was doing. Grey, Poincaré, Isvolsky, etc., were merely the executors of his political will. Germany and Austria were to be destroyed, i.e., weakened so that they no longer stood in the way of English sole rule. Austria was only a secondary consideration for England. It was the bait for Russia and Italy, which England needed as allies. The entire focus was on Germany, which England was beginning to fear. Admittedly, all calculations for the rapid collapse of the Central Powers were dashed. On the contrary—they remained Victors. And as such, they offered the encircling powers peace negotiations. Naturally, some of the enemy press interpreted this offer as a sign of weakness. We know that this is out of the question. On the contrary, the Central Powers made this offer out of a feeling of invincibility and thereby gave renewed proof of their peace-mindedness, which Germany has revealed to the world time and again over the past forty -five years. The Central Powers long for peace because the sacrifices their peoples are making are enormous. They do not shy away from openly expressing their sense of humanity. They also know that the longing for peace is alive among the encircling powers, just as it is among their own peoples. p. 529 (549) Longing for Peace and the Possibility of Peace. 529 But powerful forces oppose the idea of peace. Above all, these are the warmongers in all countries. They are also present in Germany, and

they are calling for boundless annexations. But it would be a blatant falsification to claim that the government is working in cahoots with them. The extremely measured statements made by the Chancellor on December 12 speak against this. In Austria, nothing has been heard of annexation plans so far. The same is true in Turkey. However, it is clear that Bulgaria wants to expand. But the Bulgarians claim they only want to gain Bulgarian territory, which, according to the nationality program repeatedly put forward by the encircling powers, would actually be quite acceptable. What about our enemies, on the other hand? Russia wants Constantinople, Eastern Galicia, and Bukovina; Italy wants Trento, Trieste, and who knows what else. Even the socialist Turati recently declared in parliament that Italy could not relinquish Trento . France still demands Alsace-Lorraine, and so do the French socialists. demand it. England, however, does not demand any land acquisitions. It merely wants the German fleet and to destroy "Prussian militarism." All those who put forward such war aims are warmongers, although the Bulgarians can fairly be excluded. All of them want to continue the war and are therefore opponents of the idea of peace. But one must also address the absolute pacifists as such. They live completely outside the world of any reality and are hypnotized by the idea of peace. They do not ask about the possibilities of peace, but, like maniacs, only call for peace. Anything that brings peace is fine with them. Defeat or victory of one or the other is completely indifferent to them; they want peace at any price. That is the foolish formula that does not bring peace and leaves the belligerents of all states completely cold. It is therefore downright detrimental to the establishment of peace because it only creates useless and irritating nervousness. p. 530 (550) 530 Longing for peace and the possibility of peace. The third pests of the idea of peace are those who want peace by restoring the situation as it existed before the war. They want to express most sharply, as it were, that the war is useless, that it is a crime that cannot be justified by any subsequent successes. They represent a new holy alliance that regards the present state of affairs as sacred and inviolable. To the extent that they are socialists, they are quite conservative (although they like to call themselves radical). Presumably, their idea is that nothing should change until the victory of socialism. If the Central Powers restore Poland, for example, they evidently see this as a disruption of trade. This, they probably think, is a matter of socialism. It's just a pity that the Poles don't want to wait until then. We don’t know when socialism will come. There are good socialists who have not yet "re-educated" themselves and believe that it will not come until private capitalism has exhausted itself, and who further believe that it is only now preparing to enter a new, hopefully highest and final form. To the Poles,

oppressed by Russia, it nevertheless seems safer if their nation achieves the independence necessary for its development today. It also does not bother this type of peace-seeker that the restoration of the previous state also means the renewed consolidation of English sole rule. If they have any national sentiment at all, it is certainly not German. To the extent that they are of German descent, they display that revolting national indignity that is simply not found in other nations. They are to be regarded as true traitors to the people. Their actions must be embittering and directly counteract peace. These are the same people who always cry: There must be no victors and no vanquished. Political children who believe one could decide this as one decides resolutions. If the real victors in peace negotiations, in all magnanimity, do not speak like victors to the vanquished, but treat the enemy respectfully, they are only doing what they did throughout the war: they are simply responding to the furious passion of the enemy with calm and prudence. History will judge who has been victor and who has been vanquished in the war. If the Central Powers had merely effectively protected the borders of their empires against enemy attacks up to the present day, if they had thereby thwarted the loudly, often, and stormily expressed intentions of their enemies, they would undoubtedly be the victors in this war. But now they stand deep in enemy territory! It does not look at all as if the Central Powers will, in the further course of the war, could be defeated militarily. Their starvation is also unlikely, especially after the conquests in Romania. The Central Powers can only be defeated at the negotiating table if they fail to vigorously protect their interests there. And that is the crux of the matter today. — We are happy that the Central Powers have offered peace negotiations. We want to insist that it does not stop there, and that everything is done to realize them and advance them. If, of course, the encircling powers respond by demanding that the Central Powers announce the terms, then things are already going wrong. Peace negotiations at the negotiating table are—let's put it bluntly—a bargain. It is an unfair, even anti-German demand to demand that Germany present its terms to the encircling powers. Germany does not demand this of the Quadruple Alliance either. The peace terms can only be discussed at the negotiating table. And not immediately in their entirety, but first in individual. If one or the other party were forced to present its entire peace program at once, the negotiations would come to a rapid end. It is not unlikely that the encircling powers would attempt to lure the Central Powers onto the ice in this way. But the public opinion of the Central Powers certainly has the right to speak about their least peace demands. The governments of the encircling powers have placed no restrictions on their publicity regarding the discussion of their

war aims. The Central Powers have sought to prevent such discussions on both sides. Apparently for the purpose of not offending the enemy countries and also the neutrals with exaggerated demands. It is particularly worth noting that the so-called friends of peace in Germany condemn any expression of exaggerated demands by the Pan-Germans, to the extent that they dared to emerge, not only fought them to the utmost, but generally attributed them to the German government as their own intentions, even though there was not the slightest reason for doing so. These same circles could not, without exposing themselves too much, completely silence the bloodthirsty manifestations of the official government manifestations of the enemy, but their opposition was generally mild. This position is thought-provoking and indicates that there are circles in Germany that, while issuing the slogan: "No humiliation on either side," actually have little objection to a humiliation of the Central Powers. I deliberately do not speak of those Germans who would also be willing to give up Alsace-Lorraine and who simply do not say so openly because they fear public contempt. How much Germany, in particular, must be on guard is demonstrated by a remarkable passage from a recent English book by Harald Begbie, entitled The Vindication of Great Britain. One passage in it reads: "A wise policy would be for you to agree to the present punishment of Germany and, if Germany shows the will to evacuate the territories she occupies, to withdraw your armies and also your blockade. The result of such an action would be the following: Germany, with negligible foreign trade, an equally negligible currency, and without raw materials, would immediately fall into a state of insolvency. The greatest misery and despair would reign throughout the entire German Reich." I don't have the book to hand; the author appears to be an American. He hopes that then the social revolution will come in Germany and that the Pan-Germanists and the monarchy will disappear. In any case, such statements are symptomatic. They show that the world hostile to us, having failed to defeat us in military struggle, will attempt to ruin us in peace after the war. Therefore, it is so extremely important that peace give the Central Powers every possibility of future development. Just as the Central Powers will grant these opportunities to all encircling powers, provided they do not demand things that affect the integrity of the Central Powers. Thus, we entered the new year with the hope that it will bring us peace. An honorable peace, and one that does not endanger our future. Despite the Entente's harshly negative note, people are still reluctant to speak of the failure of the peace negotiations. But should the unthinkable happen, should the struggle continue, we are strengthened by the awareness that we are fighting for the future of our peoples. This is a thought that

should be particularly understandable to a socialist. If we could win socialism with our deaths, we should not hesitate. The assertion of the German people is a prerequisite for the victory of socialism. Fichte's words apply here: with our downfall, all hope of humanity would perish. We would be showing low spirits if we were not willing to give ourselves for those who come after us. In a beautiful poem by the German poet Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, perhaps the greatest poet in world literature, the last in the collection "The Spiritual Year," entitled "Gethsemane," she describes how Christ, hanging on the cross, tormented by all the pains of human frailty, bleeding from a thousand wounds, immersed in nameless human suffering, begins to despair in this last hour and, forgetting his task of redemption, prays to God: "Let this cup of suffering pass from me." Then he sees a vision: p. 534 (554) 534 Central European Agrarian Questions. A flash of lightning struck the night; in the light floated the cross, oh, radiant with the martyr's mark, and he saw millions of hands reaching out, clinging fearfully to the bloody trunk, O hands and Little hands from the farthest reaches! And around the crown hovered millions of still-unborn souls, resembling sparks; A faint mist, creeping from the ground, rose from the graves of the deceased's supplications. Then Christ rose in the fullness of love, and: Father, Father, he cried, not my will, but yours be done! European humanity hangs, a crucified martyr, on the cross of endless suffering. It longs ardently that this cup of suffering may finally pass from it. But of German humanity, at least, one shall not be able to say in the future that it despairs. If inexorable fate wills it, we will persevere, because we suffer for the future of our people, which is worth more than the lives of millions of today's people. It is the most sacred thing for us, because it is necessary for the salvation of humanity. We say this not in vain arrogance, but in the awareness of the great duties that lie upon us and whose fulfillment demand the utmost seriousness and complete devotion, duties that only we and no one else in the world can fulfill. We humbly bow our heads before the inescapable necessities of fate. WILHELM JANSSON: Central European Agrarian Questions. While the vulgar Marxist waves still gently lap against Central Europe, the idea of a Central European Economic Union has made considerable progress. It is beginning to transform into a political reality. p. 535 (555) Central European Agrarian Questions. 535 This applies primarily to the removal of obstacles. Here, the Polish Proclamation undoubtedly paved the way for far more important decisions by the Central Powers. And in this respect, even those who are otherwise pessimistic about it can regard it as a wise act. For it eliminates the Polish difficulties between the Central Powers. Occupied Poland cannot be a bone of contention for the Allies; it does not stand in the way of the unification of

Central Europe. One can assume that the frenzy in the Entente press was at least partly caused by dashed hopes of future Polish discord within the Central Powers, and that they are particularly sensitive to the idea that an independent Poland could become part of a Central European alliance. Events in Austria appear to be equally important. Much as Körber's resignation was regretted in the German press, one should not overlook the fact that this turn of events in Vienna amounts to a promotion of the Central European economic alliance. The new Viennese cabinet will probably soon finalize the Compromise with Hungary. This is a prerequisite for the success of further Central European efforts, which were specified in the Prime Minister's statements that, in addition to the Compromise with Hungary, the government will work for economic rapprochement with the German Reich. The Dual Monarchy's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czernin, has a reputation as a staunch supporter of close relations with the German Empire. This also applies to the other, more influential members of the cabinet. As far as the personalities themselves are concerned, there no longer seem to be any obstacles of insurmountable importance. But what about the circumstances, which, as is well known, are supposed to be stronger than the individuals? A major treatise in the fourth war issue ("War and Economy") of the "Archives for Social Science" seems to me to present quite noteworthy arguments. Gustav Stolper discusses the German-Austrian-Hungarian Economic League there. He assumes that while the merger was a more or less justified wish of some political and economic circles in the first months of the war, it has now become a necessity. In contrast to those who opposed German involvement in Austria's Balkan affairs, it had become clear that Germany, out of its own best interests, had to devote all its power to these oriental affairs of Austria-Hungary, because they had become its own affairs. This statement is correct insofar as a vigorous Austria-Hungary has also become a vital question for the German Empire. For us, who see the center of gravity of the economic and political development of the European nations shifting to the East for the coming decades, our agreement with Stolper's view is all the more unobjectionable because it clearly expresses Germany's political interest in the creation of Central Europe. But if this is established, then it follows that the scope of all economic policy measures must also be examined from this standpoint. Stolper here accuses German trade policy before the war of having been responsible for the Danube Monarchy's policy of isolation against the Balkan countries, which ultimately had such serious consequences. The Austro-Hungarian agrarian will only agree to a reduction in grain tariffs against Romania and Bulgaria if he has free access to the German market for his surplus produce. The dismantling of the German tariff

barriers for agricultural products is therefore necessary for both domestic economic and foreign policy reasons: "Both are vital questions for the future of the monarchy and therefore, given the indissoluble political union of the two powers, also for the German Reich." p. 537 (557) Central European Agricultural Questions. 537 The attempt to shift responsibility for the economic policy of the Danube Monarchy towards the small Balkan peoples onto Germany is more than contestable, and the demand for the dismantling of German agricultural tariffs would necessarily have to be supplemented by the same demand for Austrian industrial tariffs. Stolper does not go that far, however, despite some excellent remarks about the impossibility of an expedient protectionist tariff policy for the first years of peace. With regard to the war and peace economic organizations, he considers the "primitive means of customs policy," but he still wants to allow for intermediate tariffs in exceptional cases when establishing the common autonomous customs tariff with third countries. Apart from these minor flaws in Stolper's statement, his starting point seems to us to be fruitful for further discussion. For the agrarian question undoubtedly plays a greater role in the eventual realization of the Central European economic alliance not only because the agrarian circles in all three countries have a decisive influence, but also because the question of agricultural production affects the broad masses more than ever. This applies to the working masses of Germany to an even greater degree than to the workers of Austria or even Hungary, because these countries are not yet as industrialized as Germany. But the war has proven to us in the most decisive way that, precisely from the standpoint of the broad masses of consumers, we must strive for greater independence in the procurement of food. In addition to the further increase of German food production, which has already reached a very high level and is among the most intensive in the international agricultural economy, this is only possible through an expansion of the area producing for the German market. The creation of the Central European Economic Alliance is the most advantageous and also politically most expedient path that can be taken for this purpose, for it does not violate the rights of other peoples, but is suitable for safeguarding and promoting the interests of the allied peoples. For our future food supplies, even the restoration of the free seas at the conclusion of peace cannot offer sufficient security. No one can guarantee against a repetition of the English blockade. But even without assuming this will happen, one must arrive at the same conclusion. The fact is that world grain production has partly stagnated and partly declined in relation to population growth over the past few decades. I discussed this in more detail in issue 10 of the current year of the "Glocke," so I will limit myself to pointing out that

the European harvest of wheat, rye, barley, oats, and corn fell from 355 kilograms per capita in the decade 1871-80 to 351 kilograms in the decade 1891-1900. However, the United States, which harvested 1055 kilograms per capita in 1871-80 and was able to increase this harvest to 1152 kilograms in the following decade, had fallen back to 1088 kilograms in 1891-1900. The high figures were also achieved largely through the cultivation of fodder (maize), while the American harvest of rye and wheat was not significantly larger than the European one: 218 versus 201 in 1871-80 and 220 versus 197 in 1891-1900. The more America industrializes, the less food it will be able to export and the higher the prices will become. This also applies to other overseas grain-producing regions, such as Canada and Argentina, whose populations have grown rapidly in recent decades and whose numbers are therefore turning to industrial activity. These conditions are a stark reminder that the greatest attention must be paid to food production in Europe. Regions capable of producing surplus crops are essentially only found in the East: Russia, Austria-Hungary, and parts of the Balkans. We have no influence on Russian production or its distribution. In Central Europe p. 539 (559) Central European Agricultural Questions. 539 However, common interests within the territory of the states are pushing for a joint promotion of this economic policy issue. It may seem questionable whether, under the prevailing conditions, a significant increase in German agricultural production is initially possible. But with regard to Austria-Hungary, it is beyond any doubt that considerable additional yields can be achieved with appropriate cultivation. Although the land is predominantly agricultural and despite the best soil, Hungary was only able to export 1.66 percent of its total grain production before the war. While Germany was able to harvest 4.6 quintals of the four main grains per head of its large population, Hungary, the agricultural country, only managed 3.5 quintals. That great development opportunities exist here is obvious. Two main factors are necessary to exploit them: capital and sales. In his aforementioned essay, Stolper explains that the merger with the German Empire was necessary because of the needs of Austro-Hungarian agriculture for capital, artificial fertilizers, machinery, buildings, irrigation systems, and river regulation (large areas of Hungary and many crown lands sacrifice significant portions of their harvest to floods every year). This means that capital is lacking, because all the other deficiencies mentioned can be remedied as soon as capital can be raised. However, raising capital is also the greater difficulty in German agriculture itself. It depends on profitability, that is, on the security of sales at prices that allow for an average profit within the overall economy. This creates the danger of a speculative increase in ground rent, which, however, is often

somewhat exaggerated. For not every increase in commodity prices is based on speculation in high food prices; rather, it also corresponds to the increase in value of the rural economy through better soil cultivation, buildings, and those other imponderables that Stolper speaks of as current deficiencies in Austro-Hungarian agriculture. And because we in Germany have been living in a transition period from extensive to intensive agriculture for three decades, the question does not seem unreasonable whether this circumstance has not caused the increase in ground rent just as much as mere speculation in protective tariffs and high food prices. The rapidly growing population, which ensures sales, and a price level that made it possible to raise capital for more intensive cultivation were certainly among the prerequisites for the higher performance of German agriculture compared to its eastern neighbors. If it were possible to combine the economic territories of the allied empires, separated by high customs walls, into a single economic area, then, as Stolper shared the view, Austro-Hungarian agriculture would have the path open for rapid development. The dismantling of the tariff barriers against the smaller Balkan states would have to be the result. For Stolper, the first is the prerequisite for the second, and in this way we would arrive at a closed economic complex that could offer a certain security for the future, at least in the food question. For those who reject Central Europe out of more far-reaching pacifist leanings, these arguments will carry little weight. Certainly, the United States of Europe and, more broadly, of the entire world also appear to us as a higher form of human organization. Unfortunately, they are not achievable in the foreseeable future. And just as we would rightly raise the most serious accusations against the German founders of the Reich today if they had not realized the Reich idea in 1870/71, simply because the other European states had not joined a general League of Nations on a solid basis, so too would our successors have reason to doubt our political sanity if we were to let the sparrow, which we have in our hand, so to speak, fly away in favor of the pigeon on the roof. We readily admit that the assurance of food supplies, which can be achieved through the Central European Economic Alliance with its open routes to the Orient, initially appears more valuable to us than the more ambitious pacifist goals, which cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. Stolper, like other economists of the Danube Monarchy, argues that the intensification of Austro-Hungarian agriculture is a necessity, based on reasons of national economic development, which are also of interest to us. Relieving the burden of war in Austria-Hungary is also only possible through the systematic promotion of productive labor. The future economic policy of Central Europe will therefore inevitably be determined by the currency

problem, the tax problem, the supply of raw materials, the reestablishment of foreign relations, etc. For the Danube Monarchy, agricultural production is the part of the overall economy that can primarily contribute to surplus exports, thus effectively solving the currency problem. Even before the war, the deficit in the Monarchy's trade balance amounted to almost one billion crowns annually due to the increasing import of raw materials and capital goods; it will multiply after the war because the Monarchy's economy is deprived of several of its most important raw materials. Since industry was far from able to meet the domestic market's needs even before the war (in Hungary only 30-35 percent of total demand), its exports will initially be of little importance after the war. Agriculture will therefore have an even greater role to play in stimulating export trade through intensive farming. For Germany itself, the situation is different. Here, a significant increase in export trade through agricultural production is impossible because we are completely dependent on imports, despite our high level of cultivation. Industrial production here must fulfill the tasks that, within the Danube Monarchy, can primarily be solved by agriculture. From the standpoint of Central Europe, this is merely a division of labor. And since the three years of war—it will hardly be any less—have also welded the two empires together financially, it must also be most expedient from the standpoint of German interests to cover the food shortage from the wartime allies as far as possible, just as these allies will, in their own interest, satisfy their own needs for industrial products with German goods. Even before the war, two-fifths of the monarchy's foreign trade was with Germany, and Hungary's foreign trade was primarily with Austria, which absorbed 80-85 percent of Hungarian exports and covered 85-90 percent of Hungarian imports, partly, however, through intermediary trade. The importance of imports from the Danube Monarchy for Germany's food supply before the war is demonstrated by Austria-Hungary's share of the import of slaughter cattle in 1912/13. Of the total German imports, the Danube Monarchy accounted for the following percentages: oxen 75.67, bulls 10.26, cows 11.70, young cattle, depending on sex and age, 27.88, 14.78 and 35.24, calves 67.70, sheep 90.40, lambs 98.50, goats 57.60, pigs 0.47 and suckling pigs 9.36 percent.[1] In addition, the Austro-Hungarian supply of malt (95 percent), malt barley (78.7 percent), poultry (depending on the species 10.89 to 58.41 percent) and eggs (40.3 percent) was significant for German consumption. Increasing agricultural production there would soon increase the region's importance for supplying Germany with animal feed and wheat. Of course, there is another side to this coin, and there can be no question of us simply handing German consumers over to the Austro-Hungarian agrarians. The use of the eastern region of

Central Europe for the German national diet, in the sense we understand it, is only possible through monopolization of imports. The fact that German grain—1 The figures are taken from Karl von Tyszha's essay in the first part of the study published by Herkner: The Economic Rapprochement Between the German Empire and Its Allies. p. 543 (563) Dalmazia nostra. 543 monopoly, which was created during the war in the Reich Grain Office, remains a permanent and further developed institution, is the prerequisite for every further step on this path. The tearing down of the German tariff barriers against Austria in favor of a much higher "autonomous" common tariff, which would expose German consumers to the price-gouging tactics of the Austro-Hungarian landowners, will certainly not find the approval of the working class. Within the framework of a Reich monopoly on grain, possibly extended to the milling industry and the import of other agricultural products, and with the participation of organized consumers in the administration, the matter could also be carried out in the interests of the German consumer and with due consideration for the promotion of domestic agricultural production. And because this path is feasible, we believe we must also support the Central European economic alliance from the standpoint of German food supplies. HERMANN WENDEL, M. d. R.: A Dalmazia nostra. LS In May 1915, Italy, dripping with noble sayings, joined the seven Swabians who had set out to save the world from Prussian militarism. to liberate and protect the small nations from German arbitrariness, the entire trade press rejoiced over the new champion of law and freedom. But so that the "holy war" would not be taken too literally, the Italian statesmen had already prepared for it with the lovely slogan of "holy self-interest"; they said the redemption of oppressed brothers, and meant the conquest of the largest possible territory. This has not just been the case on the Latin peninsula since yesterday. Of the "cunning policy of military interventions and diplomatic intrigues" that ancient Rome pursued in the second p. 544 (564) 544 Dalmazia nostra. One who should know, Guglielmo Ferrero, says in his well-known historical work about the Italian imperialism that followed in the 13th century BC: "Fine words sought to give this policy the appearance of a generous idealism: Rome did not fight for itself, but to give freedom to the oppressed peoples!" As in the Punic Wars, so in the World War. Generous idealism in the bardic song of Annunzio, rapacious imperialism in the expansion plans of Salandra and Sonnino, and this Italian imperialism stretched its wings all the further because it completely lacked any earthly foundation and was certainly not the expression of a highly inflated industrial capitalism for which the domestic market had become too narrow. Now, the "Avanti" may not be so wrong in speaking of the Italian imperialists mockingly as "four corporals

without a crew," but in any case, these four subaltern spirits make noise for four thousand, and their dreams must like the delusions of a hashish intoxication. They demand not only Trentino, but the entire coastal region from Trieste to Cattaro and beyond, the Albanian coast with Valona, the "Gibraltar of the Adriatic." Possession of the Adriatic, however, is supposed to be only the precursor to domination of the Mediterranean, and this, in turn, the key to world politics on a grand scale. The acquisition of the Syrian coast from Smyrna to Alexandretta and the cession of English and French Somaliland is, so to speak, merely a pear for the thirst of the Italian imperialists, and for them , even Arabia, Abyssinia, Tunisia, Brazil, and Argentina are by no means the exhaustion of Italy's dreamed-of sphere of power-political interest. Roman nationalist newspapers recall that its trade in the Persian province of Kermanshah was once involved in the export of carpets to America, and others demand more influence in the Far East. Now, most of the demands of Italy's conquering politicians not only clash with common sense, but also clash with the perceived or real rights of their beloved allies. Neither England nor France wish to see the banners of the House of Savoy flying over Alexandrette, and whether either would present their possessions on the Somali coast to their Latin sister as a sweet treat on a silver platter remains to be seen. The most irreconcilable conflict, however, between Italy and other mercenaries of the Quadruple Alliance arises in the Dalmatian question. Dalmatia has always been treated more stepmotherly by history than by nature. Its respective rulers always had only a purely negative interest in the land, ensuring that no one else would settle on this coast: thus, instead of becoming an orchard, it remained a fortress wall. After a past already ravaged by battles, it formed the dividing line between Venetian and Ottoman power at the dawn of modern times. Venice, as the first seafaring state in the Mediterranean and thus in the then known world, keenly recognized the value of the opposite Adriatic coast for its position of power; early on, the Doge was able to adorn himself with the title of Duke of Dalmatia. But superior in warfare and artillery, the northern Italian trading republic was unable to keep the advancing Turks away from the eastern shores of the Adriatic for many decades; only the Peace of Karlovaci in 1699 ushered in the century of true Venetian rule over Dalmatia. The Slavic population, who had lived there for centuries, could care less whether they were subject to the Turkish Crescent or the Venetian Lion; for them, both were foreign rule, and foreign rule in the most ruthless and destructive form. The Proveditore Generale of the Republic did just as little for the country as the Ottoman Pashas. The sun of the Renaissance certainly cast its rays here too; the cities acquired an Italian character through public buildings; as

everywhere, the noble and wealthy adopted the language and culture of their foreign rulers; renowned poets and artists of Slavic origin and Slavic stock wrote Italian verses and erected Italian palaces and churches. But at the same time, Venice's policy seemed to be systematically transforming the country into a desert to ward off the Turkish advance. Strict prohibitions hampered the development of trade and industry in the cities. The rural population was bound hand and foot by a feudal landownership system and was just good enough for the Venetians as cannon fodder. Thus, the country was condemned to stagnation and decay; the rich forests were ruthlessly cleared, the regrowing young shoots served as pasture for goats, and all in all, Dalmatia was one of the poorest, most miserable, and most backward parts of Europe when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, after a brief Austrian interlude, the French arrived. In fact, they were by no means intended to bring happiness to the people; according to Napoleon's own words, he intended Illyria to be nothing more than a sentry stationed at the gates of Vienna, and he intended to use Dalmatia in particular merely as a springboard for his oriental plans. But just as in the years 1789 to 1815 the French, whether they wanted to or not, provided the revolutionary leaven everywhere in old Europe, so during their brief rule over Dalmatia the fresh breath of the new age blew into the accumulated mold of the Middle Ages: separation of administration and jurisdiction, abolition of corporal punishment, introduction of the Civil Code and the Napoleonic Code, establishment of schools, removal of guild barriers, encouragement of trade and industry, establishment of peasant property rights, reforestation and road construction – the Dalmatians learned in amazement during these turbulent years all they had been deprived of and all that was possible under an energetic administration. When the Congress of Vienna once again made the Austrians masters of the country, they wiped the characters of the nineteenth century from the blackboard with a large sponge; In 1815, the Middle Ages began anew for Dalmatia, and right up to the brink of the World War, the policy of the House of Habsburg failed to heed that the good saying: "Acquire it to possess it!" also applies to countries and peoples. Like the Turkish and Venetian administrations, the Austrian administration therefore remained a foreign rule and did little to satisfy the people politically, and less to improve the country economically. Dull-witted despotism believed that the Dalmatians were the first to have patients as meek as lambs, even if it blocked all sources of advancement for them. This was what Metternich's fear of ghosts before the awakening of the nations had demanded, and this was what his successors imitated in the wake of the national misery, which Ferdinand Kürnberger had already recognized as having arisen not because

of nationalities, but because of absolutism. Another clever Austrian, Hermann Bahr, says in an honest and wise little book about a Dalmatian journey: "In other provinces, Austria sometimes believes it has to put on a little Europe for foreigners. Here in Dalmatia, it has no need. Here it can still show itself unspoiled. Here it stands naked, as in paradise." This paradisiacal nakedness is certainly not a pleasant sight. Just as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the medieval Kmetian economy under the Austrian Empire Just as the system of colonies, which has flourished to this day under Turkish protection, still exists in Dalmatia today, having been adopted, with only minor changes, from Turkish to Venetian rule. The colonists and colonists are not owners , but merely usufructuaries of the land they cultivate; they are often subject to serfdom, always to rent, and deliver from a tenth to a quarter or third of the annual yield. As everywhere else, this system of payments in kind, which is hostile to development and inhibits any improvement in operations and increase in yield, has kept agriculture at a very low level in Dalmatia too. Furthermore, since nothing is rarely done to dam the frequent floods of the rivers, swamps lie where flourishing fields could have grown. Dandolo, the country's first governor under Napoleon I, calculated that the soil of Dalmatia could not only feed a million people, but also produce p. 548 (568) 548 Dalmazia nostra. but also make them rich. Today it is far from able to feed six hundred thousand of them; year after year, bitter hardship draws vast quantities of grain into the country and drives people in droves to America and other global jobs. Yet no country, apart from Norway, has so much water power with which to feed enormous industrial plants and create food supplies for tens of thousands. Hand in hand with this goes the isolation of the country due to the lack of railway connections and the neglect of public education: over 300 villages do not have a single elementary school, and in half the country the number of illiterates reaches 99 to 100 percent! If Dalmatia, instead of flourishing and prospering, remained a miserable land of beggars, the main blame lies with the Viennese rulers' foolish fear of the national strengthening and unification of the South Slav peoples—in a word, of the bourgeois revolution of South Slavdom. The process of national self-reflection among the Dalmatian South Slavs had already begun under French rule, when Slovene and Croatian newspapers appeared for the first time. Around the same time, Vuk Karadschitsch published Serbian folk songs and heroic hymns, for, apart from the Serbian uprising, the national movement among the South Slavs also first manifested itself in literature. In the Vormärz period, Ljudevit Gaj followed with so-called Illyrianism, and a few decades later, Bishop Stroßmayer came as the great cultural agitator of South Slav nationalism. As

the most isolated and backward of the South Slav countries, Dalmatia was the last and weakest to be affected by the literary movement , but when literary activity turned into political activity, Dalmatia also lent a brave hand. From here, as Serbs and Croats began to feel like one and the same tribe, came the inspiration for the Serbo-Croat coalition, which at the beginning of our century united all South Slavs in Croatia, Slavonia, Istria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, across party differences. p. 549 (569) Dalmazia nostra. 549 The purpose of every bourgeois revolution is the destruction of feudalism with everything that goes with it. Where in 1912 the Turks gave way to the victorious Serbs and Bulgarians, the tributary Macedonian tenants of the Ottoman manors quickly transformed into free smallholders cultivating their own land, and thus this Balkan War revealed itself in its own way as a piece of the bourgeois revolution of the South Slavs. But no less important is the struggle of the South Slav peoples in the Danube Monarchy for the right to political self-government and freedom of economic development; this too is a struggle against feudalism, which has only come to a standstill under the state of siege, just as winter stops flowing water by freezing into ice. This struggle is directed against the division of the empire into two halves with two ruling peoples, which in 1867 had at least a glimmer of justification, since at that time only the Germans and Hungarians were nations with developed class stratification. Today, the South Slavs have risen and also want their place in the sun. For those who view things not as Schleiz-Ebersdorf-Lobensteiners, eager to snatch a sausage or a side of bacon from the chaos of the world, but as Europeans concerned with the lasting peaceful order of our continent, one of the "war aims" is a solution to the South Slav question in accordance with historical development. Of the various possibilities, the Serbs of the kingdom are striving for precisely the one that is incompatible with the existence of the Austro-Hungarian state: the separation of the South Slavs from the Habsburg Empire and their unification under the scepter of the Karajordschevichs: Greater Serbia. The Serbs look to Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular with feelings similar to those that inspired our grandfathers before 1864 to sing: Schleswig-Holstein, surrounded by the sea, Schleswig-Holstein, kin of the tribes! However, in their dreams for the future, the Serbs took the unification of Italy rather than Germany as their model. For the Southern Slavs, the Karajordschevich dynasty was to achieve what the House of Savoy did for the Apennine Peninsula: expulsion of the Austrians and gathering all tribes under one roof. In memory of the days of Cavour and Garibaldi, the Belgrade newspaper that most ardently advocated these aspirations called itself "Piedmont." The disappointment must have been all the more painful when these celebrated

Italians founded a committee called Pro Dalmazia Italiana, declared the entire coastal region from Fiume to Cattaro and beyond their share of the spoils, and thus placed a boulder in the path of the South Slavs' movement for unity. For months, a fierce newspaper battle has been raging between the Italian and Serbian nationalists. They emphasize that in Dalmatia there are 600,000 South Slavs facing barely 20,000 Italians, point out that the Dalmatian coastal region, separated from its natural hinterland, will never flourish economically, underline that even on Italian maps before the war Dalmatia was shown as Slavic, complain that the fulfillment of Italian demands would bring one and a half million Slavs under the yoke of a new foreign rule, and ask desperately, with a pleading glance to the big brothers in the Entente, where the rights of the smaller peoples, where the much-vaunted principle of nationality, actually lie. The former reply rudely that the eastern Adriatic coast is Italy's left lung, claim that the official statistics were falsified by Austria to the detriment of the Italians, suggest that Austria artificially promoted the Slavization of Dalmatia to the detriment of the Italians, suspiciously consider the possibility of seeing Serbian submarines and battleships in the Adriatic, refer Serbia to the port of Thessaloniki as an export gateway, and otherwise declare the nationality principle to be an ideal, but one to be treated with caution. Thus, pleasantries fly back and forth, and at times the language of the disputants is reminiscent of the tone of the official press of states on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations. p. 551 (571) The Proletarian Youth Movement of the Future. 551 Both sides also openly announce that if Dalmatia is not given—one side says to Italy, the other to the Greater Serbian Empire—an armed conflict between today's allies is inevitable tomorrow. The main roosters of the Entente view the squabble with mixed feelings. In England and France, Italy's growing appetite is generating growing unease, while Russia can only continue to roast its chestnuts on the fire of South Slav discontent and therefore has no serious interest in fulfilling Greater Serbian dreams. Nevertheless, from Paris, London, or Petersburg, a cooling jet of water occasionally sprays; here, there, pacification is offered, there, appeasement is offered, and all too often this dispute elicits from the anxious statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance a sigh that there are things between Entente heaven and earth that their diplomatic wisdom can never dream of. But the fact that a brawl threatens to break out over the distribution of a bearskin, while the bear is still merrily strolling around, is the humor of it, insofar as one can speak of humor in the murky entanglements of these murky times. R. WEIMANN: THE Proletarian Youth Movement of the Future. The differences within the proletarian youth movement, whose causes and effects I illuminated in the "Glocke" issue no.

12 of this year, have recently led to the publication of a second youth publication entitled "Free Youth." These and other regrettable developments in the youth movement are a consequence of the party turmoil. But it would be wrong to view it solely from the one-sided perspective, as Comrade Sollmann does in his otherwise excellent expositions in issue 22 of the "Glocke," that left-wing radical adult comrades are attempting to bring the "direction dispute" into the youth movement. One must not overlook the fact that the actual carriers of this new intellectual trend are mainly young people, albeit predominantly of the older generations, and that they are making demands that have nothing directly to do with the direction dispute in the party. Our youth movement, in its current form, satisfies neither young people nor adults. When one considers the tremendous effort and work, the enormous sums that are spent annually on the cause of working-class youth, and compares this with the benefit that the entire labor movement of this enormous expenditure, the picture undoubtedly looks very unfavorable. Even the increase in followers, which the last annual reports of the Central Office before the war record from year to year, is due in large part to the fact that new youth committees have continually been formed and founded a youth movement in places where none previously existed. In contrast, in the large cities and industrial centers, which are and remain the main field for youth agitation, our successes seem extraordinarily modest in relation to the time and expense invested. If, for example, among the two million people who populate Berlin, the number of young people between 14 and 18 years of age, measured according to the 1910 census, is approximately 130,000, and of these, approximately 5,000 rally around the banner of the "Workers' Youth," and this number remains essentially the same from year to year, then one cannot boast too much about it. The annual expenditures for the Berlin youth movement amount to a mere 25,000 to 30,000 marks. Conditions are unlikely to be much more favorable than in Berlin anywhere else. But apart from the fact that we cannot reach the main contingent of young people, we also do not know how to permanently tie the young people we have won over to our movement. The complaints about high fluctuation among our supporters are well known. For example, in the last business year before the outbreak of war in Berlin, with a membership base of 5,134, the number of lost supporters was 2,860, while the number of newly gained was 3,972. In view of such high fluctuation, the number of young people who remain permanent supporters of our movement appears very small. Even smaller, almost negligible, is the number of those who are transferred directly from the youth organization to the adult organization. These facts, in conjunction with the unpleasant tendencies toward division that came to

light during the war, make it an imperative duty to think about a reorganization of the youth movement. Full independence for youth between 14 and 18 years of age is, of course, just as out of the question as the politicization of these age groups in the spirit of our "left-wing radicals." Nevertheless, it is of course essential to enforce the abolition of Section 17 of the Reich Association Law. This legal provision seems to us today like a yellowed landmark from the darkest Middle Ages. Our economic and political life is so diverse and so closely intertwined that it seems a foolish attempt to protect young people, who are at the center of the economic process, from contact with politics with the help of a legal paragraph. Let us therefore hope that the famous "reorientation" after the war will soon bring us the abolition of the youth paragraph in the Reich Association Law, as passed by the Reichstag. How should our youth movement now be structured? It is important to increase their agitational effectiveness externally and to develop them internally so that young people remain permanently bound to them. The task is to create a single proletarian youth movement on a grand scale! The tripartite division of our youth work must disappear at all costs. Today, there is the youth section of the workers' sports clubs, especially gymnastics clubs, then the trade union youth sections, and alongside them the community of "Workers' Youth" subscribers. This tripartite division represents an unjustified fragmentation of energy, resources, and labor. Young people themselves generally do not join all three organizational groups, however desirable this might be. They participate in only one or the other movement for financial or other reasons. Undoubtedly, each of these three groups has its significance and justification. But in the interest of the growing generation, it cannot be considered desirable for them to be educated in a predominantly one-sided manner as athletes, or in professional isolation, or apart from both. A common organization for all youth must therefore be created, one that combines the particular advantages of each of the three existing organizational structures. For this, a fixed organizational form would be considered, for which the collection of a regular contribution, correspondingly low for apprentices, would be an absolute prerequisite. Furthermore, the facilities and activities of this organization would have to be designed according to the economic interests of its young members. The contribution must be offset by certain benefits in return. These would consist of the use of job certificates for young people, career and legal advice, the creation of certain support options similar to those partly available in trade union youth sections, and effective work in the unfortunately still very neglected area of youth protection. A sore spot in our educational work to date is the lack of adult advisors. By this, I don't mean the kind of comrades

we unfortunately find far too often in youth committees, who want to direct the youth movement from above but otherwise stay as far removed as possible from the actual, laborious practical work. Certainly, we have virtually no trained pedagogues. But for that, at least in the big cities, we lack them—not comrades who have emerged from the youth movement itself, nor those who, through persistent diligence, have acquired a solid foundation of knowledge and would be perfectly capable of working among young people. The adult, the Youth Advisory Council, as one might call it, is intended to have a spiritually stimulating effect on the youth movement. Every department must have its own Youth Advisory Council, which exercises this sole function. Until now, it has been a constant complaint that the adults paid very little attention to the youth movement, that is, to its actual practical work. This was because the adult youth committee members generally already held sufficient other positions. If a comrade was found whom it was thought could perhaps handle another position in addition to their usual duties, they were elected to the Youth Committee. This not only represents a regrettable disregard and underestimation of youth work, but also means that the comrade in question cannot concern himself at all with the actual practical work of the youth movement, which is a thousand times more important than the occasional meetings of the Youth Committee. Therefore, the Youth Committee system in its current form must be changed without fail. The youth advisory councils, in conjunction with the young representatives, form the best youth committee I can imagine. They draw on practical experience and are in direct contact with the youth. The youth advisory councils would, of course, be appointed on an equal basis by the party and trade union organizations, to whom they would be responsible for their activities among the youth. This committee system also has the advantage that the adult and youth elements are equally represented. If this system of youth advisory councils is implemented in the manner described, then we have the guarantee that the education of the youth will be carried out in a way that is in the interest of the entire working class, and that harmful influences and irresponsible activities will be kept away from the youth movement. Our educational tasks and methods will hardly change even after the war. We have already educated young people to feel the powerful pulse of the times. But youth remains youth, lacking all the prerequisites for understanding politics and feeling a natural need for joy in life and the exercise of their energies. Based on this fact and the general recognition of the importance of systematic physical education, I further demand that youth sports play a greater role in our movement. As much as we reject a purely military training of youth, we consider systematic physical

training, such as can be achieved through regular gymnastics, swimming, etc., to be indispensable. Our program must be organized so that, in addition to educational activities, regular gymnastics and swimming lessons, field games, etc., take place. The cooperation of workers' sports clubs is considered here, with which specific agreements must be made for this purpose. Physical fitness, in conjunction with the military training of youth, will play such a large role after the war that any organization that fails in this regard will fall behind. A difficult problem for the entire youth movement is the question of those over 18. These groups undoubtedly do not belong in an organization for younger people. A special institution would therefore have to be created for them, similar to the youth sections that exist in some larger cities within the framework of the overall party. If Section 17 of the Reich Association Law were to be repealed, the end of the seventeenth year could generally be viewed as the natural dividing line between older and younger youth. In the long run, it is an intolerable situation that we devote all our energy to 14- to 18-year-olds and then, once they reach the age of eighteen, practically cease to concern ourselves with them. Provision must be made that young people, as soon as they have reached the age of 18, will, as it were, automatically enter both the ge- 41/3 p. 556 (576) 556 "A Fight for the Soil." trade union organizations as well as the sections for those over 18. To this end, the organization of 14- to 18-year-olds would have to be considered a precursor to other organizations, whose facilities and services would be analogously linked to those. Furthermore, entry into trade union organizations could occur earlier for those young people who have completed their apprenticeships or are economically better off. If this division of the youth movement is consistently implemented, then not only can the unpleasant side effects associated with the simultaneous activity of older and younger generations in one organization be avoided, but we can also be assured that the fruits of our labor and expenditures will not be lost. HANS SONNTAG: So, "A Struggle for the Soil" is the title of a book by Emile Guillaumin, the Frenchman, who, though less as a novel than as a self-confession, has a certain significance in the literature of good. Guillaumin is not a poet in the usual sense; he is someone who, after the burdens and toils of the day, forces his thoughts onto paper with a heavy hand, who drives the plow, fills the barn with the year's golden treasures, and, with a frowning brow, still performs hard intellectual labor during the meager festive hours. That this double life must also find expression in Guillaumin's intellectual creations is quite natural. The striking sobriety of Guillaumin's language, in contrast to French wordsmiths, which is devoid of all illusion and testifies to the writer's simplicity, suggests how much more this influence is evident in

the material itself. Truthfulness is the fundamental trait of the brave self-confessor, truthfulness of such strength that one hardly notices the lack of imagination in the book. This deficiency is, of course, also the reason why the poet was not granted the opportunity to master the material artistically in a higher sense; Therefore, the novel, which reflects the harsh reality and was probably constructed by an architect but not designed by an artist, is not a narrative on a grand scale, p. 557 (577) "A Struggle for the Soil." 557 but simply a simple self-confession. As such, it is not only an enrichment of the literature of confessional writings, which are particularly common in France, but, apart from all its aesthetic aspects, it also represents an important contribution to economic literature and, not least, to the intellectual history of nations. It was primarily because of these last two qualities that Jean Paul von Ardeschah dared to translate the work; thus, another important volume has been added to the collection "Sources for Contemporary Ethnology in Peasant Novels," published by Eugen Diederichs in Jena. Until now, the image of the French peasantry had found a distorted expression in French literature in many respects. Even masters of the pen such as Zola and Guy de Maupassant were far too imbued with the urban spirit, so that they viewed the peasant more superficially; they, too, frequently portrayed him as a "greedy peasant idiot" tied to the soil. This idea, once dominant throughout Europe, has long since been overcome; nevertheless, Guillaumin has much to say in his "Struggle for the Soil" that is suitable for completing the picture, all the more so since in recent times only Belgians writing in French have made the peasant the hero of their literature, thus becoming authorities only in the second place. For as much as de Coster, Verhaeren, and Georges Eckhoud must be addressed as truly brilliant portrayers of the peasant style, the Flemish influence of this art is clearly evident. The struggle for land in France, in particular, offers material in which tragic fates already lie. A poet of great talent might be attracted by the task of bringing before our eyes, in a mighty epic, the invisible, dark social forces of that mysterious working and weaving that weighs on the fighters in the quiet village and entwines their meager existence in gloomy entanglements, from which the luminous thoughts of freedom ultimately shine like the first green tips from the loose soil in spring. In Guillaumin's self-confession, there is no trace of these forces; it ends without hope, without the ardent, fiery devotion of people to a great cause, something of which one might also find in a self-confession. The only, all- p. 558 (578) 558 "A Struggle for the Land." The benefit that Guillaumin's book offers, however, which should not be underestimated, is, as already mentioned, the portrayal of the economic conditions of the rural population of Northern France, achieved at the

expense of poetic idealization. While it may not contain anything particularly new, it is nevertheless incredibly appealing because it is narrated by a man from the life circle of these conditions who recounts his own experiences. With a keen eye, the poet-farmer observes his fellow countrymen; as an intellectually superior man of the same blood, he knows how to admirably portray the inner lives of the peasants. The philosophy of this poet comes from the things themselves; it is a philosophy of life that emerges directly from the soil on which he lives; it is not a brooding brought down from the gray daylight, into which mostly only philosophizing idlers lapse. What is admirable about the novel's hero, Salembier, who is none other than Guillaumin himself, is his sincere courage, which stands up for his ideals, even when social forces erect their enormous barriers and threaten to crush the resisting one. For the sake of his ideals, the peasant, dependent on the large tenant farmers, would rather sacrifice his homeland, abandon his father and mother, than grant the wish of the landowners to cease his campaigning for syndicalism. All the diatribes, all the defamatory articles in the tabloid of the main tenant farmers, who begin to fear Salembier's agitation, only further spur the zealous promoter of the movement in his actions. Even the hero's marriage, the cozy family life, the burdens of peasant farming, fail to tire this agitator of the indecisive peasant minds. How vividly the conflict of duty is described, which has its origin in the peasant's overwork! Through his own harsh self-discipline, the uneducated peasant has intellectually raised himself; at night he works as a writer, in many evenings he is active as a speaker, and there he is tasked not only with winning new supporters for the syndicate, but also with dispelling the objections of the educated bourgeoisie. This self-confession takes us into the struggles of the small farmers against the main tenants, into the time of the beginning of the co-operativeization of peasant life. It reveals with unmistakable clarity the intellectual emptiness of the northern French peasantry, the lack of community spirit among the rural population, the inability to grasp social relationships and work for social goals. As the poet gazes into the harsh face of this reality, moving tones of lament against the intellectual dullness of his social class emerge from his mouth. The book ends in gloomy resignation. . . . ALFONS PETZOLD: HOW The prisoner listens... Heart that longs for the air of home, heart that awaits the return home, has not the door groaned, has not the threshold creaked? Is not someone coming to me, is not someone speaking the words: "The road is free before you, wander and find your way!" Is not there a crackling like a letter, a whisper from the paper: "Home has called you for a long time, but now you may go home!" Has not the cloud laughed, is not it mocking us angrily? My God, how long the night

is, heart, and the longing so heavy! Glosses. Diplomacy. How completely clueless German diplomacy was in the years before the war regarding world events is once again evident—very clearly from the recollections published by Count Ernst Reventlow in the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" (No. 648 of December 23, 1916, morning edition) of conversations with the late State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter. It should be noted, firstly, that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, however disastrous his policies certainly were in many ways, at least p. 560 (580) 560 glosses. was by no means the most intellectually insignificant among the leaders of Germany's foreign policy after Bismarck's resignation (at least he far surpassed his successor, Mr. von Jagow!) and secondly, that Mr. Reventlow was one of Kiderlen-Waechter's confidants and no reason is apparent why he should deliberately disparage the deceased today through false or exaggerated descriptions. Mr. Reventlow writes (we quote only a few sentences from the long article): "A few days before the outbreak of the Balkan War, I spoke with Kiderlen-Waechter about the tension. . . . The actual origins of that Balkan War only became known in a reasonably complete and reliable way in 1914. They presented a picture that was entirely different from the one Kiderlen-Waechter had created for himself and others. The unity of the Great Powers at that time was a maneuver on the part of the Triple Entente to deceive the Central Powers. Russia, in agreement with Great Britain, had long since organized the Balkan League, and in the greatest secrecy from the Central Powers. The goal was to crush Turkey in Europe, to create a new, ominous front for Austria-Hungary, to shatter German policy in the Orient, and to make the rest of Turkey a helpless and unsupported object of the Triple Entente. Finally, to severely reduce the German Empire's power and prestige and, at the same time, to forge Italy into the Entente. Immediately before the war and even in its early stages, when he proclaimed the famous status quo, Kiderlen-Waechter was proceeding from entirely different assumptions than those that actually existed. He was uninformed about all these things. He considered a small, amusing Balkan war possible, and then Turkey's victory certain; but he had no inkling of this organized Balkan war, as it actually was, and, as his statements before and his policy afterward showed, he neither prepared for nor in any way expected it. The military situation, as well as the political and diplomatic ones, had caught him unprepared and surprised him." And so on! If that was possible with the green wood of Mr. von Kiderlen-Waechter, who for many years was himself the German representative in the Balkans and was considered a particularly good Balkan expert, then one should no longer be surprised by so many things that we later experienced with the dry wood of Mr. von Jagow. It is truly bitterly necessary that the

reorientation after the war extends not least to a thorough reform of the entire German foreign service. KH p. 561 (581) DIE GLOCKE 42nd Issue January 13, 1917 2nd Year. Reprint of all articles with detailed source information permitted DR. WILLY ALTSCHUL: Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. SINCE And if you've no matter how secret it was kept, you lived as a troll." (The Dovre Old Man to Peer Gynt.) For years and years, Eduard Bernstein, cloaked in a veneer of wisdom, dignity, and profound meaning, has been fighting against the war policy of the German Social Democrats. And Bernstein is waging this battle, which the "left-wing radicals" rightly mock, not with the shining weapons of revolutionary vocabulary, but with the dusty formulas that come from the venerable lumber room of bourgeois pacifism, such as: international solidarity of all civilized nations, the right of self-determination of peoples, the idealization of the international status quo, etc. Thus, Bernstein hopes, in his own way, to conjure up the mighty storm winds raging across the earth. While this certainly won't lure any dogs away from the stove, the agitation method of Bernstein and his friends has nevertheless had the success of breaking the organizational unity of parliamentary representation, and through this political self-weakening, the authority that the parliamentary vanguard of the German proletariat must absolutely have vis-à-vis class comrades and class enemies, as well as vis-à-vis the state leadership, has been seriously shaken. 42/1 p. 562 (582) 562 Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. The Reichstag faction has never glossed over the hardships and pitfalls of the current military system (as far as the state's emergency allows for public criticism), nor has it ever attempted to whitewash its own diplomacy of its sins; for example, unlike Bernstein, it has never approved the KK ultimatum to Serbia as "dictated by the necessity of self-preservation"; rather, without prejudging itself, it has left the judgment here too to its individual members, in the correct recognition that the determination of the question of guilt for the war should be reserved for calmer and less passionate times. The faction has merely granted the state the means it needs to secure its existence and maintain its independence. Everywhere, even in hostile countries, the state and the workers' movement are most closely linked, nowhere perhaps more inextricably than in the German Reich, which represents the most highly developed industrial state among all the warring states. The supreme war aim of the Reichstag faction is therefore to secure the independence of its own state; however, the faction has not yet expressed its views on how it envisions this security, or whether it holds a different opinion on this than the current leadership of our state. Certain members, in agreement with prominent party writers, without being commissioned by the faction but also

without provoking its explicit opposition, have publicly stated that a necessary prerequisite for the future security of the Reich could be a change in its borders. It will not be easy to fundamentally combat this view as unsocialist. Without clinging to the words of the old masters, we would like to assume a case which fortunately did not become reality, but which will show that border changes for reasons of military security are incompatible with imperialist conquest policies 1 Eduard Bernstein: The War, its Authors and its First Victim. "Socialist Monthly Magazine" of August 13, 1914. p. 563 (583) Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. 563 not have had the slightest thing to do with it: suppose the island of Heligoland had remained English, and it had suited the English at the time to consolidate their rule there in the form of a republic (with international guarantees and control!!), and we had wrested Heligoland from the English during the war, then, according to Bernstein's theory, we would be obliged to vacate this unique base immediately after the end of hostilities. But even if this imaginary free state were composed entirely of international socialists, which could, to a certain extent, impose an obligation of solidarity from an "ethical-aesthetic" standpoint, we would still consider it a We would consider it madness to vacate a British position of power that threatened us for the sake of a fad and the good people of Heligoland, and we would not protect the responsible statesman who concluded such a peace if he were to be stoned at the next trial. * - The only problem is whether a socialist may support territorial changes after a victorious war for reasons of military security or economic development—think, for example, of the free development of the Danube waterway connecting the new Central Europe—without thereby falling under the ugly suspicion of being a tool of imperialism. This question must occupy more qualified and knowledgeable pens; it is of such extraordinary significance for the history of the German nation and the German labor movement that a superficial and casual investigation, regardless of the factual conclusion it reaches, is only harmful. After these introductory remarks, we shall rather concern ourselves solely with the extraordinarily contradictory and unpleasant manner in which Bernstein takes a position on the matter immediately before the war and now during it. Bernstein has recently tirelessly presented himself as the guardian of the violated principles of internationalism; 42/1 p. 564 (584) 564 Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. He bitterly reviles all who hold a different view. This, however, seems somewhat grotesque, in our opinion, because in the spring of 1913, as a speaker for his parliamentary group on the Foreign Office budget, Bernstein represented ideas and views that were almost excessively annexationist. In the spring of 1914, when Bernstein again spoke

on the foreign affairs budget, at a time when, following the Russian test mobilizations, the press and public opinion had become overly nervous, he was the only representative of the entire House who, devoid of any higher sense of responsibility, attempted to incite the Reich government to a more severe anti-Russian policy. Apparently, this remained unknown to Haenisch in his last "Vorwärts" polemic against Bernstein; for he regarded Bernstein there as a kind of "hospitable pastor" who, unsuspecting and with a pure mind, entered the filthy house of foreign policy. But good old Bernstein is really not so innocent in matters of foreign policy! Very significant in this regard is, first of all, what Bernstein communicates in his major budget speech of April 14, 1913, about the character of the First Balkan War. One no longer believes one recognizes the Bernstein who today faces his own nation's war with a coolness to the core. He speaks with a warmth about the war and its outcome that would be refreshing, if it didn't have a too anti-Turkic edge for our taste. But let's let Bernstein speak for himself: "The fact that conditions in the Balkans have changed, that Turkish rule there has been eliminated, that the Balkan peoples are freed from Turkish rule, we welcome this in the interest of the Balkan peoples." Even from these opening words, it follows with an inner logic that Bernstein furiously fought against the status quo that he so praises today and wishes to perpetuate; for the word "liberate" implies breaking away from the former forms of rule. 2 Proceedings of the Reichstag, 13th Legislative Period, 1st Session, Volume 289, 139th Session. P. 4733. p. 565 (585) Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. 565 3 conditions included. Bernstein made the following delightful remark on this:* "The Ambassadors' Conference began by proclaiming the status quo. We heard the word "status quo" again today. We will therefore be able to take a closer look at the status quo. In what state interest was the status quo? It was not in the interest of Türkiye itself, since the situation had become untenable. Here (!) a regeneration had to occur, and yet (!) the powers declare the status quo." In his fear of the status quo, Bernstein now allowed himself to be carried away by a very strange idea; in the interest of lasting peace, he suggested founding a new state, namely—it is difficult not to write satire—the Republic of Salonika! The memorable part of his speech, which shows us that a socialist foreign politician before the World War could act according to the principle: "Whatever pleases is permitted," reads: 5990 Then it is said that they want to compensate the Bulgarians through Salonika. Indeed, what claim does Bulgaria have to Salonika? None at all! Don't we want to initiate new arrangements, create definitive conditions that hold out the prospect of real, genuine peace? Isn't Salonika, with its entire composition and location, perfectly suited to an independent, free city with

the control and guarantee of the Great Powers?" Bernstein is thus the intellectual father of the latest state creation; the search for paternity is unnecessary here, since Bernstein has publicly acknowledged it. Just as the great Alexander of Macedon kept the thinker from Stagira as his court philosopher and educator, so the lesser Mr. Venizelos may gratefully devote himself to Eduard Bernstein. What is particularly significant in Bernstein's curious train of thought is that "international guarantee and control" is not lacking. Doesn't Bernstein know that Tangier, too, "inter- 3 See also p. 4734 Bernstein: "And with all this, it was nevertheless—one must not forget this today—a war of liberation on the part of the Balkan peoples." Ibid. p. 4734. 5 Ibid. pp. 4734-4735. p. 566 (586) 566 Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. nationalized"? Does he not know that England, in order to avoid having to hand over Constantinople to the Russians, also proposed "internationalizing" the Dardanelles, surely with the same altruistic intention with which it carried out the "internationalization" of the Suez Canal at that time? But the part of Bernstein's speech which, even if one has adapted to his views, seems unique in the boldness of its annexationist reasoning, is the one concerning the question of the Aegean Islands. To understand Bernstein's speech, it is necessary to first state what Bassermann, as the commission's rapporteur, had stated: "The question of the Aegean Islands was answered by the Secretary of State by saying that efforts were being made to safeguard Turkey's interests and to resolve the issue in such a way that Turkey's Asian possessions would not be endangered." Bernstein, however, sharply rejected any idea of leniency; "For annexations at Turkey's expense" was his slogan:8 "The status quo is not the solution here. The status quo in Turkey's Asian territory is not what it seems; we want Turkey to be sufficiently protected. . . but whether it is necessary that the Aegean islands, which are almost exclusively populated by Greeks, be ceded to it is a very questionable matter." This speech, which would have sparked storms of applause in a Venizelist assembly, fortunately did not go unchallenged in the German Reichstag. The deputy Baron von Richthofen thankfully undertook the task of examining the validity of Bernstein's annexationist demands:10 p. 4729. 7 v. Jagow. 8 p. 4735. The speaker unconsciously got so caught up in ideas of conquest that he spoke of "being ceded," while the Aegean islands, including the part occupied by Italy, belonged to Turkey under international law! 10 p. 4745. p. 567 (587) Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. 567 "Deputy Member Bernstein has said that he cannot approve of our government's aim of preserving part of the islands in the Mediterranean Sea for Turkey, which undoubtedly have a Greek population. . . Here, too, things must be judged somewhat differently; for there can be no doubt that it

will not be easy for Turkey to protect the European possessions it still has left, especially the Dardanelles, and that this must be made easier for it by at least allowing it the islands that lie before the entrance to the Dardanelles. Otherwise, the whole of Europe will make a demand on Turkey - namely the maintenance of free passage through the Dardanelles, which it is not in a position to fulfill, even with the best will in the world, because it lacks the military means, which lie partly in the possession of land, in this case in the possession of these islands, which, however, have a Greek population. However, I continue to believe that Turkey has a great and legitimate interest in retaining some of the islands that lie close to the coast of Asia Minor, so that these remain in Turkish possession; for it would be a great economic and political loss for Turkey if these islands, which are a cannon shot from the mainland, were to belong to another state (Greece). Here, too, the question of nationality cannot be the sole deciding factor in such important military and political questions." Bernstein considered it necessary to respond to this strong rebuff, doubly embarrassing for an internationalist: "Baron von Richthofen has pointed out to me that my demand that the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea be united with Greece would create intolerable conditions for Turkey because of the proximity of these islands to the coast of Asia Minor. In my opinion, the opposite is the case, and if these islands, which are predominantly or almost exclusively populated by Greeks and are striving for Greece, remain Turkish, then you will create intolerable conditions for Turkey. Greece has declared through its representatives and parties that if these islands were united with Greece, it will from then on only have a friendly relationship with Turkey. If you do not unite these islands with Greece, then the spectacle that Crete gave us will be repeated, then They will once again experience eternal struggles, eternal frictions, eternal uncertainties. It will then become apparent that this policy of half-measures, which is being pursued by diplomacy today in these matters, has the same consequences that this policy entailed at the Congress of Berlin and, at that time, at the Congress of Vienna." - Bernstein thus turned against the policy of half-measures - this word from the nationalist vocabulary touches us with familiarity! And rightly so. He vehemently defended the claims of Greater Greece, unconcerned whether our friendly Turkish Empire would be further shattered than the resolutions of the London Ambassadors' Conference and the Basel "Peace" Conference had already decreed. Did he have the interests of the German and international proletariat in mind? The separation of the Aegean islands from Turkey, imposed on European diplomacy, means nothing other than the sanctification of the ancient right of the conqueror, in the particular case of the islands temporarily occupied by Italy, and moreover, a

violation of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. But even the idea of conquest was strangely distorted by Bernstein with the idea of founding the Free State of Salonica, in which a territory belonging to Turkey under international law, but which had passed into Greek possession by force of arms, was to be neither left to the former state nor transferred to the victor, in order to establish a lasting peace! socialist slogan: Hands off the Balkans! as a fence state, as the "Tangier of the Balkans," under international tutelage, and thus either British or a plaything of the rival interests of the major European powers. But the reason that drove our internationalists to pursue this experimental policy is very clear: it is nationalism in its most naive and voracious manifestation! Because the islanders spoke Greek, Greece was allowed to annex these islands, and they had to be separated from Turkey. Away with the damage! Because most of the citizens of Salonika are Spanish—Bernstein explicitly stated this reason in the part of his speech we have not included for reasons of space—a new Balkan state must be created immediately for the sake of the Spanish. That this new Balkan state would have been a political stillbirth naturally doesn't bother our great politician in the slightest! And how can this same Bernstein belittle it so bravely today! He, who only recently raved about the liberation wars of the Balkan peoples, today mocks12 the manifesto of the party conference on the question of peace: "At every turn in the manifesto we encounter such vague language that one is tempted to speak, with Marx, of a sacrilegious mutilation of social democratic concepts through it. This is nothing other than the way, for example, in which the word "people," which has all sorts of nuances, is used in the manifesto. . . ." He was offended by the sentence: Social Democracy "places the protection of the interests and rights of its own people at the forefront of its demands for war aims when concluding peace." Bernstein comments on this: "What does that mean? Is that the basic idea of the foreign policy of a party of the proletariat? . . . There is no reactionary who could express himself differently." And Bernstein immediately resorts to the same vague language: "Not a word about the fact that Social Democracy, by virtue of its principles (!) ... with regard to the internationality of relations between nations, must insist that no people or section of the civilized world may be violated in its self-determination when peace is concluded." Had he insisted on this when the gentlemen and ladies of Salonika were to be brought under control, when Turkey was to be destroyed according to his high decree? Perhaps he envisioned the exercise of Turkey's right of self-determination in a similar way to how the Basel "Peace" Congress had practically carried it out when, from the height of socialist thought, it sanctioned the right of conquest of the Balkan states and the destruction of European Turkey without giving a single

one of the millions of Ottomans the opportunity to express their views, which would have been valuable for pedagogical reasons alone, after the Copenhagen Congress of 1910 had its incompetence to decide Turkish questions declared in the minutes.13 Thus spoke Bernstein. In 1913. What does Faust say? "I can think of nothing better on Sundays and holidays than a talk of war and war cries, when, far away in Turkey, the peoples are fighting one another." The fateful year of 1914 announced itself early. As early as March of that year, the "Kölnische Zeitung" published its sensational, now-history-making article about Russia's planned test mobilization and war preparations. Soon, an extremely nervous, restless mood took hold of the public on both sides. To control this, the will for peace that inspires all classes of our state was to find powerful expression in the great Reichstag session on May 14 and 15, apparently based on an agreement between the government and all parties in the House. Bernstein, the internationalist and pacifist, was privileged to speak for German socialism at this great moment. When one reads those negotiations today, one realizes, not without joy, with what a deep sense of political responsibility all the people's representatives, with one single exception, were filled at that critical moment. For us, the meeting of May 15th is the correlate of its more famous sister, August 4th; just as here the will to defense, born of bitter duress, broke through, so there the sacred fear of an old, civilized nation to sacrilegiously violate the precious treasure of peace. The session began with Bassermann, 13 Minutes of the International Socialist Congress, Copenhagen. P. 118. (See also "Die Glocke " , 2nd year, 22nd issue, pp. 849/850.) p. 571 (591) Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. 571, again Commission Reporter on the Foreign Affairs Budget, made a statement:14 "The relations between Germany and Russia occupied a large part of the discussions of the Budget Commission, and it was pointed out that the present presents a fundamentally different face from the time when the Reich Chancellor spoke here with great optimism about the meeting in Potsdam. Finally, when the Budget Commission emphasized that the old traditional relations between Germany and Russia have suffered greatly in recent times, that a significant deterioration has occurred, and that widespread optimism is out of place, the State Secretary countered by stating that both the Russian and German governments want to maintain the old friendly-neighborly relations." State Secretary von Jagow also made a thoroughly peaceful statement:15 "We know of no real contradictions (between Germany and Russia) . . . even trade policy difficulties that might arise in the near future can be settled with mutual goodwill. I hope that the efforts to put a stop to these dangerous currents (in the Russian press and public opinion) will succeed." 66 All

speakers from the parliamentary groups spoke in the same vein. Then Bernstein spoke.16 In marked contrast to all the other speakers, he strove to emphasize strongly not what the two empires united them, but what divided them. He addressed the Persian question, the old bone of contention between German and Russian imperialism. In dry, completely uninspiring remarks, which he borrowed from a foreign author and which we therefore refrain from reproducing, he sought to demonstrate that Russian influence in Persia was growing ever more threatening. 14 Proceedings of the Reichstag. 13th Legislative Period. 1st Session, Volume 295. P. 8832 ff. 15 P. 8836. 16 P. 8855. p. 572 (592) 572 Eduard Bernstein as an annexation and war politician. Only once was his speech freer and took on a more personal tone when he exclaimed: "Russia is interfering in every way with Asia Minor and Persia are advancing towards the Baghdad Railway in order to cut off the path of German trade." At this moment, when all the representatives, fully aware of the perilous nature of the situation and driven by their sense of responsibility as representatives of the nation, unreservedly declared their desire for peace, our international pacifist spoke with scrupulous purpose for the interests of the Baghdad Railway, for a more active foreign policy of the Reich to protect the Baghdad Railway! The miraculous thing about this speech seems to us to be that it went unnoticed; Bernstein is a writer; as a parliamentary leader, he has no name to lose. This awareness of obscurity may also somewhat absolve him of the grave guilt he had incurred through this speech as a representative, as a pacifist, and as a socialist. Just consider for a moment what effect this speech would have had at that moment if Bebel had still been alive and had delivered it! Imagine if the Russian government had unscrupulously disseminated such a speech through its press, only to then be able to say: "Look, the entire peace demonstration is a staged comedy between parliament and government. The Germans are so militarized that even the international socialists, who had evidently not kept the agreement, revealed their cheerful belligerence." Fortunately, this speech had no dire consequences, as it went unnoticed. It remains remarkable, however, that a socialist of a certain standing spoke thus back then, while the same socialist today finds the courage, without a thought for his recent past, to play the guardian of the principles of internationalism, the pillar saint of socialist pacifism! Therefore, when you call out to us: "Remember August 4th!" we are met with laughter: "The Ides of May, dear Bernstein!" And when you mock the new orientation, that doesn't particularly bother us either; For even if we have learned a great deal during the war and forgotten much, we have not lost sight of the fact that truthfulness must be the basis of every fruitful and constructive policy. Here we have not

"reorientated" ourselves. Here we have remained the same! PAUL HIRSCH, M. d. A.: On the Prussian Housing System. WELL, OHL. Rarely in government bills does one encounter such contradictions between the text of a law and the explanatory memorandum as in the Prussian Housing Bill. If Altenrath could rightly write about the 1914 bill that anyone who reads the explanatory memorandum expects quite different, much more drastic provisions, and if perhaps van der Borght could no less rightly say that it only creates the impression that we have a terrible housing misery, which, if true, could not justify the bill because it would not go far enough, this applies to an even greater extent to the latest bill, which the government submitted to the House of Representatives at the same time as the bill concerning state guarantees for second mortgages (Guarantee Security Act). Anyone who Anyone who reads the justification will not be able to resist the feeling that it is indeed high time to tackle the housing crisis vigorously, but when one then looks at the individual provisions of the draft, one will be amazed at how the government believes it can achieve its goal with such means. Something is not right here; either the housing crisis is as enormous as the government describes it, and then the draft does not even represent one of the known small remedies, or the proposed measures are sufficient to bring housing conditions towards recovery, and then there would truly have been no need for such a justification. p. 574 (594) 574 On the Prussian Housing System. Frankly speaking, the best thing the draft offers is the justification; it is a document of inestimable value, a document of the moral and health risks for the population, the text, on the other hand, reveals the complete half-heartedness of the Prussian government, which hesitantly and tentatively approaches any attempt to eliminate the abuses and ultimately shies away from drawing the inevitable conclusions from the facts it had itself established. Even when introducing the draft in 1914, the government had to admit that a significant portion of the population lived in rooms that were extremely cramped and not separated from those of other households in a manner that met the requirements of family life and hygiene. The small apartments were often unsatisfactory due to their location or structural condition, and in some cases, from a health perspective, were completely unsuitable for permanent human habitation. The apartments were severely overcrowded, and in many cases, they housed a large proportion of strangers who were not members of the family, so that neither health and moral considerations nor the requirements of maintaining family life were adequately taken into account. At the same time, the number of vacant small apartments at any given time—of which a certain minimum is necessary, at least in larger communities, to properly satisfy the housing

need and prevent housing shortages—in many places, often with frequent recurring declines below this minimum for extended periods, and rents were in numerous cases disproportionate to the income of the wage-earning population. Can one imagine a sharper self-accusation against the decades-long neglect of such an important task as housing assistance than that expressed in these words? It is not exactly to the government's credit that it has faced the situation for so long, helpless and helpless, that it not only did nothing to remedy it, but even prevented the municipalities from successfully intervening by granting privileges to homeowners and restricting their powers. Now, finally, when it is necessary to heal the terrible wounds inflicted on the nation by the bloodiest of all wars, when the population problem demands a solution with imperative necessity, when all the signs of a housing shortage that will recur after the restoration of peace and its consequences are becoming apparent, now, finally, in the realization that it is necessary to prevent a housing shortage such as that observed after the war of 1870/71, it has roused itself to action. But it has stopped halfway. The government is by no means blind to the fact that, even in the years before the outbreak of war, the construction of housing in general had declined considerably. It recognizes that the demand for small apartments will increase after the war, that rents will rise, that the imbalance between supply and demand for small apartments and the shortage of such apartments will persist even more strongly than before, and that there is thus a danger that the existing deficiencies in the housing sector will worsen instead of being improved. However, it draws the necessary conclusions from this realization only in one point, which we would like to call the only bright spot in the draft. The draft contains—and this is an improvement over previous drafts, to which we also unconditionally express our appreciation—a special Article 6, which provides the government with 20 million marks to promote non-profit building activity for the purpose of state participation in non-profit building associations. Related to this is the Guarantee Security Act, which authorizes the Minister of Finance, for the purpose of promoting the construction of healthy small apartments, to assume the guarantee for second mortgages granted by other parties to public housing associations under certain conditions, and sets aside an amount of 10 million marks to cover the state's obligations arising from the guarantee contracts. This represents a break with previous practice; the Prussian government has thereby, for the first time, recognized its obligation to financially support the construction of healthy small apartments and not to shift all the burdens onto the municipalities. But it is also breaking with an old practice in other respects. While before the war it had caused all sorts of difficulties for the

cooperative movement, especially those led by Social Democrats, it now pays recognition to organizations based on cooperative self-help that significantly differs from its previous judgment. This recognition, however, applies only to building cooperatives, but anyone who has such strong words of praise for non-profit building cooperatives will never again be able to take up the fight against cooperatives in general in the future, unless they want to be defeated by their own words. While the 20 million provided for in Article 6 of the draft Housing Act is intended to facilitate the state's participation in capital investments in non-profit building associations of all kinds, thereby enabling them to obtain first-tier credit, the Guarantee Security Act is intended to facilitate the acquisition of second-tier credit. The idea itself is not new. Already between 1895 and 1914, the government had, through 16 laws, provided a total of 193 million marks to improve the housing conditions of workers employed in state-owned enterprises and low-paid civil servants, and used these funds, among other things, to grant loans to cooperatives. However, in its own view, the previous restriction of state housing assistance to a specific group of people no longer does justice to the importance that housing has gained for the health of the nation after the heavy losses of the war. "Everything must now be done," as the justification states, "to ensure that our people make up for the enormous loss of strength as quickly as possible. This will be achieved, among other things, by the state recognizing the direct care of small housing as its responsibility and providing funds for it within the framework of currently available resources. While before the war, care for the housing system could rightly be left essentially to the municipal associations, the issue has now largely expanded beyond the area of municipal economics. This is not to say that the state wants to replace the municipal associations; this is not the case either organizationally or economically. Rather, the aim will be for the state and municipalities to work together on this great project." We leave it open whether it was right to leave care for the housing system essentially to the municipal associations before the war; we are pleased that the state has now also recognized this obligation. The activities of the municipalities in this area certainly fall far short of social democratic requirements, but they nevertheless surpass the achievements of the state by a great deal. It is all the more unpleasant that the government's draft once again provides for far-reaching restrictions on the municipalities' right of self-government. This applies first and foremost to Article 1, which, through a series of amendments to the Building Lines Act of 1875, aims to create the possibility of making building land available on a larger scale. In principle, one will approve of this aim, and one will also be able to agree with the government that it is necessary to counteract the rise

in land prices, which either completely prevents the construction of residential buildings with small apartments or at least raises rents to levels unaffordable for the poorer sections of the population and paves the way for tenements with their health and moral dangers. But whether it will be possible to achieve 42/2 p. 578 (598) 578 On Prussian Housing. Whether it is necessary to expand the powers of the police at the expense of the municipalities to achieve this goal is a different question. It is little in keeping with the praise that the Minister of the Interior paid to self-government in his decree of March 18, 1916, if the right of self-government is now being treated in this way in the first major legislative action. We do not fail to recognize that more than one municipality has failed precisely in the area of establishing building lines; we also openly admit that more than one municipality has abused the municipal building ban and systematically strove to keep residents with less tax capacity out of its area. But it would be like driving out the devil with Beelzebub to replace the municipal authorities with the police authorities and make the public pay for the sins of individual communities. Granting the police the right to decide whether there is a need for housing, giving the police the authority to demand the establishment of refugee lines with regard to the housing need, is a challenge to the communities, one that must be doubly unpleasant at a time when German municipalities have made contributions in the area of war welfare, both narrowly and broadly, which, however much there may be to criticize in detail, on the whole bears a brilliant testimony to the community spirit and willingness to make sacrifices of the citizenry. Therefore, with the board of the Prussian Association of Cities, we must speak out against any restriction of municipal self-government in the area of settlement and housing through the shifting of responsibilities and declare ourselves against any diminution of municipal responsibilities. The draft also represents progress in that it provides for the introduction of the lex Adickes, which has proven so successful in Frankfurt am Main, for the district of the other Prussian municipalities as well, and in the interest of meeting housing needs, it intends to ensure that gardens, playgrounds, and recreational areas are available in sufficient number and size. p. 579 (599) On Prussian Housing. 579 The fact that it offers the possibility of waiving the restrictions otherwise applicable to settlements for allotment colonists is also to be welcomed with gratitude. Apart from the particularly significant value of allotment gardens for the nation's food supply during wartime, this institution also appears, as the explanatory memorandum correctly emphasizes, to be very valuable in ordinary times, offering refreshment to residents living in cramped city apartments, distracting them from useless or even harmful pleasures, and

awakening and maintaining their joy in nature and property. However, despite all these provisions, we cannot overcome one concern: whether such a profound and, in its effect, so bitter restriction of the municipalities' right to self-government was really necessary. Articles 3 to 5 of the draft, which regulate housing regulations and housing supervision, invite the sharpest criticism. It is regrettable, firstly, that the draft distinguishes between large and small municipalities in this regard, and secondly, that, unlike the draft of 1904, it dispenses with mandatory regulations. Article 3, § 1 simply states that general regulations regarding the use of buildings for living and sleeping (housing regulations) may be issued by police ordinance for municipalities and manor districts; the obligation to issue housing regulations applies only to municipalities and manor districts with more than 10,000 inhabitants. According to Article 4, a housing office must be established to carry out housing supervision in municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. For municipalities with more than 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, the supervisory authority can order the establishment of a housing office, and for municipalities with more than 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, the appointment of special housing supervisors can be prescribed. Why this distinction between large and small communities? What mysterious reason, to adopt Mayor Seydel's critical words about the 1913 draft, has prompted the government to demand truly proper housing supervision only for the big cities? Hugo Lindemann gave the answer to this three years ago when he concluded from the restriction of housing offices to the big cities, as planned in the 1914 draft, that it was the powerful influence of the Conservative Party, to which the government submits without resistance. "Even the provision according to which the supervisory authority can prescribe the employment of civil servant housing supervisors for smaller communities will change little in this regard. Such requirements will, of course, only be imposed on industrial communities in whose territories no powerful and influential mine and factory owners reside; but the estate districts and rural communities will be left unchallenged, always under the fiction of their excellent hygienic conditions." We have nothing to add to these words. Finally, as far as the provisions regarding housing regulations are concerned, it is more than regrettable that the draft falls so far short of the provisions of the 1904 draft. The draft at that time contained, among other things, a strict prohibition on the use of rooms as living rooms or bedrooms (including kitchens) which are not approved by the building authorities for permanent human habitation. It prescribed a minimum air space for living rooms and bedrooms. It introduced regulations on the accommodation of workers, in particular on the condition of bedrooms for servants and industrial workers.

Provisions that are partly missing entirely in the new draft, partly only completely and vaguely indicated, and, what is most worrying, the new draft is entirely limited to so-called "optional" regulations. The consequence of this will be that essentially everything will remain the same, because municipalities already have the right to issue housing regulations, and they have sometimes made use of this right in a way that is entirely in the interest of the general public. Which is why a special law is needed for this. p. 581 (601) Dangerous Paths. 581 The need for a law that refrains from mandatory regulations remains the secret of the Prussian government. All in all, one can say that while the draft represents progress in some respects, as a whole it falls far short of our requirements and the expectations of all housing policymakers. Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Very little remains of the legislative action repeatedly announced with such solemnity, and even that little remains requires fundamental revision if Prussia is not to be outdone by smaller federal states in this area as well. WILHELM DUWELL: THE Dangerous Paths. The pressure from interested parties, who want to see "free trade" granted unrestricted operation and exemption from maximum prices and confiscations, has already achieved significant success. In No. 533 of the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" of October 21, 1916, the President of the KEA, Mr. von Batocki, reassured opponents of the war economy that the entire war economy would be dismantled later. From his words, one can even conclude that the dismantling should begin before the final end of the war. He writes verbatim: "... As things stand, the inevitable war economy is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary, and a departure from it at this time would be disastrous. But despite this absolute necessity, it remains an evil, and the consequences of this evil must be accepted until the approaching peace will allow us to begin dismantling the wartime economy and restore the free peacetime economy to its rights." Some time ago, consumers were promised a reduction in food prices, albeit a gradual one. This promise has not yet come even a hint, much less a tangible sign of realization. For a whole range of foodstuffs, prices have in fact continued to rise, or they have been unavailable for months. p. 582 (602) 582 Dangerous paths. If consumers have been deceived in their expectations, there is, on the other hand, the danger that those interested in the KEA will push ahead even faster on the path of dismantling the war economy than may have been intended for the time being. Agricultural and industrial entrepreneurs, as well as the entire trade, are pushing toward this goal. Given the well-known mood among agrarian circles against trade, which certainly betrays more antipathy than goodwill, their current enthusiasm for the Free trade may be astonishing, but upon closer examination of the situation one will realize that it entirely

corresponds to the well-understood interests of farmers. However, it stands in sharp contrast to the legitimate demands of consumers and the interests of the general public. For this reason, decisive opposition must be voiced against these dangerous efforts. Where this is headed, let us first give some information that could easily be exaggerated. In his well-known, juicy letter to the "German Agricultural Council" in October 1916, Herr von Oldenburg-Januschau recalls, among other things, the following demands he had already made in August 1914: "All trade should continue to buy and sell as in peacetime! . . . The only exceptions to this should be those things that the state absolutely must monopolize. But with few restrictions, "free trade" should operate unhindered. Mr. von Januschau's letter met with unanimous approval in the agricultural press, and in the trade-affiliated newspapers, insofar as it called for free trade. The writer himself subsequently announced that numerous letters of support for his demands had been sent to him from producer circles. The "Bundestag" praised him for demanding that "the free trades should resume their functions." The agrarian and trade press subsequently acknowledged an omission from the "Westf. Politischen Nachrichten"—the mouthpiece of Western heavy industry—claiming that the elimination of the private interests of intermediaries had proven to be a mistake and a disadvantage for food procurement and distribution. One must hurry to "reestablish free movement," which is meant to mean "free price formation." The "Deutsche Tageszeitung" attempted to prove that prices would be driven down under unhindered free trade. Such reasoning is nonsense and misleads public opinion. There is no free trade now in the sense that interested parties would have it appear. p. 583 (603) Dangerous Paths. 583 The judgment on the price-regulating effect of free trade comes from the following premise to the following conclusion: If the price of a commodity rises unduly high, this stimulates competition, which attracts larger quantities of this commodity in order to also earn a good profit. The increased supply then depresses prices again until the benefit they yield is in line with the generally usual profit of the traders. Once this basis is reached, the strongest supply ceases, and with it, the price reduction has also come to an end! In this way, according to the Law of supply and demand, free trade regulates prices! - This conclusion has only limited validity even in peacetime. The aforementioned law is influenced by more or less arbitrarily shaping the supply of goods. Syndicates and similar associations of producers, for example, do this quite systematically. They restrict the production and supply of goods as soon as a decline in demand becomes noticeable. At the same time, minimum prices are set, below which no producer or trader may undercut their offers. Here, the price-regulating law

is almost completely eliminated. In a similar way, with often even more dire consequences for consumers, speculation renders the price-regulating law of supply and demand ineffective. It buys up large quantities of goods, grain, sugar, coffee, etc., and holds back supply; the resulting artificially created disproportion between demand and supply drives up their prices. Price agreements, conventions, rings, and the like Organizations, whatever they may be called, had already achieved great importance before the war; afterward, they will dominate economic conditions to an even greater extent. And now, during the war, the law of supply and demand as a price regulator has been virtually completely abolished. There is no competition that could drive down prices, for there is no possibility of increasing the supply of goods. Imports are very limited! We are generally dependent on foodstuffs produced domestically. This is a variable that hardly changes. If the price of a commodity is driven up very sharply, then this certainly provides an incentive for greater production, but this is again only possible by neglecting the production of other crops. However, the somewhat greater production of a foodstuff is then not sufficient to exert price-reducing pressure, for supply still falls short of demand. The total amount of available food is insufficient to satisfy emerging needs. On the other hand, the underproduction of other foodstuffs, in turn, makes them more expensive; their prices are raised in order to encourage greater cultivation. We have been able to follow this cycle of events since the beginning of the war. With unerring certainty, it increases the prices of all products: it is a climb without end! -- However, we would have found ourselves in much worse conditions if this movement were not restricted within certain limits by maximum prices and public interventions (sales by municipalities, mass feeding, etc.). If "free trade" were allowed to operate unchecked, the prices of important foodstuffs would far exceed the prevailing maximum prices. Yes, one could say: without the war economy, "free trade" would have long since driven us into famine, revolts, and probably even into the predicament of an unconditional offer of peace. Mr. von Batocki is not blind to this fact either. In the above-mentioned article, he states: ---- "Those who would rather see this shift to the rule of "free trade" today than tomorrow have no need to repeatedly point out to the public the disadvantages of the current economy: rising prices and spoilage of goods, because these disadvantages are quite self-evident; and those who, like me, consider it necessary to temporarily adhere to the war economy system and, in certain respects, to further expand it in order to protect the less well-off, non-self-producing masses of the population from extreme hardship, should certainly not repeatedly emphasize those unavoidable deficiencies of the war economy, possibly in public without

cause for alarming exaggeration." Consumers unfortunately have enough reason to be dissatisfied with the war economy, but one thing is certain: without the war economy, they would not only have found themselves in a situation of "extreme hardship," but of unbearable distress! It is also a mistake to believe that the current conditions will disappear with the end of the war, so that "free trade" could no longer be excessively dangerous. How are things? All over the world, food supplies have shrunk alarmingly. Everywhere people live from hand to mouth. In many countries, production has fallen to p. 585 (605) Dangerous paths. 585 have been considerably restricted; in many cases, the conditions for fully resuming agricultural operations immediately after the end of the war are still lacking for some time to come: entire regions are devastated, there is a shortage of agricultural buildings, machinery, equipment, and above all, people to cultivate fields and arable land! A competition is breaking out over the surplus that the countries spared from the war are bringing to the world market. This, combined with insufficient shipping space, will keep prices unusually high, so that they cannot tolerate a further significant increase through "free trade." For many years to come, the supply of foodstuffs will fall short of demand. This circumstance keeps the price-driving force in effect, which, according to Mr. von Batocki's judgment, would bring us into "extreme distress." Other circumstances increase the danger! The aforementioned associations, which invalidate the price-regulating law of supply and demand, were further expanded during the war. The influence of competition as a price regulator will therefore be even less significant later than before. The transitional economy that has been introduced has also provided for the centralized transfer of imported goods to processors and consumers. This also significantly eliminates free competition and facilitates the possibility of arbitrary price setting. All these circumstances make it appear extremely dangerous to leave price setting to so-called free trade. Of particular importance in this regard are the efforts of agricultural circles aimed at dismantling the war economy. Why do they rave about "free trade"? Agricultural newspapers often claim, and cite many examples, how traders come to the countryside in droves and voluntarily offer farmers very high prices. Later, farmers hear that the traders, despite the high prices they themselves paid, still make enormous profits. Such experiences naturally do not strengthen the farmers' modesty; their bitterness grows when maximum prices place limits on their demands, while the traders are little or not at all hindered in their desire to drive up prices and reap profits to which the farmer believes he is entitled. Thus, they become convinced that without maximum prices and without a war economy, they could still increase their

income considerably. Added to this is the following: the farmers know very well that with the end of the war, the p. 586 (606) 586 Estonians and Germans. Prices of agricultural Products will not fall back to their pre-war level. They will remain higher the more they climb during the war. The dismantling of the war economy therefore promises farmers a double advantage: increased income now and higher prices for their products after the war! Both of these bring a severe disadvantage for the consumer, which would be further exacerbated if retailers could also arbitrarily increase prices. Therefore, the dismantling of the war economy means the removal of the danger that we will be driven into much, much worse conditions of hardship than the people are already experiencing. Disasters from which we were protected during the war will be made inevitable by the dismantling of the war economy in peacetime. Not the dismantling of the war economy, but its further expansion, especially of public institutions that eliminate unproductive labor and unnecessary price increases, is absolutely necessary in order to overcome the difficult conditions in the national nutrition without serious social upheavals, which will undoubtedly be faced in the years following The end of the war must be expected. Editor's note: This article was written and set before the well-known circular by Mr. von Batocki on the reorganization of the war economy. This could therefore not yet be taken into account by the author. BALTICUS: THE Estonians and Germans. - The Baltic provinces of Estonia, Livonia, Courland, and the islands of the Baltic Sea are often referred to as primordial German lands. There is a great deal of literature about these provinces in the German language. Nevertheless, the country and its political, social, and economic conditions are very poorly known in Germany. The numerous books and writings about the actual peoples of the region—Latvians and Estonians—contain almost only untruths, so that this side of Baltic life has remained virtually unknown to the German public. The Baltic provinces encompass an area of (in round numbers) 93,000 square kilometers. Of this, Estonia accounts for 20,000, Livonia for 47,000, and Courland 26,000 p. 587 (607) Estonians and Germans. 587 - - -- square kilometers, an area the size of Bavaria and Württemberg combined! During the last census in 1897, the population of these provinces was 2.38 million. This number had grown to approximately 2.8 million shortly before the war. Of these, Latvians accounted for 1.25 million or 45 percent, Estonians 1.1 million or 38 percent[1], Germans approximately 150,000 (1897: 148,225 = 6.21 percent), Russians approximately 150,000 (127,103 = 5.33 percent), Jews approximately 90,000 (82,366 = 3.4 percent), Poles 40,000, Lithuanians 30,000. Of the total population, approximately 30 percent live in cities, 70 percent in rural areas. Of all Germans, 68 percent live in cities. Estonia and

Northern Livonia, along with the islands, are inhabited by Estonians, while Southern Livonia and Courland are inhabited by Latvians. In Estonian territory, Estonians, and in Latvian territory, Latvians, make up over 80 percent of the total population. Livonia and Estonia have belonged to Russia since 1710, and Courland since 1795. The Estonians belong to the Finno-Ugric family of peoples and are linguistically very close to the Finns. The Latvians, on the other hand, are of Indo-Germanic descent; both are linguistically as foreign and incomprehensible to each other as they are to Russians or Germans. Since the 12th century, the Baltic provinces have been under the rule of the Baltic German nobility, which constitutes barely one percent of the total population. Whether the land belonged to the Teutonic Order, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, or Russia, the nobility has always ruled. Feudalism took on a particularly unnatural and harsh form here, for it was "un-Germans" over whom the Junkers ruled. - - When the economic upheaval here also dictated the "emancipation of the peasants" from 1816 to 1819, the nobility was short-sighted enough to block all exits for the peasants. Freedom of movement was denied to the peasantry until the middle of the last century, and the craft guilds were closed to "non-Germans." The peasants had to buy their "emancipation" with the village fields, for now, by virtue of the Tsar's Manifesto, it was stated that even the so-called peasant land was the inviolable property of the landlord. . . After the "liberation," the peasant, just as before, was forced to perform corvee labor for the landlord, now under the name "labor lease." Only the defeats of the Crimean War brought about a change for the Baltic provinces as well. - 1 There are still several hundred thousand Estonians and Latvians in the neighboring provinces of Russia, in the Russian industrial cities, as well as in Central Russia, Siberia, etc. p. 588 (608) 588 Estonians and Germans. vinzen, the freedom of trade and a certain freedom of movement. Simultaneous peasant uprisings in Estonia and Livonia accelerated the "emancipation of the peasants" by restricting corvée, and by using rent and, finally, the sale of peasant land as methods of exploitation. The claim that the Estonians and Latvians owed their distinctive culture to the benevolence of the Baltic-German upper classes is incorrect. Certainly, it was in the interest of the nobility to place the peasants on a firmer material footing after the "liberation" and to raise their cultural standing, since the proceeds of their labor continued to benefit the Junkers. The better equipped they had been to manage their own economy in the new economic order, the more advantageous it would have been for the lords. But the nobility did precisely the opposite of what it should have done in its own interest in this regard. Deprived of all economic resources and culturally neglected in every respect,

the serfs were set "free" and deprived of even the most basic necessity: the land. The nobility's aim was to maintain the "liberated" peasant peoples in this condition. Through the most effective tenancy system, the peasants were deprived of everything they acquired beyond their miserable necessities, making economic progress impossible. With the help of all police power and the authority of the higher intelligentsia, the nobility, on the other hand, strove to prevent cultural progress. Again and again, the hated Youngest and Youngletten, i.e., the upwardly striving national-cultural movement, were denounced to the government by the German barons, and state power was mobilized against them. The Junker rulers in the country used such opportunities to provide new evidence of their reactionary "loyalty" to the government and exchange it for greater power. In such cases, the police forces were always endowed with new powers—in favor of the Junkers. When the Russification of the administration and the judiciary was carried out between 1885 and 1889, police power in the country passed into the hands of the Russian Chinovniks. The Russified police also had the task of fulfilling the wishes of the reactionary nobility, and the noble offspring themselves gladly entered the service of the Russified police. This friendship of the German nobility with the Russian government reached its culmination during and after the Russian Revolution. p. 589 (609) Estonians and Germans. 589 With all this, it cannot, of course, be denied that the German element in the Baltic provinces, especially German wholesale trade, has been a highly significant cultural factor. Nevertheless, the historical reason for Estonian-Latvian anti-German sentiment should be clearly evident from the facts briefly outlined here. It only remains to say that the Russian government has been very adept at transforming this hatred, which has accumulated against the Baltic-German upper classes, into a general hatred of everything German. The situation is as follows: The German nobility and the German bourgeoisie have committed undeniable sins of exploitation and oppression against the Estonians and Latvians, and the indignation of the Latvians and Estonians against this is understandable. The German people and the German Reich, however, are entirely innocent in this. But with the help of all police arts, by completely eliminating free speech and by staging the most shameless demagogy, the Russian government has succeeded in directing this hatred against the German people and the German Reich itself. Today, it is impossible to enlighten the people that it was not the German, but the Russian government itself that protected the privileges of the nobility with all its might for over 200 years. This fact takes on an even more peculiar coloring by the fact that the Russian government is now—during the war—continuing with the Russification of the Estonians and Latvians. Nor has it

become milder in the application of all other methods of brutal reaction. One must ask: and yet this "devotion" and "love" of the Estonians and Latvians for "Mother" Russia? Can this be "real"? It may be genuine, but the love is not for this Russia, not for this system; rather, patriotic sympathies are for the Russia of the ideal future, the democratic Russia that is to become. People have created an ideal for themselves; they believe in the fulfillment of their revolutionary wishes and firmly believe that the brutal Russia of reactionary power is hurtling towards its downfall. They believe in this, although reaction becomes more reactionary every day and shows no signs of death. Here, too, it is primarily belief that makes one blessed. . . Democratic Russia, as an idol, means, even to these small peoples, the security of their own national culture, which is regarded as the most valuable thing to strive for and defend. This belief and these ideal expectations are maintained by the ossification of the democratic - p. 590 (610) 590 Estonians and Germans. Development in Germany presents an almost idyllic backdrop. While democratization in Germany is considered "absolutely impossible," the democratic Russia already achieved in ideology appears all the more attractive. Germany is viewed once and for all as a coercive state for the denationalization of all non-German peoples: Woe to all who find themselves in the position of the Poles, Danes, and French of Germany! In contrast, the Russia of the future appears to be a bastion of freedom for small nations... These things must be faced courageously; they provide new proof of the already well-known fact of the extent to which Germany's former perverse nationality policy is now damaging the German cause in the World War. . . That ideology, incidentally, also has a practical background—namely, the previous national development of the Estonians and Latvians. Despite the obstacles imposed by the German nobility and Russian power, the Latvians and Estonians have nevertheless succeeded in making quite remarkable progress, both intellectually and materially, and this in the short period of approximately 70 years. Economically, the last 10 years have represented a major step forward. In addition to the numerous agricultural associations with educational goals, an entire network of cooperatives with practical economic purposes has been established. Trained instructors have been hired to instruct the peasant owners in matters of agriculture, livestock farming, dairy farming, etc. Agricultural exhibitions are held annually to promote agriculture. To meet the need for credit, numerous credit associations have been established, some of which have already grown into important banking institutions. Likewise, the urban bourgeoisie has made noticeable progress. The number of intellectuals of Estonian and Latvian nationality is growing from year to year. In the legal profession, medicine,

etc., the "nationals" already outnumber the Germans, while pastoral positions are only gradually being taken over by Estonian and Latvian theologians. The same applies to trade and crafts, real estate ownership, land speculation, etc. The Estonians are making progress everywhere and have already reached the point where they are even displacing Germans from municipal offices. The large government city of Reval has been administered by Estonians since 1902. Likewise, almost all of the smaller cities in Estonia and the Estonian part of Livonia have slipped out of German hands. Only Dorpat, Fellin, and Pernau still have German majorities in the city councils, as well as German magistrates. But even here, the transition is only a matter of the very near future. It is therefore an undeniable fact that Estonians are on the rise everywhere, both culturally and materially, and it is understandable that they hope to achieve even more on the same path, especially if their hopes for the democratization of Russia in the near future prove not to be false. During the war, the national bourgeoisie had many opportunities to distinguish itself. A number of Estonian youths distinguished themselves as officers in the Russian army, Estonian doctors worked their way up to respected positions, and the Estonian city administration of Reval is developing a welfare program that is exemplary by Russian standards and even extends beyond the municipal framework. Estonian associations make their beautiful halls available for the care of the wounded; in the name of the Estonian people, special organizations for the care of the wounded have been founded, which are funded by "national collections," etc. In the event of an evacuation becoming necessary, when this possibility became visibly imminent a year ago, a nationwide organization was created, tasked with supporting the refugees with advice and assistance . This organization has also rendered great service through the procurement and distribution of food, through advice and assistance in cultivating the fields, in the correct import of the harvest, etc. It is obvious that all this strengthens the position of the Estonians immensely. They are reaching a completely new level not only materially but also socially, which must also benefit them politically. — This is the future ideology of the Estonian bourgeoisie. It desires the victory of Russia because this victory seems to it to mean the defeat of the German upper classes in the Baltic provinces. At the same time, however, it hopes for the democratization of Russia. To us, this hope for democratization through the victory of old Russia seems extremely deceptive. Only the Russian defeat will bring liberation to the foreign peoples in Russia, p. 592 (612) 592 The Balkan Question and the Balkan League of Nations. A. Grigoryants: IN The Balkan Question and the Balkan League of Nations. In No. 39 of the "Glocke," Comrade Heinrich Cunow shows us, with reference to the "Collected Writings

of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels," just published by Dietz and edited by N. Ryazanoff, how wrongly the views of Marx and Engels regarding Turkey and related issues are judged in party circles. In many respects, the true views of the old masters of social democracy represent the exact opposite of what is assumed about them. Comrade Cunow, however, is not content with these observations and draws practical applications to the present, which prompt me to ask the editors of the "Glocke" for the floor. "Du choc des opinions jaillit la vérité," says a French proverb (the clash of opinions gives rise to truth), and I hope that with my contribution, which I will strive to be as brevity as possible, I can offer a necessary complement to the stimulating essay by Comrade H. Cunow. In the Balkan question, the wars of 1912/13 constitute a dividing line insofar as Turkey ceased to be the Balkan power in the former sense of the word, and the Balkans became the arena for the rival small states of the peninsula, behind which stood various major states with their imperialist claims. In this sense, the divide between what existed before 1912/13 and what emerged during these years is so vast that a restoration of the old state of affairs is quite inconceivable. It is therefore misleading when Comrade Cunow remarks: "It had become a kind of tradition that Marx had recommended maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, and that such maintenance of the existing situation was the best means of preventing new struggles in the Balkans." This is misleading because Cunow immediately goes on to speak of the antagonisms of the Balkan states in recent times and, in the same context, the creation of a Balkan. Federation, "a beautiful illusion." If Marx's views on this matter are of historical interest, it would be doing violence to the facts to attempt to tear the concept of the status quo out of its historical perspective: the state of affairs in Marx's time is not at all comparable with the status quo after the wars of 1912/13. Something new has emerged in the Balkans that could not have been dreamt of in Marx's time. In this respect, the course of history has overtaken the viewpoints of that time and created new, qualitatively quite different conditions, which cannot be deduced from Marx's views on the status quo as reproduced by Cunow. The status quo of Marx's time was the old Turkish rule; the status quo of our time, however, is the realization of the principle of national Liberation, whether good or bad, is another question - - brought about by the Balkan wars. Comrade Cunow further believes he can assert that Marx and Engels, "had they experienced today's war, would have advocated the establishment of a great, hegemonic Bulgarian empire aligned with the Central Powers." Cunow bases this assertion on statements by Engels and Marx in which they saw the solution to the Balkan question, as it stood at that time, in 1853/54, in the fact that, of all the peoples inhabiting the Balkans, the "South Slavs"

had the best chance of seizing leadership. Let us consider the situation in the Balkans as it existed at that time, 63 years ago. With the exception of Greece, the entire peninsula, including Romania, was Turkish. The population formed a completely amorphous mass. However, it was already clear that the South Slavs were the exclusive bearers of civilization in the interior of the country. Extremely important is the remark immediately following this sentence in Engels' article in the "New York Tribune" of April 21, 1853: "They (i.e., the South Slavs. A. Gr.) have not yet formed a nation, but in Serbia they are already the most powerful and relatively well-educated nucleus of a nation." We see, therefore, that at that time it was still possible to speak of South Slavs per se, although it should be noted that Engels also seems to count the Greeks among the Slavs, which is hardly true. Since Engels wrote this, a tremendous upheaval has taken place. No one can deny that we are now dealing in the Balkans with two distinct nations of more or less Slavic origin: Bulgarians and Serbs. (Montenegrins are a variant of Serbs.) Alongside them, the Romanians and the Greeks developed rapidly. Each of these four nations has built a state, and it is precisely the incredibly complex events since the beginning of the Balkan Wars up to the present day that provide irrefutable proof of their vitality and brilliantly justify their state existence. The fact that these states came to blows immediately after their liberation proves nothing against their right to exist, etc. These "conflicts" are among the historically "necessary" phenomena, like all wars, but transient, and for the overcoming of which the situation in the Balkans places the most effective weapons in the hands of its peoples. Comrade Cunow believes that the formation of a Bulgarian empire dominating the entire Balkans would, firstly, correspond to Marx's conception of "South Slavic supremacy" and, secondly, be consistent with the course of the historical process. I agree with Cunow in what he says regarding the process of fusion, in which ever larger units are formed, but I would like to emphasize that a distinction must be made between the political fusion process and national freedom. The greatest disaster would result if, after all that has been experienced, one were to now open new chapters in the history of national oppression. Anyone with some familiarity with the situation will understand what it would mean to bring all Balkan peoples under the supremacy of one of these peoples. "South Slavs" is, in our times, nothing more than a geographical-ethnographic collective term, which is now only applied to the tribes belonging to Serbs. The socialists of the Balkan states have repeatedly, since 1909, proclaimed the solution to the inter-Balkan questions in the creation of an intergovernmental Balkan organization. This is the basic idea, to which various nuances regarding the how are attached. Behind this

demand for a federation of the Balkan states stand all socialists in these countries, who see in this new state structure the path to resolving all disputes, including such important ones as those of Macedonia, Albania, etc., as well as a protective barrier against the imperialist aspirations of the great powers. Such a Balkan federation would be the realization of the tendency identified by Cuno. to the formation of a large state. It is obvious that the subordination of all the peoples of the Balkans to a single one would only mean the beginning of a new period of terrible fighting on the blood-soaked peninsula. Above all, the Bulgarian comrades would express their sincere gratitude for the role that would fall to their state if the plan conceived by Comrade Cunow were implemented. p. 595 (615) Not Illusions, but Realpolitik! 59 And it is not possible to try to make someone happy against their will. I cannot interpret what Marx would say now. But what all Balkan socialists strive for is well known and is called: a federation, a union of all Balkan peoples, through which the path to their free development will be secured. This unanimously conceived and advocated idea must not be underestimated. HEINRICH CUNOW: Not Illusions, but Realpolitik! AS I read the article When I wrote "The Balkan Question in the Light of the Marx-Engelsian Conception," I knew in advance that those party-affiliated politicians who ardently support the maintenance of the pre-war political status on the Balkan Peninsula and hope to bridge the sharp differences between the individual Balkan states by uniting them into a Balkan League would immediately object that Marx and Engels had judged based on the Balkan conditions of their time, but that these conditions had changed fundamentally since then, and consequently, Marx's views of that time could no longer be authoritative today, etc. I was therefore not at all surprised that Comrade Grigoryants argued in this way. I am even certain that the Anglomaniacs will also follow this recipe and say: "Marx's criticism refers to the England of his time, not to modern England today, consequently, etc." Certainly, the status quo of 1853/55 is not the same as today's—but I by no means claimed that because Marx and Engels considered the status quo in the Balkans untenable back then, the current one would also be untenable. I have only demonstrated from their statements that up to now, our party has attributed to them a false position on the Balkan problem and, accordingly, has no right to invoke them for all sorts of fine projects, such as the establishment of a Balkan Federation. Incidentally, Comrade Grigoryants seems to assume that Marx and Engels considered maintaining the then status quo impossible only in the Balkans. This is not the case. They are opposed to the doctrine of the status quo in general, that is to say, to the attempt, in order to avoid internal political upheavals or the threat of war, "to

leave things as they have become by chance or by chance." Conditions which have become untenable must, in their view, fall. Even a world war does not seem too terrible to them if it can serve to sweep away stagnant conditions and help new, progressive structures to break through. "Whoever," explains Engels (editorial article in the New York Tribune of April 21, 1853), "has learned to admire the eternal change of human destinies in the study of history, in which nothing is constant but inconstancy, nothing immutable but change; whoever has followed the iron course of history, whose wheels roll pitilessly over the ruins of great empires, mercilessly crushing entire generations; whoever, in a word, has his eyes open to the fact that no demagogic appeal and no seditious proclamation can have such a revolutionary effect as the simple, bare facts of human history; whoever is able to grasp the tremendously revolutionary character of the present age, in which steam and wind, electricity and printing ink, artillery and gold discoveries, in concert with one another, bring about more changes and revolutions in one year than a whole century previously produced, will certainly not shy away from asking this historical question simply because its only correct solution a European war in its wake." When I said that Marx and Engels, had they lived through today's war, would undoubtedly have advocated, in their entirety, for the "establishment of a great hegemonic Bulgarian empire leaning on the Central Powers," I base this opinion not on the fact that they considered the conditions in the Balkans untenable in 1853/55, but rather on their view that the Balkan population was such a mixture of peoples with profound ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts of interest that the only means of culturally elevating the entire population was the supremacy of one of these peoples, the strongest and most capable of culture. This view has not only been confirmed by the entire history of the Balkans since the Crimean War, but hardly anyone would want to claim that the contradictions within the Balkan population have diminished since then. Even if some Balkan conditions may have changed in the last 60 years, they certainly have not changed in the direction that the national, religious, and economic differences and the resulting rivalries have diminished . p. 597 (617) Not illusionary politics, but realpolitik! 597 Comrade Grigoryants confuses his conception of history with Marx's. According to Marx's conception, what becomes a historical event is what is historically necessary, that is, what results as a necessary consequence of the given historical conditions. Whether what is becoming appears desirable, salutary, moral, etc., to any group is quite irrelevant. The fact that any group considers a war immoral or undesirable does not mean that war will not break out nonetheless. Accordingly, from the perspective of Marx's conception of

history, it is quite irrelevant whether Comrade Grigoryants considers Bulgarian supremacy in the Balkans "disastrous," or whether most Balkan socialists believe that the existing rivalries could be avoided by establishing a Balkan League. Development does not proceed according to their wishes or hopes, but rather according to the given conditions—and these conditions must be recognized. Comrade Grigoryants views the development of the Balkan peoples through ideologically tuned convex lenses. He believes that the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 formed a dividing line, for since then Turkey ceased to be a Balkan power in the former sense of the word, and only now have the Balkans become the arena of rival Balkan states. To the extent that one can speak of a dividing line at all, in reality, all these events are closely causally linked. It was not created in 1913, but rather by the fighting of 1877/78, as well as the Peace of Santo Stefano and the so-called Treaty of Berlin, through which Bosnia and Herzegovina fell to Austria, Romania and Serbia were liberated from Turkish rule, and an enlarged Montenegro and a new Bulgaria emerged. As soon as these liberations were carried out, national rivalries flared up among the "liberated." In order to expand their possessions, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Montenegrins united once again in 1912 to fight the Turks. But this war had barely ended when they were already at loggerheads again. Exhaustion forced the Bulgarians to yield, but it only exacerbated the differences even further, so that even after the outbreak of the current World War, we find the Serbs and Montenegrins, and finally also the Romanians, on the side of the Entente, and the Bulgarians alongside the Turks on the side of the Central Powers. It is possible that Comrade Grigoryants assumes that after the war, the hostile Balkan states will soon unite peacefully in a Balkan League, that the national, religious, and economic differences will be resolved amicably, and that the Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs, Kutzovalachs, Zinzars, Albanians, Greeks, etc., united in the League of States, will sing in joyful harmony: "Be embraced, millions, etc." That is a strong belief, one that is not at my command. Comrade Grigoryants must admit that, based on my study of the ethnological and economic conditions in the Balkans, I believe in this Balkan League and its continued existence just as little as I believe in the imminent establishment of a great European union of states. I hold Marx's view—and not just since I read the two new volumes of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels—that a prosperous development of the Balkans is only possible if an energetic, cultured people gains the upper hand there and, in resistance to Russian claims, seeks allyship with the Western powers of Europe. It is undoubtedly true that the rivalries between the Balkan states have been repeatedly fueled by the great powers, especially Russia, in the interest of their power

plans, and not just recently, as Comrade Grigoryants seems to assume. No sooner had the Balkan peoples achieved a certain political independence than the differences between them were exploited by the great powers to play them off against each other. Marx and Engels foresaw as early as 1853/55 that this would happen. Precisely to protect the Balkans from these machinations, they considered the dominance of a strong Slavic empire necessary there. Can Comrade Grigoryants really believe that if, after the current war, the status quo ante were to be restored in the Balkans, this game of the great powers would not soon begin again? HEINRICH LERSCH: Go on! Humanity prays for success! The worker grasps his tools firmly with hard hands. Others chase their thoughts from one end of the world to the other. The iron-willed, stubborn work of the entire dark mass of humanity: a prayer for success. p. 599 (619) Glosses. 599 For five thousand years brains have struggled, muscles trembled, conquering forces. Even though a thousand lie shattered on the ground, Even though from the hot hearts of those who stormed heaven Red, warm lifeblood flows to earth, Past the widows, orphans and the abandoned, Past the wounded who have fallen, The procession of humanity goes: Looking upwards. Awaiting the moment that shall come with salvation. And in the dust and smoke that passes over the wanderers, The cursing and prayers of struggling humanity mingle. From this, rising higher in ascending circles, unravels: An aviator. He throws the message to the stars: Onward, we will conquer! Glosses. Soldiers of culture. The soldiers of culture have a difficult time during these war years. They are the only ones whose weapons are almost exclusively at rest. Indeed, they often have to endure being mocked and ridiculed, as if all their goals and paths had suddenly become void. Even such clever people as those from "Siplicissimus" take their wits out of the "coffeehouse greats" and act as if they don't understand that, in the midst of difficult events, one can still ponder other things: the expression of a primal, eternal feeling in the form of a song, the reflection on more eternal questions than the conflicting interests of nations. Kant and Goethe would be such "coffeehouse greats" in this era. There are natures to whom the purely temporal remains forever alien. If they force themselves to do so, a volume of bad war poems appears. And the philistine in man is always the same: in peacetime, he laughed at anyone who even considered the possibility of war, and today, just as superiorly, he laughs at anyone who thinks about more than just the possibility of war. p. 600 (620) 600 Glosses. To avoid misunderstandings: this is not to be a champion for those who cowardly hide from the great horrors of these days and retreat behind a bloodless aestheticism. But alongside these spiritual wretches, there are also true soldiers of culture. These soldiers of culture are

in a bad way. Not just because of their outward antagonism. Even more so because of their inner struggles. We have all dreamed such a wonderful dream, and we do not want to let it be completely buried under the thunder of artillery. Humanity grew up before our mind's eye like a beautiful tree. Here and there, the individual branches still stubbornly strayed apart, but we already saw and felt in everything a common tendency that would one day arch them into a common crown over the heads of our children. Was our dream merely a delusion? Will such a crown, the crown of humanity, be forever impossible? Have we, with everything that was particularly sacred to us, have the best of us in truth simply slept through reality? I do not envy those who, mocking such spiritual struggles, go from daily report to daily report. But I doubt that they are more valuable to our future than we are. God has many children, says Schopenhauer, and there are different ways of feeling truly and deeply German. These are the ways of deed and thought. They should be brothers, should understand and complement each other. If the field-grey soldier now mocks the cultured soldier, he is just as wrong as the cultured soldier of old who delighted in cheap jokes about the lieutenant. Long hair captures the meaning of Germanness in war no less intimately than short hair, and just as much cultural feeling can live beneath short-cropped hair as beneath long hair. Thoughts, too, are blood, heart's blood. Upholding the faith and spirit of Dürer and Goethe is surely no less a holy war than the one fought in the editorials of certain newspapers. The comrades out there, the comrades of the sword, fight to preserve the body; the comrades inside, the soldiers of the spirit, fight to preserve the spirit. Both wars are difficult, serious, and holy. It would be strange and not a step forward if the body, after victory in the battle around it, were to discover that its spirit has since died. It is a silent but all the more bitter war that the cultured soldier of today is fighting. His weapons and his aims seem to be of no importance at the moment. They only appear so, but they are not. But all this will only be recognized and appreciated when the peace agreement has also secured his work. Tamen. p. 601 (621) DIE GLOCKE 43rd Issue 20 January 1917 2nd Year Reprint of all articles permitted with detailed source references Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: THAT A stupidity. The most astonishing thing about the note the Entente sent to Mr. Wilson is that it was still able to arouse astonishment in Germany. Didn't we already know where we stood with Lloyd George, Briand, and their cronies? Did we doubt the seriousness of their will to destroy? Admittedly, in a section of the Social Democratic press, where they prefer to slap facts in the face rather than face them, efforts had been made up until the last few days to somewhat retouch the seriousness of the situation. Especially the sentimental poet, who, on odd

days of the month, makes "politics" with wailing and gnashing of teeth in the central organ of German Social Democracy, repeatedly delighted in replacing the hard facts with the illusions of his vague, soft, sentimental imagination. The Entente powers were coaxed into making peace, for, as it was literally said, "peace costs them nothing but an illusion to which they had indulged regarding (!) the quality of their Eastern ally." Another time, in the most beautiful political lyricism, it was said: "Infinitely much would be gained if both sides began to be honest with themselves!" This poet found the speech with which Lloyd George rejected the German peace offer on December 19, which he compared to a noose, "somewhat obscure." With such an inability to see things as they are, it is not surprising, however, to be surprised and shocked by the facts. One can only be grateful to the Entente for having now, with all its brazenness, revealed its plans to save the people. One can see where and how! However, the prudent among our enemies will have been aware that by sending such a note, they have now made the moral position of the Central Powers, which was already very strong after the peace offer, unshakable. The English and French take pleasure in claiming that they have never dreamed of destroying the German people, or more precisely, since they see in the German nation only a horde of Negroes divided into many ethnic groups, they do not want to destroy "the German peoples." We have no doubt that Bernstein, Kautsky, and Haase will see in this confirmation of what they have always emphasized and will fall, moved, at the feet of their beloved English. For the others, however, this very turn of the note will represent the height of political arrogance and narrow-mindedness. If the Entente truly, as it emphasizes, wishes to strengthen the democratic powers of Central Europe and the world, and solely for this purpose to destroy "Prussian militarism," then there can be no less suitable path to this end than the one it has chosen in its note. Not merely because so far England's fight against militarism has produced only one result: to give birth to English militarism, but because it is the surest means of making the contradictions between militarism and democracy disappear, of militarizing a country's democracy and democratizing militarism, by forcing that country into a life-and-death struggle, even to the last piece of dry bread. This, and nothing else, is what the note of the Entente powers to Wilson did. And therefore, from the Entente's own point of view, it is a highly unwisely drafted document. They knew and should have known that by using it— p. 603 (623) A stupidity. 603 would merely increase the defense strength of the Central Powers. However, if it is unwise, it is not rash. The long time it took the Entente to draft it proves how thoroughly it was deliberated. Here, however, the banal wisdom applies once again: too many cooks spoil the

broth. Each of the enlightened allies wanted its claims to plunder documented and sealed in this note, "noble" Italy as well as "noble" Romania, and each also wanted to be "compensated." Only England, as the piqueur of this pack, did not place itself on the same level as them and remained silent about its goals. It knew that what its bastards received belonged to it too. In this embarrassing situation, however, only a document could come into being that revealed all too clearly the character of the Entente as a world distribution syndicate. and thereby weakened their position throughout the world. But another reason also plays a role, and once one recognizes it, one immediately sees that the enormous stupidity the Entente made with its note was a historically conditioned step—one could even say, a necessary stupidity. It was Comrade Scheidemann, let us not mistake, who, in his efforts to serve peace, cried out loudly to France: France did not know how good a peace one could have. A vain cry of love that only someone who misunderstands the historical situation of our western enemy, past and present, could utter! Does Scheidemann want to give the French Alsace-Lorraine? He's not thinking about it! He already believes he's offering them a lot when he holds out the prospect of a "peace without annexations," that is, without German annexations. For France, however, a "peace without annexations," that is, without French annexations, is an absolute and, for the foreseeable future, decisive defeat. If the Republic does not at least bring home German Alsace-Lorraine from this war, it will be out of contention as a great power. We already pointed out on a previous occasion the essentially quite modest task that France has to fulfill in this war, namely, in alliance with Belgium and the million-strong English army, to liberate French soil from half the German army. For the past two and a half years, France has proven itself incapable of this modest task. What fate would have awaited it if it had ventured to go to war alone with Germany, there is probably no longer any doubt, even in France. This, however, has put an end to France's status as a great power. This future, which this proud and great nation dreads, is something it intends to avoid at all costs through this war. The current situation, which is unlikely to ever be repeated, must be used to humiliate and dismember Germany and to forcibly restore France's superiority. What good is a Scheidemann peace to it? The fate of nations is being decided here, and neither humane mediation proposals nor gentle persuasion will help. Does one not understand that a "peace without annexations," in which a section of German Social Democracy believes it has found the longing for brotherhood among nations, means something entirely different for Germany than for France? Precisely because the world-historical situation of Germany as a rising country is directly the opposite of that of France as a declining

country? If for Germany in its ascent the slogan: "no annexations" has at least a historical meaning in the main, for France it means a descent into the shadowy realm of those world powers of yesterday, where Spain and Portugal mourn their past greatness. And precisely because the political energy of the French people resists this course of fate with all its might, it cries out its demands and secret wishes to the world with all its might: it can only live if Germany is defeated, dismembered, and bled dry. Hence the French stylization of the Entente Note, hence the proclamation of a war of annihilation: the West of Germany to France, the East to Russia and Austria cease to be great powers. p. 605 (625) A stupidity. 605, the Balkans Russian, Turkey destroyed, and then a torrent of compensation claims. This explains the imprudence of this world-historic note! It is a product of despair, and of French despair in particular. Clever England remains silent about its goals. In its repercussions, the Entente note will have an enlightening effect on the German people in general and on German Social Democracy in particular. The party opposition held a peace rally at its so-called Reich Conference on January 7, which proves that these primal, mighty social revolutionaries are basically just dried-up state hemorrhoidarians who have lost all understanding of historical growth and decay, to the extent they ever possessed it. Just as the Russian Emperor Nicholas I drew a line on the map from Petersburg to Moscow and commanded: "This is how the railway will be built!", so too do these utopian despots draw a line through political life with a ruler and command: "This is how development must unfold." "The struggle for peace can only be won as an international struggle," their proclamation reads. That is indeed Nicholas's style! If reality does not unfold according to the prescribed lines of development, these Icarians withdraw from the public eye in a huff, pronounce a few curses upon it, and continue to split each other's skulls open. Thus their lives pass in a harmonious alternation between curses and prophecies. They call it politics and are happy with it. But the party is different from the sect. The Entente Note must have a highly politically educational and rousing effect on them. Not in the sense that German Social Democracy, out of anger at the defiance of its opponents, would now follow in the footsteps of the Pan-Germans and adopt their war aims. Of course, that is out of the question. But rather in the sense that it is now formulating its war aims more precisely. Until now, it had made do with general phrases and had been able to do so. Now p. 606 (626) 606 Entente Note and Entente Socialists. But the situation is ripe for a concrete discussion of the war aims from the standpoint of German Social Democracy. Here, the new "Vorwärts" editorial staff, in particular, has sinned greatly and, through a largely childish understanding of the major problems of the war, has made

the debate very difficult. It must be conducted all the more thoroughly and all the more necessary that it begin. ALWIN SAENGER (Munich), currently a gunner: Entente Note and Entente Socialists. Before the world catastrophe, WE believed in many political concepts as fundamental historical facts: the brilliant progress of English social legislation, the democratic freedoms of the Western nations, the revolutionary strength of the French people, liberal state doctrines across the Channel, a purposeful struggle against the subversive power claims of the hierarchy, a more reasonable response by the bourgeois class to the demands of the working proletariat, a freer state life without the nightmare of the notorious Prussian-German militarism, in whose shadow our own fatherland, Germany, breathes its entire life. For the thinking person who can and wants to learn from facts for the sake of truth and thus progress, almost everything of the paradisiacal structures beyond the black-white-red border posts has collapsed like a maze of maps. From the "democracy of the West" to the "antimilitarism" of democratic and republican states, the World War has carried out a thorough cleansing of all illusions. Just as every child must have known before the war that in no other country in the world was personal and political freedom of opinion so limited and so brutally trampled upon as in the "free" United States of America, so today every political student sees that in no other nation on earth are the working classes so ruthlessly harnessed to the cart of a conquering imperialism as the proletariat in France, England, and Russia, that nowhere are the workers so under the thumb of dictatorial power as in these Entente countries, that nowhere are the weak attempts by individual sections of the population to defend an independent expression of opinion so suppressed as there. What did the French comrades say at the international congresses in glowing eloquence and powerful words against They railed against Prussian militarism and celebrated the democratic state as a shining symbol of better days; today, for 30 long months, they have not even been allowed to read the German daily reports in their republic, and, united with their English comrades, they still allow their judgment of the most momentous events to be disastrously clouded by the lying rabble of an imperialist, hate-mongering press, unprecedented in the history of all time for the baseness of its attitude. Today, the English trade unions are for the most part the pacesetters of an English world empire, whose foundations, in a century of conquests, against which all pan-German chatter vanishes like an insubstantial phantom, came to stand so deeply in the blood of nations that in our day these waves of blood and misery reach up to the ridge of the roof. Today, they sit as responsible heads of state in the ministries that want to take German land from us and carry the pillars of Muscovite rule to the

waters of the Bosporus, proclaiming in resolutions the right of national independence. Constancy. Words, nothing but words! Today, Citizen Thomas earns himself the honorary title of French Krupp, and the republican leaders, not far from the Place de la Concorde, march under the blessing of the papal cardinal back into the main church of France. Today, none of them, all the democrats of the Word, can prevent their democratic governments with the Social Democratic ministers from responding to a peace offer, which the civilized world recognized as a moral act, with the most shameful expressions of hatred between nations; they cannot ensure that an opportunity to silence nameless suffering tomorrow, to end the deepest misery tomorrow, to bring the news of a new world birth to every proletarian hut tomorrow, is seized and held on to. What miserable Powerlessness! Or do they not want to? Enough terrible things have happened. The responsible Entente comrades remained silent when England crowned its miserable plunder of Egypt with a smooth annexation in the first days of the war; they concealed their eloquence, often heard in Germany and against Germany, in the folds of their democracy until the moment when the bloodstained Tsar, their ally, announced the plunder of Constantinople of recent days; they themselves still preach revenge, the war of revenge. Do they share English capitalism's will to destroy so blindly that, after this further year of night, does not the voice of conscience stir in their hearts, to grasp at every straw that could somehow save us from sinking further into the night of centuries? To staunch blood and save lives: whoever does not now regard this as the gospel of all humanity is not only not a socialist, he is a criminal to whom fate has not granted a minute of peace of conscience. more! Now is the hour of confession. They will have to confess, driven by "Prussian-German militarism," whether action or rhetoric should prevail. Sooner or later, they will have to decide whether they want to continue to be the precursor to the journey to Constantinople and the planned destruction of Germany. Prussian militarism has provided the necessary clarity. Will the French and English socialists declare their unreserved agreement with the Entente's response to the peace offer of German "militarism"? There is no more wavering talk. From today on, the blood guilt that history will place on their shoulders in the event of their continued agreement with the aims of their governments will grow immeasurably every hour. If the gods have not struck them with incurable blindness, then they will finally see the mendacity of the union states, which speaks of the aggressive imperialism of Germany, which in two generations has not achieved a fiftieth of the world's conquests, like Great Britain and its appendages, fighting "for the freedom of the peoples." - The thinking mind needs only to remember this one fact to correctly assess the

enemy's response. It demonstrates a moral low that can no longer be surpassed. One dares to speak of the free existence of small states, of the recognition of the fundamental law of nationalities, at the very moment when an ultimatum is being addressed to Greece, which is the most shameless piece of diplomatic evidence of all time. One disregards the longing for peace of a human race bleeding at its heart with oft-heard cold-blooded phrases. One simply decrees, without attempting any proof, that the German proposal is "without sincerity and without significance," a proposal that demonstrated the moral strength of a people and its statesmen to the world. Comrades Bernstein and Kautsky will, in their usual manner, undertake the defense of this reply note—they can do so, since they bear no responsibility. But the comrades over there bear the responsibility, and it is all the greater since the behavior of the French comrades is primarily decisive for the question of peace. Will they, if asked once again, abandon the half-heartedness of their last December resolution? Will they openly and honestly renounce the empty phrases about Prussian-German militarism and the last hate document of their democratic states? Will they, from the pangs of conscience of their responsibility toward a grieving Europe, bring themselves to the realization that there can be and is no aim of the Entente that is contrary to the Quadruple Alliance, that it could justify continuing the genocide, and that the losses of further battles must irreplaceably outweigh any price of victory? p. 610 (630) 610 German Social Democracy, etc. As long as they do not achieve this purification of their political thinking, the anchor of hope for peace rests only in German soil. Form is nothing, content is everything. Western democracy as a whole has so far achieved nothing in this struggle between nations that could endure before history as a lasting good. On December 12, 1916, the much-maligned German barbarian state proved to the world through its deed that it had a conscience. It was a pure, moral act, born freely out of the awareness of duty towards the peoples of the world and their future. And so today this German state stands as the rock to which the hopeful belief looks up: that humanity will raise it to the heights once again. HEINRICH CUNOW: German Social Democracy and Marx's Theory of the State. I. The question: "What is the attitude of Social Democracy towards the state?", which previously led to heated discussions in our party whenever major tax and military demands were presented to the Reichstag or the South German Social Democratic parliamentary groups voted for the state budget, has certainly been shifted in a certain direction by the experiences of the World War, but has not been resolved. It does not take any particular political foresight to recognize that after the conclusion of peace, as soon as the so-called reorientation begins, the old dispute will revive. Many may well

be of the opinion that the Social Democratic party majority, by recognizing the necessity of national defense and voting not only for war credits but also for strengthening the state through measures that intervened so deeply in economic life, such as the Civilian Service Act, thereby simultaneously putting an end to the earlier p. 611 (631) The German Social Democracy etc. 611 has broken through the theoretically advocated negation of the state in our party and admitted that the existence and continuation of the state community is something that can by no means be indifferent even to the worker. Logically, this is certainly correct. The free trade unions in particular, after having cooperated with state organs on many occasions during the war in the interests of their members and in some cases even assumed functions that can be described as state-organizational, can hardly subsequently profess the thesis: "The state is none of our business; we fundamentally negate its right to exist." But internal party disputes do not follow the rules of logic, but rather a matter of feeling and mood, and within the party majority there is often a tendency to view our party's votes and actions during the war as mere exceptions, which, due to the special circumstances of war, cannot claim any validity for the practice and theory of the coming peacetime. After the war, the socialist movement must therefore resume where it left off before the war. Theoretical work, too, must return to the intellectual status quo ante. Before the war, the political principle held by most of our party was that Social Democracy must fight not only the current form of state and government, but the state as such, for every state is a ruling organization based on class distinctions, whose purpose is to keep the lower classes subjugated in the interests of the ruling classes. The state is therefore always a class state, and since Social Democracy wants to overthrow all class rule, it must also fundamentally deny the state itself, not just one of its particular forms. From this, however, it follows that it must fundamentally deny it the means for its existence, for the maintenance of its administrative and governmental machinery. Therefore, Social Democracy may under no circumstances recognize political necessities of the state; rather, it must refuse the state all demands that could serve to strengthen its power or prolong its existence. According to the nature of class society, today's state is nothing other than a dictatorship of the property owners, which must first be opposed by the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. the working class must seize state power in order to then use this power to abolish the capitalist economic system and replace the capitalist with the socialist social order (in vulgar Marxist literature, no distinction is usually made between state order and social order). It was frequently added that this conquest of state power could not be a gradual, partial, step-by-step

process, accomplished through parliamentary or corporate influence on state power, for that would not be a political conquest of state power, but only a partial transformation of an existing state form, a compromise; the seizure of state power could only be achieved through revolutionary action. To prove the correctness of this deduction, reference was usually made to Karl Marx, usually to his statements in the Communist Manifesto, and it certainly contains certain elements of Marx's theory of the state. However, not only are conclusions derived from Marx's propositions that Marx himself never drew, but Marx's conceptual distinctions are also ignored, and above all, it is not taken into account that the views on state theory developed by Marx in various places in his writings do not represent a unified, self-contained conception, but contain certain contradictions: a fact that can be explained by the fact that Marx's The conception of state and society is not something completely finished from the outset, but undergoes a development. Marx initially proceeds from Hegel's theory of law, and his concept of state and society is almost purely Hegelian. However, he then incorporates elements of the radical-liberal theory of state, as it had developed in England at the end of the 18th century, into his conception of the state. p. 613 (633) The German Social Democracy etc. 613, only to then, after comprehensive economic and social-historical studies, partially reject these and replace them with a view of state life that is perhaps best described as economic-organizational. Unfortunately, Marx never managed to systematically develop his conception of state and social theory in a single work; it is found scattered throughout various writings and must be selected and This is a rather laborious task, made even more difficult by the fact that his views can only be properly understood if one returns to their intellectual-historical foundations and their connection with contemporary radical and democratic theories of the state. Such work cannot be accomplished in a few short articles. They can only characterize Marx's development in very general terms. Detailed explanations must be reserved for a later, more comprehensive work. - 1. The social contract theory. The medieval conception of the state and society, up until late in the 18th century, was dominated by the contract theory adopted from ancient Greece, according to which society or the state (no distinction is made between the two) arose when people previously living in an isolated state of nature joined together to form an association, a society, and, through mutual contract, appointed a kind of government, a leader, to maintain the necessary social order. Aristotle already conceived of the origin of society in this form in his "Politics," and his conception was adopted by later Roman writers, as well as, after a period of temporary hostility towards the state, by the Catholic

scholastics of the Middle Ages. This theory only gained greater significance, however, when stubborn struggles arose in Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between the feudal nobility, the newly emerging urban merchant bourgeoisie, and the monarchy striving for absolute rule, and when the advocates of the interests of the contending classes recognized in contract theory a plausible legal basis for justifying their claims to power. Such a social emergence appeared to be the most natural process in the world. Society undoubtedly consists of so many individuals, and how could these individuals have come together (Aristotle already compares the state to a traveling club) other than by joining forces, just as all other associations in medieval public life: professional and support corporations, guilds, brotherhoods, church associations, etc., had emerged in this way. Of course, the nature of the association and its consequences were often conceived and assessed quite differently, depending on the political needs of the theorists concerned. While Aristotle, still familiar with the ancient Greek family and gentile constitution, assumed that the state arose from the union of village communities that had grown out of the patriarchal household family, later, medieval political theory usually imagined the state as having emerged from the union of individual families or even individuals. And the process of contract formation was conceived just as differently. While the Scholastics, primarily Thomas Aquinas, assume only a single contract arising from people's natural instinct for sociability and self-preservation, the French monarchomachs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, consistently assume a threefold contract: first, a contract between the members of society with one another, to live together and stick together; then, a contract with God, i.e., a contract with God to be his people and henceforth to live according to his laws; and third, a contract of rule with the future ruler. The German Johannes Althusius (Althus), on the other hand, takes a different view, although he p. 615 (635) The German Social Democracy etc. 615 otherwise essentially follows the teachings of the French Calvinist Hubert Languet, from the viewpoint that the state is not a simple socialization, but a general, public socialization encompassing all kinds of smaller associations or societies (families, corporations, communities, regions, etc.), and that therefore the actual conclusion of a state treaty must necessarily be preceded by smaller local treaties. The legal consequences that are derived from the type of contract conclusion are of course also varied. For example, while the Calvinist monarchists derive the right of the nobility to actual supremacy in the state from the contract with the monarch, English theorists like Milton, Algernon Sidney, John Locke, etc., use this to justify the rule of the wealthy English bourgeoisie. The latter, by simply

identifying popular rule with parliamentary rule and seeing in the English Parliament of their time the given representation of the popular will, do so without further ado; the former, by saying that through the sovereign contract, the people only give the king a mandate, while they themselves remain the holders of supreme power. But since (as Languet, for example, expresses it) the people are an "ignorant and confused mass" incapable of wielding power, the exercise of popular sovereignty belongs to their leaders "appointed by divine and human order," i.e., to princes, peers, patricians, etc. 2. Society and the State in 18th-century Social Philosophy. State and society are considered identical by all these theorists, and even by Rousseau and Kant, and even by some contemporary political theorists, they are often simply equated. In Althusius, however, we find the first dawning realization that state and society are not the same thing. Other social associations exist even before the state: large family communities, village communities, regions, etc.; thus, societies exist even before the state. Likewise, Hugo Grotius, in his 1625 book on the "Law of War and Peace" (De jure belli ac pacis), already distinguishes to a certain extent between society (societas) and the state (civitas). By society, he defines a group of patriarchal families living loosely together and alongside one another, without being bound by any actual administration or specific legal system, while by state, he defines an association of free people who have joined together for the purpose of mutual legal protection and common benefit. Similarly, in his 1672 work on natural and international law (De jure naturae et gentium), Pufendorf assumes that social structures, namely family communities and gender associations, already existed before the formation of states. Nor, he argues, is the mere coming together of such family associations sufficient to establish a state, for unions of small kinship groups only give rise to larger associations. Rather, it is necessary for the family patriarchs to unite their wills contractually into a unified will and establish a government. for the state is a composite "moral person" whose unified will is to be regarded as the "general will." This distinction received further support when, in the Age of Discovery, the horizon broadened and, through new descriptions of the earth and travels, the social institutions of primitive peoples became better known. All these peoples had no state and no "political government," but they lived united in family associations, clans, tribes, etc.; consequently, the state cannot be the "first state of society." Other pre-state social formations preceded it. Only from these did the state, "political society," finally develop. p. 617 (637) The German Social Democracy etc. 617 A complete change in the earlier concept of the state is now taking place. First in England. William Temple, Bernard de Mandeville, Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, Henry John

Bolingbroke, James Harris, David Hume, Adam Smith, etc., are increasingly discovering that the state is by no means the first social formation. Family groups, tribes, and peoples existed long before the state, and these, too, are "societies." Isolated man, they say, is a mere fictitious construction. Fundamentally, man has a "sociable" nature and has always lived in society. Similarly, Montesquieu in France proclaimed in his "Spirit of the Laws": "Man is born in society and remains in it!" This did not immediately invalidate the contract theory. Societies did exist before the state, but when these societies later developed into societies, they became societal. political or civil societies developed, it was thought that this development could have occurred in such a way that the family and tribal heads entered into a kind of contract and established a "state power" from among themselves. However, increasing knowledge of the institutions of primitive peoples made even this limited contract theory appear to be a fiction. It was replaced by the view that even before the formation of states, differences in rank and wealth had developed in primitive societies, which had forced the regulation of internal disputes: a situation that was then exploited by the highest chiefs or war leaders to increasingly increase their possessions and power and ultimately to assume "supreme authority over their societies." This is the view of the origin of political government that we find in David Hume and Adam Smith, except that the latter attributes an even greater influence on the origin of the state to the differentiation of wealth and the necessity of regulating property rights than the former. Adam Ferguson, in particular, advocates this view in his "History of Civil Society" (1767). He explains that even in primitive societies, with economic development, unequal property and unequal "living conditions" had arisen, especially since family heads and tribal chieftains had received larger shares of the spoils of war. The latter had thereby acquired ever-increasing power. A kind of tribal monarchy developed, which was then further strengthened by the subjugation of neighboring tribes, for their suppression and exploitation would have required the introduction of all kinds of domination mechanisms. The state, he argues, thus emerged from the regulation of property and class distinctions. Therefore, the form of government of a state is determined by "how the members of the state are originally organized into classes," and even later, the power relationship between the individual classes determines the form of the state (Ferguson consistently uses the words "class" and "class" as synonymous). The state is therefore an institution of rule based on differences in property and class: an idea that Nicolas Henri Linguet develops even more sharply in his "Theory of Civil Law or Fundamental Principles of Society" (Théorie des lois civiles ou principes fondamentaux de la société,

1767). He distinguishes between primitive and "true" or "political" societies. Even between primitive societies, inequalities in lifestyle develop as a result of the different living conditions and the division of labor. Alongside hunter and fisherman hordes, societies of shepherds and peaceful farmers emerge. Provoked by the possession of the latter, the hunter or shepherd peoples attack the farmers, subjugate them, and force them into slave and servile service. The suppression of the subjugated, however, requires institutions of rule; thus, from primitive society arises ---- p. 619 (639) German Social Democracy etc. 619 political society or the state, which is therefore based on subservience, class inequality, and class rule. With this change in views on the origin of the state, the views on the position of the individual in relation to the state also change. In the first decades of the 18th century, English moral and social philosophy still mostly viewed man living in society as endowed with so-called charitable or mutualistic drives, in addition to all kinds of selfish or egotistic drives inherent in his previous natural state. The struggle of individuals against one another in the state was traced back to the conflict (antagonism) of these drives. The demand placed on the individual, as the most important commandment of state morality, was to tame his antisocial, egotistic natural drives and subordinate them to social (mutualistic) drives. However, as capitalist development progresses, with its intensification of economic competition, the view that egoism is a very useful and legitimate human trait gains increasing ground. Selfishness is what primarily spurs the individual to ever greater achievements; without it, society would never have reached the heights it has reached. A general subordination of egoistic drives to charitable drives would therefore have a pernicious effect. At the same time, society, or rather the state, would lose its high regard for the individual. Whereas previously the regulated state of society had been praised as a way of life in which only man could develop into a moral being striving for perfection, the state was now often regarded as an "artificial" coercive institution that inhibited the natural impulses and activities of the individual, which was necessary for the purpose of maintaining a certain order in social life, but which should interfere as little as possible with the sacred rights of the individual. William Godwin (Political Justice, 1793) even came to the conclusion that every state was in itself an evil and, according to 43/2 p. 620 (640) 620 German Social Democracy etc. the supreme principle of justice "socialization would have been a most ill-chosen and ill-conceived mode of bringing about the general happiness of humanity." However, no matter how views on the relationship between the state and the individual change, one cannot arrive at a true distinction between state and society. While the state has not always existed, there was

a pre-state society, the state is certainly identical with today's society. The credit for having distinguished these concepts goes to Hegel's philosophy of right. According to Hegel's view, society does not merge into the state at a certain stage of development, but society and the state (which is not a society at all, but a community) exist side by side. The state is a political constitutional organization based on the rational will of a community, whereas society is a sphere of life, a system of universal dependence, which arises from the fact that the welfare of each, as he pursues his particular purposes according to his needs, is interwoven with the welfare of others, for even when one acts contrary to another, his action still has that of the others as its condition. In this way, the individual becomes a link in the chain of a general connection, and as far as this connection extends—that is, as far as the circle of persons interrelated by the economic process extends—society also extends. Marx adopted this conceptual distinction, although he later defined it more sharply. It underlies his entire conception of the state and society, which is incomprehensible without this distinction. However, only in his earliest writings does Marx fully adopt Hegel's conception; Already in the "Communist Manifesto" he combines it with elements of the previously described conception of the state, which came to prominence in England towards the end of the 18th century. — More on this soon! p. 621 (641) Social Democratic War Aims. 621 ERNST HEILMANN: Social Democratic War Aims. CAUSE OF WAR, warfare, and war aim are closely, but not inextricably, related to one another. An aggressive war will generally have the aim of conquest, a defensive war will merely seek to assert the status quo. In exceptional cases, however, one can also imagine an aggressive war that merely aims to break up a hostile coalition or weaken an enemy expected in the future and can therefore achieve its aim without territorial expansion. On the other hand, in a purely defensive war, the weaknesses of the The defensive position it reveals will awaken the desire for a strategic border improvement. The views on these issues in the social democratic world of thought are more closely and inextricably linked than the causes and aims of the war in general. The great dispute over our position on the war, which currently fills the party's thinking, necessarily also results in diverse social democratic war aims; we will attempt to derive them logically here. Logic is not infrequently neglected in politics driven by interests and passions; in party politics, it is a rare guest. In one of the party debates, I recently heard a simple worker say that he did not want to judge the guilt for the war; he had not studied the books sufficiently for that, but he did know this much from general history: when it comes to conquering and taking away foreign lands, Germany is still a mere orphan compared to England. "Oho!" another

interrupted, "Germany a mere orphan?!" You've probably already completely forgotten the Socialist Law?" And this prime example of a completely thoughtless interjection was met with applause. Perhaps one will object that such cracking and creaking only occurs in the dry wood of party debates in some remote Saxon mountain corner. Missed shot! Bef p. 622 (642) 622 Social Democratic War Aims. The party's most respectable brainiacs are no better off with their logic. In a party magazine (Nos. 6 and 7 of this year's issue of "Neue Zeit"), I recently published three articles on the question of war guilt. I devoted the entire first article to demonstrating that the Entente diplomats and Entente socialists, in their position on the war, were guided solely by the events of the critical "twelve days," from the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia to England's declaration of war; if one wanted to engage with them, one would have to discuss the diplomatic prehistory of the war with them and leave aside the deeper causes of the war. "You have to say it three times." I did so. Savvy from the experience that our party scholars still don't understand simple German, I repeated it in Greek: my article was not about the war, but merely about the war itself. The "Vorwärts" newspaper reported on these essays under the headline: "Still Causes of War." Despite all these causes! And then Kautsky and Stampfer quarreled in "Vorwärts" about whether I alone had written about the causes of war or whether Kautsky had also addressed the causes of war in his reply article. Yet neither of them had even said a word about the causes of war! When the leaders of the party's scientific and political central organs engage in such sloppy thinking and write so sloppily, one might lose the desire to discuss any issue for party debates in the correct sequence of thought. But it remains a duty. For logic is ultimately the best protection, the only effective weapon against the confusion of phrases and the dishonesty of demagogy. Without any concrete judgment about the current prospects for peace and the now possible conditions for peace, the Social Democratic war aims will therefore be derived here from our entire attitude toward the war and during the war. The standpoint of the extreme left of the party is, as is well known, defense nihilism: "Where national defense begins, Social Democracy ends." Every war of the present appears to the Spartacus people as a consequence and a part of imperialism, which social democracy must fight at all costs. Without any consideration for the situation and fate of the countries, they wage "their" class struggle and only take note of the fact of war insofar as its forms and consequences can be exploited to whip up the indignation of the masses. Not only the main enemy, but the only enemy, represents those in their own country, or can only be effectively fought in their own country: namely, the propertied class and the class state. Honestly thought through to its logical

conclusion, this view also leads to war-aim nihilism. It could be completely indifferent to the proletarian whether the piece of land in which they live becomes Russian, French, or German. The intellectual leader of this group, who writes under the name Junius, has, of course, consoled his beloved Berliners by saying that the Tsar would not keep Berlin, even if he occupied it temporarily, because he could do nothing with it. But as reassuring as this security may be for the evening payday, the fate of all the border regions remains uncertain, and the extreme left of the party demands that this must be accepted. This entire view becomes reactionary. Naturally, this method damages the country more the stronger and more determined the working class is. A social democracy with a Spartacus program would truly be a national threat to the continued existence of its own state. Defensive nihilism would regularly lead to conquests for the backward enemy and only then achieve what it teaches: that war must necessarily be hostile to development. All other party views somehow proceed from the distinction between aggressive and defensive war. They approve of the self-defense of the attacked, they condemn the frivolity of the aggressor. The concepts of attack and defense are thus more or less deeply understood, and this then gives rise to differences even between those who fundamentally profess national defense. In principle, this distinction was, at least until the War of the p. 624 (644) 624 Social Democratic War Aims. Unanimous position of the International. The decisive discussions on this took place at the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress of 1907; all subsequent resolutions of the International refer explicitly to it. As rapporteur for the commission, Vandervelde stated at the time that the International was a free association of living nationalities. "From this principle follows as a necessary conclusion that against a hostile invasion, against an attack, against an attack that could threaten their independence, nations have the well-earned right of self-defense just like the individual human being. . . . On this point, too, we were unanimous." (According to the minutes published by the International Socialist Bureau, page 387.) The simplest distinction between attack and defense clings to the external history of the war, to the declaration of war and its originator. In Germany, far too little emphasis is generally placed on this question of guilt. It is dismissed with the objection that even if one's own government had criminally or recklessly brought about the war, one could not make one's people pay for it by exposing them to the horror of enemy invasion and the catastrophe of defeat. This is certainly true, and from it, national defense follows as a self-evident duty. But even within this framework, there remains a difference for the political activity of Social Democracy whether one's own country has recklessly attacked another

people or is necessarily defending itself with its life. The causes of war may be sought in the capitalist economic order itself, in inherited and newly created political injustice, in the arms race, or whatever, but we must not completely neglect the cause of war, the question of aggressor and defender in the simplest sense. Firstly, because the earlier resolutions of the International and of the German Social Democrats attach great importance to this aspect. Consider, for example, Bebel's speech at the Essen Party Congress (Minutes p. 255). We will not unnecessarily contradict our earlier statements on the war question. Secondly, a section of the party minority bases its argument on the fact that Germany was politically and diplomatically wrong in unleashing this world war. While Wilhelm II, Bethmann, and Jagow had honestly striven to maintain peace, a nebulous military party had brought about the war. It is certainly evidently absurd not to portray Grand Duke Nicholas and War Minister Sukhomlinov as the military war party, but rather the subtle and timid Moltke and Tirpitz, who had not yet finished with naval expansion and whose Chancellor-overthrowing followers have recently been working against Bethmann with the accusation that the Grand Admiral expressly advised against the declaration of war on Russia and France. But the fact remains that prominent members of the Working Group have declared themselves ready to return to factional and party unity as soon as their conscience could absolve Germany of war guilt. Now, the majority's position is more clearly and convincingly substantiated on the question of war guilt than on any other issue. So why should we refuse to debate this complex of war issues? Above all, we cannot avoid the Entente. All the notes of the League of Ten, all the declarations of the French Social Democrats, the English Workers' Party, and their friends raise the question of aggressor or defender in this sense of moral guilt in the diplomatic game. And the entire work of the party minority in France amounts to destroying the popular notions there of a frivolous invasion and war of plunder by Germany and at least exposing the competing complicity of the Entente states. In "Vorwärts," Lensch and Stampfer are currently waging a man-killing battle over the question of whether or not French Social Democracy can still be used as a factor for peace. In the p. 626 (646) 626 Social Democratic War Aims. I completely agree with General Lensch's prediction that practically nothing will be done with this bunch of blood-thirsty Jacobins. If we had no other hope for peace than the peace-promoting influence of French Social Democracy, we could certainly endure a few more years of war. But Social Democracy has no other means of directly promoting peace than understanding with the other socialist parties; even if the prospects are therefore practically zero, Stampfer seems to me to be right in this—this

does not affect the duty to continually maintain contact- To strive for acceptance. Of course, to the extent and in the forms that our own dignity demands. But it is not the desire to promote understanding, but how one knows how to promote it, that is decisive for the judgment of the politician, and in this the new "Vorwärts" fails just as the old one did. - That the fortress of Kovno was mobilized as early as July 26th is something that the reader of the central organ must naturally learn, because it speaks for Russia's war guilt. But the new "Vorwärts" has withheld from its readers the latest sworn statements about the invasion of French troops into Belgium as early as August 1st and the letter from a French minister about France's absolute determination to bring about war, just as the old one had done with beautiful consistency with similar documents for two years. We haven't exactly jumped out of the frying pan into the fire, but it's still drizzling quite significantly, and the central organ is still far from having dry ground under its feet. And yet, on this very question, reorientation would be so easy for him; he would only need to learn a tiny bit from the French party opposition. The last manifesto of the French internationalists, published in the Zurich "Volksrecht," devotes a large part of its space to proving French war guilt and, on the basis of just a tiny portion of the actually available material, comes to the conclusion that the war was not forced upon France, but in any case p. 627 (647) Social Democratic war aims. 627 would have intervened: The certainty that France would not remain neutral forced Germany, for military reasons, to declare war, the postponement of which would have represented the greatest danger for Germany." Only here can the lever be applied from Germany that will unhinge the raging chauvinism of the warmongering French Social Democrats. That chauvinism which, after Germany's peace offer and Wilson's peace note, led the French Party Congress almost unanimously to call on the government to wage the war even more energetically than before. Anyone who determines their position on the war solely by the external course of the outbreak of war subsequently arrives at exclusively morally motivated war aims, namely the return of stolen goods (restitution), the punishment of the perpetrators (reparations), and the creation of guarantees against the repetition of such crimes. Months before Lloyd George added these war aims to the Entente's conditions for entry into When peace negotiations began, Humanité declared precisely these points as its war aims. While the question of war guilt cannot simply be put aside, we cannot, on the other hand, recognize it as decisive. Who, in the historical sense, was the aggressor in 1866, Prussia or Austria-Hungary? And for whom, in the service of the progress of the labor movement, should Social Democracy wish victory? Or the same questions apply to the Balkan

War of 1912: the aggressors were certainly the Christian Balkan states, and yet their victory over Turkey paved the way for historical development. And how can one proceed with the purely external distinction between the rabbit that started it and the best that could not remain in peace because it displeased its evil neighbor in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05, in which Japanese and Russian soil remained almost entirely out of the picture, with only Korea and Manchuria being the operational and theater of war? Therefore, as firmly as we are convinced that Russia, after previously assuring French and English aid, unleashed the World War according to plan, we, for our part, can hardly think of now setting up the return of all former German possessions, compensation for all German war suffering, and the safeguarding of Germany against future three-front attacks as our minimum demands for peace. Another rather primitive distinction between aggressor and defender is based solely and painfully on the war situation. When the French are on the Rhine and the Russians on the Oder, Ledebour, as is well known, wants to approve war credits, even though we can no longer use them. But because, fortunately, the armies of Germany and its allies are deep in enemy territory, he rejects the war credits and raises the battle cry: no annexations! This is, in fact, the war aim, which arises from the attitude toward the war depending on the war situation. This peace program is attractive in that, according to it, peace negotiations could become extraordinarily easy; everything would simply return to the way it was before the war, and everyone would pay their own costs. In practice, it is completely impracticable. Just as during the war, if one were honest about it, it necessitated a constant fluctuation in attitude depending on the changing evidence of army reports, it would pose an impossible task for the conclusion of peace; for example, to continue the war until we have reconquered Tsingtao and South West Africa, or for the other side, until the last Serbian and Dobruja village has its pre-war owner back. The status quo program would amount at most to a kind of commercial peace of a liberal-pacifist nature, in which at least the major players would be compensated elsewhere for what they have to give up. But within Social Democracy, this group has a peculiar secondary character of anti-German sentiment. For example, in the five articles on peace conditions published by Karl Kautsky in the party press, we find the axiomatic statement that Social Democracy has no p. 629 (649) Social Democratic war aims. 629 positive war aims, their war aims could only be of a negative nature, and if we place this in context with his further remark that the status quo is nothing sacred, but that this unholy status includes not only the provisions of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, but also its subsequent breaches through a series of conquests, the conclusion is

nevertheless very obvious that Kautsky, while absolutely intending to forbid German Social Democracy from agreeing to an eastward expansion of the German border, would have nothing against it advocating the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine, which is clearly what is meant by the later conquests. However, because he ultimately returns to the point that Social Democracy may not set border changes as war aims, this is probably more a lack of control over his true feelings against Germany than a theoretical consideration. The entire doctrine of the status quo is, moreover, conservative, more a petrification of thought and cerebral ossification than a guide to practical action. Its adherents seem to perceive this themselves. They therefore often borrow from a third kind of distinction between aggressor and attacked, which is based on the will of the people. According to this, a war of aggression is a war that seeks to subjugate a people against its will to a new government, while a war of defense is the fight for the right of self-determination of peoples. Even the Entente socialists and Entente diplomats—practically not the slightest difference in their attitudes since the beginning of the war—have recently been heavily invoking the slogan of this right of self-determination. From the German point of view, there would be no need to object if this were taken seriously, if not only the Polish and Alsatian-Lorrainian peoples, not only the Macedonians and Romanians were called to vote on their nationality, but also Finland and Ireland, Egypt and India, Morocco and Persia. One would have to be a complete fool to believe this, however. That the world— p. 630 (650) 630 Social Democratic War Aims— will only behave democratically at our expense, we are not good-natured or literal enough for that. Especially since the Entente press has already declared that such a depraved and bloodthirsty people as the Turks naturally cannot claim the right of nations to self-determination for themselves, but must immediately surrender Constantinople to the Russians, having forfeited any right to exist. With such a method, it is easy to rave about the right of nations to self-determination, while the enemies are always too bad for that. Fundamentally, the right of nations to self-determination is obviously a piece of democracy, but little more than a democratic slogan. Theoretically, Karl Kautsky can certainly defend the proposition that the referendum is still the only means of determining the will of the people, and that without it, socialists cannot agree to any border change. But in practice, he should draft a referendum procedure for Gorizia! The question of whether or not German officials and immigrants in Alsace-Lorraine should be allowed to vote could give rise to the most violent dispute and war. And what if a people has made a mistake?! Should it never be allowed to reverse its vote, or should every part of a country have the right, even in peacetime, to secede from the state

as a whole if something in the state doesn't suit it? Should Westphalia and Upper Silesia, with their rich natural resources, be allowed to decide to form their own state so that they can no longer be called upon to bear the burdens of state administration in the poorer regions? The idea of the right of self-determination of peoples, if thought through to its final conclusions, will have an anarchistically dissolving rather than a socialist organizing effect. The only truly purely democratic war in world history was fought against the right of self-determination of peoples: the American Civil War of 1861-65. At that time, the southern states wanted nothing less than the right to form their own state with laws according to their own will; but the northern democracy forced them back into the unitary state by force. Even if Karl Kautsky subsequently- p. 631 (651) Social Democratic War Aims. 631 Even if the German Social Democratic Party takes up the banner of the slave-holding states' right to self-determination, it will hardly be able to rally the German workers around its flag of unrecognizable color. The Socialist must not cling to democratic slogans, but must first and foremost have learned to think economically. We see the war ultimately arising from economic causes, without wishing to dismiss the moral, state, and national elements as insignificant. The Social Democratic war aim must therefore also be determined economically. For German Social Democracy, it is the unabridged freedom of development of German labor. For international Social Democracy, it is the right to all work and the fight against all exploitation of one nation by another. A Social Democrat should not deny that there are exploiting and exploited peoples; Karl Marx already pointed out the special proletarian interest in eliminating this national exploitation in "Capital," citing the example of England and Ireland. After all, in the realm of a free economy with unlimited competition and the complete freedom of movement of capital and labor, national oppression was hardly of decisive importance; it has only regained this importance since we entered the state socialist era. If every state takes its most valuable raw materials under public supervision and sells them to foreign countries only in return for appropriate services or at the highest possible prices, securing the foundations of its own economy becomes the most important war aim, even for the workers. Its limit is the right to life of other peoples, whom we also do not want to exploit, but rather allow to live off their labor, but whom we must, for our own sake, deprive of the possibility of exploiting Germany. Security is also one of the foundations of the national economy. No one likes to sleep with the door open. Kautsky opposes Russia's demand for Constantinople: peaceful Russia does not need it; the Strengthening the power of belligerent Russia would, however, contradict the interests of democratic and international socialism. The thesis

is correct, but the justification is inadequate; for the Russian economy is in fact constantly endangered whenever any conflict threatens to deprive Turkey of its freedom of passage through the straits with any opponent possessing a fleet; only with the greater interest of Turkey in the development of its economy and of Germany on the Oriental route can the Russian claim be fought and repelled. Which prerequisites are indispensable for the undisturbed development of its own political and economic life can only be examined in detail and in practice. If, for example, Germany has to fear a repetition of the naval blockade even after the war, then possession of the arable land of Courland of entirely different value to us than if a repetition of the starvation plan is no longer possible. The trade union leaders first paved the way for investigating these questions in their collection of essays published by Jansson. From there, further research must be carried out to develop a comprehensive program for protecting the German economy against foreign exploitation, based on the essential needs of individual professions. Its basic principles can be none other than the fundamental Social Democratic war aims already laid down by the party several times in solemn rallies: the unabridged preservation of German territory and unabridged freedom of development for the German economy. Many unlearn how to think through much reading, and others learn it. Those who know life will never mock the bookish wisdom born of life. Among poets there are many who, where they could have a poetic effect through prose, have a prosaic effect through poetry. H. Sonntag. p. 633 (653) Economics on the Submarine Question. 633 RICHARD SCHILLER: Economics on the Submarine Question.' The rejection of the German peace offer will now bring the world a final act of this war, the likes of which could hardly have been dreamed of. A frantic race for military superiority, for the perfection of military-technical means of destruction, will begin. The last act of the war will be the bloodiest and most destructive; but it will also be the act that plants hatred of war most deeply in people's hearts. Nevertheless, we should not fatalistically resign ourselves to the inevitable, but rather seek means to shorten this last period of this cruel game, if possible. One such means exists in the submarine. The odium of cruelty that lay upon this weapon at the beginning of the war has considerably diminished over the course of the war years. Today, we may confidently assert that the submarine cannot operate nearly as "rationally" in the destruction of human life as the terrible land weapons, that but it is all the more effectively able to destroy economic assets of immeasurable importance. Destruction is, after all, the essence of war. And in a war of its present dimensions, the destruction of the economic and subsistence potential of entire nations plays a perhaps greater role than

the purely military possibilities of destruction. England's methods are examples of this. Its sophisticated system of warfare against us lies in the exploitation of its global economic power and its maritime power, by means of which it keeps the world's waterways clear of any supplies to Germany or to the neutral bridges leading to Germany. There seemed to be no hope of countering these weapons with anything similar. A showdown between the major battle fleets, for all the efficiency and bravery of our navy, is not the means that could guarantee us a decisive defense against the combined English method of blockade and economic warfare. Our submarine force, on the other hand, has every prospect of being able to wage this fight against England not only as a defense, but also as an attack. 1 Editor's note: We are publishing the following article by Comrade Schiller because it contributes noteworthy material to one of the most controversial issues today, not from a military but certainly from an economic standpoint. It goes without saying that neither the editorial board of the "Glocke" nor even the German Social Democrats should be politically committed in any way by the inclusion of this article. 43/3 p. 634 (654) 634 Economic aspects of the submarine question. The first actions of the German submarines, the silent sinking of English warships, caused a great stir, and the enemy colossi fled to safety for years of sleep. Then came events like the "Lusitania" incident, and the use of this weapon created serious scruples of conscience, not least in our party. There were isolated incidents in the submarine war that were difficult for human sensibilities to bear. But if we look at things today, with a certain distance, and after our entire nervous system has become accustomed to warlike excesses of all kinds for two and a half years, we come to the realization that the isolated incident stands out in no way from the overall picture of this monstrous war frenzy. And when our enemies repeatedly seek to rally the world's indignation around the Lusitania incident, they are doing nothing other than what they still attempt with phrases like "German barbarism in Belgium" and others: they are stirring up sentiment. They are decidedly superior to us in this regard and have had their successes. The policy of the German government has indeed been forced to take this sentiment into account in order to keep new enemies at bay. Our disputes with America fall into this category. We do not yet know for sure whether the submarine question still plays the same role in America today as it did a year ago. But there are signs that things are now being viewed differently over there as well. But more important for Germany at present than America's ambiguous stance is the question: can we afford the luxury of foregoing a weapon that has provided the most brilliant proof in recent months that: 1. it can be very dangerous to the enemy navy; 2. that it works quickly, thus shortening the

war. works; 3. England can inflict the same fate that it intended for Germany; 4. can reduce human losses. As for the first two statements, it is certain that by the end of 1916, the enemy war fleets had lost 196 ships with a total weight of 759,430 tons in larger units (i.e., excluding submarines and auxiliary vessels). Of these, England alone lost 125 ships with a total weight of 565,200 tons. For Great Britain, this means a quarter of its war fleet. No wonder it brought the other precious colossi to safety. All these losses are almost exclusively due to torpedoes from submarines. In the meantime, all the world's oceans had become the battlefield of the submarine force; it no longer remained a means of coastal defense. The boats held their own up to Two months without any recognizable base, far from home. They slip through enemy-held and heavily guarded straits, towing American ammunition shipments into German ports or sinking them. They have sunk 60 percent of the ammunition intended for the Romanian army in the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic at enormous distances from the Romanian theater of war, thus maintaining wonderful contact with the army operating on land. Above all, however, the submarines are now beginning to inflict such severe damage on enemy trade and self-sufficiency that the development of these operations must become of the utmost importance for the outcome of the war. Here, the enemy shipping loss figures, combined with the actual economic disruption, seem downright sensational. By the end of 1916, the enemy loss of merchant ships was calculated at 3,800,000 gross registered tons. From these Losses give rise to the specter of a shortage of cargo space. It is constantly increasing and, above all, has the consequence of reducing supplies and skyrocketing production prices. This calamity hits England twice over. The difficulties for its own supply are increasing, and England's satellites, who only remain under the Union Jack as long as England provides them with the bare necessities, are also facing severe economic hardship. This is the most vulnerable point in the Entente's war system; this is where action must be taken to bring about a final outcome. Let us give them the bitterest object lesson, since they refused to accept any understanding. We will not only shake the roots of their true strength, but we will also turn the tables and, for our part, be able to begin a silent blockade war against our enemies, primarily against England. It remains to be investigated whether this possibility has any prospect of success. The answer to this question can be decisively affirmed. It is already affirmed by England itself. Lord Curzon said in May 1916, that the English merchant ship loss had been completely offset by new construction. It goes without saying that he also tacitly categorizes under new construction the ships that were sequestered by England in all ports of the world as the property of the Central Powers.

England has thus appropriated 800,000 reg. tons on its own account alone. Another very well-known English politician, Mac Namara, recently admitted that by the end of September 1916, the net loss of the English merchant fleet amounted to more than 2% of a hundred. According to German calculations, the English loss at this time had been determined to be 10%. It is not unimportant to attempt to clarify this difference. First of all, it should be pointed out that since September 1916, the freight English losses have increased quite significantly. While 254,600 reg. tons were sunk in September, the figure was 393,500 reg. tons in October, 408,500 reg. tons in November, and according to rough estimates, this latter figure was also exceeded in December. But even that would not explain the difference between the English and German accounts. It might be advisable to consult the English publications of the Lloyd's Register. From them, the following can be determined: The English merchant fleet numbered 20,463,881 reg. tons at the end of the first half of 1916 and 20,523,706 reg. tons in 1914. The average loss at sea is calculated at 4 percent annually. In two years, that's 1% or about 300,000 reg. tons. This leaves 20 223,000 registered tons. To this total, however, we must add the following newbuildings, purchases, and sequestrations, also based on Lloyd's figures: August-December 1914 January-December 1915 January-June 1916 Sequestered ships 1914/16 877,500 registered tons 664,200 400,000 800,000 "" 2,741,700 registered tons. This list yields an astonishing result: If we add the cargo space created in two years to the 1914 inventory, the total is 22,964,700 registered tons. However, since only an official inventory of 20,463,881 registered tons is stated for June 1916, an absolutely certain deficit of 2 500,819 Reg. tons. And this figure corresponds damned closely to the German calculation of 10 percent English cargo space loss. We therefore have some justification for adhering to this latter calculation if we want to get a true idea of the losses of the English merchant fleet. But the following stock exchange quotations can speak and testify more than these figures. Even the buttoned-up and cautious Englishman could no longer conceal how much the lack of cargo space was making it difficult for him to hold out. If the English people are to be fed and clothed, the bare necessities must be imported. How much the disruption of these supplies and the increase in freight costs have driven up the price of the most indispensable foodstuffs For this, just these two examples: London quotations in sh for the quarter of English wheat Prov. Manitoba (Canada) Dec. 1916 73.2 93 Dec. 1915 52.10 Dec. 1914 42.1 Dec. 1913 31.2 61.6 50.6 35 As a second example, we use the most recent quotation from the International Agricultural Institute in Rome. There, the following is quoted for sea freight in cotton per metric ton in Italian gold

francs: Line 1916 1915 1913 Dec. 15 Dec. 8 Dec. 1 Dec. 24 Nov. 17 Nov. 17 Dec. 12 Dec. New York-Liverpool. 233.45 140.05 140.05 140.05 204.24 235.30 34.33 New Orleans United Kingdom.... 274.30 274.26 274.26 233.42 233.32 264.71 37.76 Salles-Le Havre 325.99 320.95 320.95 320.95 320.95 ? ? New Orleans-Le Havre 291.81 291.77 291.77 291.77 291.77 264.71 45.77 These are two examples of such convincing proof of the "rational" effectiveness of our submarine force that we can save ourselves further \. If the German war effort succeeds in increasing these effects, then we will have proud England where we need it: not on its knees, but with a tendency to negotiate . There is no other means of dissuading England from its egotistical frenzy. If we strike at the very heart of the enemy resistance in this way, then we will strike it more surely and much less bloodily, and we will not need to increase our casualties to the same extent as in a land war. In doing so, however, we will not only strike England alone, but will also make it impossible for it to fulfill its supply obligations to its allies. We will disorganize the Entente's entire defense plan, which can only be maintained through uninterrupted supply from overseas. I cannot admit that the reckless use of this German weapon must be rejected by a Social Democrat on moral grounds merely because it is more brutal than other weapons. We reject the gruesome art of war as a whole. 638 (658) 638 Glosses. off, and the horrors of land warfare that the coming weeks will bring us will considerably exceed those of the U-boat scare. The enemy is forcing us to use all means of defense because they have never before proclaimed our destruction so cynically and brutally as they did this time when they rejected the German peace offer. EDWARD SLONSKI: Will you recover from red wounds? BEL -- Translated from the Polish by Stefania Goldenring. Will you recover from red wounds, Which the grey frost's kiss inflicted on the fighters, You, dismembered from threshold to ridge, You my dying, blood-thirsty Poland? Will your fields be greened again with seeds that fire has plowed and laid waste for us? Who, O my Poland, will build you house and hearth? To whom does the Lord give the trowel and the spade? Will today not grant you, according to history written in blood, carpenters whom heaven's command obliges to work? Should your blood therefore nourish our fields so that ghosts may wander over them, from graves into which one brother pushed another? Glosses. Nature. In El Lagarde one finds a passage where he speaks of German education; he says that we will never possess such an education, and that all our schools are folly as long as we have not replaced our unnatural nature with a natural one, as long as we have not, in a word, become natural human beings. In fact, Lagarde touches here on the most sore spot of the entire German character, the reason why everything that is

self-evident to other peoples becomes a philosophy for us. In these days, which give rise to much self-confidence, let us quietly beat our breasts and confess: We are hard workers, we are deep thinkers, but we are not nature. And in this we are quite like the good Peter Schlemihl, who pulls felt Parisians over his seven-league boots, for fear that his steps might otherwise easily lead him too far. Having nature is not the same as being infatuated with nature. In being infatuated with nature, we have indeed come awfully far. Every German child stands with due rapture before a buttercup, and when we look at the pictures in which our painters, who are in the rear, depict the trenches for us, we can almost always see some small bird jubilating with all its might on the shattered cannon. But the same painter who so honors the little bird is offended when one addresses him not as Professor, but simply as Herr Schulze. Countless Germans spend most of their precious time striving to conceal their true selves as watertight as possible behind a series of titles and similar niceties. They are not nature, do not want to be nature; they must be labeled somehow and somewhere. One takes off one's hat much more deeply to Professor Schulze than to Schulze the genius. Our worst enemy, the Englishman, is a boring nature, but he is a nature. The Frenchman is a nature despite all his playful vanity. The Italian is a nature, albeit often a depraved one. Perhaps, to a certain extent, we have been so unable to achieve an understanding of our uniqueness through foreign nations because we have practically made the German system out of not being nature. It seems as if we lost our nature in the course of the Thirty Years' War. And afterwards, there was no possibility of restoring it. The German idea perished, the petty state system began. With it, the turning away from nature and the natural. In the future, there should again be Germans like there are English and French, that is, people of a German nature, a German characteristic that other peoples may like or dislike, but in any case, are understandable . Not what we have been for the last few hundred years: a statistic christened with a national name . Tamen. School reform after the war. THROUGH Germany's idealistic pedagogy, a spring storm of wishes and hopes is once again roaring. In the course of the past 19th century, profound criticism of the German school system has uncovered all manner of deficiencies and errors: the elementary school is, both internally and externally, almost entirely under the spell of the churches, the middle schools are petrified, the humanistic Gymnasium, in the opinion of many, has become a medieval relic in the world-weary grammar chaos, and the universities are largely outdated in their operation. In addition, new problems are being tossed around: unified schools, state schools, the selection of the most capable, etc. Thus, the field of pedagogy presents a

confusion and juxtaposition of opinions and theories, so that even the knowledgeable often becomes anxious. The war influenced the debates more than any other political event, and the success of German arms has revived the saying about the schoolmaster of Sadowa from 1866. It is truly touching to see how the idealists and ideologues enthusiastically and enthusiastically set about building a new German school system, unfortunately failing to notice how other powers are hindering its implementation. Maria Theresa's words that schools are a political issue remain true in the sense that political parties are devoting their attention to the school system. If not in terms of numbers, but rather in terms of actual influence on the government machinery, the conservative parties still have the decisive say in school reforms. Therefore, it is instructive when, from time to time, one of the leaders of the reform opponents expresses his opinion. It is a very interesting book published by Lübeck school inspector Wychgram.[1] Admittedly, it seems a bit too fragmented, but the thread is not easy to lose. From Schulz to Heydebrand is a long way, or rather, a deep chasm over which no bridge leads. What lies in between brings many good ideas, but the crucial framework is missing: a strong political program. Heydebrand and his friends will ensure that the German school of the future doesn't arrive too soon. He states that "the glorious successes this war has brought us through the efficiency and effectiveness of our troops are largely based on the educational and instructional foundation we owe to our schools, both lower and higher, their system and their results." From this he concludes: "There are, after all, reservations about departing from such proven foundations in essential points." He does not want to oppose a certain "development" and "justified changes," but the fundamentals must remain." Heydebrand contributed only half a printed page to the book, but unfortunately, it weighs more heavily than a dozen pages from a reform-enthusiastic professor or schoolmaster. If one compares the conservative view with the statements recently made by the Bavarian Minister of Education, Knilling, in the press, the sober-minded schoolmaster and friend of the people must prepare for a fierce school struggle in the future. School is, after all, a political issue, and political parties must fight for it; for whoever has the youth has the future. Dr. Palatinus. [1] The German School and the German Future. Contributions to the Development of Education. Leipzig 1916, 465 pages. p. 641 (661) DIE GLOCKE 44, Issue 27, January 1917, Year 2. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source information is permitted. Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: S% In the Mauser. The war created the first prerequisite that was absolutely necessary for the reorientation of German Social Democracy: the separation from those intransigent elements of phrase and utopia, whose regressive or,

more precisely, historically backward type of development only became apparent in the throes of the world catastrophe. As long as the monstrosity was still in the making and the new world epoch that this war ushered in was only just being prepared, the young, supporting layer of the future remained in both camps of the party, among the radicals and the revisionists, overshadowed by a leading generation whose intellectual structure belonged entirely to the past and who, even if they adopted opposing guidelines within the party struggles, were nevertheless fundamentally of one heart and one soul. This explains why it is precisely the leaders from the two camps of the past, the real quarrelers from the era of radicalism and revisionism, who are now in each other's arms and, as Kautsky recently admitted quite openly about his earlier disagreements with Bernstein, are discovering to their own astonishment that everything that separated them before was nothing, a mere slugfest, and that they all, the Mehrings and Eisners, the Luxemburgs and Bernsteins, the Ledebours, and whatever they may be called, are one heart and one soul, one flesh and one bone. People have wrongly joked about this admission by the old Kautsky. In truth, this confession reveals a brilliant piece of unconscious self-criticism; for it states: The space in which we formerly held our brilliant knightly games fought against each other was the friendly, airless space of utopia. Now that the war, that terrible realpolitik, has hurled social democracy out of the realm of dreams and placed it on the ground of brutal reality, it runs like a fraternal oath through the ranks of the knights of the fourth dimension. They fight for their most sacred thing, for that which is the common premise of their poetry and thought, for abstraction from reality, for utopia, and in this struggle, everything that once separated them disappears, and they stand in a common front in defense against the facts and against the party that has placed itself on the ground of these facts, against German Social Democracy. Read the appeals of the opposition, the secret pamphlets of the Spartacus Group, listen to the speeches of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft members! The words they use are, of course, the words of this world, but the concepts they associate with these words are the concepts of the beyond. The "masses" that play such a large role for them, and about whose threateningly approaching onslaught they whisper and prophesy so much, are not earthly masses, but only masses of their imagination, which never and nowhere exist; they are ghost battalions; the "Internationale," whose future heroic deeds they so eagerly recount, is not a real, living International, but a spirit, an International of the fourth dimension, and the "revolution" they always talk about is not the actual, physical revolution of the World War, but an abstraction, a specter. Thus, in tragic delusion, they continually run past

reality, grasping for the disembodied nebulous images of their imagination, and denouncing everyone as a social patriot and imperialist who does not, like them, mistake appearances for reality and their ghost battalions for the workers' battalions of the German proletariat. p. 643 (663) In the moult. 643 So the separation had become inevitable. But it would be wrong to speak of a split. At most one might speak of a shedding of skin, or better still, a moulting. It was Bebel who coined the good phrase in the Reichstag at the beginning of the 1890s: Social Democracy is actually constantly in a process of moulting. That is indeed the case. Who would deny that the party is losing more feathers, and even a few particularly beautiful and dazzling ones, than ever before in this moulting? But the lively bird will certainly not die from it, however unattractive it may currently look. It is also said of it: the more it changes, the more it remains the same. Certainly, the current crisis is the most terrible the party has to endure, just as the war is the most serious crisis capitalist society has to endure. But however profound the changes this crisis will bring about for socialism and capitalism, at their core both historical forces will only be strengthened: the one as the most developed method for developing the productive forces to date, the other as the ever more mature system for socializing these productive forces. The closer socialism grows toward its stage of maturity, the more the veils fall from things, the more it is forced to see the facts naked, without utopian coverings. Seen in this light, the course of development of social democracy is a constant struggle against utopia, a spiritual liberation struggle of the rising class, which bears the most remarkable resemblance to the spiritual development process of the nation and humanity. Just as at the beginning of human thought there is poetry, the freely creative imagination which populates mountain and bush with its creations and which is only able to grasp the surrounding world in great allegories, until in the course of development of centuries or millennia sober scientific knowledge takes the place of poetic imagination and Thor's hammer is transformed into the electric spark of the Leyden jar, so too 44/1 p. 644 (664) 644 In the moulting period the thinking of the young proletariat also begins as poetry; The first socialist systems are fictions, from Fourier's Phalansteries to Bellamy's Retrospective, and only slowly and with a thousand pains does a realistic understanding of the world begin to triumph over the soft and friendly utopias, until finally all speculation about conditions "the day after the revolution" is recognized as empty cloud-cuckoo-land, and the study of industrial statistics and trade policy replaces political revolutionary songs. This inevitable process of class development accomplishes in decades what the larger body of the nation needs just as many centuries, just as one has

sought to recognize in the development of the human embryo in the womb a reflection, taking place in months, of the development of the living world from primitive animal to human, taking place over millions of years. And just as in national history the great stages of intellectual development were only brought to completion through tremendous external struggles, so the class never reaches a new stage of its maturity without the most violent internal struggles. The greater the leap forward the class makes, the stronger the rebellion within its ranks will generally be, and judging by this, it is certainly a substantial leap forward that German Social Democracy has made in the World War. Indeed, the fratricidal war has never been as profound as it is now. Internal friction is inherently part of the law of movement and development. Only the dead body knows it not. Nevertheless, what developed within German Social Democracy since August 4th very soon revealed itself to be a highly inflammatory phenomenon. The crisis dragged on for two and a half years, during which the party body was shaken by the most violent feverish tremors, until on January 7th the abscess burst and the drainage ensued. What we experienced in terms of party warfare during these thirty months of war need not be repeated here. It is enough to point out that the opposition, which began quite tame and reserved, became increasingly sharper p. 645 (665) In the Mauser. 645 and finally resorted to measures which it itself would have considered impossible only a short time before. Since it was incapable of recognizing the essence of things and accordingly did not understand that this war was a revolution in which the Central Powers represented the revolutionary and the Entente Powers the reactionary side of developments, it remained fixated on externals and did not get beyond the formal distinction between so-called war of conquest and so-called war of defense. But even in this formality it resorted to false cards and frantically designated the defenders as aggressors and the attackers as defenders. And in order to make the utopian-petty-bourgeois character of the opposition stand out even more glaringly, it chose to judge the monstrous catastrophe of the World War according to the highly respectable concepts of virtue of the uncle tailor and the glove maker, and, like the old, honest historian Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, to apply the yardstick of a moral sense to all things and people. But once historical understanding had been replaced by the investigation of "guilt" and "innocence," it was, of course, child's play to paint one's own government as the black man who was "to blame" for everything, using old party stereotypes. The Working Group faction became a political morality club and constantly proclaimed that it was thus upholding the best and most sublime traditions of German Social Democracy. We are objective enough to find the grain of truth in this

assertion as well. German Social Democracy, which had almost entirely been deprived of training in major world-historical upheavals throughout its life, had indeed been inclined to judge questions of foreign policy from purely ethical perspectives, all the more so because it was accustomed to playing no role in settling these issues and therefore easily saw them as merely the intrigues of an uncontrolled diplomacy. But this petty bourgeois attitude was not not a strength, but a weakness of the party, which it thoroughly overcame when the World War took it through its harsh training, and it is a truly tragicomic confusion when the Working Group now hastily puts on the party's discarded, tattered wardrobe and proudly claims that it has thereby saved the party's best traditions. Alas! What the Working Group saved was merely fodder for the antique dealer or for the historical museum. It resembles the noble Knight of La Mancha, who also had a strong preference for over-the-top wardrobe and always asserted that he upheld the best traditions of chivalric Spain. This already indicates that for the Social Democratic Party, the real historical task only begins after the opposition has left office. And this task is the spiritual one. Reorientation. It would be short-sighted to deny that the necessity of this task is by no means clear throughout the party. Most people probably don't yet see the task itself, but rather naively believe that once the "troublemakers" are out of the party and the party's external unity and cohesion are once again maintained, everything will be all right again. Simply liberating the party body from the opposition fulfills only one, the negative, part of the task. The greater and more difficult, because positive, part still remains to be accomplished. We must draw the conclusions from the new world situation and utilize them to enrich the socialist world of thought. Or do we really believe we could enter the new era of high imperialism, on the threshold of which stands such a secular fact as the overthrow of British world domination, without taking a thorough inventory and discarding many a venerable old item in the process? That could only be the case if everything we had predicted for the outbreak of war had come true on time. But, as we know, that was not the case at all. We need only recall Bebel's views on the next war, of which reality left little trace; Kautsky, who, even well into the war, had been considered the theoretical representative of the Party Executive, and who declared it impossible that Germany could raise more than a maximum of five-quarters of a billion in war credits! We recall the collapse of the International, which was more hopeless than anyone had foreseen. The rising power of the working class within a national framework and the resulting definitive national orientation of future labor policy, the social attrition of capitalist society with its destruction of the middle classes and their flow into the

proletariat, which will thus experience a significant intellectual transformation, also in a national direction—these are all questions that confront German Social Democracy and whose discussion it can no longer avoid. Only by resolving these problems will the opposition be overcome internally, i.e., positively, and the party become ripe for the tasks presented to it by the new epoch of development. That the party's central organs, "Vorwärts" and "Neue Zeit"—not to mention "Gleichheit"—have so far completely failed in this regard, cannot be denied. It will be up to the party executive to decisively bring about change here. "Die Neue Zeit" must be returned to the party, and the undignified situation of the scientific organ of the largest party in the world being a caricature of science and, at the same time, an instrument of a small clique, increasingly losing prestige and circulation, must be eliminated. But "Vorwärts" also urgently needs transformation. The party writer who now holds the political sway in it is certainly a man of rare talent and even rarer diligence. It was apparently said of him that if he were woken at 3 a.m. with the request to write an article, he would deliver it immediately and in the shortest possible time, just as the water pipe delivers a glass of water. That was probably also the reason why the party executive entrusted him with the work on the central organ. But it is the fate of the water pipe not to be able to deliver anything but water; it is incapable of meeting other demands. 648 (668) 648 In the Mauser. Not up to the challenge. Indeed, the new "Vorwärts" editorial staff has also failed to meet the demands placed on it by the world-historical situation, as Comrade Heilmann already stated in the last issue of "Glocke." And while other party members attempted to at least somewhat alleviate this deficiency in our central organ through their own letters, the new "Vorwärts" editorial staff developed manners reminiscent of the best times of Ströbel and Stadthagen and practically suppressed any freedom of discussion in "Vorwärts." Thus, much remains to be done here, and the party executive should see to it that things are in order. Whatever battles the party may now face, as far as the fight against the Working Community is concerned, are merely rearguard actions. Historically, the decision has already been made. That does not prevent these rearguard actions from being fought with extreme bitterness and fierceness. Here, the party simply needs to take decisive action. For example, we would consider it a matter of course if, now that the separation has taken place, the party were to nominate its own candidate in the Potsdam-Osthavelland constituency. The bourgeois parties would then maintain the truce, and Mr. Mehring, who has already received the official support of Representative Haase, would be able to and whose group he has found, could then try his luck in the fight against the party. It would be a

worthy conclusion to this eventful life. The party will gain as much confidence as it has in itself. The stronger its sense of strength, the easier it will be to overcome the current process of molting and the better able it will be to turn to the great tasks of the future. It is said that knowledge and insight can overcome passions; but that the drive for insight sometimes nourishes and flares up passions is at least as true. p. 649 (669) Party Split and the Trade Unions. 649 WILHELM JANSSON: Party Split and the Trade Unions. The German trade unions are not directly affected by the party crisis because their organizational basis is entirely autonomous and independent. But since the circle of members of both organizations is at least partly the same, and Since the political activity of the party, above all, must complement the economic activity of the unions if friction is to be avoided, the lively interest of the unions in the events within the party naturally follows. The previous organizational cooperation between the party and the unions was based on the resolution of the Mannheim Party Congress, which demanded an agreement between the Party Executive and the General Commission on all issues affecting the common interests of both branches of the labor movement. The differences at that time were directly caused by the differing views on the possibility and value of the so-called "political mass strike" and the work stoppage on May 1. Both are impracticable without the unions. However, despite the unions' greatest sacrifices, May Day celebrations through work stoppages had proven impossible. The reasons for this need not be examined here, but it may be pointed out that the struggles over May Day temporarily rendered many unions unable to fight for more important workers' interests. This was the reason for the desire of trade union circles to celebrate May Day in a form that would not weaken the organizations, but rather serve as propaganda for them. However, the experiences the unions had had with May Day celebrations and their recognition of the limits of the influence of large-scale work stoppages warned them to exercise the greatest caution with regard to the "weapon" discovered by academics: the political mass strike. This led to the divide in views that found expression on the part of the trade unions at the congress in Cologne on the Rhine, and on the other hand, at the party conference in Jena. Reconciliation was then attempted in Mannheim, and one can safely say that it was essentially successful. The Mannheim decision signified, above all, the overcoming of that orthodox party tendency that demanded the subordination of the trade unions to the will of the party. Kautsky, the theoretician of this tendency, no longer found a majority in Mannheim. His revenge consisted in the "scientific" proof of the "Sisyphean achievements" of the trade unions, which still remains one of his favorite themes. This

connection must not be ignored if one wishes to assess the position of the trade unions in the current party crisis. There are only two possibilities: either the cooperation between the party and the trade unions on the major common labor issues, as decided in Mannheim, or the absolute party-political neutrality of the trade unions, as practiced by the French syndicalists and the American trade unions following Gomper's lead. In Germany, we opted for the first option, which here also represented a historical necessity. Since Mannheim, we have cooperated on issues such as May Day support, youth education, press services, social policy, food issues, and finally, in the broad area of internal war policy over the past 30 months. In this cooperation, no branch of the labor movement was subordinate to another; rather, it was based on the free recognition of the usefulness and necessity of mutual agreement in daily work for the benefit of the working classes. Nowhere did this necessity become more apparent than during the difficult war years with their plight for the working class. The policy of positive cooperation by the organized working class for the protection of the Reich, proclaimed on August 4, 1914, was the only possible policy for the unions. By their very nature and purpose, the trade unions had to concentrate all their activities on alleviating the suffering of the workers; they had to help rebuild the economic life disorganized by the outbreak of war; and, last but not least, they were interested in keeping the fury of war at bay from German Reich territory. The battles of the World War would determine Germany's economic development prospects; a defeated Germany, shattered by the enemy's will, would become a hell for the workers, who would have only emigration as their last hope. From all this arises the trade unions' vital interest in a positive policy of the workers' party during the war. For it would be an impossible situation if the economic branch of the workers' movement had to contribute positively to the preservation of the Reich and its economic life on a political basis such as the party opposition sought to create in its negation of German workers' interests. The policy of the party opposition, had it become the policy of the party on August 4, could only have brought about the separation between the party and the trade unions. The Mannheim basis for cooperation would have been eliminated. German Social Democracy would have reaped the praise of Poincaré, Lloyd George, and Romanov, and its spokesmen might have been able to shake hands with Mr. Briand's French colleagues in the Labour Ministerial, but the Caesarean section between the political and economic movements of the German workers would have been the inseparable consequence in Germany itself. By securing the basis for positive cooperation even during the war, the policy of August 4th gave us more than the friendly recognition of the anti-German "pacifism" of foreign countries

could ever have offered us: it gave us the future. The continuation of the policy of August 4th guarantees the unions that the party will successfully defend union interests in parliament in the future. p. 652 (672) 652 Party split and the unions. However, the unions share with the party majority not only a common determination for positive labor policy within the scope of what is possible, but also respect for the prerequisite of this policy: organization. The party opposition, with its constant breaches of discipline and its disregard for the decisions of the organization, has demonstrated the impossibility of successfully working with it in the interests of of the workers. By thwarting the unified action of the Workers' Party and going its own way, first in the Reichstag and then within the party, it paved the way for the complete disintegration of the workers' movement. The proclamation of indiscipline as the law of its actions whenever the decisions of the majority do not suit it has already been disastrous for the party; for the unions, however, it means the elimination of any possibility of successful struggle. The unions must demand unconditional discipline from their members; every wage movement, every work stoppage, and every collective bargaining agreement is impossible unless every individual worker submits to the majority, respects the organization's statutes, and sets aside their own special interests. The party opposition motivates its actions with the terror of the majority. This is the same motivation that we have seen in union life from the Yellows, who seek to evade the supposed terror of the unions through their "economically peaceful" fragmentation of the workers. Motives and effects are the same, whether some are guided by anarcho-socialist ideas, others by harmony-seeking ideas. In both cases, the workers' energy for action is paralyzed, their organizations deprived of the necessary discipline, and finally fragmented. If one calmly assesses the Reich Opposition Conference of January 7, which externally carried out the factually existing party fragmentation, one must, for these reasons, consider the clean separation achieved to be expedient. Party fragmentation may be a very serious matter for the working class, it is still more advantageous than continuing the struggle within one's own ranks. The unions will have to keep their organizational distance from the struggles of the two parties, just as they previously did not engage in actual party debates. But they will always have to examine which policies correspond to their interests: the purely anarchist policies of the Spartacus group, the anarcho-socialist policies of the Haase group, or the positive workers' policies of the party purged of these elements. There can be no doubt about the outcome of each examination. The entire existence of the unions is based on positive work. By working on this common ground, the party eliminates any danger of alienation between

the party and the unions. Upholding the organization and imbuing it with unshakable discipline ensures the success of this work. The unanimous cooperation between the party and the unions on this basis will accelerate the overcoming of disintegration. Only positive work has always possessed creative power. The fate of the youth movement in the party and the anarcho-syndicalist tomcat group in the trade union movement shows sufficiently that verbal radicalism has no basis among the working masses, even if it occasionally celebrates cheap triumphs at popular assemblies. Organizationally, it is sterile because it is doomed to permanent failure. HEINRICH WETZKER: THE The Future of the International. The proletariat needs international unity to protect its interests against capital, and it will create it again, regardless of opinions about the current state of the Workers' International and quite independently of the personal sympathies and antipathies of the current proletarian leaders for and against each other. p. 654 (674) 654 The Future of the International. The realization, created by capitalist reality, that the development of capitalism does not stop at political state borders has penetrated so deeply into the minds of so many proletarians, and has become the intellectual property of the German proletariat to such an extent, that even the narrow-minded nationalist expressions of an anti-Germanism, untouched by any economic insight, of English, French, Belgian, Italian, or even so-called neutral workers' leaders will not prevent the re-emergence of a proletarian International. No serious proletarian International is possible without the participation of the German proletariat, and only if and to the extent that the organized German proletariat lends a hand will such an International be re-emerged. Previous international workers' associations were primarily the result of tireless German propaganda and German organizational activity, and they thrived on the fact that German workers' organizations seriously attempted to implement the resolutions, as far as they were practically possible. The excited speeches against international cooperation with the German workers, such as those heard at the last English trade union congress, reinforced by a two-thirds majority in the rejection of the American proposal to hold an international trade union congress at the site of the future peace negotiations, only prove that the English workers will not be able to do more for the proletarian International in the near future than they have done so far. Because it proves that the history of the previous International is just as foreign to them as the recognition of Germany's economic importance and the utter helplessness of a workers' international without the German workers. Anyone who treats economic facts of such importance as the international union of workers as the English Trade Union Congress did again,

apparently purely emotionally, but in truth obviously guided by the most narrow-minded national-economic interest standpoint—the same, apparently, that drives the English bourgeoisie to attempt to exclude German industry from the world market—lacks the necessary recognition and the resulting solidarity to promote the international union of the proletariat. On an international scale, it is the same lack of solidarity that prevents workers, who have not yet become aware of their class position, from becoming members of a trade union organization within a national framework. And just as the foolish attempts of the English bourgeoisie to boycott German industry and exclude German trade from the world market have nothing to do with morality, as they arise solely from unbridled self-discipline, but above all betray a complete ignorance of global economic interrelationships, just as the lack of solidarity in the individual worker, which prevents them from joining a union, stems from their selfishness based on ignorance of the common interest of all workers, so too is the rejection of international cooperation with German workers by English trade unionists merely an expression of their selfishness, which is based on ignorance of the international common interest of workers vis-à-vis capital. It might seem as if English workers, who have always been rather cool about international unions, were gradually beginning to gain a better understanding. Unfortunately, the war has destroyed all the weak beginnings of international solidarity among the English workers. The war has repeatedly provoked outbursts of narrow-minded national selfishness against the German workers in England. The behavior of the Birmingham Trade Union Congress is merely the organizational stamp on the repeated outbursts of mass sentiment. These are rough stones that stand in the way of the restoration of the Workers' International, all the worse because they are not only English. There are stones of a similar nature in other countries as well. But ultimately, they are nothing other than the difficulties encountered so far. We therefore need not judge the possibilities of a new International too pessimistically. Certainly, it is more difficult to build anew than if we had been able to further expand what the war destroyed. But even if one assesses the International's achievements so far as soberly as possible, it has nevertheless left behind a wealth of practical experience, including some of a deterrent nature, which will become apparent again in time. In addition, new men are growing up who are unaffected by the antipathies that arose during the war, while the economic facts of capitalism, the foundations of our international union, persist and continue to exert their influence, asserting themselves more strongly and forcefully every day. Therefore, we may look to the future with calm confidence. We must, of course, not sit back and expect that

"development" will take care of everything. Fundamentally, this entire development is nothing supernatural, but merely the result of our work, which will reach a definite result all the more surely the clearer its goal is. If one is convinced that the emotional arguments of the Entente Socialists against international cooperation with the German Social Democrats are not, in the long run, a serious obstacle to the reconstruction of a proletarian International, then one will also realize that we can let people talk freely, that we in any case have no reason to justify ourselves in this direction and to attempt to make our accusers think better of us in a special trial, in the expectation that they will be convinced in this way and one day say: we realize that we have wronged the Germans; therefore, we want to let them play along again. That will come back all by itself in other ways. I don't consider it so urgent, either, Now, by all means, to pursue the rapid re-establishment of a political International. p. 657 (677) The Future of the International. 657 If anywhere, personal antipathies would make themselves felt as an obstacle, because the political International can practically achieve very little. Its restoration therefore does not make itself felt as an urgent need, and there remains time and opportunity to give vent to pent-up feelings. That the proletarian International could exert a noticeable effect on the speedy end of the war, I consider a beautiful fantasy. Yes, if the world could be governed with the Spartacus template...: In reaction against the anarchist self-glorification of personal conviction, which recognizes no subordination of the minority to the majority within national borders, an international executive committee will be established, naturally consisting only of the inventors of the Spartacus template, and to this committee, all people must submit unconditionally, from one end of the world to the other, under penalty of exclusion from the community of saints. . . . . In the real world, things are somewhat different. Even if the English workers' organizations and the French and Belgian socialists had the goodwill—which they still lack—to work for a speedy end to the war, even then this effect would fail to materialize. One is deceiving oneself about the power of the Entente socialists if one believes that they can do something against the war and, above all, achieve something in opposition to the ruling circles and their government. Their influence is only apparent; only because and as long as they go along with the government does such apparent influence exist. In opposition to the government, their lack of influence would immediately become apparent. The International was sorely mistaken about its power before the start of the war; although internally undisturbed, full of harmony, and in full organizational capacity, it was nevertheless incapable of ending the war. to prevent it. Now that its organization has been shattered, its

leading figures are hostile to one another, and even its national groups have never been as divided as they are now, no one wants to trust it to halt the fury of war, to be able to influence the conditions of peace against the will of the actual holders of power? A wasted effort! We will have achieved a great deal if, in a few years, we have brought so much order to the political-proletarian internationalism that it outwardly functions again. It will be an achievement enough if, through joint discussion on the problems of proletarian-socialist policy, we eventually reach an agreement on certain goals to be achieved first, if we agree on which institutions to consider as lying on the road to socialism and therefore are to be strived for. In the future, we should beware of repeating the unfortunate attempt to dictate a specific political tactic to the national parties through international resolutions. I am ignoring the story of the May Day celebrations. Beyond that, only one such resolution has achieved significance, and its success was not such that it would encourage repetition. It is the resolution on the participation of socialists in the government, the implementation of which, under the influence of Jaurès, had such an adverse effect on the International's peace work. Otherwise, the International's resolutions have remained on paper, only capable of giving us the illusion of an achievement that in reality did not exist and will probably remain unattainable for a long time to come. We should, for the time being, be content with what is possible, and I see this solely in international understanding through discussion and in the cultivation of mutual personal relationships. It is not just a cosmetic defect to be mistaken about the limits of one's power; disappointment, born of insufficient knowledge the limits of the possible, easily leads to pessimism and equally exaggerated underestimation. To correctly assess the effectiveness of a political-proletarian International, it will always be good to clearly visualize the limits of our power within a national framework. If we had realized how small our influence was on everything that posed a threat of war within a national framework, if we had, for example, properly appreciated the attempts of the Italian proletariat to prevent the Tripoli War, then we would also have formed a more accurate idea of the power of the International to prevent a world conflagration than has happened. Yet it seems as if these lessons are still not sufficiently appreciated at present, for we still hear hopes expressed that we can influence the duration of the war and the conditions of peace. We should In the future, we should better heed the lessons of the past and be content with what is possible. And this only points us to a long-term intellectual influence on international politics, which, moreover, can only occur once we have gained influence within the country and, on that basis, acquired a thorough

knowledge of the facts determining international politics. Resolutions, in any case, are not such weighty facts, no matter how long and peppered with superlatives they may be. The Trade Union International is different. It can immediately accomplish considerable practical work. Here, much more depends on the insight and will of those involved than in the political sphere. A multitude of urgent tasks await the proletariat, which, once brought to the attention of the working masses, can soon be solved. The questions of unifying the organization through mutual takeover by members, organizing common resistance against capital, international solidarity in labor struggles —all the tasks that are known to the leaders of the Trade Union International, and which have also been cultivated up to now, but have not yet brought the desired results. A very extensive practical work needs to be done, so extensive that it will completely absorb all the resources available for it. From this, a fertilization of the political International can also be hoped for through social policy legislation, which can follow the demands put forward internationally by the trade unions. There are therefore areas of joint international proletarian work that will gradually bring us together again. Such joint practical work is a better cement than theoretical discussions followed by pompous resolutions, which achieve no more than filling the archives with printed matter. The German trade unions will simply begin this work again as soon as the war is over; without much fanfare, I think they will pull the strings there again. take up where they are reachable. Not even an international congress will be necessary for this. On the contrary: the simpler, the less demanding the beginning, the easier it will be to reunite, and the firmer and more secure the foundation of the new union will become. There will be no need to ask whether this or that nation, or parts of it, will refuse to participate because they do not want to extend a hand to the Germans. That will change again. Once it is seen that a new beginning has been made, the Germans will also be accepted as indispensable. Because their work will be gladly accepted. Everything depends on our action. And only on that. Based on all previous experience, we have neither to hope nor to fear that an effective international organization will emerge without us. Not only do we take some credit for our organizational achievements, and indeed we should: they have also been recognized often enough by non-Germans, even during the war by those who were not well-disposed towards us. The Restoration International relations of the proletariat offers an opportunity for the useful use of this organizational gift. The pressing need of the day will bring the workers of the nations now hostile to us to the realization that they are least serving their interests by cultivating old antipathies, and then we may hope that the experiences of previous joint

international work will reassert themselves and prove strong enough to overcome the groundless antipathies against the leaders of the German proletariat that arose during the World War. There is no reason for particular concern about the fate of the proletarian International. Let us now let the others speak, keep calm, and when the moment for action has come, that is, at the earliest after the conclusion of peace, then we will begin the work of reconstruction at the point of least resistance, that is, at the trade union area. A grain of practical work, done by us without grand speeches and without arrogance, will be worth more than the most brilliant pleas for our innocence, which we have no need to prove. We can wait for the rest in peace. HEINRICH CUNOW: German Social Democracy and Marx's Theory of the State. II. 3. Society and State according to Marx's Conception. As already mentioned in the first article, MA ARX initially follows Hegel's footsteps in his conception of society and the state. This is clearly demonstrated by the critique he published in the German-French Yearbooks of Bruno Bauer's two works, "The Jewish Question" and "The Ability of Contemporary Jews and Christians to Become Free." He not only adopts Hegel's conceptual distinctions, but also, in many cases, his mode of argumentation and expression. His distinctions between the unfinished and the finished state, between the bourgeois as a social type emerging from the social economic process and the citoyen as a citizen, between the egoistic individual connected with others only through the interrelations of social cooperation and man as a public member of a political community are, as every Hegel expert immediately sees, borrowed in all parts from Hegel. p. 662 (682) 662 The German Social Democracy etc. For example, it says : B. in the first part of the aforementioned essay (cf. "Collected Writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels", edited by Franz Mehring, Volume 1, p. 407): "The perfected political state is, by its very nature, the life of the species in contrast to its material life. All the prerequisites of this egoistic life remain outside the state sphere in civil society, but as characteristics of civil society. Where the political state has reached its full development, man leads not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a double life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a community, and life in civil society, in which he is active as a private person, regards other people as means, degrades himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of foreign powers. . . . Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he, as a real in- dividuum to himself and others, it is an untrue phenomenon. In the state, however, where man is considered a species-being, he is the imaginary member of an imagined sovereignty, he is robbed of his real individual life and filled with an unreal

universality. "The conflict in which man, as a proponent of a particular religion, finds himself with his citizenship, with other men as members of the community, is reduced to the worldly division between the political state and civil society. For man as bourgeois, life in the state is only an appearance or a momentary exception to the essence and to the rule." However, the bourgeois, just as the Jew remains only sophistic in state life, just as the citizen remains only sophistically a Jew or bourgeois; but this sophistry is not personal. It is the sophistry of the political state itself. The difference between the religious person and the citizen is the difference between the merchant and the citizen, between the day laborer and the citizen, between the landowner and the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen." Marx flirts here with Hegelian terminology. Those unfamiliar with Hegel's Philosophy of Right may consider these remarks to be more or less witty wordplay. In fact, they state that social life rests on a material foundation, that is, on the p. 663 (683) The German Social Democracy etc. 663 satisfaction of material needs by means of the economic process that connects and interrelates individuals—a conception that Hegel himself summarizes in § 192 of his Philosophy of Right in the sentence: "Needs and means are considered Real existence is a being for others, through whose needs and labor their satisfaction is mutually conditioned." The line of thought is as follows: As people strive to mutually satisfy their needs, they arrive in the course of development at certain economic processes or economic modes (Marx calls them modes of production, a term which for him includes the mode of exchange). From such an economic mode, however, certain relationships of reciprocity and dependence, interrelations (Marx later often uses the term relations of production for these), arise for all those directly or indirectly involved, and all individuals in such relationships form a society in the sociological sense. The same idea is expressed here as in Marx's well-known definition of the materialist conception of history (Preface to the "Critique of Political Economy"): "In the social production of their lives, people enter into certain necessary relationships, independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a particular stage of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these production relations forms the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which a legal and political superstructure arises. . . . 46 Accordingly, Marx defines "society" as the circle of people who are subject to the interrelations and interactions resulting from a particular economic system, whose members are therefore bound together by particular, economically determined material living conditions. Social life is therefore not, as Professor Rudolf Stammler believes in his work "Economy and Law According to the

Materialist Conception of History," a coexistence regulated by externally binding norms, but rather a coexistence in particular economic conditions. The economic system determines social life, just as the more precise designation of a society is usually determined according to the type of economic system, without the speakers always being clear about the context. It is generally customary and conceptually quite correct to speak of a capitalist society (the older social philosophers spoke of "bourgeois" or "civil" society), a feudal society, an agrarian-communist society, etc. 99 Marx himself, in the above essay (p. 423), describes bourgeois society as the world of needs, labor, and private interests, in which the individual lives merely as an egoistic "individual withdrawn into his private interest and private arbitrariness, separated from the community (that is, from the state)." The bond that holds the members of society together is only "natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic personality." Of course, since no social coexistence is possible without regulation, society also has its particular rules at every stage of development. However, these are not externally binding political laws set by the members of society themselves or given by any public authority, but rather social laws that assert themselves as norms of the social life process, since they are the conditions of its existence and constant renewal, such as the law of population, the law of value, the law of wages, the laws of common decency, etc. They are neither determined by any state authority, nor are the members of society always conscious of their content. They arise at certain stages of development from the social conditions of life as their lawful precipitate. Such social laws can indeed also become state laws if the state sanctions them and gives them state legislative power; but even then, their state-political content almost never completely coincides with their social content. State laws are fundamentally different from this. They are established, binding norms of behavior of state members towards one another, towards state institutions, or towards foreign states. Marx therefore describes them, by explaining that the "human rights" of the French Revolution are mostly neither mere social nor so-called natural rights, as political rights "which are only exercised in community with others" and whose actual content is "participation in the political community, in the state." - According to Marx, the state is therefore not a society at all, but a community, a polity – a conclusion which he himself does not draw, however, in contrast to the earlier communities based on kinship ties that preceded it in the series of developments, such as the family, clan association, tribe, etc. – a political community whose members are bound together by a political constitution (which need not be a written one), by a political legal regulation.

Civil society and the state are therefore not the same thing. However manifold the relationships between them may be, they exist side by side as different complexes, and neither their extent, nor their boundaries, nor their content coincide. Even if, for example, today's bourgeois or capitalist society extends over different states, the state is by no means a mere subdivision of society, since the members of a state can have material interrelations with one another that arise from entirely different economic systems. Thus, for example, the state extends For example, capitalist society prevails over all European civilized states, although these by no means live under the same unifying political and legal norms. On the other hand, however, the Swedish Lapps, for example, do not belong to capitalist society just because they belong to the capitalist Swedish state. p. 666 (686) 666 The German Social Democracy etc. This conceptual distinction between society and state underlies Marx's entire view of society, both his socio-economic explanations in "Capital" and his materialist theory of history, the definition of which he himself famously introduces with the words: "My investigation led to the conclusion that legal relations, like forms of government, are to be understood neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human spirit, but rather are rooted in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of the English and French of the 18th century, summarizes under the name "bourgeois society", but that the anatomy of bourgeois society is to be sought in political economy" (Preface to the "Critique of Political Economics"). Despite their importance for Marx's teachings, however, strangely enough, these distinctions and their consequences have not been understood at all by most interpreters of Marx, while (starting with Hegel) they have frequently found their way into bourgeois political and social theory. I am reminded of Lorenz Stein, Robert von Mohl, and especially Ferdinand Tönnies, whose book "Community and Society," although he treats his topic purely formally and deductively, displays entirely Marxist lines of thought in certain parts. Popular vulgar Marxism, as it is rampant in Germany, has not yet progressed that far, however. Just as Kautsky, as the main representative of this Marxist variety, has not yet grasped Marx's concept of the mode of production, he also (primarily in his work "Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History") confuses the concepts of society, community, state, and social and political law like cabbage and turnips. According to the old stereotype, he defines any association as society: capitalist society, animal or human hordes, family communities and sexual associations, as well as the state. Just as little distinction is made between social and communal life. 4. The State Dictatorship of the Proletariat. However, Marx not only adopts Hegel's

concept of the state, but also, in essence, Hegel's theory of the purpose of the state. Hegel distinguishes between the "unfinished" and the "completed" state. Today's states are "incomplete" because they have not yet achieved the true purpose of the state, which consists in uniting individual interests within the state community to serve the common good while preserving their particularity. This purpose is only possible through the implementation of legal institutions that unite freedom and necessity. Accordingly, Hegel defines the complete state as the "moral whole," as the realization of freedom. This distinction between the incomplete and completed state, as well as the assumption of a further development of contemporary states toward a certain higher state purpose, is accepted by Marx; however, for him, the "realization of freedom" consists in the complete democratization of the state, the abolition of all class distinctions. Marx counters this with Bruno Bauer in the above-mentioned essay (Collected Works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Vol. I, p. 410 ff.): "Yes, not the so-called Christian state, which professes Christianity as its foundation, as state religion, and therefore behaves exclusively toward other religions, is the completed Christian state, but rather the atheistic state, the state that relegates religion to the other elements of civil society... "The so-called Christian state needs the Christian religion to complete itself as a state. The democratic state, the real state, does not need religion for its political completion." Rather, it can abstract from religion because in it the human basis of religion is expressed in a secular way. . . . This goal of complete democratization, however, can only be achieved, since the legal relations of the state (the state order) p. 668 (688) 668 German Social Democracy etc. are rooted in the material social conditions of life (in the social order), if the working class within the capitalist system attains such social significance that its claims and rights, as Marx expresses it in his "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," become the rights and claims of society itself. The prerequisite for the development of the unfinished state into the completed one is therefore a corresponding prior revolutionization of social relations. The Communist Manifesto's conception of the working class The idea that the state could first establish a state dictatorship and then, through the application of state power—that is, by transforming the state system—simply establish a socialist social order was still foreign to Marx in 1844. Only in the following years does this view seem to have gradually taken shape in his mind. The impetus for this came from his acquaintance with the English political theory of the late 18th century mentioned in the previous article, which Marx seems to have encountered not directly, but indirectly via the revolutionary French social theories of the 1830s and 1840s, which were intertwined with various

traditions of the great French Revolution. He had already previously combined his conception of the state, borrowed from Hegel, with his class theory, which saw classes not, as earlier theorists had done, as a mere wealth, income, or occupational stratification, but as a social stratification determined by the production relations of capitalist society, and thus recognized the state as a political community dominated by class antagonisms and class interests. The doctrine that the state was born out of class antagonisms as a means of suppressing the lower classes, and that it was therefore merely a political institution of rule which, since it hindered the free development of society, had to be abolished, therefore met Marx's view halfway. p. 669 (689) The German Social Democracy etc. 669 This view was accompanied by the view, almost universally held among revolutionary theorists and politicians at the time, that the great French Revolution had only accomplished partial results; it had stopped halfway. It had barely touched the bourgeois social order. Therefore, a new, greater revolution had to follow, an even more energetic political dictatorship of the lower classes, such as the Time of Terror had once seen, so that the transformation of social living conditions could finally be carried out. How these views initially influenced Marx and constrained his earlier Hegelian outlook is difficult to determine. In "The Poverty of Philosophy," traces of his transformation are already evident; However, it is only clearly expressed in the Communist Manifesto, where, following these French theories, it states: "The immediate aim of the communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: the formation of the proletariat into a class, the overthrow of bourgeois rule, and the conquest of political power by the proletariat." The proletariat must then use this political rule to overthrow the capitalist social order by means of the conquered state power: "The proletariat will use its political rule to gradually wrest all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase the mass of the productive forces as much as possible. This can, of course, initially only be achieved by means of despotic interventions in property rights and in bourgeois production relations, i.e., by measures that appear economically inadequate and untenable, but which in the course of the movement, they exceed themselves and are inevitable as a means of revolutionizing the entire mode of production. Two quite different views are mixed together here without being logically connected. First, the Hegel-Marx view that the state order is rooted in social conditions, i.e., in the social order, and that accordingly a fundamental change in the state order presupposes a prior change in social conditions; and second, the view handed down from the great French

Revolution that the well-being and woe of society depends on state institutions and that through dictatorial changes to these institutions the so-called "state of society," i.e., the totality of social conditions of life, can be changed at will. The latter view assumes that the social order is dependent on the state order; the other, that the state order depends on the social order. Certainly a contradiction in itself, but one that is not found in this complete opposition in Marx's work, but is bridged by another, third view. While the state's legal regulation is rooted in social relations, there is nevertheless a certain repercussion of the state on society insofar as the state incorporates certain social relations into a state legal system, so that it can, in a sense, be described as a legal organization of social relations. Therefore, by adhering to outdated legal regulations, the state can either hinder or promote social development within its sphere. If, therefore, social development has progressed so far that it is pushing towards new social forms of life, has already produced these in embryonic form, so to speak, but the free development of these embryos is inhibited by the legal and state organization, then a change in the state order can simultaneously bring about a revolution in the social order. As is well known, however, in the years 1848/49 Marx considered economic development to have already progressed so far that the social preconditions for the emergence of a socialist, classless society seemed to him to be in place. The only thing standing in the way was the outdated legal order of the state. A view that history since then has revealed as a great illusion. The above quotation from the Communist Manifesto is rooted in this overestimation of the economic development at that time. 671 (691) Scharnhorst on the War. 671. However, this does not prevent certain Marx interpreters, in their ignorance of Marx's conception of the state, from repeatedly referring to these and similar passages and, after some wriggling and stretching, from deducing from them the necessity of the negation of the state, as characterized at the beginning of the previous article. Even the fact that, as will be demonstrated in the next article, Marx himself later denied the relevant part of the Communist Manifesto has not changed this procedure. JULIAN: VERY Scharnhorst on the War. VERY At the right time, Georg Müller's publishing house in Munich published Scharnhorst's private letters. It is incredibly fascinating to hear the statements of the great Prussian army organizer and brilliant Chief of the General Staff, which he wrote not officially but confidentially about the war, today, when the greatest battle ever seen in human history is raging. These letters, which Scharnhorst mostly addressed to his wife, are far from beautifully written; they are anything but perfectly formed. But they have one advantage over many others: they are honest, fundamentally sincere,

and offer us a glimpse into the soul of a pure and just man, who was himself not far removed from human misfortune, for he must have felt it harshly in himself, and who therefore retained a heartfelt compassion for all suffering, even the suffering that war brings in its wake. It is quite wrong to assume that the great general must take pleasure in the exercise of his profession. And I doubt whether even Napoleon rode with pleasure across battlefields on which countless corpses lay and from which the cries of pain of the wounded echoed to his ears. One can perhaps read such things in patriotic books of a now bygone era, or see them in official photographs showing the victor, marshal's baton in hand, continuing on a fiery ROB over a corpse while his troops cheer him enthusiastically. Reality today offers quite different pictures of battles p. 672 (692) 672 Scharnhorst on the War. and it was probably not much different in the past either. Such descriptions in words and pictures were part of the publicity for war and glory that was still considered necessary at the time. In 1799, General Jourdan, the French commander of the Army of the Rhine, said to his adjutant and chief surgeon Percy when signing the order for the vanguard and division commanders for the Battle of Stockach: "My heart beats every time I sign such a document. How many unfortunates do I thereby pronounce their death sentence! No court sentences to death as often as I do." These sentiments do Jourdan credit, and we find very similar sentiments, only to an even greater extent, in Scharnhorst's letter. For example, we read in one letter: "I say nothing of the cruelties we commit. Man is, after all, a cruel animal. Should I ever find peace again, I want to shed some light on this through examples, through cruel examples. I am collecting a great deal of material and will not let any effort be wasted." And the very next day, another letter reads: "On the first day, everyone fled the villages. We found deserted houses; only a few returned, especially since several villages were set on fire by marauders and people massacred in the days following the incident. The English mostly gave no quarter to the prisoners. The Austrian hussars don't always do that either. The man without education (Scharnhorst speaks of education of the heart) is a true beast, a cruel animal. In general, I found that only well-educated people seek to mitigate the horrors of war, and that uneducated officers were just as bestial as the privates." Three weeks later, he was heard saying: "God, what a life this is! Everything in the military is devastation! How glad I will be one day when I am with you again... Prince Ernst (Duke of Cumberland) is very angry with the French; he has already reprimanded them several times for bringing in prisoners: they should massacre them. Above all, it is terrible to see the massacred and killed people around me; the impression could lead me to horrible things." In another letter,

Scharnhorst is even more explicit. There we find the cry of pain: "Oh, believe me, if I knew some other way to make our fortune, and if my name were never to be mentioned again in the world, I would leave this hour p. 673 (693) Scharnhorst on the War. 673. I am not the only one who thinks this way; almost everyone who still has some feeling thinks this way. It is simply too abhorrent to be a soldier." The saddest confession, however, is contained in the following passage of the letter: "How often tears come to my eyes when I see a woman with a child... A couple of times, however, I have seen children shot dead in the villages, which completely overwhelmed me. . . Never a word about any of these things. The war is horrible." And finally, two years later, a cry of pain escaped his heart: "In summer, war is merely a devastation of the human race, but in winter, this is accompanied by immeasurable misery." I have deliberately cited only a few of Scharnhorst's many sayings about the cruel nature of war; they could be greatly increased. The great general had a sensitive heart and a keen eye for conditions and events. But he was also animated by a sense of duty and the insight that one people should not live under the rule of another. And this explains why the same man, who was so opposed to the cruelties of war, nevertheless remained true to his calling. He was an opponent of war, but he hoped to conquer war by itself and believed that the freer, coming age would no longer require this last means to allow nations to live side by side in equal community. He was mistaken, and it is questionable whether even the tremendous, bloody lesson we receive today will bring humanity to the insight that inspired one of the greatest battle thinkers more than a hundred years ago. Scharnhorst's letters are very interesting in another respect as well. Hardly a letter goes by in which this great, capable man, certainly recognized by his superiors, does not complain again and again about how much he is being neglected, how much false merit is spreading, how much others are taking credit for his laurels, and how much name and connections are compensating for the lack of military talent. He has to endure a true martyrdom, from which he suffers greatly. And when he once exclaims resignedly: "That's just the way things are in the world," he was certainly right, and not just for his time. And it no longer bothers him when, in one of his next letters, he says of a high superior, "although he had done nothing for himself, he had nevertheless known how to appropriate what others had done." But such resignation did not always last. And when he saw the Duke of York commanding, he wrote: "A prince cannot command without the help of some skilled man to direct the machinery." He later developed this theme several times, and he described in a very vivid way not only the mistakes of the princely commanders, but also of the other generals who undeservedly

occupied their high posts. He, the commoner, had a very hard time rising to the top; and if the harsh hardship of the country hadn't led him to it, he would probably have remained forever in the lowlands of life. I cannot conclude this brief sketch of the Scharnhorst letters without making room for a strange observation about Scharnhorst. He once wrote to his wife, asking her to send him a gray chenille (coat), for in his blue chenille he served as a rendezvous point for the enemy hunters. Scharnhorst made this observation in 1794, and yet neither he nor any other military leader ever thought to change the uniforms, which shone in all their colors, and introduce a modest gray instead. Almost 100 years had to pass before Bebel took up the idea that Scharnhorst had expressed at that time. And it wasn't until another quarter of a century later that the idea was put into practice. EDGAR STEIGER: Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky.' LS in 1882 with Wilhelm Friedrich in Leipzig the Henckell- Germany, which at that time was trying to merge poetry and the social question, saw the Russian poet jubilantly on his military shield. The Russian student who murdered the disgusting peddler soon became the hero of the day. This nihilist with the master morality reflected the academic youth who were enthusiastic about Friedrich Nietzsche. At the same time, the criminal from 1 Dostoyevsky's complete works have been published in a masterful German translation in 22 volumes with introductions by Möller von dem Bruch by R. Pieper and Co. in Munich. p. 675 (695) Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky. 675 Conviction, which here appeared as a victim of the spirit of the times, these young people, all toying with similar ideas, were inwardly related to a torn, problematic nature that collapsed under the burden it had imposed on itself, an unfortunate re-evaluator of all values, who suffered miserable shipwreck at the first test, and at the same time a profound brooder who continually turned over in his brain the most profound enigma ever posed to man, the question of good and evil and the origin of morality. Finally, here the long-sought connection between life and poetry was embodied in the poet himself, in that the author of this nihilist tale had himself languished for years as a convict in Siberia. Thus, a true martyr to his own idea! Strange! Two years earlier, the poet had delivered this very "Raskolnikov," of whom young Germans at that time knew nothing, at a Pushkin celebration in Moscow, amid endless cheers. Turgenev, the "Westerner," who expected Russia's salvation from joining European culture, and the dogged Pan-Slavist Aksakov, who hated everything that came from the West like poison, both paid homage to the orator as the spokesman for the entire Russian nation. Indeed, when Aksakov died the following year, his funeral became, in a sense, a universal Russian fraternization, and grand dukes, students, and beggars wept at his coffin. How does all this fit

together? As good and as bad as Russia fits together. "In my opinion, Russia is just a play of nature and nothing more," it says somewhere in "The Demons." But Dostoyevsky is Russia become the word, the Russian national soul, embodied in its unbroken unity with all its contradictions. His entire poetry is nothing but the magnificent epic of Russia, endless like its steppes, dreamy like its mist-shrouded plains: religion, mythology, and the most gruesome reality all at once. In it, the theologian can eavesdrop on the secret growth and development of the gods and divine secrets; in it, the philosopher is shown the fine gearwork of modern psychology; in it, the historian of the caliber 44/3 p. 676 (696) 676 Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky. Lamprechts has a finished piece of contemporary history (note: history understood as applied psychology). One thing must not be forgotten: Spiritual Russia also exists! has caught up with and surpassed the development of three millennia in barely fifty years. The romantic Pushkin, in whom the Middle Ages appear with the mask of Byron, is immediately followed by the stark realist Gogol, who lets out his heartbreaking laughter at the sight of the decay in the state; and after him, in succession, the chivalrous Turgenev with the westward-facing face of the 18th-century Enlightenment thinker, and the two prophetic figures Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, on whose foreheads the two great enigmas of our day, the social and the religious questions, are seared. But all these great figures, not to mention the many small ones, appeared almost simultaneously from the first to the last third of the last century, anticipating in a few years the developments of decades and centuries. As if the whip swung behind them were driving them forward into the future. It is no coincidence that almost all of them had a taste of Siberia for their convictions. For example, Turgenev in 1852 for his enthusiasm for Gogol, and Dostoyevsky three years earlier, when the death sentence imposed on the 27-year-old writer for socialist activities was commuted "as a mercy" to ten years' penal servitude. He languished in Siberia for five years, first as a convict, then as a private in the army, until a pardon granted upon the accession of Alexander II in 1856 allowed him to return to Petersburg. But strangely enough! He returned not as a revolutionary , but as a penitent, as someone who said: I was right, not in the sense of those who pronounced the punishment, but in the sense of that unknown One who guides all human destinies for the good. Here, Dostoyevsky shares a common understanding with his great compatriot, Tolstoy. Both could be called the last Christians, if one understands by a Christian someone for whom Christianity as the salvation of humanity has become the most personal experience. "Humble yourself, proud man!" "Work, lazy man!" Dostoyevsky calls out to the festive assembly at the

Pushkin celebration. In doing so, however, he p. 677 (697) Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky. 677 - in his entire life and poetry, he rejects any association with the inwardly rotten Russian state, for which he has only the most boundless contempt. Indeed, his entire love—as all his works prove—belongs precisely to those who fight against this rotten state, because they are flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood. Even when they err and go astray and become criminals and murderers, they appear to him only as lost children or sick people, with whom every human being must pity. Certainly, he hates the Enlightenment thinkers of the 1940s, who, in his opinion, alienated Russia from itself and deprived it of the best, what it had, of its earthy scent and its Christianity. In the vain chatterer Stephen Trophomovich Verkhovensky, he created an imperishable monument of biting irony to these people. But he himself, if we stick with his novel "The Demons," is the student Shatoff, who is killed by the Nihilists as a traitor because he loves his Russia more than they, whom he considers fools. But this Russia is, as already said, not the Russian state, nor the Russian Church, but the Russian people and the mother earth that gave birth to this people. Here is holy land, even in the poetry of this fervent admirer of Mother Russia. Here is the mysticism, which at the same time forms the best part of his art. Here religion and fatherland touch and merge so that one can no longer distinguish them. Thus, all the revolutionaries he portrays become nothing but seekers of God. They are therefore worthy of veneration to him in all their perversity, and if all his poetry is a struggle against nihilism, then his entire love belongs to the nihilists themselves. No one has portrayed them in all their variations so truly and vividly; no one has immersed himself so lovingly in their entire thought and feeling as Dostoyevsky. Not only in "Demons," which compresses the entire revolutionary movement of the 1960s in Russia into a colorful family portrait, but above all in "Raskolnikov," this archetype of the nihilistic student, who is at once a champion of a new morality and, to quote Nietzsche, a failed revaluator of all values. p. 678 (698) 678 Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky. "Raskolnikov" was written in 1866, five years before Nietzsche's first work, "The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music." "Zarathustra," "Beyond Good and Evil," and "The Antichrist" were not published until twenty years later. One must consider all this to understand Dostoyevsky's full significance for our time. "God has tormented me my entire life," says the student Shatoff. Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche could say the same thing about themselves. Indeed, however far apart the Zarathustra poet, with his battle cry "God is dead," and Dostoyevsky, the eternal seeker of God, may seem, they both have one thing in common: they are both engrossed in the religious problem of our time. And what

Dostoyevsky says about the various peoples and the God they created, Nietzsche repeats almost word for word in "The Antichrist," except that here an unbelieving European speaks about the history of the individual peoples lying behind him, while there a believing Russian speaks of his Russian God. I mention this only because here the solitary greatness of the Russian is revealed in its enigmatic, predictive nature. Or must Raskolnikov not merely think through the entire problem of the "superman" in all its terribleness in the anxious weeks before and after the murder of the peddler, but actually experience it as a martyr of thought? It was not for nothing that Wilhelm Wundt declared "Raskolnikov," which, incidentally, Nietzsche, by his own admission, knew very well, to be the best textbook on psychology. Here, the workings of the soul are truly laid bare, so that one can observe the interlocking of its finest teeth and levers, so to speak, from second to second. Thus, we see: This mystic, who, like a prehistoric bard, composes his mythology for the Russian people, simultaneously masters the scientific mechanism of modern psychology like no other. Darwinism and mysticism peacefully join hands here. The dissecting intellect of the hated "Westerners" and the unfathomable feeling of the Slav, in whose womb all thought still slumbers as an image, symbol, religious obsession, are an unbroken unity in Dostoyevsky. Just as his Christianity, which has nothing to do with any of the existing churches, is not denial and condemnation, but rather an all-understanding and all-forgiveness. This is all the more so because he himself experienced all these inner struggles, indignations and defeats, triumphs and self-tortures, which he presents to us in his various nihilist incarnations. Therefore, his works are not only poems of eternal content, but also contemporary documents of lasting significance. Anyone who wants to understand contemporary Russia must Dostoyevsky. "The worse a person's life is, and the more oppressed a people, the more stubbornly they think of the reward they expect in the afterlife." Here we have a clue that leads us to an understanding of Russian mysticism. In Florence, where Dostoyevsky stayed on his first trip abroad in 1862, he was characteristically bored in the Uffizi because art left him cold and interested only in living people. Instead, he read Victor Hugo's novel "Les Miserables" with a friend. He transferred the title from the French poem to his novel "The Humiliated and Insulted," published shortly afterwards. But only the title. Reading the French Romantic sufficiently demonstrates how Dostoyevsky, with his naturalism, stands entirely on his own two feet and has no external role model other than Gogol. A few dates may further demonstrate this. When he wrote his first novel, "Poor People," in 1845, Balzac hadn't even completed his "Comédia humaine" in France. Flaubert's "Madame Bovary" didn't appear until 1857,

the Goncourt brothers' "Germinie Lacerteux" only in 1864, and Zola's "Thérèse Raquin" only in 1867. Only Dickens, who was so very different, had made the timid beginnings of social poetry in England eight years earlier with "Oliver Twist" and "Nicholas Nickelby." But when the masterpiece of the modern psychological novel, "Raskolnikov," was published, just amid the thunder of the cannons at Königgrätz, Zola hadn't even conceived the plan for his "Rougon-Maquart." And under what torment did this masterpiece come into being! The poet wrote it on a trip abroad, sick, lonely, and beset by creditors. But wasn't illness perhaps the very mother of genius here? One must know, - - p. 680 (700) 680 Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky. that Dostoyevsky suffered from epilepsy throughout his life. Before the attacks, he had moments of ecstasy that resembled the divine visions of the ancient mystics. After the attacks, he felt morally humiliated, almost to the point of criminal mania. Thus, he was able to experience everything he wrote about gruesome reality in an inner, dreamlike way. Added to this was the restlessness and haste of the journalist, who wrote to commission for newspapers, just like Dickens. And finally, the constant financial hardship, against which the impractical poet, who could occasionally even be found playing roulette, was defenseless. The night was dedicated to work. During the day, visits were made, tea was drunk, and endless conversations were held. This must be kept in mind when reading his novels. Here, too, they are a reflection of reality. The endless conversations, which become almost epidemic in his later works, correspond to the Slavic loquacity that, at every opportunity, causes people to turn their inner selves inside out and out. Here we have that inwardness that never comes to action, that merely discharges itself in sudden, ill-considered, lightning-fast acts of violence, but never coalesces into the formation of a state—the living reflection of nihilism. But how artistically Dostoyevsky treats this Slavic conversation! Only in this way is it possible for him to reveal to us the deepest mysteries of God and morality in the guise of the most humble everyday life, or to conjure up female figures like Sonya in "Raskolnikov" and Maria Timofewnja, who have no equal except Goethe's "Gretchen" and "Klarchen." Here we sense a breath of the spirit of him who once sat at table with sinners and prostitutes; here the Savior's eye shines again, which discovers the beautiful teeth on a dead dog. Noble people disdain to astonish with appearances; only the immature cannot live without appearances. * People who too quickly judge another: "Ha, I know him," prove that they usually misjudge him; an action that seems bad in the eyes of one-sided and superficial observers can arise from the purest impulses and be quite pure. H. Sonntag. p. 681 (701) DIE GLOCKE 45th Issue 3 February 1917 2nd Year Reprint of all articles permitted with

detailed source references Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: The Cause of Peace. Mr. Wilson's second note on peace has met with the most varied reception. Not only in individual countries or among the individual parties in each country, but even within the parties themselves, the opinion was completely opposite. To draw on the Social Democratic press, the "Hamburger Echo" in an excellent article treated the "fine words of Mr. Wilson" with remarkable coolness, while the "Dresdener Volkszeitung" took a lead from a well-known party correspondence in which the President and his "magnificent program" were showered with the "loudest applause," since Mr. Wilson's program was our own Social Democratic program! The "Vorwärts" tripped somewhat indecisively back and forth between these two views, declaring that for the Central Powers, Wilson's principles were "debatable." Now, the American President's manifesto is certainly one of the strangest documents that modern times have produced, and perhaps its strangeness lies precisely in the fact that it was not actually produced by modern times, but stands in stark disproportion to them. It emits archaic sounds, tones from the age of nationalism and the Enlightenment, which now lie one hundred and fifty years behind modern times, and one almost comes to the 45/1 p. 682 (702) 682 The Cause of Peace. The assumption that Mr. Wilson must still wear a pigtail like Lessing and lace jackets like Nikolai. In his short essay, published in the fall of 1914: In "Culture and War," the late Karl Lamprecht once stated: "In America, we have the remarkable case of being able to closely follow the formation of a nation in our present time, and the President of the United States is in the very remarkable, historically extremely rare position of being able to pursue a policy that first leads to the formation of the nation, a position that no European statesman can ever have, since he stands before completed formations." We recall that Wilson, in his speech to the Senate, also referred to the unique position he occupied as President of the Union in this war. Of course, he meant this in a different, directly opposite sense to that of the German historian. For he was inclined to derive American claims to strong co-rule in the world from its unique position, whereas Lamprecht, in a direct continuation of our quotation, continues: "But you can already see from this how the Americans, despite all the claims they might otherwise have to strong co-rule in the world, fail here, on this crucial point." Indeed, the Americans are still a young, developing people, whose social psychology may still lag behind that of Europe in terms of developmental history by a century and a half, and perhaps they are still stuck in the inherently highly interesting intellectual period of the Enlightenment, to which we in Germany, for example, owe such a profound text as Lessing's One Hundred Paragraphs on the Education of the Human Race, which even today no one would read

without inner emotion. There really does seem to be a strong similarity between Lessing's edifice of paragraphs and Wilson's ideological construct. He, too, wants to devote himself to the education of humanity, and one would be inclined to make the most historically interesting observations about the relationship between today's American nationality and that of Germany four or five generations ago, if it did not occur to one that this speech by Wilson, strangely composed of sentimentality and doctrinal nationalism, is about politics and human destiny in the 20th century. In fact, the significance of this speech lies solely in the fact that its speaker is the leader of the only great power in the world not yet swept into the maelstrom of war. For this reason, one would do well to forgo all cultural-historical parallels and stick solely to the points of view expressed in it. There has been debate about whether these points of view correspond more to the interests of the Central Powers or the Entente. While the English press is rather irritated with Mr. Wilson, the French press fawns over him with remarkable insistentness, seeking to prove that Wilson is a declared friend of the Entente. We do not wish to interfere in this dispute. The fact is, in any case, that Wilson's note expresses a desire for peace, which we consider genuine, and we would believe that anyone who doubts the sincerity of this call for peace is making a grave error. There is no question that, in his actions so far, the American president has proven himself to be a standard-bearer of English interests. How far his heart coincided with the influence of the steel and iron magnates and high finance can remain entirely undiscussed. If he is now pursuing propaganda for peace, and even for a peace without victory, which he must admit is arousing anything but friendly feelings in England, the reasons for this change of system must be very strong and effective. In fact, the length of the war has brought about a shift in interests in America that makes such a change of system seem understandable. The price increases that are ravaging the entire world as a result of the war have become particularly severe in America due to the strong influx of gold that followed the war deliveries. In Chicago, grain cost 45/1 p. 684 (704) 684 The Cause of Peace. 80 cents per bushel before the war; at the end of 1914 it rose to 127 cents, in 1915 to 170 cents, and in 1916 even to 190 cents. Similar, though not as severe, price differences were evident for corn, lard, and cotton. This significantly increased the cost of living for the working masses, especially since the majority of businesses that were not involved in the munitions or other war industries suffered greatly. Even more important was that in America, quiet doubts began to emerge about the swift and great victory of the Entente and thus about its financial strength. A weakening of the value of French and English government bonds, for example, would hit

America hard, since a vast amount of these bonds are in American hands. Therefore, the Union's supreme banking authority recently warned against further foreign loans and short-term treasury bills, which came as a bolt from the blue in London. Ultimately, however, for its future imperialist conflicts in East Asia, the Union absolutely needs a naval, or at least a naval power, England. A highly instructive work on this question was published in New York six months ago: Our Eastern Question (Our Eastern Question), to which the "Frankf. Newspaper" in which the author, Millard, explains how serious the dangers are that threaten America from the Yellow East. The core of the book is the idea that an economic penetration of the 400 million Chinese by Japan would set in motion this enormous mass of people, who until now have lived densely packed in their districts, which would naturally pour out as a stream of emigrants to where they encounter the least resistance and where the relatively best living conditions beckon: to the Pacific coasts of America. The emergence of Japan as the unrest in the clock of East Asia thus threatens America's interests most vividly, and in Japan they are already cold-bloodedly preparing for the coming conflict. Enormous naval armaments, which far exceed the extent of the officially authorized p. 685 (705) The Cause of Peace. 685 The Construction projects beyond the existing shipbuilding projects are underway. The author of the aforementioned book is clear that America would only enter into such a military conflict with extremely unfavorable chances of winning, which is why he is already seeking allies, whom he sees primarily in England. That he also includes Germany among them is mentioned only as a curiosity. From this global political constellation emerging for America in East Asia, the correctness of a strong England for the interests of the Union is clear. Therefore, the Republic is now pressing for peace. It does not want to let England be ruined as a useful instrument of war for its coming conflict with Japan by the World War. The strange entanglements to which the war leads are evident from Millard's interesting remark that the Americans, who, by granting credit to England and France, enable Russia to pay for the war material it acquires from Japan, are indirectly enabling Japan's armaments against America. This is entirely accurate, and it is not impossible that Wilson's call: Peace without victory! is supposed to represent a way out of this circular argument. However, it would ultimately hurt Russia rather than Japan. Yet, as far as one can judge, Russian conditions are already hopelessly deteriorating. The restless turnover of ministers, the renewed adjournment of the Duma, the looming famine, the mood in the parties, the worried, not to say fearful, attitude of the French and English press about Russia's future all point to the approach of the oft-heralded Russian Revolution. It is possible that it will come. But if it really did

happen, its effect on the war would possibly be quite different than in 1905. Back then, the Russian people wanted nothing at all about the East Asian War; today, the political spokesmen of the Russian bourgeoisie passionately desire victory; they are the real warmongers. A truly victorious Russian Revolution could therefore be brought about by the overthrow of p. 686 (706) 686 The Cause of Peace. of Tsarism and the issuance of democratic slogans would release popular forces that would give the war the character of a Russian liberation struggle. However, this perspective is not very likely. The Germany of 1914 and 1917 is not like the Germany of 1792, which marched against revolutionary France to force it to maintain the old regime. Furthermore, one should not underestimate the strength of the reactionary forces and the state bureaucracy in Russia. In 1905, the revolution achieved its success only by shutting down the railways. A failure of the railway service in the current war, however, would primarily have a devastating impact on the Russian front. Thus, the situation in Russia is still unclear, and it is precisely here that the next few weeks may bring us surprises. Meanwhile, England has already brought a surprise of its own kind. Admittedly, the attitude of the English Workers' Congress could ultimately only surprise those who still judged the psychology of the English working class according to the usual party template. The resolutions passed there are the most severe blow yet dealt to the cause of peace. The motion that an international socialist congress should be held concurrently with the future peace conference was rejected by one and a half million votes to only 700,000. A resolution calling for immediate peace proposals was rejected by 1.7 million votes to 300,000. Only the holding of a workers' conference of the Entente states was approved. Strangely, turnout in the vote was very weak. One million voted in favor, half a million against. It is clear that these votes must greatly strengthen Lloyd George's cabinet. It can now claim that the overwhelming majority of the English people—for this is expressed in these votes. for the most determined continuation of the war. The Welsh lawyer's Boxer Speech has now become England's national program. This is the echo of the German call for peace and Wilson's slogan: Peace without defeat! And it is English workers who are leading the fight against peace. Long live the International! AUGUST WINNIG: In recent months, German and Italian workers' papers have dealt quite extensively with the position of foreign workers in Germany, with Italian workers being the subject of various considerations. The occasion for this was a discussion in the newspaper of the German Construction Workers' Association. Here, several South German shop stewards took the floor to demand less considerate treatment of the immigrant workers. These views, however, did not go unchallenged; several

voices that spoke about the future While some were very skeptical about international cooperation, others also voiced their anticipation of an upswing in international activity after the war. Against the view that the Italian workers had lost the sympathy of the German workers, another arose that there was nothing to justify a less comradely relationship with the Italian workers in the future. All of these statements came uninvited and uninfluenced from the construction workers' midst. It must be noted, however, that the individual participants in the discussion expressed themselves more unfriendly and critically about the Italian workers the more and the closer they came into contact with them. This discussion was misinterpreted both in the Italian workers' press and in some minority German party papers; it was precisely the most critical that was ignored. p. 688 (708) 688 The Foreign Workers. ... In this case, too, one must delve into the details of the matter if one wants to find one's bearings. A century ago, foreign workers were a rarity in Germany. In the 1950s and 1960s, designers and machine operators often came from England to western Germany, but only sporadically and temporarily. In general, the country's existing workforce met the needs of the German economy. Somewhat later, agriculture began to import Eastern European workers in larger numbers. This was the time when sugar beet cultivation was gaining ground, while at the same time, the industrialization of the cities exerted its attraction on the rural population, creating a need for foreign workers. This phenomenon, however, was limited in space and time and could not prevent Germany from sending a far greater number of workers to foreign countries than it received from them. Population growth proceeded far faster than the increase in commercial and industrial production. In the 20 years from 1851 to 1870 alone, German emigration amounted to 3.06 million people, and even p. 689 (709) The foreign workers. From 1889 until the 1880s, Germany sent more than 100,000 of its inhabitants across its borders every year. As late as 1892, German emigration amounted to 116,000 people, but then declined sharply. From this same time on, Germany became a country of immigration. In general, we can see the causes of this shift in the upswing of German industry. If one considers the details, many things emerge that give the matter new dimensions. As is well known, we have also had a not inconsiderable immigration of foreign workers in these years, when German workers themselves are suffering from a noticeable lack of work. Thus, it appears that it is not an actual need of German economic life that is drawing foreign workers into the country; rather, powerful special interests of entrepreneurs play a certain role. A characteristic of this immigration is that more than a third of it is absorbed by agriculture, and that the foreigners

streaming into German industry primarily meet the need for unskilled workers. According to the census of June 12, 1907, 799,863 foreigners, or about 4 percent, were recorded out of a total of 19.5 million employed people. Of the foreigners, 279,940 (35 percent) worked in agriculture, etc.; 440,800 (55 percent) in industry, including mining and construction; 45,205 (5.7 percent) in trade and transport; and the remainder was domestic services and other wage labor. With very few exceptions, foreigners in agriculture are to be regarded as unskilled workers. But even in industry and commerce, unskilled immigrants predominate in most occupational groups. Overall, statistics count around 251,000 of the 440,800 foreigners in industry and commerce as unskilled workers, or 58 percent. Foreigners in agriculture and unskilled foreign workers in industry and commerce alone account for two-thirds of all foreigners working in Germany. However, a considerable portion of foreigners employed in trade, transport, and domestic services must also be considered equal, so that about three-quarters of all foreign workers must be counted as unskilled workers. What does this fact show us? It seems to prove that the German economy is developing a real need for unskilled labor that cannot be met within the country itself. This is true to a certain extent. The more the intelligence of a workforce increases, the more suited this workforce is to quality work; it will devote itself to this to the best of its ability, as long as the production framework has room for it. Nevertheless, this need not necessarily lead to a shortage of workers in unskilled professions; for since an excessive rush into areas of quality work will soon lead to overcrowding in these, a regulator is already provided. However, it does not offer absolute security for maintaining equilibrium, as has been demonstrated in Germany. There, such a high tension soon arose between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers that the workforce increasingly turned away from agricultural work and the rough tasks of unskilled labor and turned to higher-quality jobs. Once a worker had transitioned to industry, it was extremely difficult for him to decide to return to agricultural work, even in times of unemployment. Likewise, skilled workers would rather accept prolonged periods of unemployment than agree to work as unskilled workers again. The gap in wages was too great for such an equalization between the production areas to have been easily possible. How this could have happened is obvious to anyone familiar with the development of trade unions. The trade union movement in Germany was initially a movement of skilled workers: printers, tobacco workers, joiners, carpenters, bricklayers, metal workers, and plumbers were the first professions in which unions gained prominence and influence. Here, wages rose, and this was where the masses of the proletarian youth turned.

Agricultural workers, p. 691 (711) The foreign workers. 691 Earth and brickworkers lagged far behind with their wages, and these wages, which, however, were offset by enormous physical exertion, soon caused a permanent and, with few interruptions, increasing shortage of unskilled workers. In addition, the demand for labor was subject to strong fluctuations; some of the professions that relied on unskilled workers had so-called campaigns after which the workers had to be laid off, which also made it difficult to recruit local workers. In itself, this growing need for foreign workers was a testament to the generally favorable development of social conditions in Germany for workers. The German worker had gradually achieved a way of life that made him shy away from working under conditions common in the construction of dams, waterways, railways, tunnels, etc., where they were expected to be content with very meager accommodations despite the hardest and most strenuous work. No matter how loudly one promoted such work, as long as a manual worker still hoped to find some other way out, he avoided these places. Only crass ignorance or aversion can accuse German workers of a tendency towards complacency and laziness because of this phenomenon. What we have here is rather the entirely natural consequence of social and cultural advancement. While the recruitment of foreign workers corresponded to a neutral economic need, it also became a means of combat for employers to avoid meeting the demands of German workers. In the construction industry, since the end of the 1890s, it became a popular practice for employers to lure foreigners to replace striking local workers. But even where the recruitment of foreign workers did not have this clearly visible and pronounced combative character, it often served to evade the concession of higher wages. And finally, p. 692 (712) 692 The Foreign Workers. One could say that the general effect of immigration of foreign workers was to put downward pressure on workers' wages, whether this effect was actually intended or not. This effect has never left organized workers indifferent, and wherever workers' organizations had the power to do so, they protected themselves against immigration to the best of their ability. The most radical, but also crudest, means of protection is the prohibition, or at least a restriction equivalent to or close to a prohibition, of foreign immigration. Should the German working class also declare itself in favor of such protective measures? Wherever German workers' organizations have expressed their views on this issue, they have spoken out against immigration bans. More or less decisively rejecting the purely utilitarian standpoint of the North American trade unions, they have, under the influence of the principle of international solidarity of the working class—a plant that thrives only

meagerly in Anglo-Saxon countries—held fast to free immigration, demanded liberal alien rights, and ardently strove to win foreign workers for their own organizations in order to reduce, as far as possible, the inherent danger of wage pressure. The objective justification of a standpoint is not determined by doctrines, but ultimately by success. If one examines the effectiveness of the German trade unions' immigration policy, the outcome of this policy is anything but favorable. However, the situation is not so simple that it can be explained in a few words. The foreign workers active in Germany formed a very mixed group, and their attitudes toward the German labor movement varied greatly. Immigration came primarily from four regions: 42 percent from the countries of the Danube Monarchy, 25 percent from western Russia, 15 percent from Italy, and 6 percent from Holland; the remainder was distributed among Switzerland, France, Scandinavia, and Great Britain. 76 percent of the workers coming from Russia went to farms; here, of course, conquests for organization were out of the question; for where the native workers themselves are unorganized, foreigners cannot be won over. Furthermore, the control regulations restricted the freedom of movement of foreign farm workers so much that they almost lost their essence as free workers. 20 percent of the Russian immigrants worked in industry and trade. They were mostly earthworkers. Only in the last years before the war did agitation among them begin, with some isolated success. Polish professional associations also gained support among the miners. The majority of Russian immigrants, however, were and remained indifferent and represented virtually the most primitive group of foreigners. Immigration from the countries of the Danube Monarchy was older and larger. Of these, 27 percent went into agriculture, 62 percent into industry and trade, and 6 percent were employed in trade and transport. Here, one encountered extraordinary diversity: alongside the intelligent and highly qualified industrial workers from Bohemia and Lower Austria, one encountered thousands of Galicians and people from Bukovina; alongside the mobile bricklayers from the Budapest region, one found the destitute fieldworkers from the Hungarian lowlands. This diversity also reflected the attitude toward the union agitation. The industrially active Czechs, German-Austrians, and Hungarians were soon organized in large numbers and formed the reliable core of many local organizations. It is clear that the common language and the familiarity with German culture already acquired at home facilitated adaptation to the German working world. The Italians occupied a clearly defined exceptional position among all immigrants. Although they constituted only 15 percent of all foreign workers identified in 1907, they nevertheless became of the greatest importance to the German labor movement. This was because they

were almost exclusively employed in industry and trade; only about 4 percent of all Italian immigrants were employed in other professions. They then particularly favored three occupational groups: the construction industry, where 46 percent of them worked; the mineral and stone industry, where 24 percent of Italian immigrants worked; and mining, which accounted for 18 percent of them. Moreover, 94 percent of Italian immigrants were men, while only 72 percent of the total immigration was male. Now, the Italian immigrants were no more and no less familiar with the idea of organization than the Czechs, German-Austrians, or Hungarians. But by concentrating on a few trades, their behavior took on particular significance for the German workers in those trades. Their lack of solidarity during wage struggles among German construction and stone workers became proverbial as quickly as it had become dangerous. As a result, propaganda focused particularly on them. In 1898, the General Commission founded an Italian newspaper, which was distributed most liberally among Italians. It was soon recognized that educating Italian immigrants to act in solidarity would be very beneficial if the trade union movement in their homeland grew stronger. They then devoted themselves to supporting the Italian organizations. Hundreds of meetings were held every winter in the emigration provinces. When the importance of Switzerland as a transit country for Italian immigrants was recognized, they also took care of the Swiss organizations. As far as they found useful organizers among the Italians themselves, they tried to put them permanently at the service of the organization. In fact, the German trade unions did as much propaganda as was possible. The success of this work after 15 years was that they had about p. 695 (715) The foreign workers. 695, one-twelfth of the Italians working in Germany had organized themselves. This complete failure naturally prompted a reconsideration of whether this method should be continued. One can, however, point to the well-known practices of the aliens' police in Germany, which, through threats and orders of deportation, deterred many Italians from joining the organization. But one only has to look at Switzerland, where such a practice was certainly unknown and the organizational situation of the Italians was even more deplorable, to recognize the unfoundedness of this frequently put forward excuse. We must consider it an established fact that the Italian worker, at least when working in Germany, is extremely difficult to persuade to integrate into the union system. Whether this results from the primitive individualism of the Italian worker or the cause lies in differences in language and customs, the effect remains the same: Italian immigration represents a serious obstacle to the German labor movement. - Nevertheless, the German trade unions will hardly be able to decide to follow the Anglo-Saxon example

and demand a ban on immigration. That would be a surrender of the principle of international freedom of movement, an achievement that is, after all, one of the great assets of modern life. On the other hand, one cannot admit that, even after the war, profit-hungry entrepreneurs should be allowed to lure needy and willing workers into the country in order to depress the living conditions of the native workers. Our policy therefore has no other option than a public-law organization of the entire employment agency, which relieves the entrepreneur of the right to hire workers and assumes and exercises it itself as a public right. Then any abuse of foreign rights to the detriment of the native workers would be impossible. 696 (716) 696 German East Africa. make. Foreign workers would only be hired if there was a lack of suitable local labor. This would be genuine protection of national labor, which would also correspond to the interests of the workers and the principles of socialism. GUSTAV NOSKE, M. d. R.: IN German East Africa. After a heroic struggle, waged with astonishing tenacity, the small Schutztruppe in German East Africa is still resisting the fact that the last German colony becomes complete prey to a vast enemy force. A massive Anglo-Boer force has been thrown into the German protectorate after the English forces suffered a severe defeat at Tanga at the beginning of the attack on the colony. But even the large Boer contingent, splendidly equipped for fighting in the tropics, has not yet succeeded in conquering the entire country in more than a year. However, the greater part of German East Africa is occupied, all railway lines are in enemy hands and the defending force has probably been completely cut off from supplies for a long time, so that there can be no doubt about the final outcome of the fighting. With German East Africa, the last and largest German colony, which with its 995,000 square kilometers is almost twice the size of Germany, will temporarily become the spoils of England. If the German Social Democrats are committed to ensuring that Germany emerges unscathed from the war, it must of course be understood that this not only means that the fatherland itself should remain undismembered, but that its overseas possessions should also be preserved. The saying that the German colonies are worthless sandy deserts or murderous feverish nests can long since be dismissed. Just like little Togo and the extensive Cameroon, German East Africa also went its own way thanks to tenacious German p. 697 (717) German East Africa. 697 work and its increasingly sensible economy and treatment of the natives, the country was heading for a certain economic prosperity, which gave rise to good hopes for the distant future. Now, a great deal of cultural work in this promising country, accomplished with unspeakable effort but interrupted by numerous setbacks, has been destroyed by the war. The beginnings of the colony of German East Africa

date back to 1884. At that time, Dr. Karl Peters, who had set out with a small expedition, concluded treaties with numerous chiefs of the country regarding the recognition of German protectorate. The Empire did not acquire the colony; instead, a private company, the "German-East African Company of Karl Peters and Comrades," was founded to manage the acquired territories. It received an imperial letter of protection at the end of February 1885. The Sultan of Zanzibar raised objections to Peters's acquisitions, but dropped them when, with a threat that could not be misunderstood, a number of German warships aimed their guns at Zanzibar on August 1, 1885. Through the conclusion of further treaties with numerous chiefs, the protectorate was extended in the following years to the great inner African lakes. Witu Land and Uganda were also temporarily acquired for Germany in East Africa, but were exchanged for the island of Heligoland by the Zanzibar Treaty of Caprivi on July 1, 1890. The exchange only gained its full significance during the World War due to Heligoland's great importance as a barrier fortress for Germany. The necessary funds The Peters Colonial Company never directed any efforts toward the economic development of the colony. Due to the clumsy and brutal behavior of its officials, it soon came into serious conflict with the natives. A major uprising under the leadership of the Arab Buschiri drove the company's employees out of the country. The Reich then intervened. Warships were dispatched, and Captain Wissmann, who had been appointed Reich Commissioner, led colored troops recruited in Egypt to East Africa. In very protracted, costly battles, which necessitated a continuous increase in the fighting force, one tribe after another was defeated. When peace was finally restored, the Reich replaced the Peters Colonial Company in 1891. Peters, who had been in He was still active in the protectorate as Reich Commissioner for a while, but was removed from office due to the well-known unpleasant stories that gave rise to endless discussions in the Reichstag, and he lost his title and pension. As a mercy, he was restored to the title of Reich Commissioner in 1905, and through an act of mercy, he has also received his pension back since 1914. An extraordinarily serious, second major uprising broke out in German East Africa at the end of July 1905. The warlike movement of the natives spread across the entire south of the country, extending far into the interior, so that about a full third of the colony was affected. A considerable number of whites, including missionaries and sisters, were killed by the natives. The uprising was extraordinarily bloodily suppressed at the beginning of 1906. Since then, serious fighting with the natives has not been possible. The fact that no uprising by the natives occurred during the war, but rather The fact that the colored troops recruited in the country performed quite excellently

under their white leaders proves, despite the persistence of some deficiencies often criticized by us in the Reichstag, that in recent years the relationship between the administration and the natives has improved considerably. The hope, clung to almost desperately in colonial circles for some time, that German East Africa would become a New Germany in which larger numbers of German settlers could create a tolerable existence for themselves, has proven to be deceptive. It was believed that in the highlands, especially in the Kilimanjaro region, hundreds of thousands of German plantation owners and settlers could find a home. In reality, the number of settlers has not exceeded a few hundred, and even of these, relatively few have made economic progress. The climate allows even in In the highlands, Europeans cannot expect years of continuous activity; without Black labor, the White cannot make progress. After several initial failures, however, some quite remarkable achievements were made on a number of plantations, of which there were over 700 in the year before the outbreak of the war. But the German administration did not expect the future prosperity of the protectorate from plantation management alone. As in Cameroon and Togo, in recent years, it increasingly decided in East Africa to advance the country economically through transport routes, railway construction, raising the educational level and health of the natives, and by instructing Black farmers in field cultivation. Last but not least, in the German protectorates, the suppression of liquor consumption was also one of the measures aimed at the cultural upliftment of the native population. In East Africa, however, the import of spirits was always low because the population was under Muslim influence. Do not drink brandy. Numerous tropical diseases such as fever, malaria, and dysentery claimed an extraordinary number of victims even among the native population of East Africa at the beginning of German protectorate. In addition to leprosy, smallpox, plague, and sleeping sickness raged terribly. To combat all types of epidemics, an extensive medical service was established at considerable expense. To counteract the danger of infection from leprosy, special leper villages were created. There were 47 of these in Protectorate in 1912, with almost 4,000 inhabitants who were under constant medical supervision and whose well-being was cared for in the customary manner. The vaccination of the Black people to combat the smallpox epidemics. 45/2 p. 700 (720) 700 German East Africa. was largely completed at the outbreak of the war. To name just a few figures, in German East Africa, almost 900,000 people were vaccinated in 1910, and over 800,000 natives in 1911. Thanks to thorough plague control, the disease, when it occasionally broke out in recent years, remained confined to a small area, thus preventing major economic damage. The fight against sleeping

sickness, which in some areas virtually decimated the native population, demanded the greatest efforts. An entire medical corps of doctors, medical non-commissioned officers, and numerous Black auxiliaries devoted themselves exclusively to the fight against sleeping sickness, after Professor Koch had investigated the nature of the terrible disease on site during an expedition made possible by specially provided Reich funds. The costs of combating sleeping sickness alone amounted to 324,000 in German East Africa in one year. Mk. Of all the German protectorates, the school system for natives in German East Africa had reached the greatest extent. Yet, the first five government schoolteachers had only arrived in the country in 1900. In 1913, there were 99 government schools with more than 6,000 students, three larger and four smaller government craft schools. The main educational work was carried out by the missions, which reported that they taught over 100,000 students in 1,832 schools. Every attempt to advance German East Africa economically was doomed to fail as long as the country was not connected to modern transport routes. Until recent times, the movement of goods took place mainly on narrow mule tracks, with hundreds of thousands of porters carrying their bales of goods on their heads from the coast, sometimes to the Great Lakes, and vice versa. This was an unspeakable waste of time, energy, and, unfortunately, human lives. Only in the year In 1905, the administration in East Africa began implementing a major road construction program by drawing up a plan for approximately 2,000 kilometers of roads. However, it soon became clear that the desired economic development of the vast rural areas could not be achieved through roads alone; instead, the construction of railways was essential. The Usambara Railway was built first as a private venture, but soon collapsed and was later taken over by the treasury. It was subsequently significantly expanded. The great East African Central Railway from Dar es Salaam to Lake Tangangika, completed shortly before the war, began in 1901 as a short branch line. The Reichstag repeatedly refused funds for the continuation of railway construction. The debates about the worthlessness and futility of railway construction in Africa. In recent years, railway construction has progressed more rapidly. By the end of 1913, 1,660 kilometers of railway line were in operation in German East Africa. New major railway projects were approved in 1914. The Usambara Railway in the north was to be continued, and the Rwanda Railway was to be built from Tabora on the Central Railway, 431 kilometers long, at a cost of approximately 50 million, in order to open up the densely populated regions of Urundi and Rwanda between Lake Tangangika and Lake Victoria to traffic. This railway would also have made the entire Kagera river basin, which, with its tributaries, forms 500 kilometers

of shipping routes, accessible to traffic. The Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag, which had held lengthy discussions about it, almost approved this project. The construction of the railway was initially heavily promoted during the war. Equivalent advantages were available. At the outbreak of the war, the considerable expenditures that Germany had made for its protectorate in East Africa had not yet been compared. Nevertheless, the country had made considerable progress in cultural and economic terms. From the rapidly growing demand of German industry for cotton, oil, rubber, sisal, and copra, a not inconsiderable portion could be obtained in German East Africa, as in the other protectorates, in the foreseeable future. The main emphasis was placed on native production. Particular zeal was given to promoting cotton cultivation. Progress had been made with such crops in a number of districts. Numerous natives, in addition to producing for their own increased needs and for export, had devoted themselves to the production of foodstuffs and luxury goods for sale in the Turning to the increasingly developing domestic markets, German East Africa would have become financially independent in the not too distant future with patient continued work and the allocation of additional resources. The Reich subsidy had steadily declined in recent years and was no longer significant compared to the total Reich expenditures. The economic and cultural development of the approximately 8 million native population, which is by no means lazy or unteachable, would certainly have made further progress in the future. The war disrupted all this for a considerable time, and a great deal of cultural work was destroyed. It can be expected that the outcome of the war will essentially allow the German Reich to preserve the integrity of its colonial possessions, so that German cultural work can be carried out on African soil in the future more thoroughly, insightfully, and successfully than before. It is not uncommon for people who can torture a person to the point of blood to step up and say, oh, what a vicious person! and do not realize that it is they who, through their behavior, demonize the most pious lamb. If there is a guilty party to crucify, the scoundrels who have even more to answer for and whose misdeeds only the sunlight has not touched are seldom lacking. H. Sonntag. p. 703 (723) The German Social Democracy etc. 703 HEINRICH CUNOW: The German Social Democracy and Marx's Theory of the State. ITS III. (Conclusion.) 5. From the Governmental State to the Economic State. A revolutionary urge repeatedly led Marx in the following decades to overestimate the maturity of economic development and to consider the outbreak of imminent political revolutions imminent; however, the Communist Manifesto's view that the working class could easily implement the socialist social order through appropriate use of state power, now

completely fades into the background in his remarks. This emphasizes all the more strongly that the state order depends on the material living conditions of society, and that its progress to higher levels of development takes place in slow transitions. While it is possible to remove obstacles to social development by influencing the legal institutions of the state, a new society cannot be created from scratch. A given social order always makes way for a new one only when the old one has already produced the elements of the new one, or, as Marx expresses it in the definition of his materialist conception of history: "A social formation never perishes before all the productive forces for which it is sufficiently advanced have been developed, and new, higher relations of production never take their place before the material conditions for their existence have been hatched in the womb of the old society itself." Marx does not conclude from this conditionality and slowness of the social development process that the working class has behaved passively towards it. It must organize itself politically and strive to achieve a decisive position of political power in the state; for even all the power of the working class cannot implement a social order for which the preconditions have not yet been met. p. 704 (724) 704 The German Social Democracy etc. are, the working class can nevertheless, by influencing the state organization, help the advancing forces in existing society to break through and thereby, in a sense, act as the midwife of a new phase of development. In this sense, Marx declares in his Inaugural Address to the International Workingmen's Association (1864): "To conquer political power is therefore now the great duty of the working class," not in order to immediately introduce the socialist social order through state power, but in order to develop the cooperative system already in embryo "on a national scale" and through "national means" (meaning state means). A certain influence on this development of Marx's conception of the state, which partly represents a return to Hegel's philosophy of right, was undoubtedly exerted by the change in the character of the state that gradually began around the middle of the last century, after the overcoming of the revolutionary period of 1847/50. This has recently been described as the beginning of the socialization of the state order or of the state organism. When we look back today at its organizational form at that time, the state of the eighteenth century appears to us almost exclusively as a defense organization (mostly only for the protection of dynastic or oligocratic interests) and as a political ruling organization for the regulation of legal relations between the various estates or classes. Political power was generally not yet perceived as general state power, as necessary communal power, but as the arbitrary power of the bureaucratic government apparatus. This feeling corresponded to a

"social condition" for which the words of Louis XIV still applied in almost all European countries: "L'état c'est moi!" This condition naturally gave rise to the view, already mentioned in the first article (No. 43 of the "Glocke", p. 619), that the state was actually an evil, a coercive institution, whose regulation had a certain justification only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for social coexistence, for the rising bourgeois classes who, with the progress of capitalist economic development, saw themselves constrained in their business endeavors everywhere by old legal systems inherited from the former corporate state or by the government bureaucracy. Therefore, a weak government, limiting itself to the most necessary legal regulation and interfering as little as possible in the diverse economic life, i.e., in the sacred commercial interests of the individual, would undoubtedly be the best government. A true sense of state community could not exist in most countries at that time, if only because the contrast between the political interests of the often still class-based, self-contained sections of the population and those of the prince hardly gave rise to any awareness of common state interests. Around the middle of the last century, a certain transformation began very gradually. The sphere of the state's responsibilities expanded. The state now assumed more and more functions that, to the extent that they had previously been exercised at all, had been left to the discretion of the individual. Driven by social development, the state took over the school system and expanded it. Furthermore, the transport system (postal service, railways, canals, etc.) was often transferred under its administration. It became involved in health care and provided sanitary facilities. Extensive social policy legislation with state supervisory apparatuses emerges. At the same time, the state increasingly intervenes in the national economic system, not only in an organizational and supportive manner, but also takes over many previously privately operated enterprises and incorporates them into its organization as state-owned enterprises. Formerly a simple governmental state—in a certain sense, one could almost say a servant state—it grows beyond its old form and increasingly encompasses the entire community of state members within its framework. It becomes, in a sense, an organized economic community within the international economic network. Such changes in state organization naturally affect the personal lives of those involved. From the feeling that one's own well-being is, to a greater or lesser degree, linked to the state, arises the recognition of a certain sense of community, which subsequently develops into a conscious and deliberate participation in the community, although in the poorer sections of the population this only occurs after they have acquired a share in the exercise of state power. The former dynastic dictum

of power, "I am the state!", is now replaced, in an increasingly broader circle, by the feeling: "We are the state!" This awareness of the state's commonality in some places even overtakes the old national feeling: a fact that explains many phenomena during the current war. And with the state, the community, in civilized states, simultaneously acquires a different meaning of life. It, too, sees itself compelled to expand its sphere of tasks and functions and to pursue so-called "municipal socialism." It would be an exaggeration to say that Marx recognized this transformation as the emergence of a new phase in state development. The beginnings of such a development were still far too weak in the 1860s and 1870s to trigger the idea that a new form of state was emerging; after all, it was often only the current war that brought us the surprising realization that state consciousness has now penetrated sections of the population that were previously claimed to possess merely class consciousness. Even today, vulgar Marxist circles contemptuously mock Comrade Karl Renner's phrase "the supranational state," which in its essence was entirely apt. - p. 707 (727) The German Social Democracy etc. 707 Even if Marx did not yet recognize the direction of the new process of state development that was beginning in his time, he nevertheless saw clearly that the "state machinery" was becoming more complex and that the community was gaining increasing importance within the state as a whole. When the course of the Paris Commune of 1871 seemed to confirm this observation, he drew his conclusions from it in his address to the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association on the civil war in France. 6. Marx denies the Communist Manifesto. Marx does emphasize in the address to the General Council that the political character of state power has so far always changed simultaneously with the economic changes in society, but, as far as the last centuries of French development are concerned, he distinguishes only between the centralized state of the absolute monarchy and the state that existed after the great revolution under the first He sees the "modern state" emerging from the empire, whose distinctive character he sees in the fact that state power has increasingly transformed itself into "a machine of class rule." He fails to recognize the timid beginnings of a new, even more recent state development. In the increasing expansion and complexity of the state organism, he therefore sees only a further expansion of "state parasitism." On the other hand, the General Council's address lacks the earlier view that the working class could simply use the state machine to introduce the socialist social order. Social and state ideals, Marx now explains, can only be realized to the extent that economic development is ripe for them. In order to achieve its own liberation and thus that higher form of life toward which economic development irresistibly strives, "the working

class would have to endure long struggles, a whole series of historical processes through which both people and circumstances (meaning the social conditions of life. HC) are completely transformed." With a certain bluntness, Marx explains to those who believe they can simply realize their social ideals through state power: "It (the working class) has no ideals to realize; it only has to set free those elements of the new society that have already developed in the womb of collapsing bourgeois society." The transition to a socialist social order can therefore only take place gradually. Marx, referring to the activities of the Paris Commune, describes this development as occurring in such a way that the working class first takes control of individual communes and, as he puts it, uses them as leverage to "overthrow the economic foundations on which the existence of classes and thus of class rule rests." These socialist communes would then have to unite again, i.e., form communal associations, which, by taking over ever more important functions from the state, would restrict its sphere of influence, and thus ultimately break state power. This would "return to the social body all the forces that had previously been consumed by the parasitic outgrowth of the state, which feeds on society and inhibits its free movement." It is not intended here to examine how far, in view of the latest state developments, it can be considered probable that the socialist social order will originate from the socialized commune, from communal socialism; the point here is simply to demonstrate the contradiction that exists between this conception and that of the Communist Manifesto. While there the proletariat seizes state power, thereby "centralizing all instruments of production in the hands of the state," and thereby establishing a socialist society, after the acceptance of the General Council Address, the new society is built on the foundation of the socialized commune. A view that Marx also expressed in several other places at the beginning of the 1870s. For example, in one of his letters to his friend Kugelmann of April 12, 1871 (Neue Zeit, XX, Volume 1, p. 709), he states: "If you look up the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire, you will find that I propose that the next attempt of the French Revolution is no longer, as before, to to transfer the bureaucratic-military machinery from one hand to another, but to break it, and this is the precondition for any real popular revolution on the continent. This is also the attempt of our heroic Parisian party comrades." The Communist Manifesto assumes a centralized state as the starting point for the new social structure; the General Council Address proposes a federation of communes. However, however many contradictions may exist between these views, the Address does not contain a direct retraction of the relevant statements in the Communist Manifesto. But this was not lacking either. In the preface to the new edition of the Communist

Manifesto, written jointly by Marx and Engels in 1872, it states: "However much conditions have changed during the last twenty-five years, the general principles developed in this Manifesto still retain, on the whole, their complete correctness today. Here and there, individual points could be improved. The practical application of these principles, the Manifesto itself explains, will depend everywhere and at all times on the historical circumstances prevailing, and will therefore place no particular emphasis on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II." This passage would sound different today in many respects. In view of the immense development of large-scale industry in the last twenty-five years and the party organization of the working class that progressed with it, in view of practical experience, first of all with the February Revolution and even more so with the Paris Commune, where the proletariat held political power for the first time for two months, this program is now in some respects outdated. In particular, the Commune has provided proof that the working class cannot simply take possession of the ready-made state machine and set it in motion for its own purposes." p. 710 (730) 710 The German Social Democracy etc. This is a thorough rejection of the statements on proletarian state dictatorship contained in the Communist Manifesto. This new preface has, of course, received little attention in our party literature precisely for this reason. It fits all too poorly with the widespread old idea of the imminent introduction of the socialist social order through state power seized by the proletariat. However, the fact that Marx, in his later years, attributed less importance to the working class's seizure of state power for its struggle for emancipation should not be taken to mean that he considered the working class's striving to expand its political power within the state and to gain decisive influence over the "state machinery" to be secondary and that he wanted to advise the workers to conduct their struggle solely in the economic sphere by founding trade unions and business associations, establishing cooperative enterprises, organizing large-scale strikes, etc. The proposition that the workers' struggle for emancipation in capitalist society must necessarily be a political struggle, whose goal is the conquest of political power, remains valid in all its aspects, as Marx explains anew in his Critique of the Gotha Program ("Neue Zeit," Volume X, 1, p. 573): "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transitional period, whose state can be nothing other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." Marx's arguments oppose the Blanquist idea that with the conquest of political power, socialist society would also exist, for through the use of state power, capitalist society could simply be

overturned. In contrast, in his critique of the draft Gotha Program, Marx again emphasizes that capitalist society cannot be simply abolished by acts of political power; it is "dying out," and the birth of the new society is taking place in a series of successive phases of development with "long labor pains." Even the constitutional legal order cannot be changed at will by the state, for the law can "never be higher than the economic structure and the cultural development conditioned thereby in history." In his critique, Marx also sharply mocks the Gotha Program statement that the German Workers' Party strives for "the free state"—and indeed as its next goal. The German working class, Marx believes, "is demonstrating that socialist ideas are not even deeply rooted in it, since instead of treating existing society (and this applies to every future society) as the foundation of the existing state (or future society for future society), it treats the state rather as an independent entity possessing its own intellectual, moral, and liberal foundations." The accusation is entirely justified, but it is directed at the wrong address. It was not the working class that introduced the demand for a "free state" into the Gotha draft program, but rather certain intellectual leaders; just as today it is not the Social Democratic working class that is to blame if such confused arguments, as outlined in the first article, find favor in the Social Democratic Party as theoretical masterpieces, but rather those great party theorists who are still unable to distinguish between society and state, social laws and state laws, social order and state order. * The appeal of the negation theorists mentioned in the first article to Marx's theory of the state is therefore entirely unjustified, since the entire argumentation of these "Marxists" is based on the premise that it is not the state order that depends on the social order, but the other way around - p. 712 (732) 712 The German Social Democracy etc. - that the state forms the basis of existing social relations and therefore a conquest of this basis by a proletarian revolution, which according to this view is already imminent, will automatically result in the socialist social order. Admittedly, even from the Communist Manifesto, the theory of negation can only be deduced by extending some sentences of the manifesto in a certain direction and then deriving Blanquist conclusions from them, which Marx himself, as should be emphasized again, never drew. Nevertheless, Previously, the relevant sentences in the second section of the Manifesto provided a certain theoretical basis for such argumentation; however, since Marx himself refuted them, the appeal of the negation theorists to Marx can only be regarded as an abuse of his authority. If the working class, even if it succeeds in seizing state power through a revolution, cannot simply realize its ideals, but must limit itself to helping the new seeds that have arisen in the womb

of the existing society to develop, then it is not clear why it should wait until the "day after the revolution" to undertake this activity and not use its position of political power today to safeguard the interests of the working class by influencing state power and, as far as possible, "to set the elements of the new society free." However, the so-called fundamental negation of every form of state and the non-recognition of all state necessities are certainly the most unsuitable means for such an influence on the state machinery. If Social Democracy wants to gain any decisive influence over the state machine, it must participate in its operation and be prepared to assume the functions of an operating engineer. This does not mean that this influence on the state machine can only be exerted through parliamentary channels, nor that Social Democracy will also consider all demands that the government declares to be so-called state necessities to be state necessities itself. p. 713 (733) Centralization of our press. 713 How Social Democracy positions itself in detail toward state power depends, of course, on how the state machine functions. But the so-called "Principled denial of the state" is nonsense. In practice, it merely amounts to postponing reforms that would already be possible today through the establishment of the political power of the working class until the famous day after the hoped-for great revolution. H. PEUS, M. d. R. UN Centralization of our press! OUR press must begin a new era after this war. Like the party itself, its press must also develop into a vastly increased political power. Otherwise, it will not be able to cope with the new conditions. I am speaking here of the daily press and distinguish it from other publications—magazines, pamphlets, and books—essentially on the grounds that the latter mainly present the opinions of individuals, whereas the daily press is intended to create a power for the interests of the working class by generating a common will within the working class. But in order for our party press to become this power, it must organize itself in every respect into a cohesive whole, and technically, commercially, and politically. First, the party press must become a unified economic organism. It is quite unfounded to maintain it in its local fragmentation. A purchasing association for the entire party press should be formed as soon as possible. It truly has ample resources for its activities. The joint purchase of all printing, bookstore, and stationery materials offers an excellent means of exercising economic power. A close relationship should be established immediately with the Wholesale Purchasing Association of German Consumer Cooperatives and the Publishing Association of German Consumer Cooperatives. The resistance of those who would like to remain independent local figures must be broken for the sake of the interests of the whole. Just don't be impressed by democratic phrases that might be thrown against it. These same

democrats are inferior in the sense that 45/3 p. 714 (734) 714 Centralization of our press. That everyone should be able to do what they want, absolutely no democrats, which I don't blame them at all. All organization, to a certain extent, abolishes the right of democratic self-determination. The wholesale purchasing association of the press, which, in conjunction with the corresponding institutions of consumer cooperatives, can very easily lead to paper mills, envelope factories, and the like, is not enough; an organization of the press itself must be added. The central office of this press, in conjunction with the lower authorities in the province and locality, must also decide where a special press organ should be published or not. The fact that this is left today to the clumsiness and random capacity of individual localities cannot be justified in any way. I could name places where a party organ must be published without fail, and where none exists today only because the necessary solidarity between the whole and the part is lacking. Today, the party executive says: Help yourselves. We are not helping you; rather, we are warning you; you have to bear the entire risk. There is little sign of solidarity here. Above all, however, there is far too little of a purposeful organizational spirit. I could also cite cases from the past where a larger newspaper in a larger town resisted establishing an independent newspaper in a neighboring town out of pure local egoism, while later it turned out that the new paper thrived. Create a unified economic organization of the entire party press throughout the entire Reich, one that reaps the success of each individual newspaper, but also bears the difficulties of each individual newspaper! Perhaps such a central authority will also recognize that it is folly to serve more than three million people in Berlin with only one newspaper. The capitalist press is more intelligent. It has its ideas disseminated simultaneously by a dozen newspapers. Of course, none of this is possible without purposeful centralization. This systematic centralization of the entire daily press, which I demand, would also have to take into account the entire structure of the press. No one will want to claim that it is necessary for newspapers to appear in all possible formats. But if the same format and the same column width existed everywhere, the use of matrixes would be possible far more often than today. The content of newspapers offers ample opportunity for this. A good parliamentary report can very well be printed using matrixes. The fact that it is retypeset everywhere is, to say the least, nonsense. Novels can also be matrixed. Congress reports and many other things. p. 715 (735) Centralization of our press. 715 If the common content of the newspapers then appears even more honest, that is no harm. How other technical production can be significantly improved through influence from an authoritative central

authority (selection of paper, legible, not too small type, etc.) must be understandable to anyone who knows the current highly unsatisfactory conditions in all these matters. The positive consequences for the Advertising could be achieved if the current haphazard coincidences were replaced by a systematic will to utilize the product announcement system, as long as it is connected with the dissemination of ideas, as best as possible, especially for the benefit of the working-class mass press. On the other hand, the collaboration of writers of all kinds, as well as the manner of their remuneration, could be brought into order and justice with a systematic organization of the press, instead of today's complete confusion. But even more organization is required. The staffing of editorial boards should no longer be solely the concern of local authorities; the central office should have a say in this. The same applies, of course, to any dismissals. Here, too, let's not talk of a violation of democracy! Are the local authorities today that decide on the hiring and dismissal of editors such a perfect expression of democracy for all party members at the location or in the distribution area? Don't great coincidences and personal influences, especially chance, play a role in how strongly meetings, Conferences and meetings were attended? The cooperation of a central authority, which would consist of expert colleagues, can at most contribute to greater objectivity taking hold. And if the current coincidences of a place having a specifically focused editorial team, for which there is no particular justification among the local population, then disappear, that is no harm. However, I admit that precisely when this purposeful power organization of the daily press, which I demand, prevails, everything must be done to promote the possibility of free expression by all means. This should be done in magazines, but also in brochures and books. The small and smallest brochure (all in the same global format) could be very useful here. Every writer who has something good and useful to say could be given a voice in a long series of similarly formatted small and smallest brochures. That would also provide easy orientation. 45/3* p. 716 (736) 716 In memory of Heinrich Wetzker . ation, much better than in the disjointed articles in today's magazines. Every possible kind of organization that makes it possible for those who have something to say to also reach the reading public must be created. I emphasize this with all emphasis because, based on the suggestions I made above for the organization of the daily press, I might be accused of being indifferent to democratic freedom of expression. No accusation can be more unjust. But I want to see the militant daily press transformed into a power that grows only from thoroughly implemented, unified organization. KONRAD HAENISCH: In memory of Heinrich Wetzker. EXACTLY at the same hour that the last issue of

the "Glocke" appeared with Heinrich Wetzker's article on the future of the International, we received the news of the Passing away of our contributor, to whom the "Glocke" owes not only a number of valuable, major articles, but also a whole series of (signed) glosses. A manuscript by Wetzker dealing with general cultural issues is still in our possession and is to be published soon. This close connection between Wetzker and the "Glocke" justifies a word in the obituary here, after the party's daily press has already documented the most important stages of his life and party career. In my opinion, obituaries not only can, but must, have a personal touch if they are not to come across as a worn-out cliché. Therefore, it will hopefully not be misunderstood if I offer a word of personal remembrance of Heinrich Wetzker here. We met in the 1990s at Saxon state conferences and during other joint party work in Saxony. At the end of the 1990s, we worked together for a time on the editorial staff of the Dresden party newspaper. Differences in age, temperament, and party leanings p. 717 (737) In memory of Heinrich Wetzker. 717 - prevented us from becoming closer to one another on a human level. Later, the party machinery tore us apart. Wetzker went to the "Vorwärts," where he worked as editor for party news and related topics until the well-known editorial conflict in the autumn of 1905. It wasn't until the end of 1906 that we met again for joint party work, this time in the Ruhr region. Wetzker, who was never overcome by bitterness over the events in Berlin in 1905, had recently become editor-in-chief of the Bochum party newspaper, and I returned to the helm of the Dortmunder Arbeiterzeitung. For more than four years, we worked in close proximity. However, more against each other than alongside each other. Our views on the possibilities and prospects of proletarian politics had diverged over the years. I had no doubt—in the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek—that, under the influence of ever-intensifying class antagonisms, we were marching straight toward social revolution and that the conquest of political power by the proletariat was a matter of the near future. Wetzker, for his part, viewed all these things much more skeptically. Precisely as a former worker—he was a wood turner by trade and had worked his way up through iron diligence to become a respected socialist writer—he judged the "masses" (it was this term an idol!) and their intellectual and political maturity very soberly. As loyal as he stood by the working class in all dangers and hardships, and as unshakable as his belief in its great socialist cultural mission was, he also considered it his duty to repeatedly hold up a mirror to the masses' still-present inadequacy, even if this can of course be explained by a thousand reasons, and from this realization to warn them again and again against all illusions. It goes without saying that this opposing fundamental view resulted

in a completely different assessment of most individual political questions. To my impatience, which saw the great goal very close, the arduous current work for social reform and the advancement of the trade unions seemed, if not a Sisyphean task, then at least a waste of time and a distraction from the most important thing; to him, it was already indispensable - p. 718 (738) 718 In memory of Heinrich Wetzker. -- Working on the construction of the socialist future itself. If the general perspectives are different, the eye inevitably sees different images of all the details. Wetzker considered my hopeful exuberance to be downright dangerous to the public, as he feared that the proletariat could be lured by it, as by a will-o'-the-wisp, onto dangerous paths. For my part, I saw in Wetzker's skepticism a no less dangerous element of unnerving weakness. For almost half a decade, we consciously worked sharply against each other in our closely related papers. And as unfortunately usually happens with such profound differences of opinion: it did not remain a mere factual contradiction; personal discontent grew out of it and ultimately made any personal contact impossible. This remained the case long after I had left the Ruhr region. Then came the war, and with it the great psychological and spiritual upheaval in so many of us. Wetzker learned from the tremendous political and social earthquake that this war meant that social development would not, after all, follow the pattern of the revisionist theory of an almost imperceptibly gradual and peaceful growth into the new society. But it became clear to me that the social revolution would take place under entirely different conditions and in entirely different forms, and was already largely unfolding before our very eyes, than I had previously imagined. Above all, however, I understood that precisely through the proletarian struggle, the relationship of the working class had fundamentally changed not only to national culture but also to the state, and that the security of the German state was the prerequisite for the rise of its working class. In short: like so many others, Wetzker and I, each in our own way, learned a fundamental lesson in this war. He overcame the old-school revisionism, whose thought processes had strongly dominated him, even though he always rightly refused to be counted among the true revisionists. On the other hand, I overcame the illusory radicalism of yesteryear. We met on the diagonal of that practical politics of direct proletarian activity which—equally far removed from revisionist and radical illusions—today unites all the forward-looking elements of German socialism, and to which the future itself will belong. I will never forget Heinrich Wetzker how, as soon as this objective agreement had emerged, he, despite all the disagreements of earlier years, extended his hand to me in a manner as free as it was subtle for personal reconciliation. The letter with which he did so is

such a tribute to the deceased that I would like to include it here verbatim. Wetzker wrote: Bochum, March 25, 1915. Dear Comrade Haenisch! It will certainly be painful for you—more painful than it would be for me to be savaged by M. as is happening in the Bremer Bürgerzeitung. But I hope this will gradually lead you to come closer to my judgment of the man. However, it is not my intention to influence you in this direction; I know that it will take some time to transform such feelings. My reason for writing to you is different. In this fateful hour of the German working class, something irretrievable is at stake. In addition to the wise insight of its leaders, their unity is also an important factor that influences victory or defeat. Between a very large and a very small section of leaders, this unity is not possible. Not even amicable, peaceful coexistence. I could more easily imagine a peaceful, personal, friendly relationship based on mutual respect with any conservative Junker than with an M. This seems all the more necessary to me. but then a friendly and united cooperation, undisturbed by any differences, between those party comrades who essentially agree in their assessment of the proletariat's great hour. I offended you deeply at the time with a judgment about your achievements, which I made out of honest conviction, but which I now gladly retract. However, I have no more exposed you to the contempt of your opponents, as M..... now so elegantly does—a kingdom for an intelligent turn of events, so why not a decent person too!—than I myself wanted to make you contemptible with my judgment at that time. The circumstances seem to me to allow the past to be forgotten between those who strive likewise. I cannot p. 720 (740) 720 Heinrich Wetzker in memory. know whether our agreement on questions of party policy will prevent the war and will outlast the period following it, because, above all, I cannot know to what extent your current assessment of the situation is related to an inner change, or to what extent such a change might still occur under the influence of your current assessment of the current situation. However, that need not be an obstacle to an informal, friendly relationship between us, as existed in previous years. I await your reply and, in the meantime, with kind regards, yours, Heinrich Wetzker. Need I first say that I quickly and happily accepted the offered hand? I have never been a fan of personal quarrels. But it has always seemed completely undignified and senseless to continue to vent personal disagreements even when the factual conflict from which they arose has been resolved. A few months after Wetzker's letter, the "Glocke" was founded, and Wetzker gladly agreed to my request to work diligently on it. The program of the "Glocke" coincided entirely with his conviction that nothing we now desperately need is an overcoming of all old socialist strife over political direction through the

higher unity of that active proletarian policy, liberated from rhetoric, described above. Wetzker served this idea in all his articles and notes. The courage to face the truth, the unswerving loyalty to his convictions of a strong, self-contained personality, the common sense, and the keen eye for the realities of life that shone through in everything Wetzker wrote: all this ensured his contributions to our magazine always received special attention. Many of his columns published here have been included in dozens of party and trade union papers. Years ago, Wetzker began publishing his memoirs in the "Bochumer Volksblatt," to which he has consistently infused the interesting note of his character over the years. Hopefully he was granted the completion of this work before death struck the pen from his tireless hand. p. 721 (741) DIE GLOCKE 46th issue 10 February 1917 2nd year Reprint of all articles permitted with detailed source references DR. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: The break with America. America's response to the escalation of the German submarine war is the severance of diplomatic relations. That was to be expected from the outset. And if the giant republic should finally take the final step and declare war on the German Reich, then those in the Reich government will have prepared for this as well. Social Democracy, both in the country and in the Reichstag, had never left any doubt about its position on the intensification of naval warfare. It opposed it until the very last moment, precisely in anticipation of the facts that were now becoming or had already become reality. However, the decision has now been made. The struggle of the German people for its existence has reached a climax that can no longer be surpassed. For all of us, regardless of our opinion of the appropriateness of the resolution passed by the Central Powers, it can only be a matter of doing everything possible to ensure that the decision reached has a favorable outcome from the German point of view. And such an outcome is promising enough, despite the truly fantastic disparity between the two warring parties in terms of lands, people, and supply possibilities. The masses of the German people therefore received the proclamation of intensified naval warfare with remarkable calm. Some circles have welcomed it directly as a release from lingering pain. Others saw it more as a declaration that we were now technically "ready," having already become accustomed to the idea that the intensified submarine war would be unavoidable. All, however, are fully aware of the terrible implications of the resolution. It is a matter of the life and death of the nation. The situation in which Germany now finds itself is reminiscent, insofar as its unique situation allows for any parallels, of the situation of France in 1792, when it declared war on Austria, which then lasted with only minor interruptions until 1815 and dragged all of Europe into its maelstrom. The leaders at that time, as it

was later said, endangered the fatherland precisely in order to thereby save it. Germany's situation today is similar to that of old France in that the very danger facing our country is only likely to draw out all the national energy and resilience that lies within the central peoples, and precisely by doing so, to save the fatherland. It is without question true that the new submarine war can be waged today with entirely different prospects for success than in an earlier phase of the World War. Today, England's situation is nowhere near as strong as it once was; its economic and especially its financial circumstances are extraordinarily strained. Lloyd George recently described England as the tower to which all its allies look and on whose steadfastness they all rely. It is certainly true that the terrible difficulties afflicting France, Italy, and not least Russia are placing the utmost demands on English capabilities, on its silver bullets as well as its black diamonds—to emphasize just two points. And these difficulties will experience a tremendous increase due to the intensified German submarine war. France, which is so easily reached by England, is already suffering from a coal crisis that could prove disastrous for its entire war economy. In Italy, however, p. 723 (743) The break with America. In 723, things are even more critical. The country, as is well known, has no coal at all. Every ton must be imported by ship from England. Before the war, Italy imported almost 10 million tons; in 1916, only 5.7 million. A further reduction in these imports, which is certainly to be expected due to the submarine war, would have a directly catastrophic effect in Italy. And if the continuation of the war and munitions industries in Italy and France is endangered by increasing coal shortages, England and America together would not be able to supply enough finished munitions, let alone transport them. This poses the danger for the Entente that it will no longer hold together, that is, that some of its members will one day have to declare in London that they have run out of steam. This result of the submarine war is probably the most certain and quickest to expect. The difficulties in nutrition, which will certainly rise considerably for England due to the poor world grain harvest, could perhaps lead to a decisive crisis less quickly. The exact reserves available to England are unknown; moreover, strict rationing would naturally allow it, like the German people, to "hold out" with a considerably reduced amount of grain. Nevertheless, the situation in this respect is much less favorable for England than for Germany, since England, with regard to grain, is in a similar position to Italy's with coal. Almost every ton has to be brought in by ship. Great Britain earns only negligible amounts from its own harvest. The longer the war lasts, the more unbearable conditions in England will become. In England, too, people are aware of the danger of the hour. Lloyd George openly declared that the situation was

serious. All the more effort will be made to draw America into the war. And since there are very influential circles in America that have a material interest in prolonging the war, and since Mr. Wilson has so far not proven himself strong enough to break their influence, one must be prepared for anything. 46/1 p. 724 (744) 724 The Break with America. 1 Scandinavia played a special role in this war as a major transit country for Anglo-Russian trade. It formed the great hole in the wall through which Central Europe separates the East from the Western powers. This geographical position, as is well known, was energetically exploited by the trading circles of all three Nordic states, and wealth flowed into this country of quite unheard-of size. Passenger traffic between the Eastern and Western powers, the transport of munitions and war industry supplies, passed through this route, enabling an already faltering Russia to recover after the defeats of 1915. For the Entente, keeping this route open is a war issue of the highest order, just as its closure is for Germany. It remains to be seen how the three Scandinavian kingdoms will react to the interruption of their trade with England and thus the elimination of their role as mediators between East and West. The difficulties in Russia, which have already grown steadily worse, would severely endanger the country's military capability if it were possible to close or significantly reduce this west-eastern passage. Thus, here too, the cohesion of the Entente is threatened by grave dangers. Thus, the Anglo-German conflict ultimately imposed itself as the core of the war even on those politicians who had previously believed they saw this core in the East and who still readily believed in the possibility of an Anglo-German understanding. Among them, as is well known, was the German Chancellor. That he of all people ultimately had to resort to intensifying the submarine war seems almost ironic; for it is clear that this step abolished all hope of a "peace of understanding" with England. Precisely because England, in its situation, cannot conclude a peace without victory as Wilson proposed, it will have to conclude a peace with defeat. - - p. 725 (745) Responsibility. 725 ERNST HEILMANN: WE Responsibility. A play on words. WE are facing a fateful hour. The consequences of imperialist policies, which brought about an era of arms races and intensified the conflicts between nations, have swept across Europe like a storm tide. The responsibility for this, which we reject, falls on those who pursued these policies." Thus began the declaration with which the Social Democrats justified their approval of war credits on August 4, 1914. It clearly states what we actually reject, what responsibility we cannot assume. It is responsibility for an entire past, for conquests, armaments, threats, and violent measures of all kinds, as they had been carried out by all states long before the war. But after this statement, the declaration

continues: "Now we are faced with the iron fact of war." And as much as we had to reject responsibility for this iron fact having befallen us, we declared ourselves equally willing to share our responsibility for ensuring that Germany is not crushed by these iron facts. We rejected responsibility for the outbreak of war and expressly assumed responsibility for the course of the war. On August 4, we expressly declared ourselves willing to cooperate responsibly to ensure that the horrors of enemy invasions would not befall us, that the defense of our country would be successfully carried out, that the culture and independence of our own country would be secured. In doing so, we have expressly assumed responsibility for our people, for whom, according to our declaration of August 4, "everything is at stake," and have made ourselves guarantors of the war aim, which lies in the defense of all enemy plans against German culture and freedom. p. 726 (746) 726 Responsibility. 99 It seemed necessary to refresh this memory because recently a strange game has been played with the alleged rejection of our responsibility. When the unrestricted submarine warfare was announced, the press began to write to the Working Group, claiming that the party majority bore responsibility for it. The Social Democratic majority faction can also claim some credit for having brought the government to its current grave decision, for the government knew that it had no reason to fear resistance from this side. Stampfer and Scheidemann have once again paved the way for Westarp, Reventlow, and Bassermann. They bear a tremendous responsibility before the world, and especially before the world's proletariat! Thus thundered the grim accuser in the "Leipziger Volkszeitung," and the "Vorwärts" anxiously defended itself. We had not become a government party; we had only approved, on a case-by-case basis, what the government had done in our interest—for example, the earlier concessions in the matter of submarine warfare or the peace offer of December 12. But if the line of government policy and Social Democratic policy had occasionally converged, they could diverge widely at other times; we had no parliamentary government at all, and no party could therefore bear responsibility for all the decisions made. 99 According to the external parliamentary rite, this is perfectly acceptable. According to it, the majority of voters elect a popular representation, and this popular representation forms a government from its majority. And this government remains, even in war, the supreme director of the people's destinies, far above the military, which merely, so to speak, carries out the technical execution of assigned to war affairs. Unfortunately, in times of war, it is not this formality that is important, but rather what actually happens in the field of warfare. However, the intelligence of even the wisest parliamentary majority is not sufficient to make such decisions;

this requires military expertise and, in many cases, secrecy, which is an important weapon in warfare. Parliamentarism only has value through its derivation from the will of the people. Only where the people can be informed unreservedly, in clear dialogue, of everything essential to assessing a question, do parliamentarism and democracy have anything to do with one another. In times of war, this is impossible, and thus parliamentarism itself is immediately invalidated in matters of warfare. That is why we see the parliamentary system collapse everywhere with the outbreak of war. Most helplessly in its classic homeland, England. The The most important decisions are made everywhere by the leadership of the armed forces. Whether and where to attack is determined by the general, and the success of his plans is the central element of government policy. He takes his measures according to purely military considerations, guided solely by the desire to inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy armies and to gain control of as large a piece of enemy territory as possible. If he must subordinate his plans to political considerations, he is from the outset not free in his pursuit of military success. The civilian government has only the secondary task of exploiting the results of the military effort to restore peace. Since its entire work depends on the available military means and on the judgment regarding the outcome of pending military operations, which in turn demand secrecy, it must proceed absolutistically in each individual case. Without parliamentary control in the interests of peace, Lloyd George's War Council functions like the Reich Chancellor in Germany. Responsibility for the conduct of war in A parliament can never have the constitutional spirit of peacetime unless it constitutes itself as the Court War Council of Old Viennese Memory. One may curse secret diplomacy, but secret strategy is irreplaceable. p. 728 (748) 728 Responsibility. From the day of the declaration of war, diplomatic and military war command become an inseparable unit, which deliberates and decides in a self-contained manner, closed to the outside world. Fundamentally, only one area remains open to parliamentary criticism and the democratic influence of the parties: the war aim. The parties can demand that the determination of a specific war aim ends hostilities, or conversely, that they be continued until a envisaged war result can be realized. Everything else is ultimately a matter for the war command. Social Democracy has rejected propaganda for or against a new method of Submarine warfare; it did not spare ridicule those who, with the knowledge of assembly speakers, undertook to solve the infinitely difficult and complicated problem; it very aptly emphasized that only the war command could make a truly reasoned decision. It saw here a task whose very nature precluded a solution by parliament and the responsibility of the

parties from the outset. So why the emphasis on irresponsibility now? The unfettered submarine warfare can be judged politically no differently than the offensive against Verdun or the breakthrough through Serbia. These, too, could under certain circumstances have diplomatic as well as military consequences, could induce potential enemies to participate in the war quickly or deter them from doing so. We did not demand a vote when, after the breakthrough through Serbia, the decision had to be made as to whether to continue urgently attempting to expel the Entente troops from Greek Salonika or whether to halt at the Greek border. The party has expressed its opinion when one she asked how the submarine war should be conducted; but she never claimed that this opinion should be more valid than an opinion that the party might give on how land warfare should be organized in the coming year. Basically, the parliamentary group's position on the submarine war was more a matter of being informed about the decisions of the war command than the expression of its own opinion. The responsibility for the conduct of the war in every country always lies solely with the war command. The highest conceivable degree of democracy during war consists in Parliament sending one or more of its trusted representatives to the war command. But no one then selects these trusted representatives according to party-political considerations, which alone give content and life to peacetime democracy; everyone simply asks for the most knowledgeable and decisive man. Whether the Whether the right choice is best sought through Parliament or some other means is a very subordinate question; once he is appointed, he rules absolutely, and only failure might overthrow him. Woe to the country whose war leadership errs! One can hold them accountable for mistakes afterwards, but one cannot prevent them. The House of Commons elected French, Haig, and Robertson any more than the Reichstag elected Moltke, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. In this respect, no parliament and no party ever bears responsibility for the conduct of war. To emphasize, on the occasion of any decision concerning the conduct of war, that we are not a party of government is to make a meaningless statement in the wrong place. As a party, we can at most examine the question of whether a means of warfare employed still falls within the scope of our war aim. We can, for example, oppose submarine warfare if the achievement of our war aim is assured without it and it is carried out purely for the purposes of conquest or destruction. As long as that is not the case, we have no right The right to exclude the use of any means of war from our responsibility" and the possibility of judging whether it will be to the advantage or disadvantage of the German cause always lies solely with the War Command. 99 However this may decide, it changes nothing about the

real responsibility that we voluntarily assumed on August 4, 1914, and to which we adhere, the responsibility for doing everything in our power to prevent damage to Germany's freedom of development through the war. Purely theoretically, one could of course imagine that a party might declare at a given time that the frivolity or foolishness of the War Command made it impossible for it to maintain the war aim for which it had assumed responsibility, and that it was therefore abandoning it and absolving itself of responsibility. But this has never been discussed in Germany so far. Talking about the governing party and responsibility in a parliamentary sense therefore completely misapplies the current situation. We have rejected responsibility for the past, which led to war. We cannot bear parliamentary-political responsibility for the conduct of the war because it contradicts its very nature. We have assumed responsibility for the outcome of the war, which leads to peace. We bear this responsibility before the German people. If Germany perishes, if German development is set back further by a defeat than Germany was set back by the Thirty Years' War, then we share the responsibility; for it strikes the interests entrusted to us most severely. We bear this historical and moral responsibility on our heavily laden shoulders; it is our burden and our pride, while the parliamentary pastoral play of ministerial responsibility and party responsibility is harmless jest from sunny days of peace. We fulfill this higher responsibility by making it the supreme guideline of our conduct to work with all our might for German victory. In this responsibility, which speaks to us in tongues from the declarations of all workers' organizations to the Chancellor, we must not be disturbed by idle talk about the constitutional design of a responsibility for peace, which now has no more significance than the dispute over the balcony on a new house that we might perhaps one day build when the building ban from the wartime emergency has been lifted. a p. 731 (751) The beautiful legend. 731 AUGUST WINNIG: The beautiful legend. Pacifism is coming into its own. Wilson may have broken off diplomatic relations with Germany and Grey wants to beat us down, but for the postwar period, both have embraced the idea of a League of Nations, and Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, on behalf of the German government, has declared that it is prepared to cooperate in establishing such a peace alliance and even to spearhead these efforts. Aristide Briand, too, would probably be easily persuaded to make such a commitment, and since Tsar Nicholas is, so to speak, the creator of the former peace conferences, we have the comforting certainty that the rulers of all the major powers are committed to the idea of a supranational organization for maintaining peace. It is a pity that Müller-Lyer, the knowledgeable sociologist and convinced herald of a better future, who had

to experience the cruel disappointment of this war, did not live to see it happen – it would have given him mild satisfaction. What this scholar wrote about the future of the idea of peace at a time when the entire globe was free of warlike entanglements deserves to be recalled once again today, when the pacifist idea is generating so much buzz. For through him, the idea of a supranational legal order was, for the first time, placed on the only solid scientific foundation it can possibly find today. Popular, backwoods pacifism was never, and still is, nothing more than moralizing reasoning, a shimmering bouquet of flowers from the hothouse of pure thought, which unfortunately always immediately drooped its head when ruffled by the harsh winds. Just as Müller-Lyer views all of history "phaseologically," that is, as a stepwise, progressive development, he also identifies such phases in the development of the idea of peace. He saw the problem of world peace as nothing other than the expansion of the legal order beyond the national framework. Social history shows a constant repression of violence and its replacement by the organization of law. Primitive man knew no law; he knew only decision by force. That was the inheritance of his origin. Humanization is not a single act; it is a protracted process spanning eons, in which growing humanity is in constant struggle with the animal instinct to violently overcome the adversary. Law was born in the family. Here, violence was renounced and the almighty legal order that had emerged. From the family, it spread to the clan, from there it became tribal law, and finally grew into public law, and as such, following the development of political organization, expanded its scope. Within states, the legal order reigns supreme; any individual violence is proscribed. But between states, a seamless organization of law has not yet been achieved. A beginning has indeed been made here, too—trade treaties, settlement agreements, extradition treaties, trade unions, agreements on design protection, etc., are the strong threads that already represent supranational ties between nations; but they regulate only sub-areas of international life, whose greatest questions still recognize only violence as the final arbiter. From these socio-historical facts, Müller-Lyer draws the certainty that the establishment of an international legal order is only a matter of time and has already been fundamentally decided by this development. Pacifism quickly embraced these insights. powerful. Scientific pacifism seemed to be born. In reality, only the vocabulary of its reasoning has changed, for it still has nothing more to offer than encouragement of good will. This activity should by no means be condemned, for it always remains p. 733 (753) The beautiful legend. 733 meritorious to direct the human will toward the high ideal of international peace. But the question here is what prospects the theories of pacifism have in real world politics, for

it is clear that an uncritical, trusting devotion to the ideal, if it were to become practical among a people, could have very unpleasant consequences. It is very difficult to combat pacifist ideas because they proceed from a cause that is sacred to every truly civilized person, and this is doubly difficult in this time when humanity is under groans under the torments of war. What can be said against it, and what must also be said, is not directed against the idea of the international legal order as the necessary and ideal goal of human development, but against the pacifist illusion that all that is needed is universal goodwill to make the ultimate happiness of nations a reality. The great brotherhood of nations will come one day; it certainly only remains uncertain when and in what form it will come. Our development is moving toward this goal, but we do not know whether it will last that long, whether it will not suffer a disruption before reaching its goal, setting it back several stages. As firm as this certainty is within us, we become just as modest in predicting its fulfillment when we become clear about the prerequisites to which the victory of law over force has so far been tied. This uplifting fact was not the gift of good geniuses; it was the result of long struggles between conflicting interests that first had to find their equilibrium before they could submit to the legal order. subjected themselves to the legal order under the spell of the idea that this is most conducive to their own well-being, and that the associated restrictions are easier, or at least no harder, to bear than the disadvantages that threaten those who violate the legal order. Where this idea ends, every legal order finds its limits. For the usurer, who is promised a profit of hundreds of thousands if he risks half a year in prison, the legal order dissolves into a mathematical equation. However, the unviolated legal order is an unattained and probably unattainable ideal, even within the state community. This is explained very simply by the fact that a complete balance of social and economic interests has never been achieved so far; only from a socialized society do we hope for such a state, which would in any case greatly reduce violations of the legal order. The The sharper the divergences of interests, the more numerous must be the violations of the legal order. Such comprehensive economic transformations and upheavals can even occur that they seriously call into question the existence of the legal community, with the emergence of new classes, with catastrophic upheavals of the entire social structure. The legal order is therefore never absolute, but always only relative; the degree of perfection depends on the balance of the interests of its members; it arises when these interests have developed a certain minimum degree of solidarity capable of supporting a state organization and executive. Our pacifists have never concerned themselves with these

fundamental prerequisites of any legal order. They saw only the results of previous legal development, not its driving and formative forces. Those who have striven for them will be no less firmly convinced of the eventual realization of this age-old human dream, but they will and must remain aware that the international legal order cannot be goodwill of the rulers, nor does it depend on the greater or lesser insight and agility of the peoples, but on the balance of their interests. Let us apply these presuppositions to the tasks of world politics. First of all, the war has shown us such an unexpectedly strong cohesive force of the national cultural and economic community that it completely undermines the assumption that the solidarity of social organizations would overcome nationally defined interests. In all belligerent countries, landowners, capitalists, scholars, and workers fight in ranks for their national communities, and there is no justification for assuming that this could change in the further course of the war. We must therefore view the peoples as units that are just as united in their will externally as the individual is within the national communities. The relationship between the national- The relationship between national units is now, quite apart from the immediate present, extremely unbalanced. Certainly, all nations are buyers and sellers at the same time, and this gives rise to the beginnings of a convergence of interests, which had already given rise to the aforementioned beginnings of an international legal order. We certainly overestimated the significance of this intertwining of interests in the past, and perhaps today, under the influence of wars of annihilation, we underestimate it. But we are not mistaken in seeing the stronger force in shaping the behavior of nations in the conflicting interests that until now resisted binding by an international legal order. These conflicts lie in the claims of countries with a capitalist culture to influence in undeveloped but promising regions. Today, a good two-thirds of the earth's habitable surface is still at the level of economic and political dependence and thus represents a constant incentive for expansion-hungry capitalist states to conquer, annex, and cultivate. No great nation can exclude itself from this if it does not want to retreat, and even the small nations, as satellites of the large ones, seek their share of the mass of division. In this state of incompleteness and imbalance, in this competition for goods not yet finally distributed, lies not only the cause of the war, but also the force that still resists the binding force of an international legal order. There can be no talk of an equilibrium in the slightest. England-Germany: there has never been a greater antagonism between two nations. It is perhaps possible that the coming peace will mitigate this antagonism, reduce the tension of interests, and enable further and stronger approaches to an international legal order. But it would be the

flimsiest illusion to consider international peace assured thereby. Today's pacifists were born too early. The dream has not yet become reality. unity. Even if a balance were to be established between today's enemies, allowing the establishment of a confederation of states, humanity would still not have reached its desired goal. For the activity of capitalist states in dependent territories is like the seed of dragon's teeth, from which armored men must one day grow who will wage the "holy war" for the independence of their peoples and countries. Pacifism closes its eyes to these facts. We will always salute its goals and motives with great respect, but as politicians we must not forget how endlessly far the road is that tormented humanity still has to travel before it can plant the tree of eternal peace. Gottfried Keller wrote: A beautiful legend, like the scent of violets on earth, wanders like a longing love-lament by day and night: That is the dream of peace among nations and of humanity's highest happiness. This beautiful legend will wander restlessly through the minds and hearts of humanity for many years to come. Yet even in this time, much remains to be done for peace and human happiness. "It is characteristic of limited people that they grasp the few ideas within the narrow sphere of their comprehension with a clarity that often misleads us in our appreciation of their spirit. They are like beggars who know the stamp and year of every coin they own." Boerne